






Peace Forum 2023 Proceedings

Ways to Promote “Cooperation and Coexistence” — Beyond “Power and Interdependence” —



Peace Forum 2023 Proceedings

Ways to Promote “Cooperation and Coexistence” —Beyond “Power and Interdependence”—

International Symposium

Co-sponsored by Soka University and Kyungnam University
and Chinese Culture University

Date: October 25, 2023

Venue: Soka University

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International Symposium

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Peace Forum 2023

Ways to Promote “Cooperation and Coexistence”

–Beyond “Power and Interdependence”–

Date: October 25, 2023

Venue: Soka University

[LEARNING ARENA at SPACe in Global Square]

Program

Opening

13:00 Welcome address by President Suzuki of Soka University

13:05 Opening remarks by President Park of Kyungnam University

13:10 Opening remarks by Chair Professor and Director Chao of Chinese Culture University

Session1: Keynote and Discussion

Moderator: Prof. Koide (Dean of SIPS)

13:15 Remarks by organizer: Prof. Tamai (Director of SUPRI)

13:20 Keynote: Prof. Luckhurst (SIPS/SUPRI)

Cooperation, Coexistence, and Contested Pluralism in Global Politics

13:50 Panel Discussion

Moderator: Prof. Koide (Dean of SIPS)

1. Comment by Prof. Lenz (SIPS/SUPRI)

2. Comment by Prof. Wang (CCU)

3. Comment by Prof. Lee Byongchul (IFES/KU)

4. Response from Keynote speaker: Prof. Luckhurst (SIPS/SUPRI)

5. Exchange comments by the panelists (30 min)

15:20 Session finish

Break

Session2: Ways to Promote “Cooperation and Coexistence”

Moderator: Chair Professor and Director Chao

Presentation I

15:30 Presentation by Prof. Kim Jung (UNKS)

Democratic Cooperation against the Weaponization of Economic Interdependence

15:50 Comment by Prof. Hanssen (SU, Faculty of Law)

16:00 Response by Prof. Kim Jung (UNKS)

16:10 Dialogue between the panelists and the participants

16:25 finish

Break

Presentation II

16:35 Presentation by Prof. Kuo Jing-houng (CCU / Acting Dean of Social Science)

*Proxy presentation: Prof. Lin Hsuan-Hsiang (CCU)

The Crisis and Opportunity for Adolescents in the Post-Pandemic Era in Taiwan, Macao, and Mainland China: A Comparative Analysis of Social Care, Integration Promotion, and Physical and Mental Health

16:55 Comment by Prof. Kim Sangbum (IFES/KU)

17:05 Response by Prof. Lin

17:15 Dialogue between the panelists and the participants

17:30 Session finish

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Kyungnam University

Kim, Jung / Professor, University of North Korean Studies

Jung Kim is Dean of Academic Affairs and associate professor of political science at University of North Korean Studies (UNKS). Currently, he is a regional coordinator of Asia Democracy Research Network, an editorial committee member of *Asian Perspective* and *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs*, a central committee member of Republic of Korea's Peaceful Unification Advisory Council, and a policy advisory committee member of Republic of Korea's Defense Intelligence Agency. Prior to joining UNKS, he worked as a senior research fellow at East Asia Institute and the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam University in Seoul, held a visiting research position in Advanced Social and International Studies at University of Tokyo as a Fox International Fellow and Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University, and assumed a research director of Korean Political Science Association and a public relations director of Korean Association of International Studies. He earned his undergraduate degree in political science from Korea University and graduated from Yale University with his doctoral degree in political science.

Lee, Byongchul / Professor, IFES, Kyungnam University

Dr. Lee Byong-Chul is Professor at Kyungnam University's Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul, South Korea. His research interests include North Korean denuclearization, nuclear non-proliferation and policies on the ROK-US relations. His recent research has focused primarily on "What explains variation in South Korea's commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime?"

Before joining the IFES, Dr. Lee worked as an aide to the Presidential Senior Secretary for Foreign and National Security Affairs and served as foreign and national security policy planning staff member at the Presidential Office of South Korea from 1993 to 1999. He also served as a special aide and policy planning secretary to the Speaker of National Assembly from 2015 to 2016. He previously worked as a senior policy researcher at the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). Currently, he works as a visiting professor at Seoul National University.

Kim, Sangbum / Professor, IFES, Kyungnam University

Dr. Kim Sang-bum is Assistant Professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University. His research interests include North Korea's politics, Cold War history especially North Korea-Vietnam-Cuba relations and Northeast Asian culture and society. He is

currently researching the relations between North Korea's ruling ideology-legal system and policy. Dr. Kim received a B.A in North Korean Studies from Dongguk University, a M.A in East Asian Area Studies from University of Southern California, and a Ph.D in North Korean Studies from Dongguk University. Before joining the IFES, he worked as a chief of Staff to Lee Soo-hyuck, a lawmaker (later Korean ambassador to the United States) who was South Korea's first chief delegate to six-party-talks with goal of resolving the North Korean nuclear issues. His representative studies include research on North Korea's Aid to Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis (2022).

Chinese Culture University

Chao, Chien-Min (趙建民) / Distinguished Chair Professor, Graduate Institute of National Development and Mainland China Studies, Chinese Culture University

Dr. Chien-min Chao is a Distinguished Chair Professor at the Graduate Institute for National Development and Mainland China Studies. Between 2008 and 2012, Dr. Chao served as a Deputy Minister for the Mainland Affairs Council in the ROC government. Dr. Chao was a visiting Distinguished Professor at the George Washington University and visiting teaching professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Dr. Chao has written and edited thirteen books, including *Decision-making in China: Leadership, Process and Mechanism* (in Chinese) (Taipei, 2014). The book has won him a distinguished award here in Taiwan and has been translated into Korean in 2018.

Kuo, Jing-Houng (郭靜晃) / Acting Dean of Social Science, Chinese Culture University

Dr. Jing-Houng Kuo was graduated at Ohio State University, majored in Family Relations and Human Development. He has worked in the field of Child and Youth Welfare Department as well as Social Department since 1988 . Now he is serving as a professor and chairperson in the Department of Social Welfare, Institute of Youth and Child Welfare , as well as acting dean of College of Social Science.

Wang, Shun-Wen (王順文) / Associate Professor, Department of Political Science

Dr. Shun-Wen Wang is a faculty member of Department of Political Science at Chinese Culture University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from National Taiwan University. His main research interests lie in the fields of the Middle East (especially focus on Turkey and Iraq), Cross-Strait Relations, and conflict resilience and has published some papers related to these subjects. Dr. Wang got projects from the Ministry of Science and Technology and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was also a visiting scholar at AVIM center in Ankara under MOFA's project "Turkey's reaction on the Chinese 'One-Belt-One-Road' policy." His recent research project is related to Turkish foreign policy on Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Current course

offerings range from International Relations, BRI and RCEP, Islam and the Middle East Politics, and post-conflict reconstruction.

Lin, Hsuan-Hsiang (林炫向) / Professor, Department of Political Science

Dr. Hsuan-Hsiang Lin is a professor at the Department of Political Science at Chinese Culture University, Taipei, Taiwan. He served as the chair of his department from August 2021 through July 2023. His academic expertise was mainly in the areas of international relations and political theory, with particular focus on the ethics of international relations and the historical sociology of international relations. His research interest is now turning to developing a cultural approach to the study of politics and international relations, on the basis of the study of comparative civilizations. In addition to his interest in theory building, in recent years he has also been interested in the question of the rise and fall of hegemony, particularly the ongoing hegemonic competition between China and the United States. He is currently writing a book tackling this issue by employing Robert Gilpin's theory of hegemonic war.

Soka University

Tamai, Hideki / Professor, Director of SUPRI

Hideki Tamai is a Professor of Peace Studies, International Relations at Soka University and Director of Soka University Peace Research Institute (SUPRI). He earned BA (Sociology) at Soka University in 1985 and MA (International Relations) at Soka University in 1989. His research examines and promotes Human Security, Global Governance for Human Security, for example his analysis of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) presented it uniquely as a novel type of international regime from the perspective of constructivism. He is also very experienced in leading many international conferences, such as the International Symposium "Human Security in Asia," "Global Governance for Human Security," and "Building a Peace Community in Asia in 2017".

Koide, Minoru / Professor, Dean of SIPS

Dr. Minoru Koide, Ph.D. in International Relations (the University of Southern California), is the Dean of the Graduate School of International Peace Studies, Soka University. His research area includes international relations in Asia, Japanese foreign policy, and South Korea-Japan relations. His latest publication is "The Japanese Discourse on Japan-South Korea Relations under the Moon Jae-in Government," Soka Hogaku (Departmental Bulletin of the Faculty of Law, Soka University), March 2022.

Luckhurst, Jonathan / Professor of SIPS

Jonathan Luckhurst is Professor of International Relations at the Graduate School of

International Peace Studies of Soka University in Tokyo. A British academic with a Ph.D. from the University of Essex, his publications include the books *G20 Since the Global Crisis* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) and *The Shifting Global Economic Architecture: Decentralizing Authority in Contemporary Global Governance* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), plus several academic journal articles and chapters in edited volumes. Prof. Luckhurst's research focuses on the G20 and global governance networks, as well as linkages between global economic governance and policy challenges such as COVID-19, the SDGs, and the environment. This research includes his current project, *Networked G20 Governance: Normative Consequences of Inclusivity Practices for Transnational Actor Networks*, which is funded by the Japanese Government's Kakenhi Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (project number 20K01534). Prof. Luckhurst participates in the G20's official Think 20 forum as a task force member and policy brief author; and is a member of the Global Solutions Initiative's expert working group on 'Rethinking Multilateralism and Global Governance.'

Lenz, Hartmut / Professor of SIPS

Hartmut Lenz joined Soka University in 2014 and currently holds the position of Professor of International Relations. Previously he has been a lecturer and Leverhulme Fellow at the London School of Economics, a John F. Kennedy Scholar at Harvard University, and a Nuffield Fellow at Oxford University. His current research includes two main projects: "Domestic Constraints on Bargaining on the Intergovernmental Treaty Negotiations", which examines the impact of public opinion on intergovernmental negotiations, and a second project with the title "How stable is Government? Institutional Accountability, and the Survival of Semi Presidential Democracies", which is a comparative analysis of the impact of institutional structures on survival of semi presidential and presidential democracies."

Hanssen, Ulv / (SU, Faculty of Law)

Dr. Ulv Hanssen, Ph.D. in Japanese Studies (Free University Berlin), is an Associate Professor at Soka University's Faculty of Law. His current research is centered on Japan-North/South Korea relations and Sweden-North Korea relations. His latest publication is "Hate on the Bookshelves: Explaining the Phenomenon of Anti-Korean Hate Books in Japan" (co-written with Eun Hee Woo), *Social Sciences Japan Journal*, August 2022.

History of Peace Forum

- ① Peace Forum in Okinawa 2017 (September 8, 2017 / Soka University)
Building a Peace Community in Asia
 Symposium 1 “Creating Future Peace: Inheritance of War Experience”
 Symposium 2 “Making a Sea of Peace: the Collaborations for Human Security”

- ② Peace Forum in Taipei 2018 (October 7, 2018 / Chinese Culture University)
Prospects of Cross-strait Relations and East Asian Developments
 Keynote Speech “Taiwan in the New Balance of Power in East Asia”
 Panel 1 : Issues in the Taiwan Strait
 Panel 2 : East Asia’s Developments
 Panel 3 : Regional Security in East Asia

- ③ Peace Forum in Jeju 2019 (May 15, 2019 / Kyungnam University)
Conflict, Cooperation, and Peace in East Asia
 Session 1 : Conflict and Cooperation between Korea and Japan
 Session 2 : Conflict and Cooperation between Taiwan and China
 Session 3 : Conflict and Cooperation between North and South Koreas

- ④ Peace Forum 2020 (December 12, 2020 / Soka University (online))
Creative Collaboration for a Resilient World: Creating New Shared Values and New Policies in the Post-pandemic World
 Keynote Speech: ‘The World Maps in 2100: Freedom in the Age of Great Migration’
 Professor MINE, Yoichi (Doshisha University)
 Session 1 : “Creative Collaboration for a Resilient World: Perspective from Japan”
 Session 2 : “State, People, and Regional Cooperation in East Asia in Post-COVID-19 Era”
 Session 3 : “The Cross-Straight Relationships and Prospects after the American Presidential Election in 2020”

- ⑤ Peace Forum 2021 (December 10, 2021 / Chinese Culture University (online))
Building a Better East Asian World Order in the Aftermath of the Pandemic
 Keynote Speech: “Testing Time for Asia: Great-Power Competition and Economic Integration” Dr. Yang, Philip (Former Deputy Secretary-General)
 Session 1: “Perspective from Taiwan”
 “Hegemonic Rivalry and East Asian Order: Revisiting Robert Gilpin's Theory of Hegemonic War”

Session 2 : “Perspective from Japan”

“Lessons from Response to COVID-19 in Japan and Contribution to Improving Global Health”

Session 3 : “Perspective from Korea”

“The Perils and Opportunities of Competitions between U.S. and China: From South Korea's Perspective”

⑥ Peace Forum 2022 (November 18, 2022 / Kyungnam University (online))

The U.S.-China Strategic Competition and Its Impact: Perspectives from South Korea, Japan and Taiwan

Session 1 : “Perspective from South Korea”

US-China Competition and Impact on East Asia: Perspective from Korea

Session 2 : “Perspective from Japan”

The positive consequences of superpower détente: The case of Swedish-North Korean normalization in 1973

Session 3 : “Perspective from Taiwan”

US-China Competition and Its Impact on East Asia: An Analysis of Leaders' Discourse

The 7th Peace Forum Greetings

SUZUKI, Masashi

President
Soka University

The Peace Forum, which has been held in cooperation with Kyungnam University and Chinese Culture University, is now in its seventh year. It is a great pleasure and honor to host the Peace Forum at Soka University for the first time and to welcome President Park Jae-Kyu of Kyungnam University and Distinguished Chair Professor Chao Chien-min of the Chinese Culture University. I would like to extend my hearty welcome and express my gratitude to the professors from Kyungnam University, University of North Korean Studies, and Chinese Culture University for traveling all the way to our university to attend today's Peace Forum. Thank you very much indeed.

Although your stay may be short, I hope that you can enjoy the atmosphere of our campus with the trees that have finally begun to change its colors for autumn.

In the video message that I sent for The 6th Peace Forum organized by Kyungnam University last year, I mentioned that although international cooperation is crucial, confrontation and division between major nations are increasing. Furthermore, I have also mentioned that rationally examining the impact of the US-China strategic competition at this annual Peace Forum has an important meaning in today's world where wars/conflicts are still ongoing and a large number of innocent civilians become victims of these conflicts. I am very aware of the significant results achieved at the last year's symposium.

Unfortunately, the war in Ukraine has not yet come to an end, and in addition, the Israel-Hamas conflict has occurred. It seems like the major nations, which have great influence in such armed conflicts, are prioritizing national benefits over saving the lives of the people that are threatened.

On January 11, 2023, the Soka University Founder, Dr. Daisaku Ikeda, announced a

statement calling for action aimed at restoring peace in Ukraine, urging for life and dignity to be given top priority. He states:

“This year marks eighty-five years since the adoption by the League of Nations General Assembly of a resolution on the protection of civilians from aerial bombardment. It is also the seventy-fifth anniversary of the adoption by the United Nations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which expressed the shared vow to bring about a new era in which human dignity would never again be trampled and abused.

Recalling the commitment to protect life and dignity that undergirds International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, I urge all parties to bring about the earliest possible end to the present conflict.”

I hope that today's symposium will provide wisdom on how to transform conflicts among nations into cooperation and create an Asia and a world where "life and dignity" are prioritized.

To close my remarks, I would like to express my gratitude to the speakers for the symposium and all the professors who have contributed in holding today's Peace Forum. Thank you very much.

Opening Remarks

Dr. PARK, Jae Kyu

President
Kyungnam University

I'm honored to be here at the 7th Peace Forum of Soka University, Chinese Culture University, and Kyungnam University. I'd like to thank Dr. Suzuki Masashi, President of Soka University, and Dr. Chao Chien-min, Distinguished Chair Professor, Graduate Institute of National Development and Mainland China Studies, Chinese Culture University, for their continuing support of our tripartite fellowship.

I'd also like to thank the distinguished participants for coming, and especially the organizing committee at Soka University for bringing us all together, in one setting – which is the first time since the pandemic! It is wonderful to be able to see everyone in person again.

Through our Peace Forum, our universities have strived toward the goal of making peace in the region. Last year, our discussion centered on the issue of the US-China strategic competition, its impacts on East Asia, and the dilemmas it poses to South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.

This year, the discussion deepens, but with a focus on “dependence” and “interdependence” in the international system. Conflict is intensifying as independence strengthens. How can our nations, our institutions, our peoples promote cooperation and coexistence in this complex system? How can dependencies be developed into mutually supportive cooperation? How can we promote cooperative relations beyond the idea of interdependence?

These are tough questions. But I know this forum will provide a solid platform for some critical discussion among us.

Once again, it's good to see everyone here. I hope you enjoy today's proceedings.
Thank you very much.

Opening Remarks

CHAO, Chien-min

Director

Graduate Institute for National Development and China Studies
Chinese Culture University

Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon!

It's indeed a great honor and privilege to have finally come to this very gorgeous campus of Soka University for a visit. Let me first take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to our Japanese friends, especially President Suzuki and Professor Tamai for organizing this great event.

I would also like to congratulate the three universities, Soka University, Kyungnam University, and my own Chinese Culture University for bringing the conference series into its third round. This year celebrates the seventh anniversary of the trilateral peace forum.

The wave of globalization starting in the early 1990s has immensely broadened our perspectives on interdependence.

Interdependence as we understood it has gradually been expanded from economic division of work to security to environment and even breaking the cultural and religious barriers that have existed previously.

Although unprecedented the expansion was nevertheless reserved to like-minded countries with similar political and social value systems. But nowadays countries could be interdependent not only with different ideologies and belief systems but they can also harbor hostile intentions against each other. Politically hostile countries could very much be economically interdependent.

This is a totally new situation and Taiwan and mainland China are just one of those cases. The two are locked in ideological and political rivalry but there is an economic interdependence from across the Taiwan Strait.

Facing this new situation new solutions must be found and fast. I've learned a great deal from the forum in the past and I'm sure I will continue to benefit from the wisdom generated by these meetings of great academic minds.

Thank you once again for the invitation and I'm looking forward to hearing your opinions.

Thank you!

Ways to Promote “Cooperation and Coexistence” -Beyond “Power and Interdependence”- Symposium Concept

TAMAI, Hideki

Professor
Soka University

To begin the symposium, as the organizer, I would like to briefly talk about the theme concept.

In planning the 7th Peace Forum, we had no choice but to consider the current state of the world, where divisions and conflicts are deepening. The last time Soka University hosted the event in 2020, it was forced to be held online amid the coronavirus pandemic. When Chinese Culture University hosted the event in 2021, it was also held online, and during this time we have tried to use the pandemic crisis as an opportunity to change the status quo and consider the possibility of building back to a better world.

However, last year, Russia began its invasion of Ukraine. In this context, last year's Peace Forum, hosted by Kyungnam University and held at Hyflex, examined the impact of the US-China conflict on the deterioration of the international environment.

In the face of a human crisis, now is the time for all countries and peoples to work together to take on the challenge of solving problems, but we have entered an era in which it is extremely difficult to expand human solidarity. The current dire situation in the Gaza is exacerbated by divisions and conflicts.

The modern international community has deepened its interdependence among nations. While the deepening of interdependence between nations has the function of strengthening mutual cooperative relationships, there is also a growing tendency to exercise "dependence" as

one's own power.

Nearly 50 years have passed since Keohane and Nye published "Power and Interdependence", suggesting that increasing interdependence could lead to a decline in the importance of military power.

As globalization progressed with the end of the Cold War, it was increasingly criticized as a neoliberal system of domination led by the United States. China claims that this is a Western-style international order and that it is unjust to universalize it, and it is promoting the construction of a different international order led by China.

As seen in the rise of China and Russia's opposition to the West, has the "post-Cold War" period ended, and has we entered a new era of a multipolar world in which conflicts intensify while interdependence strengthens?

Keohane and Nye also showed that interdependence does not mean mutual assistance and examined the reality of states exercising "dependency" as their own power. One example of using "dependence" as a weapon is "economic sanctions," but as seen in the economic sanctions against Russia, such sanctions are also a "double-edged sword" that causes considerable damage not only to the sanctioned party but also to the sanctioning party.

In the increasingly interdependent international community, using "dependence" in order to pursue the supremacy of power will increase the risk of confrontation and conflict between nations. What is needed to develop dependencies into mutually supportive cooperation without falling into this trap of interdependence? We would like to consider how to address the challenges to promote cooperative relations beyond "interdependence."

This time's keynote was given by Professor Luckhurst from our university. Professor Luckhurst will use remarkably interesting concepts such as "contested pluralism" to show how to understand the current state of the world, and from there he will suggest how to move toward a world of cooperation and coexistence.

In the second session, Professor Kim of Kyungnam University / University of North Korean Studies will give a presentation in response to our research topic as "How should we address economic security challenges in Asia?" And then, Professor Kuo of Chinese Culture University provided research results related to a research topic as "What should be done to further promote multi-layered cooperative relations in Asia?" Today, Professor Lin will give a presentation on behalf of Professor Kuo.

In addition to these excellent keynote speech and presentations, distinguished scholars will serve as discussants. Although today's time is limited, I hope that we will be able to have an extremely meaningful discussion.

I would like to express my deep gratitude once again to today's panelists for their contributions. And I would like to thank everyone who participated.

Keynote Speech

Cooperation, Coexistence, and Contested Pluralism in Global Politics

LUCKHURST, Jonathan

Professor
SIPS/SUPRI/Soka University

The paper examines how *contested pluralism* influences global and global-regional politics. This indicates the albeit contested practices of growing inclusion of previously excluded or marginalized actors in world politics, especially those from the Global South and outside of the Group of Seven (G7). Contested pluralism influences the form and content of contemporary global governance, in particular, constituting increasingly disputed and potentially fragmenting organizational settings and fora, as well as contending networks, policy beliefs, and practices. This has key consequences for international cooperation, coexistence, and interdependence.

The analysis incorporates evidence from theoretical, historical, and contemporary empirical research, particularly on shifting global governance authority in the twenty-first century (Luckhurst 2016; 2017). This is linked to core themes of Peace Forum 2023, including assessing the consequences of contested pluralism for East Asian interdependence. Recent shifts in global governance authority, which are coextensive with contested pluralism, influenced authority relations in world politics and Asia. Contested global political pluralism has important repercussions for East Asian economic and security relations, on issues such as economic development, infrastructure, trade, digital technologies, supply chains, and climate cooperation.

The first section of the paper indicates how global governance scholars built on earlier research on international regimes and interdependence, by analyzing the complex interlinkages between global governance issue-areas and the transnational governance networks involved. This research ‘sacrifices’ the parsimony of state-centric and siloed policy analysis for greater empirical density, more effectively indicating the complexity of global politics. The second section

analyzes the consequences of a perceived ‘polycrisis’ and heightened uncertainty in global politics, especially for global and East Asian multilateralism. The final section assesses how contested pluralism in global governance influences shifting authority in East Asian relations. The paper concludes that multilateralism and networked governance practices augment the scope for global and East Asian cooperation and coexistence, which might reduce strategic tensions despite or even due to contested pluralism.

From interdependence to contested pluralism

There have been growing concerns among officials and experts about the global economic consequences of strategic tensions, particularly between G7 members and the Chinese and Russian governments. This has led practitioners and scholars to question whether global governance cooperation and forms of interdependence could be destabilized by economic decoupling, deglobalization, and “de-risking” of production supply-chains (G7 2023, 1), thus bringing into question the durability of interdependence and globalization. Contested pluralism constitutes additional challenges for these processes of world politics.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s (1977) *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* examined important issues of power in relation to interdependence, the ideal-type of complex interdependence, and dynamics of change in international regimes. The book left some analytical gaps, as the authors themselves noted 10 years later – for example, failing to assess the influence of domestic actors on state interest-formation (Keohane & Nye 1987, 740). Keohane and Nye’s (1977) analysis also remained too state-centric, despite their willingness sometimes to discuss the influence of non-state actors. Their (Keohane & Nye 1987, 752) research on international regimes focused on aspects of interdependence within particular issue-areas. Global governance scholars often examine, instead, *transversal* or cross-cutting interlinkages across policy issue-areas and governance networks, in their efforts to overcome siloed approaches to policymaking (see Bastos Lima et al. 2017; Florini & Sovacool 2011; Kirton & Warren 2020; Luckhurst et al. 2020).

New analytical lenses and tools are necessary to understand such dynamics, integrating more insights and evidence from the Global South and beyond the transatlantic region. The present analysis builds on recent developments in social constructivism, practice theory, relational theory, network theory, and sociological insights – contrary to the broadly state-centric, rational-actor, and materialist arguments from Keohane and Nye. This constitutes a relational, processual, and practice-focused approach to gauging the consequences of contested pluralism in world politics, including for cooperation and coexistence in global regions such as East Asia. The paper incorporates empirical evidence from public sources, participant-observation research, semi-structured interviews, and informal discussions with diplomats, officials, experts, civil-society advocates, and politicians from Group of Twenty (G20) members and other states.

This transversal and multistakeholder focus, which is common among global governance

scholars, ‘sacrifices’ the parsimony of state-centric and siloed policy analysis for greater empirical density. This approach more effectively indicates the complexity of global politics. Analysis of transversal interlinkages in global governance indicates how network-relational processes of world politics influence global and global-regional cooperation and coexistence, partly through contested practices of pluralism. Growing pluralism is evident in global governance authority shifts since the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008-09, for example with the recent expansion of the G20 to include the African Union (AU) as a new member, the culmination of Global South advocacy on this over several years. Earlier evidence of increasing pluralism included the shift to a new G20 consensus on ‘macroprudential’ financial regulation and on sustainable development since the GFC (see Baker 2013; Luckhurst 2016; 2017), plus the voice and vote-quota reforms at the Bretton Woods institutions. The delay in implementation of the latter reforms of the International Monetary Fund agreed in 2010, due to U.S. Congressional politics preventing ratification for five years, was criticized even by American allies in the Global South.¹ The American and European duopoly on the leadership positions at the Bretton Woods institutions also rankles with many officials, experts, and critics in the Global South.

Post-2008 global governance reforms have not brought parity between the Global North and South, but they partially shifted their relative influence. Officials from G20-member middle-income states such as Argentina and Brazil have increased opportunities to participate in dialogue and modify practices of global financial governance and in other policy fields, albeit with disparities in influence (Choer Moraes & Pérez Aznar 2022). The increasing Chinese sway in global and Asian-regional governance and multilateralism constitutes a clearly contested example of contemporary pluralism in global politics. Chinese influence has grown together with heightened security tensions, especially due to territorial disputes in East and Southeast Asia, with Xi Jinping’s administration more openly and militarily assertive than his predecessors in those international disputes.

Recent evidence of the difficulties caused by European reliance on Russian energy supplies, since the expansion of the conflict in Ukraine in February 2022, heightened awareness of the potential strategic implications for states and industries with a heavy dependence on Chinese production and supplies. This led to the recent shift to strategies of decoupling and de-risking from the Chinese economy, especially by G7 governments, while heightening contestation of global and Asian-regional pluralism, especially American official skepticism about the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Bergsten 2018). Economic sanctions imposed on Russia since February 2022 further indicate that interdependence is double-edged, with potential gains and losses for both the Russians and those imposing sanctions. Tensions and challenges to interdependence in the context of contested pluralism in global politics is not unprecedented; oil crises due to international security relations

¹ Personal communication during semi-structured interview with former Mexican G20 Sherpa, Lourdes Aranda Bezaury, July 2015.

were another example in the 1970s.

Contested pluralism is evidenced by other key issues in world politics. The politico-discursive contestation on core global governance issues in recent years includes criticisms from the Global South of the reserve-currency role of the U.S. dollar, especially due to negative international spillover effects from Federal Reserve interest-rate hikes to counter American inflation. There have been claims of a global “de-dollarization” trend as a consequence, though the U.S. dollar likely remains the leading global reserve currency for the foreseeable future (Gerding & Hartley 2023). Another recent example was the apparent contestation between the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), on which organization should lead the global tax reform agenda (Agyemang 2023). The prospective BRICS² expansion to include six new members could constitute a significant shift in informal global governance influence, though tensions between founding BRICS members the Chinese and Indian governments might undermine the potential for the BRICS to become an effective, anti-western diplomatic alliance. Nonetheless, the impending expansion of the BRICS could intensify contested pluralism in global politics, especially considering the inclusion of Iran among the new candidate members.

Another contemporary example of contested global political pluralism is the debate on the war in Ukraine, particularly a divergence of perspectives arguably indicative of a Global North–South divide. These differences prevent a consensus on the conflict at the UN or G20, despite the violation of the most basic principles of the UN Charter. The Indian G20 Presidency (G20 2023) managed to achieve a joint leaders’ declaration at their New Delhi summit in September 2023, which recognized the differences of perspective within the forum on the Ukraine conflict – overcoming prior doubts among observers and even Indian diplomatic sources that this would be achievable.³ The G20 declaration was further indicative of contested pluralism in global politics, as despite the G7 preference to include a stronger condemnation of Russian actions – similar to that included in Bali G20 Summit declaration (G20 2022) of November 2022, the declaration was agreed without incorporating such direct condemnation. Indian diplomats, including G20 Sherpa Amitabh Kant,⁴ contended that the New Delhi declaration would not have been achievable with more direct criticism of Russian actions. The text was still implicitly critical of the war and Russian justifications for it, despite several media assessments that there was practically no criticism. Some insightful experts perceived the New Delhi declaration as evidence of the Indians’ growing diplomatic sway in international relations, plus the growing influence of

2 The BRICS currently consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The BRICS announced the expansion of their forum to incorporate Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates in 2024.

3 This was evident from public statements and the author’s personal communications with Indian diplomats.

4 Comments made by Amitabh Kant at the virtual Panel Discussion on the Outcome of the G20 New Delhi Summit, organized by the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) think tank on September 13, 2023.

the Global South in global governance (Atlantic Council Experts 2023; Bajpae 2023; Tiberghien & Alexandroff 2023).

‘Polycrisis’ and uncertainty in global politics

This paper engages with key arguments from global governance scholarship, including James Rosenau’s (1990; 1997) pioneering analysis of the consequences of growing turbulence in world politics in the 1990s, with increased uncertainty in that transformative decade of international relations. The present constitutes another period of perceived heightened uncertainty, with much discussion of a worldwide “polycrisis” (Tooze 2022) due to concurrent crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the growing sense of a global climate emergency. Some key assumptions and practices of the post-Cold War era have seemingly ended, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and war in Ukraine.

Keohane (2002, 265) and others (Nelson and Katzenstein 2014; Taleb 2007; Widmaier et al. 2007), deploying various theoretical lenses, have argued periods of apparent uncertainty are particularly propitious to the types of challenges to governance orthodoxy constituted through contested political pluralism in recent years. The present author’s research also indicates the potential political consequences of crises and uncertainty, for example how the GFC contributed to destabilizing authority relations and dislodging conventional economic policy practices – especially in aspects of financial regulation, capital controls, development strategies, and the role of markets and the state in the economy (Luckhurst 2016, 64-74). Political contestation due to perceptions of crisis, or even *polycrisis*, has important consequences for global and East Asian cooperation, coexistence, and interdependence. There are significant implications from Chinese and Indian policymakers, for example, as well as others from the Global South gaining greater influence in world politics and Asian regional relations.

An historical perspective is useful for assessing the continual shifts in global authority relations and politics, including the consequences of periods of heightened awareness of uncertainty and growing contestation of influential political or economic beliefs. Understanding that uncertainty is intrinsic to world affairs indicates the basic contingency of global politics and international relations, even during times of perceived stability. The period since the GFC, however, has been particularly indicative of crisis-induced uncertainty in world politics.

This heightened sense of uncertainty, partly due to contested global political pluralism, influences cooperation and coexistence in East Asia in important ways. The crisis narrative and substantive crisis effects from the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, such as global inflationary pressures and energy- and food- supply shocks, as well as global heating due to the climate crisis, exacerbate global and global-regional political challenges and concerns about security issues destabilizing East Asian relations. The growing influence of populist politicians since the GFC has increased global political uncertainty. The presidency of Donald Trump brought concerns about declining American leadership and engagement in East Asia – partly

evidenced by his withdrawal from the original Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement in 2017. The potential for Trump to return to the White House in January 2025, as the likely Republican Party candidate for the presidency in 2024, could bring further shifts in U.S. foreign policy that would substantially influence security and economic relations in East Asia and elsewhere. In this sense, contested global political pluralism does not just indicate the ‘rise’ of erstwhile marginalized voices from the Global South, but also of dissonant voices in the Global North.

Contested global pluralism and global-regional authority shifts

Contested global political pluralism has significant consequences for global-regional authority relations in East Asia. The heightened sense of uncertainty and shifting global and global-regional authority, especially in a context of perceived polycrisis or multiple contemporaneous crises, constitute what positivist scholars would conceive as important variables in foreign policy decision-making. There is greater potential for increased mistrust between erstwhile alliance partners, as well as in dealings with adversaries and other interlocutors, as assumptions about past behavior no longer guide expectations about the future (Keohane 2002, 265). Some constructivists and poststructuralists would put it differently, by emphasizing the linkage between such moments of contingency and the *repoliticization* of formerly taken-for-granted background knowledge as no longer constitutive of conventional wisdom (de Goede, 2004; Edkins, 1999; Hopf 2010; Widmaier et al. 2007).

The aforementioned point about foreign policy decision-making indicates the influence of uncertainty and contested global pluralism on inter-state relations. There are also important consequences for the authority of transnational governance networks, regional intergovernmental fora and their secretariats or staff, plus individual policy actors in the increasingly contested post-GFC context of global and Asian politics. The destabilization of conventional policy and political assumptions due to repoliticization and contested global political pluralism has brought significant challenges, particularly from recent populism. One could additionally conceive of potential benefits, as it also constitutes opportunities for improvements in global and global-regional governance, due to the augmented potential to contest and supplant ineffective practices with alternatives.

There is substantial evidence that authority shifts in global governance contributed to greater influence from East and Southeast Asian policymakers in multilateral fora and global governance, as noted earlier. The South Korean government’s influence on the G20’s sustainable development agenda, since its 2010 G20 presidency, is another example. There is further evidence of Asian economic development strategies influencing post-GFC global governance, most obviously from China but also India, Bangladesh, and elsewhere (Luckhurst 2017, 163-170). The heightened contemporary sense of uncertainty, partly due to contested global political pluralism, influences cooperation and coexistence in East Asia in important ways. It indicates the potential for alternative and contested organizational strategies for East Asian regionalism,

including Chinese-led multilateral projects such as the AIIB and the BRI. The growing Chinese influence in global governance, along with Indian influence, underpins the shifting global governance authority between the Global North and South. Despite perceptions of increased competition between China and the United States, these Chinese projects broadly constitute forms of “cooperative decentralization” rather than conflictual relations with the Bretton Woods institutions (Helleiner 2016), despite American government concerns.

Augmented Asian influence in global politics constituted opportunities as well as significant challenges for East Asian cooperation and coexistence. There remains a broad consensus on core aspects of sustainable development, despite the existence of contentious regional economic, territorial, and security issues. Climate cooperation might also constitute an issue-area of regional cooperation, while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains a key interlocutor and facilitator of regional multilateral cooperation – its ‘ASEAN way’ approach to cooperation and consensus-building is sometimes criticized (Nischalke 2000), but the forum continues to facilitate regional cooperation in a period of growing dissensus in world politics. The tendency to perceive recent trends of decentralizing authority in global and global-regional governance through a ‘geopolitical’ lens of conflict is arguably indicative of a deficiency in aspects of mainstream IR scholarship. Amitav Acharya’s (2014, 105) concept of a “multiplex world” of parallel, sometimes complementary, forms of multilateralism more accurately fits the current context.

Global North–South tensions could potentially undermine East Asian cooperation and coexistence, though there is some recent evidence that the G7, collectively, is beginning to take seriously the concerns of the Global South – whether genuine attempts to understand their priorities, or instrumental attempts to engage strategically with the South in a context of increased international tensions with the Chinese and Russian governments. Regardless of the motives, the apparent willingness of the G7 and some other high-income liberal democracies seriously to engage on Global South priorities could contribute to improving cooperation and coexistence in East Asia and even globally, if the G20 and other multilateral fora become a focus for what might be termed ‘competitive benevolence.’ One recent example was the collective G7 shift to acceptance of the AU’s inclusion in the G20. Other aspects of G7 attempts to engage with the Global South include comments from President Joseph Biden (2022) on the need to reform and expand the UN Security Council. This could augment the Biden Administration’s reputation in the Global South at the expense of Russian and Chinese influence, as neither of the latter have been supportive of Security Council reform. The G7 and other high-income liberal democracies could also increase their influence and authority in the Global South and East Asia, by implementing their commitments to the UN’s Loss and Damage Fund on climate financing, plus taking other measures to mitigate the costs of economic and climate transitions in middle- and low- income states.

Multilateralism and networked governance practices sometimes augment the scope for

global and East Asian cooperation and coexistence, with potential spillover effects that reduce strategic tensions despite or even due to contested pluralism. The G20 and other global governance fora and institutions, such as the G7, BRICS, OECD, UN, and World Health Organization, engage with heterogeneous and transnational global governance networks. These outreach engagement activities often constitute relations between the Global North and South, linking “professional ecologies” (Seabrooke 2014) or backgrounds by including private, intergovernmental, supranational, state, semi-state, and civil society actors in the deliberations and development of global governance and policy practices, through workshops, expert working groups, and other meetings. These transnational networks include network-relational dynamics with potential benefits for Asian regional relations, providing opportunities to reduce international tensions and enhance cooperation and coexistence, including through processes of “reciprocal socialization” (Luckhurst 2019; Pu 2012; Terhalle 2011; Ye 2023; also see Acharya 2004).

Conclusion

Global and Asian cooperation and coexistence are influenced by contested political pluralism, but while the latter brings significant challenges, it does not prevent multilateralism and global governance processes. The Bali and New Delhi G20 summit declarations and continuing work of international organizations that include strategic competitors, despite recent international security tensions, underscores this – with evidence of continuing dialogue and financing for global climate and development goals, plus cooperation on global financial and tax regulations and on other policy areas.

A relational analysis of global governance networks is useful for understanding how reciprocal socialization and transnational networks reinforce global and global-regional multilateralism. The current heightened sense of uncertainty and crisis constitute key challenges for global and East Asian coexistence and cooperation, but uncertainty is endogenous to world politics rather than an exogenous or temporary factor. Contemporary contested global political pluralism destabilizes existing authority relations, but heightened contestation could engender benevolent competition and even encourage competitive cooperation – for example, implementation of G20 or UN agreements for strategic reputational and practical gains.

Interdependence, like cooperation and coexistence, is a configuration of relational processes that are constituted through global and Asian-regional politics. There is existing evidence and the potential for further decreases in aspects of interdependence, globally and in East Asia. Declining economic ties between some states would likely be offset by increasing interdependence elsewhere, including new production supply-chains and trade relations between other states. Contested pluralism in global politics could continue to influence such economic shifts, as well as global governance and Asian-regional multilateralism, for the foreseeable future; notwithstanding, there remains substantial scope for forms of cooperation, coexistence, and

interdependence.

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Comments

Dr. Lenz, Hartmut

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Thank you Professor Koide, for the introduction and Professor Luckhurst for this compelling paper. I will endeavor to keep my comments concise. However, I must take a moment to express my appreciation for the stimulating atmosphere of this peace forum, which has been a constant source of inspiration for me over the years. It is a particular pleasure to be among esteemed colleagues from Kyungnam University and the Chinese Culture University. I am delighted to reconnect with you all today.

This paper is relatively short and to the point, but I highly recommend reading it. I hope it will be widely available soon as it raises critical points about the future direction of international relations. I would like to emphasize two significant points from several positive aspects and then I will provide some critical feedback to suggest some improvement.

The first key point to note is the paper's truly global approach to international relations. In recent years, this perspective has somewhat been overlooked. Often, discussions have centered around the top two or five global actors and their dynamics, sidelining the broader global context. This paper reiterates the importance of considering a more comprehensive network of actors and dynamics, which are critical for understanding international politics in its entirety.

Moreover, the global source is also significantly impacted by these changes and must adapt accordingly. This paper provides invaluable insights into the broader implications of recent shifts in international relations. It encourages us to consider the far-reaching consequences beyond just specific actors or nations.

Another crucial aspect of this paper is its concerted effort to transcend the traditional boundaries of theoretical frameworks such as liberal institutionalism, realism, and constructivism. It endeavors to move beyond these silos and initiate a more integrated and nuanced theoretical discourse—a step that is much needed in contemporary scholarship.

It is quite noteworthy that Professor Tamai in today's introduction referred to research from the 1970s by Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane. It is evident that we are living in a different world now than that of the 1970s, and we must move forward beyond the experiences of the Cold War era. This paper's effort to advance the theoretical discussion beyond the limitations of liberal institutionalism, realism, or constructivism is commendable and essential.

The concept of contested pluralism is particularly intriguing and could be one of the approaches to consider when analyzing the multiple forces at play in international relations. The

inclusion of examples in the paper is useful, but they could benefit from more detailed descriptions to clarify their relevance to the central argument.

Despite the keywords 'beyond power and coexistence', I believe the analysis could benefit from a more explicit consideration of power dynamics. The work of liberal institutionalism, for instance, which aims to address the complex nature of power structures, could provide valuable insights.

Furthermore, the notion that the plurality of divergent ideas strengthens international institutions is an intriguing one. However, it's essential to scrutinize the recent role of these institutions, especially in the context of major crises like the Ukraine crisis. The tendency for international institutions to function more as signaling devices than problem solvers in such instances raises valid concerns.

Lastly, the paper's discussion of uncertainty and poly-crisis in international institutions is highly relevant. The prevailing uncertainty may indeed lead nations to adopt more state-centric foreign policies, focusing on individual economic stability rather than global problem-solving. In conclusion, this paper raises many thought-provoking questions and offers a great starting point for further exploration. I look forward to seeing how the ideas presented here will shape the discourse in international relations moving forward.

Dr. Wang, Shun-Wen

Professor, Chinese Culture University

1.

It's my honor to have the opportunity to participate in this conference in person first and read the paper of our keynote speaker, Professor Luckhurst, in advance. As he mentioned in his speech, contested pluralism influences both global and regional politics, providing valuable insights into our ongoing discussions and developments in international relations. This includes topics such as international regimes, interdependence, uncertainty, and how contested pluralism impacts shifting authority in East Asian relations.

Contested pluralism emphasizes a relational, process-oriented, and practice-focused approach. It also underscores the importance of transversal and multi-stakeholder perspectives, allowing for a better understanding of the complexity of global politics. At the same time, it affects the forms and content of global governance.

First, I would like to raise the issue of "uncertainty" for further discussion. Decision-makers often find themselves facing uncertain situations, particularly in a post-pandemic world. This forces decision-makers to reconsider their roles and opens the possibility of role transformation (Melo, 2019: 228-9).

As Katzenstein (2020) proposed, "protean power" and the impact of actors in an environment characterized by unpredictability and uncertainty (Hymans, 2020: 410), especially when past actions do not provide a reliable foundation for future actions (Katzenstein et al., 2018: 80). In such situations, actors may opt for being "protean power" rather than "control power," which means responding improvisationally or innovatively in unpredictable contexts, with actors unable to anticipate outcomes, leading to a relinquishment of control (Katzenstein et al., 2018: 82). This results in a form of "shape-changing power" (Katzenstein, 2020: 481). In other words, calculations are not solely based on material resources or national capabilities, as structuralists might argue, but rather, they are guided by specific intentions depending on the region and the situation and lack a clear directionality (Katzenstein, 2020: 493).

Professor Luckhurst's concept of contested pluralism shares similarities with these ideas and provides a more in-depth exploration of various relationships, including the aforementioned changes in relations and authority. This is a significant contribution to the academic field because mainstream IR studies often overlook the "unknown unknowns." For instance, Ann Hironaka, in her book "Tokens of Power," points out that great powers often enter conflicts overconfidently, while real-life situations are not always rule-based games but are filled with unexpected capabilities (Hymans, 2020: 412).

However, as Jacques Hymans notes, some actors, when faced with "momentous decisions," may prefer to stay in the realm of empty risks rather than venture into uncertainty. In cases of leaders who disregard uncertainty, their decisions are primarily influenced by the concept of national identity and nationalism, which may lead from feelings of fear or confidence, causing them to believe that their decisions are correct (Hymans, 2020: 415). Therefore, how can we infer that under contested pluralism, as the author suggests, populism does not make cooperation and coexistence more difficult to achieve?

2. The Problem of Governance

As Professor Luckhurst pointed out, "Pluralism helped sustain interdependence through cooperation, e.g., multilateral cooperation on the global financial crisis, SDGs, UNFCCC/climate," and it has led to the decentralization of authority, creating a multiplex world. It has also heightened the sense of distrust.

In this era, the differentiation of traditional state roles, the weakening of security providers, and even challenges like hybrid warfare have given a new significance to security. It is no longer about large-scale armies and deterrence, but rather, it involves various crisis management models influenced by capital and geopolitics, resulting in regional disparities (TASAM, 2022).

Furthermore, factors such as great power competition, artificial intelligence, space, and nuclear capabilities have created multifaceted missions. However, international consensus is decreasing, which increases the likelihood of risks. Wolfgang Ischinger mentioned five "losses" at the 2019 Munich Security Conference:

- (1) A seismic change in political power, where existing powers lose their influence.
- (2) A lack of "common truth," as the influence of multifaceted media and social networks erodes mutual trust.
- (3) The cessation of the monopoly on legitimate force (by states and the United Nations), resulting in the dispersal of the capacity for harm, which can be exploited by non-state armed groups and terrorists (in cyberspace).
- (4) The digital era has given rise to hybrid threats and forms of warfare that lack territorial interests, manifesting as covert tactics (proxy wars), making conflict prevention more challenging.
- (5) Conflict resolution methods: Information, energy, the internet, and financial sectors can be used as weapons, with only the European Union remaining committed to global unity (Werther-Pietsch, 2022: 118).

In this context, the international community avoids direct intervention in conflicts because the underlying causes are often unclear. Instead, they employ "smart power" and low-threshold interventions using information warfare as an effective deterrent (Werther-Pietsch, 2022: 119). Under the shadow of the COVID-19 pandemic and the confrontation between democracies and authoritarian regimes, all major powers are seeking their new positions, entering a new era of "balance of power." The international community will likely strive to avoid large-scale conflicts and deter irrational actors from making "unintended mistakes" (Werther-Pietsch, 2022: 120-1).

In the context of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Agenda 2030, SDGs, and related issues, what is demonstrated is a form of "human-centric" approach, emphasizing collaborative crisis and conflict management. Professor Luckhurst's views seem to align with this, but the issue I'd like to raise for discussion is whether this represents a more efficient international regime, as you mentioned, where "the South" play a more substantial role. Or, does it imply Northern countries retreating from the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), leading the international community back to the aforementioned era of the "new BOP," or even the beginning of a "new Cold War"?

3. Discussion on East Asian Cooperation and Coexistence

Regarding this section, I would like to share my perspective on the developments following the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):

Xi Jinping's speech at the 20th CPC National Congress includes several key points:

- (1) The overall strategic objective still prioritizes economic development.
- (2) Similar to what Professor Luckhurst mentioned regarding the importance of perception, China's perception is that changes in the external environment necessitate policy adjustments. The themes of the 20th Congress did not prominently feature peace and development as they did in the past, nor did they reiterate an "optimistic and positive assessment of the future." Instead,

the emphasis remains on critiquing Western hegemony (Xinhua, 2022).

Furthermore, unlike the past "strategic opportunity period," the 20th Congress's report acknowledges that the challenges are unprecedented and the world view has become more inward-looking, emphasizing the challenges and complexities of the new era (Zhang, 2023: 9). Therefore, ensuring internal stability becomes a top priority. A "heightened sense of crisis and bottom-line thinking" is necessary, and self-reliance and self-strengthening in technology are emphasized (Xinhua, 2022).

(3) Building a new development pattern and an actively open strategy, embracing a community of shared human destiny.

Xi Jinping continues to prioritize the "dual circulation" approach. He emphasizes ongoing openness and a strategy of mutual benefit. China "adheres to the correct direction of economic globalization," "actively participates in the reform and construction of the global governance system, practices the global governance concept of consultation, contribution, and shared benefits," and "promotes the development of global governance towards a more just and equitable direction," while also advocating for a community of shared human destiny (Xinhua, 2022).

(4) No change in overall foreign policy, but slight adjustments in its role.

The 20th Congress has not altered China's commitment to world peace, its strategy of openness to the world, and the pursuit of mutual benefit. China continues to play an active role in the global governance system, multilateralism, and the promotion of the world order under the United Nations system. It opposes unilateralism. All of these factors demonstrate that the 20th Congress has not changed China's long-standing foreign policy (Zhang, 2023: 6).

However, there have been subtle changes in China's national identity. Scholars have noted that in the 20th Congress report, while it mentioned once that "China is a major developing country," it emphasized the importance of developing relationships with developing countries four times. In contrast, it mentioned great powers and responsibilities more frequently (Zhang, 2023: 10-11).

During the second collective study session of the Central Political Bureau, Xi Jinping further outlined the new development pattern, emphasizing the need to "accelerate the pace of self-reliance and self-strengthening in technology to address foreign 'chokeholds'." Therefore, China must consolidate its strength and take the lead in critical technological domains. The so-called new development pattern prioritizes industries such as "networks, digital industries, emerging industries, filling gaps in weak industries, and upgrading traditional industries." The emphasis remains on autonomy and control, while also sustaining the development of the Belt and Road Initiative and the dual circulation strategy (Xi Jinping, 2023a).

On October 10, 2023, the CCP released a white paper titled "Building 'Belt and Road': A Major Practice for Constructing a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind." It first emphasizes that "China belongs to the world." In addition to continuing the emphasis on

historical Silk Roads and peaceful development, it reaffirms China's support for economic globalization and a multipolar world. It reflects Xi Jinping's increasing emphasis on the term "community of shared future" in recent years. It also showcases Xi Jinping's discourse as a leading advocate of development cooperation, the Belt and Road Initiative, and a global win-win narrative, which bridges China's relationships with foreign countries. As discussed earlier, this narrative has shifted from emphasizing neighboring and developing countries in earlier partnership relationships to a broader, more globally relevant concept of a shared destiny (Guo Wenping, Sun Maogai, 2023: 115-6). Essentially, this is an expectation of China's role as a major power.

China still emphasizes "consultation, construction, and sharing." However, there is a sense of responding to Western criticism in terms of ideology and objectives. In terms of ideology, there is an emphasis on "openness, green development, and integrity." Regarding objectives, the focus is on "high standards, sustainability, and benefiting the people" (People's Daily, 2023). The significant differences from the past lie in "anti-corruption" and "high standards." These aspects have emerged in post-20th Congress discourse as a response to Western criticism of China's attempts to use opaque and lower-standard contracts and negotiations. These criticisms have been alleged to impact the politics of countries along the Belt and Road, create debt traps, and influence the political objectives of those countries (Wang, 2018). This discourse reflects a return to the original commercial considerations of the Belt and Road Initiative, rather than geopolitical strategic considerations.

In terms of the content related to "anti-corruption," the white paper emphasizes that "building the Belt and Road considers anti-corruption as an internal requirement and a necessary condition." However, in specific content, it only mentions that "all parties should work together to improve the construction of anti-corruption legal systems and mechanisms, deepen the alignment of anti-corruption laws and regulations, pragmatically promote international anti-corruption cooperation, firmly oppose all types of corruption and other international criminal activities, and continue to combat corrupt practices...while adhering to Chinese laws, as well as local laws and international regulations" (People's Daily, 2023). Interpreted in context, this response still does not fully address Western criticisms regarding the transparency of bidding processes but rather responds with the establishment of rules.

In the design of the "high standards," the white paper emphasizes "aligning with international advanced rules and standards...first piloting and then promoting, advocating for participating parties to adopt rules and standards suitable for their own circumstances and follow a development path that conforms to their own national conditions" (People's Daily, 2023). However, when examining the content, even though it emphasizes international advanced rules and standards, it still suggests that each country should adopt rules suitable for its own circumstances. This seems to lack substantial concessions compared to initiatives like the CPTPP, which aimed for a 99% reduction in tariffs for 99% of goods (Jiang, 2021).

The white paper underscores China's contributions, essentially reiterating its contributions to people's livelihoods, economic globalization, and global governance, especially in multilateral governance and cultural influence. This statement is in line with the fundamental assumptions of a change in China's worldview after the 20th Congress. It emphasizes that the world is entering a period of new turbulence and change, characterized by intensified great power competition, ongoing geopolitical tensions, Cold War thinking, zero-sum thinking, unilateralism, protectionism, hegemonism, populism, technological revolution, industrial transformation, peace deficits, development deficits, security deficits, and governance deficits. Individual countries use the concept of "national security" to "decouple and break chains" in the name of "risk mitigation," disrupting the international economic and trade order and market rules. They advocate for equality and partnership relationships (People's Daily, 2023). This highlights the continuity of China's policies, which continue to target the United States and the West, even positioning China as a developing country and potentially hindering North-South cooperation with developed countries (Wang Shunwen, Lin Yiling, 2022).

In particular, during the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan and South Korea pledged to further cooperate on security issues. Additionally, Australia, India, Japan, and the United States have discussed cooperation in areas such as digital technology, undersea cables, and maritime infrastructure. Moreover, the emphasis on cooperation with Southern countries suggests ongoing competition regarding the Belt and Road Initiative. These factors collectively indicate that the "Democratic Alliance" has transitioned from "sitting and talking" to "standing up and acting" (Ikenberry, 2023).

These signs serve as a significant warning for China, indicating that it faces an increasingly encircled external environment, combined with domestic economic challenges. Consequently, China may adopt a more assertive foreign policy in response. For example, the previously mentioned shift towards emphasizing values and ideological aspects or the 103 sorties of military aircraft disturbing Taiwan's operations is meant to convey a message and maintain the Chinese Communist Party's existing "bottom-line thinking." While China is willing to cooperate, it is not afraid of conflict and is waiting for potential changes in U.S. presidential elections in the future. However, goodwill is continually extended to Belt and Road countries, attempting to emphasize China's role in peaceful development and a community of shared destiny, emphasizing a multipolar world order and avoiding situations where nations are forced to choose sides.

Furthermore, China continues to invest in technology innovation, particularly in industries related to semiconductors, new energy, computers, and biomedicine (Mankikar, 2023: 8). To address domestic economic pressures and domestic pushback, the education system is emphasized as the forefront of ideological work. When selecting leaders among the 24 members of the Political Bureau, those with "capabilities" in technology-related areas such as space, nuclear power, and the environment are prioritized. For example, among the 24 members, Ma Xingrui and Yuan Jiajun are experts in space projects, Li Ganjie and Chen Jining have master's

degrees in nuclear engineering and doctoral degrees in environmental engineering, and Zhang Guoqing previously worked at China North Industries Group Corporation, the country's largest defense industry group. Yin Li is a health expert. Among the members of the Central Committee, 29 members come from the academic field of technology and engineering (Mankikar, 2023: 12). In summary, China's new development pattern primarily aims to counter the West and nurture talent in scientific research while reducing foreign dependencies.

As scholars researching international regimes or interdependence often conclude, the roles of hegemonies or great powers are still crucial in shaping a new international regime. Only after such regimes have been formed can they potentially serve to restrain great powers and facilitate coexistence and cooperation. Therefore, I would like to discuss whether both the United States and China still perceive confrontation as their primary focus. As I mentioned in my recent book, "Neoclassical Realism and Turkish Foreign Policy," international systemic factors still appear to be the major determining variables. However, present-day leaders are influenced by factors such as leaders' images and perceptions of threats. Given this, in the face of an uncertain future, is there a genuine opportunity for East Asia to establish a new regime for cooperation, or is it merely a slogan?

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Nurturing Trilateral Relations in East Asia: South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan

Introduction:

The global order is undergoing fundamental changes, and predicting the future accurately is challenging due to a multitude of intertwined factors. Dealing with crises on multiple levels, which manifest in various forms, is also a formidable task.

The paper provides an intriguing look into the concept of *contested pluralism* and its effects on international relations, with a particular focus on East Asia. *Contested pluralism*, as described in the paper, plays a pivotal role in the trilateral relations within East Asia. The diverse perspectives within this partnership offer both opportunities and challenges. Indeed, in an era marked by shifting global dynamics and contested pluralism, trilateral relations in East Asia hold significant promise and challenges.

The trilateral partnership between South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan warrants closer examination as it unfolds in a region with intricate historical, political, and economic dynamics. So, I will try to dissect the contested multilateralism's implications, challenges, and potential pitfalls.

1. The Ambiguity of Shifting Global Order:

The paper portrays a shift in the global order with the inclusion of previously marginalized actors, particularly from the Global South. However, it seems necessary to address the ambiguity surrounding the effectiveness of such a transition. That being said, does a more diverse global stage necessarily lead to better decision-making, or does it complicate the process with conflicting interests?

2. Complexity Amidst Opportunities:

Contested pluralism, as described, undoubtedly brings both challenges and opportunities. The critical perspective lies in questioning the potential for chaos in the face of diverse voices. In particular, the trilateral relations among South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are intrinsically tied to historical complexities. The legacy of colonialism, territorial disputes, and unresolved historical issues often cast a shadow over these relations. A critical perspective demands that these historical grievances be addressed with diplomacy and sensitivity, acknowledging the importance of historical reconciliation in building trust.

3. Multilateralism's Efficacy:

The paper highlights the role of multilateral organizations as forums for diverse actors to engage in dialogue. However, is it safe to say that these organizations are equipped to effectively handle the cacophony of voices, or that they often lead to diplomatic standstills and diluted outcomes?

4. Uncertainty and Crises:

The paper acknowledges the increased sense of uncertainty in international relations due to crises like the COVID-19 pandemic. In a time when decisive global action is needed, heightened uncertainty can lead to delayed responses and missed opportunities. With regard to regional security, the trilateral partnership assumes greater significance. South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan share common concerns about North Korea's nuclear ambitions, as well as broader regional security dynamics. A critical examination of their collective security efforts is essential to ascertain their effectiveness and readiness for emerging threats.

5. Global South's Influence:

While the paper celebrates the rising influence of the Global South, it misses the opportunity to critically evaluate the motives and consequences of this newfound power. How do these actors use their influence, and what are the implications for regional and global stability? Furthermore, does the Global South's ascent align with democratic values and human rights, or does it risk perpetuating inequalities?

6. The Complexity of Interdependence:

Contested pluralism's relationship with interdependence deserves a closer look. As interdependence grows, so does the potential for mutual vulnerabilities. Critical analysis must consider how these vulnerabilities can be exploited in an environment of contested pluralism, potentially leading to a different form of power play. Regarding economic interdependence, it forms a critical facet of these trilateral relations. Each nation possesses unique strengths and contributions to the regional economy. South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan's collaboration can foster innovation, economic growth, and regional stability. However, we need to identify potential imbalances in this economic interdependence and ensure it benefits all parties. Diplomatically, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan each navigate complex relationships with major global powers. Engaging with the United States, China, and other regional actors requires careful consideration of national interests and collective goals.

7. Future Concerns:

The paper concludes on a note of optimism, envisioning a future of cooperative approaches to global challenges. However, we must also consider the darker side. How can cooperative approaches thrive when actors with diverse interests and often conflicting objectives occupy the global stage? A myopic view may lead to naivety in addressing the complex realities of contested pluralism. The future of trilateral relations between South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan hinges on cooperation. As the global order evolves, these nations must adapt to seize opportunities for growth, innovation, and security.

8. Conclusion

While contested pluralism undoubtedly ushers in a new era of global politics, its impact is far from unilaterally positive. A critical perspective highlights the need for caution, diplomacy, and comprehensive evaluation of its implications. Only through critical scrutiny can we navigate the complex and evolving landscape of international relations effectively.

South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan's trilateral relations are emblematic of the intricate dynamics at play in East Asia. Historical complexities, economic interdependence, regional security, diplomatic considerations, and contested pluralism shape their partnership. A critical perspective is indispensable in ensuring that these trilateral relations develop positively, capitalizing on opportunities while addressing challenges. The evolving global order necessitates a pragmatic and informed approach, allowing these nations to foster cooperation, coexistence, and stability in a dynamic and evolving regional landscape.

Let me finish by briefly touching upon the diplomatic environment facing the Yoon Suk-yeol government of South Korea. The future foreign policy goals of the Yoon Suk-yeol government can be summarized as follows:

1. Enhancing future-oriented value diplomacy.
2. Promoting a Korean-style comprehensive security approach.
3. Reinvigorating mutually beneficial economic cooperation on a global scale.
4. Strengthening foreign policy in the realm of advanced technology innovation.
5. Taking a leadership role in emerging diplomacy.

To establish the cornerstone for relatively unrestricted multilateral security cooperation amidst the U.S.-China strategic competition, all in all, it is crucial to strengthen bilateral and trilateral cooperation with significant middle powers in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Japan, Australia, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

First and foremost, there is a need to actively promote trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Indonesia, and Australia, often referred to as KIA. Given Indonesia's economic growth and its role as a prominent ASEAN nation, combined with the economic and military capabilities of Australia and South Korea, the East Asian trilateral mechanism has the potential to emerge as a significant security and economic forum in the region.

Another potential avenue involves exploring groupings like South Korea-Australia-ASEAN or South Korea-Australia-Pacific Island Countries within the trilateral framework. As South Korea and Australia engage in joint development cooperation projects in Southeast Asia, the strategic importance of collaborative development initiatives can also extend to the South Pacific, an area gaining increasing prominence. Similar to the regular 'ASEAN Policy Dialogues' conducted by South Korea and Australia, it's worth considering the proposal of a 'South Pacific Policy Dialogue,' resembling South Korea's solidarity with ASEAN, such as the 'Korea-ASEAN Partnership for Peace, Prosperity, and People (KAPPPP),'

Furthermore, the improvement in relations between South Korea and Japan opens up possibilities for a trilateral cooperation framework involving South Korea, Japan, and regional nations. If summit talks between South Korea, China, and Japan resume, a platform like the 'Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS)' can be used to propose various TCS+ arrangements, such as TCS-ASEAN, TCS-Europe, TCS-PIF (Pacific Islands Forum), TCS-SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), and TCS-BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).

With the Yoon Suk-yeol government's inauguration and subsequent initiatives like KASI, the 'Indo-Pacific Strategy,' and the 'South Korea-Pacific Island Countries Summit,' expectations for South Korea's comprehensive regional policy have significantly increased. Given the heightened anticipation, it is now time to present concrete implementation plans. The current government has activated a 'Task Force' within the Foreign Ministry to coordinate India-Pacific policies across various government departments. However, it is crucial to secure an independent budget for the implementation of the Indo-Pacific strategy and to streamline the responsible organization. Consideration should be given to establishing a 'control tower' within the National Security Council, and the possibility of creating an 'Indian-Pacific Diplomatic Mission' within the Foreign Ministry should also be explored.

Response

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Thank you very much for some very helpful feedback. You know as I said before I plan to include this paper that I wrote at least as part of a chapter in the book I'm writing at the moment.

So the feedback is always very useful in these situations. Students may not be aware of this so much. But for academics when you're doing research one reason to have panels like this or to go to conferences is to get feedback and to accept criticisms to try and learn from criticisms.

In fact, criticisms are more helpful than positive feedback although of course I'd probably prefer the positive comments, but you have to face the criticisms and in a sense, those can often be the most helpful kinds of feedback. So, thank you very much for all of the comments and also some additional useful points beyond the specific scope of my presentation and paper which are some very important points brought in as well from the discussions.

I think that that's the idea now is that I should respond to the discussion points and then afterward we're going to have an open discussion. I think that's the framework. So first I guess I should do it in order. So I'll start off by responding to Professor Lenz.

Maybe I have a question for you as well which I think we'll take you know into the discussion afterwards. But you mentioned I'm kind of curious. You mentioned the inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and that could be interpreted differently.

I would like in the following discussion perhaps you could explain what you mean by that I kind of briefly mentioned that point and actually just one little side issue there related to the African Union joining the G20. There is actually already a controversial debate about that. And can anyone guess what it is?

Mean I went I was in a couple of online forums and workshops over the last few weeks following the end of the New Delhi summit talking about the consequences, and the results of the G20 presidency of India. And there was one big controversy so far and can anyone guess what it is? Anyone with a microphone can guess what it is.

The big controversy so far is whether will it be called the G21 or the G20 still believe it or not there's a growing discussion, a growing debate and there's already contestation over the issue of whether it will be called the G20 or the G21. The problem is that G21 is just harder to say than G20. So there is a genuine debate about so we'll have to see when Brazil officially takes over the G20 presidency on December 1st.

So it will be quite interesting to see whether they will change their logo to G21 or G20.

And that will be indicative of whether that change has been made. It's controversial because you may be aware of unaware of this but the G7 for example even though effectively the EU is also a member and it's kind of a G8 and they kept the name G7. So there is a genuine discussion about that. And I know that some people again particularly from the Global South have been talking from Africa in a forum recently on the issue of African Union admission to the G20. Actually, in that discussion, this point was quite controversial. I think there will be some unhappiness,

Some real concerns in the Global South that if it isn't changed to G21 it's kind of like an insult to the African Union that they're there. But you know we don't need to boiler change in the name. So that's kind of an interesting aside on that issue. And getting more to the substantive points on the issue of power structures you know is more or less absent from the analysis. I mean that I don't think in terms of power structures in terms of power relations. And so for me, that's a relational issue about dynamics between actors or within networks.

And so I wouldn't frame it in terms of power structures. But the issue of power probably might be implicit in places in the paper. I'm curious I'm tempted to have a look and do a word search to see if I use the word "power". But you might be right. I maybe didn't explicitly discuss power but there are kinds of issues there implicitly. I mean I did mention the relative shift in authority between the Global South and North. I should mention that in that sense I often use the word authority almost in a way that you might think of the word "power" in that sense. So authority in a sense implies influence in many ways.

Yes. So hopefully that kind of response to that point on the issue of Keohane. I mean there you can also add in kind of historical institutionalist arguments about you know path dependency and such. So yes you know Keohane. I mean you know one reason why the G20 became influential during the global financial crisis was perhaps you know there was actually a big discussion about what kind of multilateral forum could or should manage the global financial crisis.

The UN there was some antipathy as well. The United Nations secretariat was rather unhappy that they were not leading on that issue. Basically, the G20 had three major summits and came up with a major policy response two percent fiscal stimulus trillion, 1 trillion dollars in additional funding for the Bretton Woods institutions. And they did all this before the UN had actually released their Stiglitz commission report. So the UN had only published a report on the global financial crisis.

By the time the G20 had actually acted many of you know have taken significant actions.

So that's another little issue there about the role of precedent. You know fact if the G20 existed it become more influential during the crisis because it would become a leader-level summit. And one reason why there was this agreement that the G20 should have that role was simply because it was already there. There was discussion about having a G14 and various other mechanisms that could create a new for dealing with the global financial crisis. But basically, it was easier just to use the G20 because there wouldn't be a big dispute or a big debate about what

the membership should be because it already has the hard members.

In that sense, I think that kind of meets kind of matches in a sense that comment from Keohene about pre-existing structures to use that phrase influencing what would come next. Divergent ideas increase the strength of institutions. I mean I don't think I actually implied that. I can see why perhaps you took that interpretation. I don't think it necessarily. It can sometimes strengthen. If divergent ideas mean previously marginal ideas are actually suddenly mainstreamed and become influential and that they are superior to the previous policy beliefs or ideas then it's an improvement.

But of course, it could potentially go the other way as well. You might have worse ideas becoming more influential as a consequence of this divergence. So I would say that that depends on the case, but I don't think as a general point I would make that claim that diversity necessarily improves the strength of institutions. I just think in the case of the role of the Global South in general in multilateralism my argument is kind of a pragmatic position. I'm not an idealist. I think IR scholars back in the 19th inter-war years between the 20s and 30s learned the lesson that idealism isn't necessarily a good place to start.

So I would say I'm a pragmatist mainly that the Global South has become more significant, more influential. And so you have to engage from the Global North and you have to find a way to overcome some of the previous bad feelings. A Washington consensus was devastating for many societies back in the 90s and early 2000s. And I think that I spent 10 years working in Mexico.

So I have a lot of experience in the Global South and I'm well aware that even today decades later there's a strong antipathy towards and skepticism about the Global North and its motives and the way they have managed the world economy etcetera. So and also the duopoly, the European-US duopoly of the Bretton Woods institutions in the leadership positions those things cause continues to weigh on public opinion and political opinion in the South.

I think for me, it's a pragmatic issue in the Global North and I wrote this in a book actually a short piece that was published prior to the G7 summit back in May. I made this very argument that basically regardless of the merits of the complaints from the Global South about imbalances in the Global North, the G7 and the Global North need to try and improve their image and reputation. And you can do that through things like the loss and damage fund on climate change and other forms of positive engagement in the South.

And I used the phrase in my presentation I didn't mention it because I was trying to speed up but I used the phrase competitive benevolence. And yes I think possibly one benefit of this contested pluralism might be if you see the Chinese the Americans and others trying to positively do good stuff in the Global South in order to enhance their image and to get more support from the Global South that could be a positive. I should move on to some other points from the other discussant. I just so apologize if I skipped over some stuff that we might talk about later as well.

I mean Professor Wang in your discussion of your book and the issue of role theory I mean that I'm sure we have some I mean that is an interesting approach and I'm sure we have some

kind of shared interests and ideas there as well. There's an interesting point you mentioned about Erdogan in Turkey the issue of whether decision-makers try to play it safe in periods of uncertainty or whether it leads to more radical steps. Again this is you know this comes back to the contingency of international relations the contingency of the moment you know it can go either way and I wouldn't deny that but simply that periodical uncertainty does tend to open the possibility of greater contestation.

It doesn't make it inevitable. So hopefully that kind of responds to that point. Katzenstein's book *Plenty and Power*. I mean you know this was published a few years ago in Katzenstein. I think it was an interesting idea and certainly, I myself was very interested in some of the ideas there I don't use the same framework but indeed I think there is some compatibility.

I mentioned in the article the paper that I wrote the paper that he co-authored with Stephen Nelson. I think Nelson and Katzenstein's style anyway on these issues of uncertainty as well. So yes I think Katzenstein says some very good stuff on you know and I would broadly be compatible with some of his ideas there.

The significance of leadership and decision making. Again it can be obviously it's kind of a crucial element here. If you have an effective leader you have the president of a major country at the beginning of a pandemic who makes good decisions and is willing to cooperate with other States in dealing with global public goods challenges then you might have better outcomes than if you have a president who primarily is concerned with his own image and making himself great.

Again I don't know but I think leadership can be important at times. Lack of leadership, absence of leadership, or weakness of leadership can be a serious problem. And indeed in terms of agenda setting even and again, I'll go back to the G20 and there are scholars that focus on the role of the G20 presidency the rotating presidency each year, and the role of leadership in that sense in guiding multilateralism.

And again this year the government of Narendra Modi in India getting some applause for achieving a leader's declaration at their summit agreement a set of agreements in very difficult circumstances now. So leadership I would agree can be highly important.

One or two other points to take here.

I mean you know you mentioned as well these five losses. I mean very briefly in response to that these are serious challenges. And again part of this uncertainty that we're experiencing and there are issues on which governments and policymakers are behind the curve. I mean if you look at financial technology block chain all of this stuff, when you know even regulators central bankers, regulatory organizations in the context of global governance G20 financial stability board Brazil Committee for banking Supervision I mean, and national regulators as well they are kind of you know behind. When there are new developments logically governments and global governments have to respond to those developments.

They can't really preempt the technology until it's actually there. So whether it's AI or Fin

Tech or you know cyber threats, cyber terrorism attacks on infrastructure through you know by those means for example there are these really big challenges. I think I read yesterday that someone from Google I think was saying that you know forget climate change yes big challenge big threat but equally big is the threat from AI artificial intelligence and we need to be thinking more about that.

So we are in a very difficult period in that sense and new challenges but also these technologies hopefully might help us with some of them. Social media of course is a big problem in terms of political discourse, and political debate and again contributes to some of that bad political leadership to the extent that populism has grown in recent years.

An interesting comment and I'll move on to the final discussion in just a moment. So we need to get onto the discussion phase. But yes this issue about the Chinese thinking the world is changing not China is actually a fascinating point very often. I mean there is this hope sometimes that China will undergo some sort of democratic transition. Unfortunately arguably in recent years, the relations between China and other countries in the West in particular the G7 have deteriorated.

Things seem to be better around the time of the global financial crisis. I remember when Barack Obama in 2009 visited China and went to Fudan University and talked to university students there and it was a real success. It was a good piece of bilateral diplomacy reinforcing cooperation, and strong cooperation between the Chinese, the Americans, and others in the G20 on the global financial crisis. And so it is unfortunate that things have deteriorated there.

Now whether China's going to change again or whether the rest of the world is changing well again that's the uncertainty element. We'll have to see what happens. But also Professor Wang mentioned the cooperation with the West on issues like anti-corruption. Again there are issues like anti-corruption tax the new global tax agenda and others on which there is still some kind of cooperation.

Indeed authors such as Alice Derry and Johnston wrote a book around 20 years ago discussing the issue of socialization and how Chinese policymakers have kind of changed some of their ideas as they have been to training sessions for example with IMF staff. And you know so in that process of integration with those kinds of international institutions perhaps that also sets out the possibility for reciprocal socialization that might overcome some of those differences over time.

Coming on to Professor Lee quickly some key points here. I mean thank you for talking and focusing on relations between China, Japan, and South Korea and indeed, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. A few years ago in Jeju, I actually gave a presentation on the trilateral cooperation of a secretariat which unfortunately has from time to time not really operated much. But at the very least you know those kinds of frameworks, organizational frameworks, regional frameworks, and potentially hold the possibility of those kinds of relations building over time and improving potentially.

And, does the increased influence of the Global South make things worse potentially? yes. Again as a pragmatist, I would say that there just needs to be engagement with the Global South because there isn't much alternative. And in that process of engagement, there needs to be listening both ways for one thing. So indeed some of the lessons from the Global South have been integrated more into global economic governance in recent years with the SDGs etcetera.

There's this idea also of listening to voices, local voices rather than imposing ideas hierarchically from above. And I think that helps as well potentially. So there are problems and challenges. There is there are bad governments in the Global South.

There are problems in the Global South in terms of corruption and other things policies that are not very nice governments that are not democratic societies that are suffering from authoritarian abuses and such. So yes the Global South isn't you know isn't perfect but engagement is still the only option. I feel and I hope through engagement there might be improvements in relations and indeed improvements in the societies of the Global South.

The issue of whether the G20 is trying to contain China the whole debate about containment of China it does depends to some extent on your perspective probably. And I think from the Chinese perspective the idea that the G7 in particular might be trying to contain China then you've got things like the quad alliance as well for example and these other various kinds of arrangements.

That's a clear concern in China. But, I mean the G7 would claim that they're not necessarily trying to have a confrontation with China but they're worried about potential risks hence de-risking. But yes, it's a kind of a tricky issue. And it can whether de-risking necessarily increases confrontation or makes relations even worse which is a potential risk. Perhaps diplomacy can help reduce some of those tensions but yes you know it's it's a big issue.

History is too late. I mean very often we are too late but then you know it also we can talk about counterfactuals and we don't know things might have been worse if we'd done things differently sometimes so you can only hope that they would have been better.

But yes and I agree on the lack of action. I mean the idea with public policy making I mean you know as I'm sure you're very well aware is that sometimes it is incremental sometimes it is slow often too slow but again you know there isn't much alternative. I mean unless you can get politicians into a room who are immediately going to you know say we got we're going to do this we're going to do it now but then very often you have legislatures and legal systems that will slow down things.

Anyway so yes it's unfortunate that we can't fix everything quickly but I'm not sure there's any alternative any other way.

And, well anyway thank you again for all your comments and I look forward to further discussion.

If there's no one else I would just give my tooth sent a width. Well, it's very inspiring to talk

about all those issues fragmentation deglobalization decoupling the rising, and so on and so forth. I think we are standing at the threshold and I think everyone would agree that a new global order is in the making. Now all those things that you have been talking about are the elements that may be serving as the main components for a less stabilized ahead well but I'm sure everyone would also agree that a lot of those issues can be analyzed and approached in the context of this new bipolar system if I May be right. In other words, a lot of the uncertainties and newly created famine might be a result of the rivalry between the two superpowers namely the United States and China for the sake of making conversation since there's no one else is responding possibly because you know this is too daunting an issue. So how is it different from say a bipolar system context? You know if someone says this is another book of you. China rivalry with what would you respond to that very superficial observation?

Thank you. Professor Chao, it's I mean it reminds me of that you know 1945 when I mean soon after that by the late 40s people were talking about two superpowers the Cold War.

But in 1945 I think at least the British I would kind of like to think that there were three involved but perhaps it was kind of two and a half and I do wonder where that puts it.

You know whether Russia today is like the British in 1945. Are we with two and a half superpowers? I'm not sure what the Russians would say about that.

And a scholar called David Shambell some years ago wrote a book talking about China as a partial global power. You May have heard of it or May be aware of it. So he basically argued that China was in this at the time. I think that was published in 2013 I believe he wrote another book a few years later kind of modifying his ideas a little bit. However, in the original book, he argued that China was a partial global power. So yes there were elements of a superpower entity or the potential to be a superpower with the global reach. But he argued at that time at least that China remained predominantly an Asian power and an Asian influence.

And also if you look at the comparisons between the United States and China there was originally some years ago there was a prediction I think that China would overtake the US economy this year to become the world's biggest economy. Actually. Now that prediction has been put back maybe another decade or so because China's economy has slowed down in recent years.

Even then, it may not be inevitable even though China is a huge country it may not inevitably overtake us in terms of economic size. Back in the 1980s, there were predictions about Japan overtaking in the end, now there are predictions that Germany is going to overtake Japan to become the third biggest economy in nominal terms. So in terms of the strength of China I mean in terms of its military capabilities can it compete? Does it compete with the United States?

And we're regionally within Asia particularly unfortunately across the Taiwan straits, probably but on a global scale, there is the Belt and Road initiative but now even the American Biden has this new initiative involving some countries. Was it India going across to the Middle

East trying to have a kind of competitive framework for the Belt and Road initiative? And even the Belt and Road initiative isn't quite as popular perhaps as it was a few years ago.

Again, I mentioned earlier the issue of depolarization you know whether but what replaces the US dollar and yen now the Chinese currency is unlikely to play the role of the US dollar because to play that role china's economy would have to be more like the US economy and more open to allowing the yen to be openly traded.

So that is all of that talk about dollarization. Whatever currency replaced the dollar would need to be probably designed in a similar framework institutionally legally to the US dollar in you know whichever country whether it's China or another country. So even in that sense, you know whether the Chinese currency and economy could supplant the influence of the US is questionable.

I think politics is a big issue here as well. What is going on inside China? If you're a Chinese government minister you might want to look for other careers at the moment. I mean you might be looking for job vacancies because your job isn't very secure. And you know several Chinese senior ministers have lost their positions with you know with some uncertainty about why.

So, I don't think everything is perfect in China. You've got the whole ever-grand issue you know so these big real estate companies that are facing potential bankruptcy and you know China's economy potentially there have been comparisons made with Japan in the early 90s. So I mean China remains a large country with a large population and a strong military still.

Is it going to be influenced by the conflict in Ukraine? Is it going to be again we mentioned over dinner last night that you know that there is at least some talk about the influence of the Ukraine war and how that might have lessons for the Chinese and Taiwan and some negative lessons in terms of the experience until now that might actually act as a disincentive for the Chinese to act aggressively towards Taiwan.

Collective Deterrence with Weaponized Interdependence: How Democracies Can Counter China’s Economic Coercion

KIM, Jung

University of North Korean Studies

Introduction

I address issues about the implication of interdependence in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia. Let us start with the idea of collective deterrence with weaponized recognized interdependence. Deterrence is the keyword for the international security studies coined by Thomas Schelling that is the symbol of 20th-century international studies.¹ It is the keyword for explaining almost everything and how we can keep this long peace during the second half of the 20th century and possibly until today in the 21st century.

The second is the concept of interdependence, which is coined by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye during the 1970s to describe the increasing complexity of the international political economy.² This is also a keyword for the liberal theory of international relations. During the second half of the 20th century if we have a globalization and complex interdependency in the world economy then possibly the 21st century should have been filled with permanent peace among nations. That was the hope of the 20th century especially in the field of international political economy.

In the 21st century, we have to make some modifications to that idea. First, for the deterrence I add collective one. Because usually difference is provided by great power, in that

1 Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence (with a New Preface and Afterword)* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).

2 Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence (4th Edition)* (New York: Pearson, 2011).

sense, it is a kind of unilateral strategy. But I add collective which is some kind of uniqueness in 21st century in terms of economic security. In order to maintain economic security, we have to forge a kind of collective form of deterrence. That's my first main idea for this paper.

The second is that interdependence is no longer a buzzword for maintaining international peace. Instead, it can be a source of huge conflict. That is a paradoxical outcome of the economic interdependence. And in order to identify the uniqueness of the interdependency 21st century I add weaponized one. Today globalization is no longer a kind of secret path towards peace and prosperity.

Instead, it could be a dangerous source of first economic coercion and second possibly further militarized conflict. This is the kind of new mood of the 21st century in terms of international security as well as international political economy: collective deterrence with weaponized interdependence.

Of this paper, the subtitle indicates how democracies can counter China's economic coercion. This is a serious problem. Today many discussions indicate that China could be a problem for maintaining East Asian peace in particular world peace in general given its huge economic might in the globalized market as well as its increasing military power to compete with the United States. As in this subtitle, I hope I can introduce some noble ideas on how to make a cooperative endeavor among democracies in order to shape the behavior of China. Let me be clear that my discussion is not about how to contain China's rise. Instead, this is a proposal to coexist with China which has more prudent and more peaceful behavior with democracies surrounding the nation.

Weaponized Interdependence: A Conceptual Clarification

In the 21st century, one of the big shifts in terms of the security dialogue especially among democracies is that China emerged as a shared security concern. In the United States' national security statement, China is the only competitor in its security realm. In Japan, the newly published national security paper also indicates that China is a grave possible challenge to Japan's security. And for the first time, I think since the democratization the new government in South Korea specifically indicates that China could be a potential or possibly real threat to South Korean security as well. In that sense in East Asia, China has now become a shared security concern reality. That perception is shared by three important democracies South Korea, Japan, and the United States.

Most of the time, it is usually that North Korea is the common security problem. But despite North Korea's growing threat, most of the achievements at the Camp David Summit in the summer meeting among U. S. President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol were driven more by the addition of China as shared security concerns rather than a sole focused on North Korea. Now three democracies extend their threat perception including China's military as well as economic coercion. The addition of

China as a driver for trilateral coordination marks a notable shift in the dynamics of cooperation among not only three countries but also democracies of European unions with Australia or New Zealand.

All of those important democracies now share the same security concerns, especially in the economic realm. For them the real question is: How to shape the behavior of coercive Chinese economic power? In all probability China's defense of its core interests will continue to generate coercive behavior. This is the core problem. Beijing's economic burden entails sudden stoppage of imports from a particular country reducing the Chinese tourists to target states' consumers, or any number of entry barriers based on country in terms of the health and safety standards. These are the examples of Chinese economic coercion.

No one democracy on its own can deal with and decouple fully from Chinese economic demand. It is simply impossible to decouple China since its scale is so huge. No democracy can survive in terms of economic prosperity without the Chinese market. Decoupling is a kind of myth so we need to have a more realistic strategy. Democracies are asymmetrically dependent on China in its trade balance. For example, China accounts for 23.9 percent of South Korea, 20.3 percent of Japan, 25.9 percent of Australia, and 30.9 percent United States in 2020 in terms of trade. Based on the statistics, I think decoupling is simply impossible.³

Since the year of Keohane and Nye who coined the term, economic interdependence is a kind of peacemaker. At that time economic interdependence means three things. First of all, Economic interdependence constrains the likelihood of violent conflict because it raises the costs of disruption and incentivizes the relevant actors to continue to cooperate. It is a source of cooperation. Second, economic interdependence empowers domestic actors within great powers and enriches rising powers and non-state actors which produce a diffusion effect in world policies so it can produce better conditions for development. Lastly, economic interdependence enables the United States as the indispensable economic hegemon with the most connection to be the central player in the global agenda and unlock innovation and sustainable growth. Economic interdependence assumes that the United States is a benevolent government so that prosperity, development, and globalization will be beneficial not only for the United States but also the rest of the world.

As we may know today, these ideas turn out to be naive. Many scholars today criticized China's behavior as weaponized interdependence. I think that is a kind of misnomer. Weaponized interdependence can be used only for the hegemon like the United States. First, weaponized interdependence is a condition under which an actor can exploit its position, not the size or the scale. It might be in an embedded network to gain a bargaining advantage over others in a contained system. That is the positional power. Second, states with political authority over central economic norms can weaponize networks that just its market-side networks to gather

³ Thomas J. Christensen, "Mutually Assured Disruption: Globalization, Security, and the Dangers of Decoupling," *World Politics* (2024), 75th Anniversary, Advanced Access <https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/918726/pdf>.

information or choke of economic information flows. If you use networked interdependence then you can literally kill an economy and discover and exploit vulnerability in terms of interdependency and compel bitter unwanted actions. It is based on network power, not the naked power. In that sense, the United States is the only actor in the world economy that can exercise so-called weaponized independence.

Figure 1 illustrates a conceptual map of the likelihood of the resort to weaponized interdependence. There are two conditions. The first one is whether hegemonic commitment is strong or weak. If the hegemonic commitment is strong then you do not have to use weaponized interdependence. Only when the hegemon is declining then there will be some opportunity as well as motivation for the hegemon to use this huge weapon. The second is the perception of security importance. If for the hegemons the discrete environment is perceived as benign, then once again you do not need to use weaponized interdependence. But if the security environment is threatening then you have once again an opportunity as well as the motivation to use that one. It is possible to make a clear conceptual distinction. First, minimal use of weaponized interdependence. That is the situation of the 20th century's U. S. commitment of liberal international order when its hegemonic power is strong and its international environment is not threatening. During the so-called unipolar moment, the United States did not feel they needed to use a kind of weaponized interdependence.

Figure 1. Likelihood of resort to weaponized interdependence

		Hegemonic Commitment	
		Strong	Weak
Perception of Security Environment	Benign	<i>Minimal Use</i>	<i>Stochastic Use</i>
	Threatening	<i>Modified Use</i>	<i>Routine Use</i>

Today the situation is totally different. Recall the rise of Trump as the president of the United States and how his administration tried to use weaponized independence. At the same time, many Americans feel that they are insecure especially due to the rising competitors like China or today Russia. Now it is a mature time for routine use of weaponizing interdependence because the U.S. commitment is weak and the international environment in terms of security is threatening them. That is why the United States now has the opportunity to use the weaponized

interdependence.⁴

Another important conceptual distinction needs to be made between asymmetric independence and weaponized interdependence. Many scholars as well as practitioners think that China used weaponized interdependence in favor of their interests. In order to use weaponized interdependence, it is necessary to identify the conditions as shown in Figure 2. The first one is about the target. If the target is the state, then we can say something about using interdependence in favor of their own interests. But if the target is economic actors, then they are totally different categories. And the second one is the use of what kind of channel they try to use in terms of interdependence.

Figure 2. Varieties of economic coercion

		Target	
		States	Economic Actors
Channel	Bilateral	<i>Asymmetric Interdependence</i>	<i>Market Power</i>
	Network	<i>Weaponized Interdependence</i>	<i>Points of Control</i>

If it is bilateral then we can identify asymmetric interdependence. If you use it with network then it is weaponizing interdependence. As a result, there are two different concepts. In asymmetric interdependence, the target state depends on access to the targeting state's economy making it vulnerable to a variety of forms of economic burden. China used this asymmetric interdependence. It is basically relying on its huge size, scope, and scale.

The United States has the potential to use weaponized interdependence in which the target state depends on access to the targeting state's network and raising the cost that it would have to bear for non-compliance. This is the network power of the United States.⁵

United States' security network is unmatched because of four characteristics.

First of all, the scale of the U. S. Network is incomparable to that of China as shown in

4 Michael Mastanduno, "Hegemony and Fear: The National Security Determinants of Weaponized Interdependence," Daniel W. Drezner, Henry Farrell, and Abraham L. Newman (eds.), *The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2021): 67-83.

5 Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence and Networked Coercion: A Research Agenda," Daniel W. Drezner, Henry Farrell, and Abraham L. Newman (eds.), *The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2021): 305-322.

Figures 3 and 4. Second, its capability is disproportionate within the network. Third, in terms of its centrality within the network as measured by a number of security ties, more than 70 countries are connected to the United States as a hub. And fourth, the structure of the network is measured by other countries' ties to the U. S. and each other is much more complex compared to that of China. The United States has the most powerful network that can be transferred to or used for so-called weaponized independence. These networked properties offer the United States extraordinary leverage and flexibility.

Now see China's network power. China has only one ally which is North Korea. The bilateral Chinese security network pales in comparison and has no structural holes. Although China's rapid growth in economic and military capability has grabbed the headlines, its comparatively constrained ability to benefit from network centrality has a stark disadvantage. China has some advantage in terms of asymmetric independence but it is not comparable to the United States in terms of weaponized independence.⁶

Figure 3. Network power of the United States





Figure 4. Network power of China



⁶ Michael Mastanduno, "Partner Politics: Russia, China, and the Challenge of Extending US Hegemony after the Cold War," *Security Studies* 28 (3) (2019): 479-504.


Collective Deterrence: A Strategic Cooperation of Democracies

We need to add one more on top of weaponized interdependence: Collective deterrence. First, democratic cooperation with the weaponized interdependence can produce a collective deterrence strategy that rests on the threat of multilateral response to counter economic coercion of China. For South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and even the United States if each nation acts alone then it cannot compete with China in terms of asymmetric interdependence. Only when they act in concert, they can have some deterrence power to shape the behavior of China. This collective deterrence must be a byproduct of like-minded countries like democracies Japan, South Korea Taiwan, Australia, or New Zealand.

The collective deterrence strategy uses the threat of punishment with retaliation by exploiting the network power to impose significant and unacceptable costs on China. If China attempts to coerce other economies, the key idea of deterrence is to make a threat and show the determination of the commitment to the punishment so that without using actual force democracies can deter the behavior or action of the target. This is based on the logic of non-action.

That is why deterrence is important to maintain peace and stability in East Asia. But this peace and stability is based on deterrence which is supported by collective power based on the networked bond. The collective of democracies can credibly signal that it will carry out the punishment if and when China acts against any of the states in the collective.⁷

Figure 5. Substitutability of China's high-dependence goods




⁷ Victor D. Cha, "Collective Resilience: Deterring China's Weaponization of Economic Interdependence," *International Security* 48 (1) (2023): 91-124.

The key question for this is how we can nurture the idea of solidarity across like-minded democracies. This is a daunting task because there is always a collective action dilemma. The good news for democracies is that China is highly dependent on some important industrial elements in democracies. The substitutability of high-demand goods is the choke point of China's economy. In this sense, a collective deterrence strategy must meet two criteria. First, the goods must have some strategic value, especially for Chinese industrialization. Second, the goods must have low substitutability.

The second one is important. As illustrated in Figure 5, for example, grain sorghum, which is the one element important in the field the manufacturing, United States secured 63 percent in the use of China, then Argentina 18 percent, and Australia 170 percent. More than 18 or 19 percent of this item has to be imported from these democracies. If we can coordinate the action of these democracies then we can secure the choke point of China. Of course, this is a difficult endeavor but if it is succeeded then we can make a counteract to deter the behavior of China. If China were unable to import these items from its top three or four suppliers and most of them from democracies, finding alternative sources could create significant transaction costs. This is the choke point of Chinese economies.

Figure 6. Unfavorable view of China among democracies



This is a viable strategy but it must be coordinated. In international relations, international coordination is one of the most difficult challenges. But there is a seed that may make a collective action of democracies possible. As shown in Figure 6, a public survey of the unfavorable view of China worldwide, most of the democracies now have the score of more than 65 percent. The highest one is even more than 75 percent. Large majority of the population across democracies now have a very unfavorable view of China. This is mainly due to the Chinese rampant and constant economic coercion. This can be the domestic foundation to forge foreign policy to counter the Chinese economic coercion among democracies. It is a kind of mature time point for policymakers in democracies to make some more effective coordination in order to deter Chinese economic coordination in a more concerted way.

Conclusion

To be clear, once again, my suggestion is not about fighting with China. it is also infeasible. Decoupling from China is impossible, I think. China has huge economic might. The only possible strategy or solution to change the behavior of China in a peaceful way is to have better cooperation among democracies in order to use weaponized interdependence as a collective deterrent power.

That may be in the near future feasible solution is to change some kind of security environment in East Asia so that we can coexist with China. Without the regime change in China, we can learn from this kind of collective difference experience that authoritarian countries and democracies can coexist. And that is a sort of solution to maintain peace in East Asia in the 21st century.

Comments

Dr. Hanssen, Ulv

Professor, Soka University

Let me begin by apologizing for my absence. I had been looking forward to the Peace Forum, but since I suddenly contracted the flu, I think it is best for everyone's health that I stay away. I hope everyone will have a stimulating and fruitful day of discussions.

I also want to thank Professor Kim for providing the Forum with such a thought-provoking presentation. Please allow me to give a couple of comments.

Rather than dealing with the details of the presentation, I want to question and problematize some of its underlying assumptions. This might force me to assume a more China-friendly position than I otherwise would, but for the sake of feedback, I think it is useful to sometimes play the devil's advocate. But I should also say that I genuinely feel that China is too often demonized in academic and general discourse, so questioning our assumptions about that country can be a fruitful exercise.

The first underlying assumption in the presentation that I want to challenge is the notion that China is engaging in economic coercion.

Can we actually take it as an established fact that China is engaging in economic coercion?

If China's economic diplomacy is so coercive, why have 80% of the countries of the world joined the Belt and Road Initiative? Ten years after Xi Jinping launched the initiative in 2013, there are now 154 countries that have joined the BRI. No one forced them to do so. If these countries had been worried about economic coercion, it seems highly unlikely that they would have joined and voluntarily exposed themselves to China's economic coercion. Most of the countries that have not joined the BRI are the rich, Western democracies. These are also the countries that tend to criticize China of economic coercion. I think it is important to keep in mind that this criticism is mainly a Western phenomenon that might find far less resonance in the global south.

At this point, many listeners would perhaps object and point to China's so-called "debt-trap diplomacy" – the notion that poor countries that trade with China get caught in debt traps deliberately planted by China. However, this claim has been heavily scrutinized, if not debunked by various research in recent years. The most commonly cited victims of debt-trap diplomacy are Sri Lanka and Malaysia. However, a 2020 study by Chatham House called "Debunking the myth of 'debt-trap diplomacy'", found that the debt problems of these countries had little to do with China, but rather stemmed from, quote, "the misconduct of local elites and western-dominated

financial markets". The study concludes that there is limited evidence for Chinese debt-trap diplomacy. More recent studies have come to similar conclusions. In other words, the idea of Chinese economic coercion should be problematized and not taken for granted.

I would think that, to many countries in the global south, Western criticisms of Chinese debt-trap diplomacy sound hollow given that Western countries have imposed real debt-traps on developing countries for 40 years through the IMF and its Structural Adjustment Programs.

That brings me to another underlying assumption in the presentation that I want to problematize. This assumption is the idea that an alliance of democracies to resist Chinese economic coercion can or should be led by the US.

Given the US' own inclination for economic coercion, I wonder whether a US-led democratic alliance against China can achieve the necessary credibility to be effective and attractive. For such an alliance to be credible, it should naturally not be engaging in the same coercive policies as Beijing is accused of. However, virtually all of the examples of economic coercion that you attribute to China can also be attributed to the US, be it tariffs, export and import stops and nontariff barriers.

Japan, despite being an ally of the US, is very familiar with US coercive measures. When Japan was emerging as a serious economic competitor to the US in the 1980s, the US forced Japan to limit exports to the US and to strengthen the yen against the dollar. Both measures were aimed at reducing American trade deficits and Japan was left with little choice but to comply, something that indirectly led to Japan's disastrous bubble economy.

But such coercive measures by the US are not limited to the distant past. More recently, the US has, for example, paralyzed the WTO for many years by refusing to nominate judges to the institution's Appellate Body. It has routinely ignored WTO rulings against Washington's protectionist measures.

The US has also increasingly come to weaponize the US dollar through economic sanctions against geopolitical rivals. The US is currently sanctioning some 40 countries, affecting billions of people. Some of these sanctions are strongly opposed by nearly the whole global community, such as the long-standing trade embargo against Cuba. Because of this growing American inclination to weaponize the dollar, we are now hearing calls for de-dollarization, particularly in the expanded BRICS camp where many are frustrated with US coercive management of the world's reserve currency.

In short, the US has a long history of economic coercion, which often seems to be of a more aggressive nature than that of China.

My question is therefore, how can a democratic alliance of countries against Chinese economic bullying be seen as legitimate when it is led by the US, which itself often acts as the biggest economic bully?

My personal concern is that there is a risk that such an alliance would be seen as

hypocritical and perhaps even illegitimate in the eyes of countries which do not belong to the US' immediate circle of allies. That could make such an alliance fairly isolated on the global stage.

All this is not to deny that China is sometimes engaging in economic coercion. As a Norwegian, I remember very well the several years of unofficial economic sanctions against Norway after the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize Committee awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident. What I seek to problematize is simply the notion that China is particularly prone to use economic coercion compared to other economic great powers, especially the US.

In conclusion, let me summarize my two critical points regarding the underlying assumptions of the presentation.

The first assumption is that China is unusually prone to engage in economic coercion. Can we really say that this is an established fact?

The second assumption is that a counter-China alliance of democratic countries can and should be led by the US. How can such an alliance achieve credibility when its leader often engages in the same coercive measures that China is being accused of?

Finally, I should point out that I have only seen the presentation slides and not heard the actual presentation, so I want to apologize if I have misunderstood some of the presentation's arguments. Thank you again for providing the Forum with such a thought-provoking presentation.

Dr. Lenz, Hartmut

Professor, Soka University

Good morning, everyone, I am here in Professor Hanssen's stead today, as he is currently under the weather. Before we begin, I'd like to share a brief overview of the notes and insights he provided to me last evening.

Firstly, Professor Hanssen discusses the concept of economic coercion and China's economic relations with other actors. He raises the question of whether the perception of China's actions is biased, particularly by other democracies in the region and global North countries, and whether the global South has a different attitude towards Chinese development. He suggests that the acceptance of initiatives like the Belt and Road and AIIB by a wide range of countries could indicate that the perception of economic coercion may be skewed.

Moreover, Professor Hanssen examines the possibility of the United States using economic coercion, drawing parallels with past policies towards Japan in the 1980s. He asks whether strong interdependence with the US, considering its potential use of coercion, is wise, given that they might employ similar tactics to the countries they wish to contain.

Additionally, I would like to add a couple of my own points, which highlight a slightly

different perspective: Firstly, the relationship between Japan, China, South Korea, and the US serves as an example of how cooperation, despite substantial differences and competition, can exist among democracies. However, I question the reliability of this cooperation, particularly when there are costs involved. If these costs are unequally allocated, maintaining cooperation may be challenging.

Secondly, domestic acceptance of such cooperation is crucial. My German experience during a recent Russian invasion of Ukraine highlights the difficulties in changing interdependence-driven policies. When countries need to make changes, competition and differing opinions can hinder comprehensive strategies.

Regarding democracies, while they are brought together by their democratic nature, they are also particularly sensitive to domestic costs. This sensitivity to costs, given that they are accountable to their voters, can make it challenging for democracies to bear high costs.

Lastly, the importance of certainty in deterrence, both in military and economic terms, cannot be overstated. In economic deterrence, uncertainty is heightened, making it challenging to predict how countries will react. This uncertainty can burden foreign alliances.

I look forward to discussing these points further.

Response

Dr. Kim, Jung

Professor, University of North Korean Studies

Thank you very much for very helpful comments. First, even if he is not here today, I deliver my appreciation to Professor Hanssen. I think his comment has the point. Then I have to struggle with his comments if I want to develop this idea further to the more solid paper.

I like joining this sort of international conference always because I can get very constructive feedback before I fully develop my idea for the paper. This is I think the first possible example of how you can nurture this kind of coordination, especially in the scholarly community. And I want to extend the idea to the policymakers among democracies hopefully. Let me say even if very defensive one let me make some response to Professor Hansen's comments as well as Professor Lenz's comments here.

First of all, I want to emphasize that once again I'm very pessimistic. I don't believe that the democratic coordination would be easy. Formulating different strategies among a large number of countries is a huge challenge regardless of whether they are democracies or not. This is basically due to international relations being characterized by anarchy. So, cooperation is not guaranteed. And basically, even if it is possible, almost always self-help is better than cooperation.

That's the key. But I want to add on top of that one more thing even if we also characterized the international history of international relations with some rise and decline of alliance. An alliance is a paradoxical phenomenon in international relations because if you make an alliance then you have to sacrifice the whole autonomy of your own nation. That is a very bad thing in terms of the self-help principle. So even if the self-help principle is very important it is not a universal principle. It's conditional. I think most of the policymaking of a nation has to be conditional. You have to think about which one is better in terms of say gain and loss.

The calculation will give you some specific policy options. Sometimes, it's better not to cooperate with other nations but other times you might realize that international cooperation will be beneficial. I bet the history of international relations has two sides here. Non-cooperation will be the optimal solution sometimes but other times cooperation will give you a better chance to survive. So that's the reality of international leaders. Even if I'm a very pessimistic person I would not deny the evolution of international relations history. So sometimes even very self-interested policymakers cannot help but to cooperate. That's the starting point.

Let's move to the comments from Professor Hanssen. Here is how to perceive the economic

threats originated from China across nations. Is it homogeneous or heterogeneous? Without doubt the perception of the economic coercion of China is heterogeneous depending on many things.

But one of the most important things is, if this is linked to the comments from Professor Lenz, that if your country's political system is a democracy then you have to maintain a democratic political process. And in order to do that you need to think very seriously about a sort of economic transactions with China, which could be accommodated sometimes but need to be resisted other times.

So, this is once again conditional on the political system and democracies in that sense are vulnerable to outside pressure. But at the same time if outside pressure is too strong then in order to maintain democratic order you have to push back. In that sense democracy is resilient and once again I bet the bright side of democracy. I think the perception of the economic benefits of China is correct. How to secure is an important question.

Among advanced democracies, they have some motivations to deal with this kind of coercion in a concerted way. I emphasize these are motivations. If there's no opportunity to actually realize this motivation then no collective action is possible. So, there are once again, conditional things but great powers might think differently. They think the economic interdependence would not be so costly for their economy; it could be beneficial.

So, I think in terms of the possibility of solidarity among advanced industrial democracies and higher developing countries be it democratic or authoritarian the possibility may be low but still hopeful.

Presentation II

The Crisis and Turning Point of Adolescents in the Post-Pandemic Era in Greater China: A Comparative Analysis of Social Care, Integration Promotion, and Mental and Physical Health

Lau Ping-Kuen; Kuo Jing-Houng; Lo Po-Chan; Peng Zhen;
Liao Tzu-Ting

Responding Author: Kuo, Jing-Houng,
Professor, Dep. of Social Welfare, Chinese Culture University

Abstract

The research surveyed total of 10,131 adolescent, 6,166 living in mainland China, 2,478 living in Macau, and 1,487 living in Taiwan. The data analysis examined how the COVID-19 pandemic affected adolescent life regarding mental health in these three different Chinese ethnic regions.

The research compared the differences of the surveyed adolescent in living conditions, self-resilience, and mental health. It used the shotgun approach to examine the relationship among internet use behavior, social relationships, social support, self-resilience, and mental health.

The analysis results found that adolescent living in Macau showed the highest scores in terms of interpersonal distress and academic distress; tolerance for internet addiction and compulsive internet use symptoms; perception of interpersonal problems related to internet addiction.

Adolescent living in Taiwan showed the highest scores in terms of stress/anxiety; motivation for using social/consumption tools on the internet; higher perception of the intimacy and

informational aspects of real-life social interaction with friends and peers; level of instrumental and informational support from family members;

Adolescent living in China showed the highest scores in terms of perception of the intimacy and informational aspects of online social interaction with internet friends; and perception of self-resilience.

The findings suggested that tolerance to internet addiction, time management and interpersonal health issues related to internet addiction, intimacy with family members and informational aspects of real-life social interaction with peers and friends, intimacy with internet friends, family social support, and self-resilience can predict psychological health, including interpersonal distress, academic distress, stress and anxiety, and depression.

The statistical analysis concluded that the predictive power is highest for teenagers living in China, ranging from 20% to 25%, while those living in Macau and Taiwan have similar predictive power, ranging from 11% to 20%.

Introduction

I. The Youth and the Pandemic

Transiting from middle childhood into adolescence, teenagers undergo rapid changes in their physical and psychological development, including their social skill in interacting with other people. The period of adolescence, accompanied by a fast-paced developmental rhythm, can bring stress and challenges to teenagers, leading to emotional fluctuations that may even affect their academic performance, social life, and daily activities. However, from a developmental perspective, it is always a process that adolescents learn to know about themselves, develop problem-solving skills, improve their personal skills, and emotional management to deal with any incoming growing up challenges. The learned personal skills and emotional management methods would help them enhance their potential and promote their holistic development. Adolescents inevitably encounter different challenges and confusions on their path to growth, and they must learn to overcome these hurdles in order to thrive in their learning, work, and life. The teenage years are not only a transitional period from middle childhood to adulthood but also a crucial stage for individuals to define self-identity. Therefore, the values and behavior patterns formed during this period have a profound impact on future adulthood and later life development.

In the United States, approximately four million children have mental health issues, and 10% to 20% of adolescents experience psychological distress (USDHHS, 1999). Unfortunately, only half of them receive professional help (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1981). In China, it is known that nearly 20% of children and adolescents have significant problems in their physical and mental health development. Furthermore, a sampling survey was conducted on primary and secondary school students in some critical regions, and the analysis of the survey results revealed that between 50% and 67% of students of the same age group in China suffer from varying

degrees of physical and mental health problems. The severity of psychological distress is evaluated based on behavioral manifestations. Achenbach and Edelbrock (1981) classified psychological distress into two categories:

1. Externalizers: Individuals who exhibit conflicts in their external world, such as aggressive behavior, criminal behavior, or sexual problems.
2. Internalizers: Individuals who exhibit conflicts in their internal psyche, such as depression, anxiety, phobias, obesity, and psychosomatic disorders.

The spiritual conflicts between external and internal factors are caused by the socialization of children and adolescents. For example, individuals with external spiritual conflicts are often influenced by parents with apparent behavioral problems who show little concern for their children, leading to adolescents and children expressing their aggressive impulses through external behaviors. On the other hand, individuals with internal spiritual conflicts may come from stable families. Although their parents may not have apparent behavioral problems and care deeply for their children, they may have excessive expectations and the children may not be able to meet them. As a result, these adolescents and children internalize their stress and create inner psychological conflicts (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1981). From a perspective of health promotion, adolescence is a critical period for establishing correct health behavior patterns and the initial stage of behavior formation. Therefore, if negative behavior factors can be identified in the early age and controlled or improved, individuals can not only enjoy a healthy adolescence but also extend their physical and mental health into adulthood or old age.

In 2008, a survey was conducted in Taiwan among junior high school students, with 3,960 questionnaires distributed and 3,435 valid responses received, resulting in a response rate of 87%. The results showed the following (Health Magazine, 2008):

1. Junior high school students have low satisfaction with their own body weight.
2. They have insufficient sleep and are prone to attention problems.
3. They have worries but no one to confide in, with 30% having suicidal thoughts.
4. Poor parent-child relationship, communication and interaction.
5. Lack of sex education resources and consults.

For children and adolescents, whether they possess internal resilience to external environmental stressors becomes a protective factor for coping with stress and can help to adjust internal and external distress and conflicts.

The mental health issues of adolescents have received significant attention worldwide. According to the World Health Organization (2018), globally, 10-20% of children and adolescents are affected by mental health problems. A five-year longitudinal study conducted in Australia (Mission Australia & Bad Dog Institute, 2017) surveyed thousands of young people aged 15-19 and found that the percentage of respondents meeting the diagnostic criteria for severe mental illnesses increased from 18.7% in 2012 to 22.8% in 2016. The study in Australia indicated that the concerns of young people at risk of severe mental illnesses include stress,

school-related issues, appearance and body image, and depressive emotions.

Depression is one of the most common psychological disorders among various mental illnesses. According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2017), as early as 2015, there were already over 300 million cases of depression worldwide, and the incidence of depression has shown a significant upward trend in the past decade. Depression is a prevalent mood disorder characterized by persistent feelings of sadness, loss of interest or pleasure, unexplained self-blame and guilt, sleep and appetite disturbances, and loss of daily functioning. In severe cases, it can lead to self-harm or suicidal thoughts and behaviors.

A study by Jha, Singh, Nirala, Kumar, Kumar & Aggrawal (2017) found that among 1,412 young students, 49.2% exhibited depressive symptoms, with 7.7% showing severe depressive symptoms. Another study with similar results was conducted by the Hong Kong Baptist Oi Kwan Social Service (2018), which found that 51.5% of interviewed secondary school students displayed depressive symptoms. Depression is one of the main causes of self-harm in adolescents, leading to poor performance in social and school contexts and serving as a maintaining factor for depression. Moreover, depression often coexists with other mental health symptoms (Rohde, Lewinsohn, & Seeley, 1991). Comorbidity refers to individuals having more than one mental disorder during a specific period (Hall, Lynskey & Teesson, 2001). Studies have shown that adolescents with severe depression also exhibit severe anxiety symptoms (Cummings, Caporino & Kendall, 2014), and Garber & Weersing (2010) found that the negative consequences of anxiety increase the risk of developing depression.

Due to the rapid spread of COVID-19 pandemic starting from early 2020, the lives of people around the world have undergone dramatic changes in every aspect. The worldwide pandemic and the landslide infected population daily and globally, not only affected industries, world economy, and public health management but has also in people's everyday life including the area shut down and limited people's travel between the countries including the quarantine regulation inside the country and from coming abroad.

The pandemic accelerated digital transformation and innovation in various sectors. The integration of intelligent production and remote interaction models into supply and demand chains has become an unstoppable trend, driven by globalization. The pressure of digital transformation, resource allocation and management, cyber security, and data management has not only affected industries but also influenced the learning process in educational institutions. For example, on line learning remotely has become a widespread alternative teaching method adopted by schools worldwide in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and social isolation. Whether remote learning can replace in class teaching and deliver effective instruction has been an ongoing debate. However, interpersonal interaction has been a crucial role on the process of psychological development of adolescent. Erikson's psychosocial development theory also emphasizes that individuals continually experience various "developmental crises" during their development. The individual's "developmental task" is to resolve these crises at different stages

to progress towards a healthy personality.

The teenage stage is the most crucial period for human physical and mental development. Therefore, the detrimental effects during the pandemic not only can lead to immediate behavioral and psychological problems but also may have significant deviations in long-term physical and mental development. During the COVID-19 pandemic, teenagers and young people have expressed worries about their academic performance and career prospects, and the result of the increasing loneliness and anxiety. With limited resources and experience, young people often hesitate to seek help for mental health issues. They may worry about privacy breaches and the fear of being ridiculed by other groups. They may also face peer pressure and prefer to solve their problems on their own or lack awareness of mental health services.

A joint research between the University of Lancaster in the UK and the University of British Columbia in Canada investigated the impact of COVID-19 on various aspects of society. Yang and Yue (2021) focused on a group of 886 teenagers aged 10-16 in the UK who had previously participated in a research study. The study examined the psychological effects during the pandemic and found that teenagers who had a healthy psychological state before the pandemic period, showed significant emotional and behavioral problems, including hyperactivity and decreased communication and social skills with peers during the pandemic. They also exhibited a noticeable decline in prosocial activities such as caring for and helping others. On the other hand, teenagers who had less stable psychological states before the pandemic showed more stable emotional and behavioral patterns during the pandemic, with reduced rates of fighting, bullying, and arguments. The research team suggested that this may be attributed to increased time spent with parents during home isolation. The study also indicated that the socio-economic conditions of families had a significant impact on teenagers' emotional changes during the pandemic. Adolescents from single-parent families who were only children experienced the greatest negative psychological impact during the pandemic, with the highest levels of loneliness. Additionally, families with higher incomes had fewer cases of hyperactivity or behavioral problems compared to families with lower incomes.

Since the outbreak of COVID-19 in mainland China in early 2020, the threat of virus infection to life and the inconveniences caused by various alert levels have led to feelings of panic, anxiety, and other distressing emotions among both adults and children. Children and teenagers have been significantly impacted by the pandemic in terms of their mental health, as highlighted in a survey conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) in the United States. According to the KFF survey, teenagers, young children, LGBTQ youth, and children from racial and ethnic minority groups are particularly susceptible to mental health issues arising from the global pandemic. Factors such as school closures, social distancing measures, and being confined at home can contribute to feelings of loneliness and isolation. Furthermore, the stress faced by parents due to job loss, financial pressures, or lack of time to care for their children can also impact parents' mental health, potentially leading to the transfer of stress onto their children and

affecting overall family dynamics and support systems (Stephenson, 2021).

Moreover, in addition to dysfunction within families, external support systems have also been unable to provide adequate support due to the pandemic. For example, in the United States, social welfare organizations providing services through the Children's Health Insurance Program saw a 50% reduction in the number of children served from February to October 2020, resulting in a significant decrease in resources available to vulnerable families. However, even before the COVID-19 pandemic, there had been a gradual worsening trend in the mental health of children and adolescents, including feelings of sadness, hopelessness, and suicidal thoughts.

After the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a significant increase in emotional distress among teenagers, with one in four middle school students reporting a decline in their emotional and cognitive health. Additionally, two-thirds of teenagers feel unable to cope with their anxiety and the pressure from peer relationships. A survey primarily targeting parents also revealed that among parents of school-aged children (5-12 years old), one in five felt that their children's mental health or emotional state had worsened, 6.3% observed increased anxiety symptoms, and 4.4% noticed signs of depression.

These impacts on the mental health of children and adolescents during the pandemic can be attributed to factors such as being forced to stay at home (unable to go outside) and disruption of regular daily routines. In addition to the United States, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on Asian populations have also been demonstrated in various emotional and physiological disturbances. A large integrated analysis report covering 23 surveys conducted in China and Turkey, involving 57,927 children and adolescents, found that during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019-2020, 29% of children and adolescents met the criteria for depression, 26% experienced anxiety, 44% had sleep disorders, and a staggering 48% exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (Ma, Mazidi, Li, Li, Chen, Kirwan, Zhou, Yan, Rahman, Wang, & Wang, 2021).

Additionally, it is worth noting that there has been an increasing trend in the occurrence of obsessive-compulsive symptoms and tic symptoms among children aged 6-12 in 2020, while cases seeking medical attention for attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms decreased. Possible reasons include children not attending school due to the pandemic, which reduces the opportunity for teachers to observe related symptoms (Moreno, Wykes, Galderisi, Nordentoft, Crossley, Jones, Cannon, Correll, Byrne, Carr, Chen, Gorwood, Johnson, Kärkkäinen, Krystal, Lee, Lieberman, López-Jaramillo, Männikkö, Phillips, Uchida, Vieta, Vita, & Arango, 2020). The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mental health of children and adolescents may not disappear as the pandemic subsides. On the contrary, as life gradually returns to normal, the pressures of readjusting to school life and reconnecting with social relationships may exacerbate anxiety and depressive symptoms. It is important for governments to develop relevant public health policies to assist these students in preparing for their return to school. This could include providing resources and referrals, online counseling platforms, organizing peer support groups, and enhancing parental awareness of mental health issues.

In addressing the psychological issues of adolescents, it is necessary to focus on their unique mental and physical states, as the current social safety net is primarily based on the mental and physical states of adults. Yang and Yue (2021) pointed out that the assistance methods for maintaining mental and physical health in adults are not particularly helpful for teenagers.

Therefore, governments need to develop specific policies to assist teenagers in this regard. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China in early 2020, the changes in lifestyle during the "quarantine" period have posed severe mental and physical challenges to the general public. The fear caused by various pandemic-related information has intensified the occurrence of common mental health problems among adolescents, such as insomnia, depression, and anxiety. Chi et al. (2020) conducted psychological health assessments using the Youth Self-Rating Insomnia Scale (YSIS), Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9), and Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7) among a sample of adolescents in China. The results showed that the prevalence rates of insomnia, depression, and anxiety symptoms among Chinese adolescents during the COVID-19 pandemic were 37.80%, 48.20%, and 36.70%, respectively. In other words, symptoms of mental health problems were relatively common among adolescents during the pandemic.

However, the prolonged period of remote learning caused by the COVID-19 pandemic not only deprived adolescents of valuable opportunities for diverse interpersonal interactions and identity formation in schools but also increased their reliance on internet usage. Adolescents often experience helplessness, anxiety, and unease during developmental crises, and without proper adult guidance and supervision, they may spend long periods immersed in the online world. Virtual interactions and gaming can easily become a means for adolescents to escape from the realities of identity crisis and alleviate stress. The virtual world provides adolescents with the functions of "fantasy and exploration" and role-playing, allowing them to express themselves and forget the challenges of real-life by overcoming obstacles and achieving immediate psychological feedback and self-satisfaction. This alternative avenue of self-affirmation and self-identity emerges. Consequently, various adolescent problems arise, such as withdrawal and alienation in interpersonal relationships, visual impairment from excessive screen time, diminished autonomy, difficulty in socializing and conversing with others face-to-face, and narrowed scope of life domains. Excessive internet immersion leads to weakened academic, occupational, educational, social, familial, and psychophysical functioning.

According to the report provided by the Health Line in 2022, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the United States has pointed out that the mental health of adolescents is at risk due to the pandemic, with an increase in teenagers experiencing mental health conditions and feelings of hopelessness. In the past, these situations might have been detected by teachers and parents at school, and experts urge for attention to be paid to the well-being of children at home rather than attributing everything to "the child is just adapting to the new normal caused by COVID-19". On average, 20% of children in the United States are found

to have mental health issues before graduating from high school, but only about half of them receive evaluation or treatment. Approximately 15% of children improve their condition through school, family, peer support, and physical activity. However, the pandemic has forced children to stay at home, and as time goes on, these children may not receive the help they need. While some children may be affected by the virus itself, as it can impact the brain that accounts for only a small fraction of cases. The pandemic has indeed made children's lives very different, and feelings of anxiety and sadness are normal emotional expressions. However, due to the pandemic, they lack opportunities to socialize with classmates and are not in the school environment where they can release these emotions, which may lead to anxiety and depression on a mental illness level (Health line, 2022).

Another report by Parenting (2020) also shows that young people are most concerned about the long-lasting consequences of the pandemic in the areas of "mental health," "future employment," and "education," while concerns about contracting COVID-19 or physical health rank almost last (Parenting, 2020).

As a result of the social isolation, obsessive excessive internet use can lead to addictive behaviors called "internet addiction" is similar to alcohol addiction, drug addiction, gambling addiction, and pathological gambling. As the time consuming and obsessive behavior of using the internet increases, the satisfaction derived from online activities requires more internet content and longer online time to achieve the same level of fulfillment. The virtual world provides a new space for adolescents to establish interpersonal relationships, allowing them to escape various limitations and pressures of traditional interpersonal interactions and rebuild a new social network that satisfies their self-identity. However, this also makes it easy for them to neglect or intentionally avoid real-life interpersonal interactions, excessively relying on virtual social interactions online. This can lead to exclusion and withdrawal from real social activities and excessive internet immersion. When there is a discrepancy between the desired interpersonal relationships and the reality, it can create feelings of emptiness or loneliness due to social alienation.

If we can incorporate the concept of social integration into the approach to addressing educational issues, actively implement the right to education and welfare rights, view youth crises as dynamic processes rather than static outcomes, and transform and guide the cognition and identity of young people, they will no longer be isolated from social life. Taking into account the individual learning needs and diversity of values of young people, they can smoothly integrate into society and daily living environments, which will help create a learning environment that ensures equal opportunities for comprehensive participation.

Many adolescents who recognize emotional problems may not immediately seek help. Research has shown that when adolescents have certain knowledge about mental health issues and are aware of available resources for seeking help, it enhances their willingness to seek help. However, if they have symptoms of depression, thoughts of suicide, or fear of being stigmatized

for seeking help, they are more inclined to conceal and resolve these issues on their own (Rickwood, Deane & Wilson, 2007). The mental health problems of adolescents have received significant attention in recent years. Data from the World Health Organization (2018) official website shows that 10-20% of children and adolescents worldwide are affected by mental health issues. Adolescents inevitably encounter different challenges and confusion in their growth journey. They must learn to overcome various disturbance on the path of progress in order to move forward in their learning, work, and life. Recent research has indicated a link between the mental health of adolescents and their involvement in crime, suicide, and destructive behavior.

The same applies from a health promotion perspective. The adolescent stage is a critical period for establishing correct health behavior patterns and the initial stage of behavior formation. Therefore, if we can identify and control factors that trigger negative behaviors and intervene early to control or improve them, individuals can not only enjoy a healthy adolescence but also extend their physical and mental well-being into adulthood or old age. Our research team conducted studies on the relationship between adolescent family functioning, self-efficacy, and mental health in Macau and New Taipei City, Taiwan in 2019. The data was published in Macau and Taiwan in 2020. In 2020, due to the rapid spread and ongoing impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the research topic focuses on the crises and turning points for adolescents in the post-pandemic era: social care, integrative promotion, and physical and mental health. The research focuses on four areas: (1) What are the impacts on adolescent mental health under the social trends of the COVID-19 pandemic? (2) What is the relationship between adolescent internet use behavior, interpersonal relationships, self-efficacy, social support, and mental health? (3) The study is conducted through sampling surveys in Macau, Mainland China, and Taiwan, enabling cross-cultural comparisons. (4) A trend comparison is made between the data from 2019 and 2022.

II. Motivation and Objectives of the Study

Facing the heavy academic achievement pressure and a cramming study culture, Taiwanese adolescents are overwhelmed with school exam preparation and after school work and assignments every day. Schools and cram schools constitute the majority of their lives. While dealing with various exams, what do these children do in their limited after-school or vacation time? According to a survey conducted by the Children's Welfare League Foundation (2013) on the current state of leisure activities among adolescents, their leisure activities are not diverse enough. More than half of their daily time is spent on the internet, watching TV, or getting extra sleep. One out of every five adolescents is dissatisfied with their leisure life, and the main reason is a lack of suitable leisure venues. 80% of adolescents spend their free time at home.

The survey revealed three major problems in the leisure lives of adolescents: (1) high academic pressure and a lack of outdoor activities, leading to 72% of adolescents experiencing depressive emotions, (2) a loss of playfulness among adolescents, with over 60% feeling bored

during holidays, and (3) a lack of government attention to the leisure lives of adolescents, with 70% having never used or participated in relevant activities.

Adolescents go through specific stages of development, each with its own developmental tasks (Havighurst, 1972). The successful accomplishment or resolution of these tasks depends on many factors, including individual and environmental factors, many of which adolescents have no control over. Therefore, while adolescence is a time filled with hope and opportunities for growth, it is not without its pressures and risks. Adolescents may face harm, exploitation, deviant behavior, and various problems. If the risks related to adolescent development can be anticipated and understood, it may help mitigate adverse consequences for their development. Many studies attempt to identify risk factors associated with adolescent development, including individual traits, family, school, and community factors.

The adolescent stage is the most important period for human physical and mental development. Therefore, the harmful effects during the pandemic may not only lead to immediate behavioral and psychological problems but also significant deviations in long-term physical and mental development. During the COVID-19 pandemic, adolescents and young people are concerned about their academic and career prospects, leading to increased feelings of loneliness and anxiety. Compared to adults, young people often do not seek help for mental health issues. They may worry about privacy breaches and being ridiculed, face peer pressure, or lack knowledge about mental health services.

A collaborative study conducted by the University of Lancaster in the UK and the University of British Columbia in Canada investigated the impact of COVID-19 on various aspects of society. Yang and Yue (2021) focused on 886 adolescents aged 10 to 16 in the UK who were part of a pre-pandemic research project. The study examined the psychological effects during the pandemic and found that adolescents who had good psychological well-being before the pandemic showed significant emotional and behavioral problems, including hyperactivity and decreased communication and social skills with peers after a year of lockdown. There was also a noticeable decline in "prosocial activities" such as caring for and helping others. On the other hand, adolescents with less stable psychological well-being before the pandemic exhibited more stable emotional and behavioral patterns during the pandemic, with a significant decrease in fighting, bullying, and arguing. The research team speculated that this might be due to increased time spent with parents during home isolation. The study also indicated that the socioeconomic conditions of families had a significant impact on adolescents' emotional changes during the pandemic. Adolescents from single-parent and only-child families experienced the greatest negative psychological impact and reported the highest levels of loneliness. In families with higher incomes, adolescents had fewer hyperactivity or behavioral problems compared to those from lower-income families.

In contrast, since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China in early 2020, the changes in lifestyle during the "lockdown" period have brought severe physical and mental

challenges to the general population. The fear brought about by various COVID-19-related information has intensified common mental health problems among adolescents, such as insomnia, depression, and anxiety. Chi et al. (2020) used the Youth Insomnia Self-assessment Scale (YSIS), the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9), and the Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7) to assess the mental health of adolescent samples. The results showed that the occurrence rates of insomnia, depression, and anxiety symptoms among Chinese adolescents during the COVID-19 pandemic were 37.80%, 48.20%, and 36.70%, respectively. In other words, the symptoms of mental health problems were relatively common among adolescents during the pandemic.

This study's questionnaire refers to the 2019 New Taipei City Living Conditions Survey and scales related to adolescent internet use behavior, interpersonal relationships, self-resilience, social support, and emotional well-being. It aims to explore the living conditions, physical and mental health status, utilization, and expectations of adolescents in the three regions (Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong) during the COVID-19 period, particularly focusing on the predictive role of internet use behavior and interpersonal relationships in adolescent mental health. The results will serve as a reference for the government in formulating social welfare policies and developing policies and services for adolescent health maintenance.

Based on the above motivations, this research objectives are as follows:

1. To compare the differences in living conditions, self-resilience, and mental health among adolescents in Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong .
2. To use a shotgun approach to examine the relationship among internet use behavior, social relationships, social support, self-resilience, and mental health among adolescents in Taiwan, Mainland China, as well as Macao and Hong Kong .
3. To propose recommendations for government policies and related services for adolescent physical and mental health based on the research findings.

Findings and Results

I. Descriptive Analysis of Basic Information

This study focuses on the physical and mental health of adolescents in Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong. Based on 10,131 (6166 in China, 2478 in Taiwan and 1487 in Macao and Hong Kong) valid questionnaires collected, statistical analysis and discussion were conducted. The researchers described the total background characteristics of the 10,131 participating adolescents: 2478 from Taiwan, 6166 from Mainland China as well as 1487 from Macao and Hong Kong to understand the sample's characteristics. The basic variables surveyed in this study included gender, age, grade, place of residence, educational level, parents' marital status, and living conditions. The questionnaire responses and statistical results were analyzed and compared using percentages and frequency distribution. Descriptive statistical analysis was performed on each research variable (as shown in Table 1).

1. Gender

Among the 10131 adolescents surveyed in this study from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong, there were more females, with a total of 5,418 individuals, accounting for 53.5% of all participants. The total number of males was 4,713, accounting for 46.5% of all participants.

2. Age

Regarding the age distribution of the surveyed adolescents from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong, the highest proportion was in the "below 15 years" category, with a total of 3,618 individuals, accounting for 35.7% of all participants. The next highest category was "16-18 years," with a total of 3,476 individuals, accounting for 34.3% of all participants. The category "above 18 years" had a total of 3,037 individuals, accounting for 30.0% of all participants.

3. Grade

Regarding the grade distribution of the surveyed adolescents from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong, the highest proportion was in the "freshman year of college" category, with a total of 2,220 individuals, accounting for 21.9% of all participants. The next highest category was "first year of high school," with a total of 1,454 individuals, accounting for 14.4% of all participants. The following categories were "second year of junior high school" with 1,366 individuals (13.5%), "sophomore year of college" with 1,072 individuals (10.6%), "second year of high school" with 1,028 individuals (10.1%), "third year of junior high school" with 1,019 individuals (10.1%), "first year of junior high school" with 1,003 individuals (9.9%), "third year of high school" with 566 individuals (5.6%), "junior year of college" with 259 individuals (2.6%), and finally, "senior year of college" with 144 individuals (1.4%).

4. Place of Residence

Regarding the current place of residence of the surveyed adolescents from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong, the highest proportion was in "China," with a total of 6,166 individuals, accounting for 60.9% of all participants. The next highest category was "Macau," with a total of 2,478 individuals, accounting for 24.5% of all participants. The last category was "Taiwan," with a total of 1,478 individuals, accounting for 14.7% of all participants.

5. Educational Level

Regarding the educational level of the surveyed adolescents from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong, the highest proportion was among "middle school students," with a total of 3,537 individuals, accounting for 34.9% of all participants. The next highest category was "college students," with an unspecified number of individuals, accounting for 25.9% of all participants. The following categories were "junior high school students" with 1,537 individuals (24.9%), "middle school

dropouts" with 8 individuals (0.1%), and finally, "high school dropouts" with 4 individuals (0.1%).

6. Parents' Marital Status

Regarding the marital status of the parents of the surveyed adolescents from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong, the highest proportion was "living together," with a total of 8,133 individuals, accounting for 80.2% of all participants. The next highest category was "divorced," with a total of 827 individuals, accounting for 8.2% of all participants. The following categories were "living separately due to work" with 632 individuals (6.2%), "death of father or mother" with 235 individuals (2.3%), "separated" with 216 individuals (2.1%), and finally, "other" with 88 individuals (0.9%).

Table 1 Frequency and Percentage of Demographic Variables from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong Adolescents

n=10,131			
Demographic Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Gender	Male	4713	46.5
	Female	5418	53.5
Age	below 15 years	3618	35.7
	16-18 years	3476	34.3
	above 18 years	3037	30.0
Grade	First year of junior high school,	1003	9.9
	Second year of junior high school	1366	13.5
	Third year of junior high school	1019	10.1
	First year of senior high school	1454	14.4
	Second year of senior high school	1028	10.1
	Third year of senior high school	566	5.6
	Freshman year of college	2220	21.9
	Sophomore year of college	1072	10.6
	Junior year of college	259	2.6
	Senior year of college	144	1.4
Place of Residence	Mainland China	6166	60.9
	Macao and Hong Kong	2478	24.5
	Taiwan	1487	14.7
Educational Level	Junior high school	3537	34.9
	Senior high school	2904	28.7
	college	3690	36.4
Parents' Marital Status	Living together	8133	80.2
	Living separately due to work	632	6.2
	death of father or mother	235	2.3
	Separated	216	2.1
	Divorced	827	8.2
	Others	88	0.9

7. Living Condition

(1) Leisure Activities Frequently Engaged in the Weekdays and during Holidays

Regarding the leisure activities that the surveyed adolescents from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong frequently engage in the weekdays (non-holidays), the most common activity is "playing mobile games," with a total of 2,369 individuals, accounting for 23.4%. The next most common activity is also "playing mobile games," with 1,455 individuals, accounting for 14.4%. The third most common activity is "chatting/talking on the phone," with 1,185 individuals, accounting for 11.7%.

Regarding the leisure activities that the surveyed adolescents from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong frequently engage in during holidays, the most common activity is "playing mobile games," with a total of 2,120 individuals, accounting for 20.9%. The next most common activity is also "playing mobile games," with 1,392 individuals, accounting for 13.7%. The third most common activity is also "playing mobile games," with 1,115 individuals, accounting for 11.0% (refer to Table 2).

(2) The Most Frequently Used Online Activity

The most frequently used online activities by the surveyed adolescents from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong (refer to Table 3) are as follows: "online communication" is the highest, with 7,121 individuals, accounting for 70.3%. The next most common activity is "online streaming/video," with 6,384 individuals, accounting for 63.1%. Following that, "online gaming" has 4,849 individuals, accounting for 47.9%. "Browsing news/magazines" has 2,269 individuals, accounting for 22.4%. "Browsing social media websites" has 2,045 individuals, accounting for 20.2%. "Online shopping" has 1,699 individuals, accounting for 16.8%. "Digital learning" has 1,193 individuals, accounting for 11.8%. "Editing/browsing blogs" has 607 individuals, accounting for 6.0%. "Searching/downloading data" has 517 individuals, accounting for 5.1%. "Sending/receiving emails" has 342 individuals, accounting for 3.4%. "Live streaming platforms" have 287 individuals, accounting for 2.8%. "Visiting adult content websites" has 157 individuals, accounting for 1.6%. "Other" activities have 139 individuals, accounting for 1.4%. Finally, "visiting electronic bulletin boards/forums" has 109 individuals, accounting for 1.1%.

(3) Participation in Volunteer or Public Services

a. Participation in Volunteer Service Activities

Regarding participation in volunteer service activities, the surveyed adolescents from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong responded as follows: "never participated" is the highest, with 3,281 individuals, accounting for 32.4%. The next category is "less than 8 hours," with 2,990 individuals, accounting for 29.5%. Following that, "8 to less than 24 hours" has 2,211 individuals, accounting for 21.8%. "24 to less than 48 hours" has 691 individuals, accounting for 6.8%. "72 hours" has 585

Table 2 Leisure Activities Frequently Engaged in During Holidays from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong Adolescents

n=10,131

	the most common (%)	The next most common (%)	The third most common (%)
Watch TV, and digital platform.	1352 (13.3%)	1021 (10.1%)	956 (9.4%)
Playing sports and physical activities	1371 (13.5%)	1008 (9.9%)	742 (7.3%)
Playing instruments	245 (2.4%)	334 (3.3%)	438 (4.3%)
Reading newspaper and magazine	751 (7.4%)	830 (8.2%)	796 (7.9%)
Shopping and browsing	274 (2.4%)	550 (5.4%)	729 (7.2%)
Watching movies	309 (3.1%)	652 (6.4%)	897 (8.9%)
Musics and art performance	45 (0.4%)	90 (0.9%)	138 (1.4%)
Karaoke	23 (0.2%)	48 (0.5%)	75 (0.7%)
Hiking, picnicking, camping or outdoor activities	81 (0.8%)	142 (1.4%)	222 (2.2%)
Leisure Activities in the Weekdays chatting/talking on the phone	763 (7.5%)	1293 (12.8%)	1185 (11.7%)
Internet at net store	39 (0.4%)	49 (0.5%)	56 (0.6%)
Internet at home	1384 (13.7%)	1181 (11.7%)	979 (9.7%)
Social group activities	137 (1.4%)	251 (2.5%)	280 (2.8%)
Hip hop street dance	77 (0.8%)	84 (0.8%)	65 (0.6%)
Playing table tennis	36 (0.4%)	74 (0.7%)	107 (1.1%)
Riding bicycle	57 (0.6%)	95 (0.9%)	141 (1.4%)
playing mobile games	2369 (23.4%)	1455 (14.4%)	1159 (11.4%)
Sports (Running, swimming, etc.)	482 (4.8%)	707 (7.0%)	785 (7.7%)
Playing skateboard	43 (0.4%)	52 (0.5%)	80 (0.8%)
Cosplay	37 (0.4%)	36 (0.4%)	46 (0.5%)
others	283 (2.8%)	179 (1.8%)	255 (2.5%)

	the most common (%)	The next most common (%)	The third most common (%)
Watch TV, and digital platform.	977 (9.6%)	901 (8.9%)	911 (9.0%)
Playing sports and physical activities	1079 (10.7%)	919 (9.1%)	743 (7.3%)
Playing instruments	234 (2.3%)	305 (3.0%)	410 (4.0%)
Reading newspaper and magazine	463 (4.6%)	613 (6.1%)	668 (6.6%)
Shopping and browsing	896 (8.8%)	1039 (10.3%)	990 (9.8%)
Watching movies	522 (5.2%)	904 (8.9%)	1031 (10.2%)
Musics and art performance	78 (0.8%)	130 (1.3%)	124 (1.2%)
Karaoke	75 (0.7%)	112 (1.1%)	150 (1.5%)
Hiking, picnicking, camping or outdoor activities	370 (3.7%)	333 (3.3%)	369 (3.6%)
Leisure Activities during Holidays chatting/talking on the phone	589 (5.8%)	949 (9.4%)	909 (9.0%)
Internet at net store	42 (0.4%)	74 (0.7%)	50 (0.5%)
Internet at home	1469 (14.5%)	1086 (10.7%)	889 (8.8%)
Social group activities	143 (1.4%)	160 (1.6%)	200 (2.0%)
Hip hop street dance	78 (0.8%)	72 (0.7%)	75 (0.7%)
Playing table tennis	93 (0.9%)	86 (0.8%)	122 (1.2%)
Riding bicycle	109 (1.1%)	176 (1.7%)	205 (2.0%)
playing mobile games	2120 (20.9%)	1392 (13.7%)	1115 (11.0%)
Sports (Running, swimming, etc.)	463 (4.6%)	589 (5.9%)	750 (7.4%)
Playing skateboard	57 (0.6%)	63 (0.6%)	90 (0.9%)
Cosplay	44 (0.4%)	45 (0.4%)	87 (0.9%)
others	230 (2.3%)	174 (1.7%)	243 (2.4%)

individuals, accounting for 5.8%. Lastly, "48 to less than 72 hours" has 373 individuals, accounting for 3.7%.

b. Types of Volunteer Service Activities

Regarding the types of volunteer service activities, the surveyed adolescents from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong responded as follows: "community service" is the highest, with 4,855 individuals, accounting for 58.0%. The next category is "environmental protection," with 2,459 individuals, accounting for 29.4%. Following that, "social welfare services" has 1,943 individuals, accounting for 23.2%. "Cultural activities" has 1,928 individuals, accounting for 23.0%. "Educational activities" has 1,483 individuals, accounting for 17.7%. "Other" activities have 731 individuals, accounting for 8.7%. Lastly, "religious activities" has 408 individuals, accounting for 4.9%.

(4)The Most Important Public Issues

Regarding the most important public issues for the surveyed adolescents from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong, "eliminating discrimination" is rated as the highest, with 3,552 individuals, accounting for 35.2%. The next categories are "education," with 3,194 individuals, accounting for 31.6%, and "social security," with 3,144 individuals, accounting for 31.1%. Following that, "rule of law and justice" has 1,834 individuals, accounting for 18.2%, "national health and healthcare" has 1,787 individuals, accounting for 17.7%, "environmental protection" has 1,758 individuals, accounting for 17.4%, "employment" has 1,608 individuals, accounting for 15.9%, "social welfare" has 1,591 individuals, accounting for 15.7%, "citizens' participation in politics" has 1,500 individuals, accounting for 14.8%, "diplomacy and international relations" has 1,418 individuals, accounting for 14.0%, "economy and livelihood resources" has 1,327 individuals, accounting for 13.1%, "leisure and entertainment" has 1,237 individuals, accounting for 12.2%, "technological development" has 1,163 individuals, accounting for 11.5%, "national defense and military service" has 1,121 individuals, accounting for 11.1%, "culture and heritage development" has 705 individuals, accounting for 7.0%, "transportation and safety" has 506 individuals, accounting for 5.0%, "public spaces" has 332 individuals, accounting for 3.3%, and finally, "other" has 75 individuals, accounting for 0.7%.

II. Analysis of Differences in Internet Use Behaviors, Mental Health, Social Support, Interpersonal Relationships, and Resilience Among Adolescents in Different Residential Areas of Taiwan, Mainland China, as well as Macao and Hong Kong

1. Life disturbance

The differences in life disturbance variables among the "current place of residence" background variables were analyzed using independent samples one-way ANOVA. The

Table 3 The most frequently used online activities from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong Adolescents

n=10,131

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage (%)	
The most frequently used online activities(multiple choices, up to 3)	online gaming	4849	47.9%	
	Sending/receiving emails	342	3.4%	
	online communication	7121	70.3%	
	Browsing news/magazines	2269	22.4%	
	online streaming/video	6384	63.1%	
	Editing/browsing blogs	607	6.0%	
	Browsing social media websites	2045	20.2%	
	Searching/downloading data	517	5.1%	
	visiting electronic bulletin boards/forums	109	1.1%	
	Visiting adult content websites	157	1.6%	
	Live streaming platforms	287	2.8%	
	Online shopping	1699	16.8%	
	Digital learning	1193	11.8%	
	others	139	1.4%	
	Participating in volunteer service or public service	never participated	3281	32.4%
less than 8 hours		2990	29.5%	
8 hours to less than 24 hours		2211	21.8%	
24 hours to less than 48 hours		691	6.8%	
48 hours to less than 72 hours		373	3.7%	
more than 72 hours		585	5.8%	
community service		4855	58.0%	
Education		1483	17.7%	
Religion		408	4.9%	
Culture		1928	23.0%	
Environmental protection		2459	29.4%	
social welfare services		1943	23.2%	
others		731	8.7%	
The most important public issues (multiple choices, up to 3)		Citizenship	1500	14.8%
		Prohibition of discrimination	3552	35.2%
	law and justice	1834	18.2%	
	Social Security	3144	31.1%	
	Economic and civil resources	1327	13.1%	
	National Defense and Military Service	1121	11.1%	
	Diplomacy and International Relations	1418	14.0%	
	National Health and Sanitation	1787	17.7%	
	Social Welfare	1591	15.7%	

n=10,131

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage (%)
	educate	3194	31.6%
	employment	1608	15.9%
	Culture and Preservation Development	705	7.0%
	Public places	332	3.3%
	Transportation and Safety	506	5.0%
	Leisure and entertainment	1237	12.2%
	technological development	1163	11.5%
	environmental protection	1758	17.4%
	others	75	.7%

results showed significant differences in interpersonal disturbance with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 220.319$, $p = .000 < .001$, indicating significant differences in interpersonal disturbance based on the current place of residence. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Macau perceived higher levels of interpersonal disturbance compared to those residing in China and Taiwan. Similarly, adolescents residing in Macau perceived higher levels of academic disturbance compared to those residing in Taiwan and China. These findings are supported by the significant differences found in academic disturbance with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 292.145$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Macau perceived higher levels of academic disturbance compared to those residing in Taiwan and China, while adolescents in Taiwan perceived higher levels of academic disturbance compared to those in China. (Noted as Table 4).

Table 4 Anova of Life Disturbance by residential area from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong Adolescents

n=10,131

Variable	Residential Area	n	Mean	Standard Deviation	F	P	Scheffe Post Hoc Comparison
Interpersonal Disturbance	Mainland China	6166	2.6756	3.59362	220.319	.000	Macao > Mainland China ; Macao > Taiwan
	Macao	2478	4.4048	3.45553			
	Taiwan	1487	2.8810	3.14948			
Academic Disturbance	Mainland China	6166	2.9054	3.07832	292.145	.000	Macao > Mainland China > Taiwan
	Macao	2478	4.6546	2.99955			
	Taiwan	1487	3.3578	2.96749			

2. Emotional State

The differences in emotional state variables among the "current place of residence" background variables were analyzed using independent samples one-way ANOVA. The results showed significant differences in stress/anxiety with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 1116.882$, $p = .000 < .001$, indicating significant differences in stress/anxiety based on the current place of residence. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Taiwan perceived higher levels of stress/anxiety compared to those residing in China and Macau. Similarly, adolescents residing in China perceived higher levels of stress/anxiety compared to those residing in Macau. Regarding differences in anxiety based on the current place of residence, the results showed significant differences with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 1771.225$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in China perceived higher levels of anxiety compared to those residing in Macau, while adolescents in Taiwan perceived higher levels of anxiety compared to those in Macau. Furthermore, significant differences in depression based on the current place of residence were found with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 1490.607$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in China perceived higher levels of depression compared to those residing in Macau, while adolescents in Taiwan perceived higher levels of depression compared to those in Macau. (noted as Table 5).

Table 5 Anova of Emotional State by Residential Area from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong Adolescents

							n = 10,131
Variable	Residential Area	n	Mean	Standard Deviation	F	P	Scheffe Post Hoc Comparison
Stress	Mainland China	6166	10.7713	4.46766	1116.822	.000	Taiwan > Mainland China > Macao
	Macao	2478	6.0004	4.56298			
	Taiwan	1487	11.3127	4.40035			
Anxiety	Mainland China	6166	9.7953	3.88884	1771.225	.000	Taiwan > Macao ; Taiwan > Mainland China
	Macao	2478	4.3313	4.23469			
	Taiwan	1487	9.6785	3.74582			
Depression	Mainland China	6166	9.2746	3.80264	1490.607	.000	Mainland China > Macao ; Taiwan > Macao
	Macao	2478	4.1877	4.65273			
	Taiwan	1487	9.4492	4.02866			

3. Internet Use Motives

The differences in internet use motive variables among the "current place of residence" background variables were analyzed using independent samples one-way ANOVA. The results showed significant differences in social/consumption motives with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 541.367$, $p = .000 < .001$, indicating significant differences in social/consumption motives based on the current place of residence. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Taiwan had higher social/consumption motives for internet use compared to those residing in Macau and China. Similarly, adolescents residing in Macau had higher social/consumption motives for internet use compared to those residing in China. Regarding differences in instrumental motives based on the current place of residence, the results showed significant differences with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 818.548$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Taiwan had higher instrumental motives for internet use compared to those residing in Macau and China, while adolescents in Macau had higher instrumental motives for internet use compared to those residing in China. (noted as Table 6).

Table 6 Anova of Internet Use Motives by Residential Area from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong Adolescents

n = 10,131

Variable	Residential Area	n	Mean	Standard Deviation	F	P	Scheffe Post Hoc Comparison
Social/consumption Motives	Mainland China	6166	24.1958	9.29661	541.367	.000	Taiwan>Macao >Mainland China
	Macao	2478	29.3604	6.92707			
	Taiwan	1487	30.6106	7.25917			
Instrumental Motives	Mainland China	6166	11.9609	5.06960	818.548	.000	Taiwan>Macao >Mainland China
	Macao	2478	15.4653	4.11956			
	Taiwan	1487	16.4291	4.33865			

4. Core Components of Internet Addiction

The differences in core components of internet addiction variables among the "current place of residence" background variables were analyzed using independent samples one-way ANOVA. The results showed significant differences in tolerance with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 492.221$, $p = .000 < .001$, indicating significant differences in tolerance based on the current place of residence. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Macau had higher tolerance for internet addiction compared to those residing in Taiwan and China. Similarly, adolescents residing in Taiwan had higher tolerance for internet addiction compared to those residing in China. Regarding

differences in withdrawal symptoms based on the current place of residence, the results showed significant differences with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 303.755$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Macao had higher withdrawal symptoms for internet addiction compared to those residing in China, while adolescents in Taiwan had higher withdrawal symptoms for internet addiction compared to those residing in China. For differences in compulsive internet use symptoms based on the current place of residence, the results showed significant differences with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 282.082$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Macao had higher compulsive internet use symptoms for internet addiction compared to those residing in Taiwan and China, while adolescents in Taiwan had higher compulsive internet use symptoms for internet addiction compared to those residing in China. (noted as Table 7).

Table 7 Anova of Core Components of Internet Addiction by Residential Area from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong Adolescents

n=10,131

Variable	Residential Area	n	Mean	Standard Deviation	F	P	Scheffe Post Hoc Comparison
Tolerance	Mainland China	6166	9.4058	4.14589	492.221	.000	Macao>Taiwan>Mainland China
	Macao	2478	12.1529	3.97697			
	Taiwan	1487	11.6907	3.79183			
Withdrawal Symptoms	Mainland China	6166	11.4102	5.06800	303.755	.000	Macao>Mainland China ; Taiwan>Mainland China
	Macao	2478	14.0504	5.04508			
	Taiwan	1487	13.6812	4.67899			
Compulsive Internet use Symptoms	Mainland China	6166	11.1810	5.16454	282.082	.000	Macao>Taiwan>Mainland China
	Macao	2478	13.8410	4.98894			
	Taiwan	1487	13.1675	4.68103			

5. Internet Addiction-Related Issues

The differences in variables related to internet addiction-related issues among the "current place of residence" background variables were analyzed using independent samples one-way ANOVA. The results showed significant differences in time management with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 159.950$, $p = .000 < .001$, indicating significant differences in time management based on the current place of residence. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Macao had higher time management problems related to internet addiction compared to those residing in China, while adolescents in Taiwan had higher time management problems related to internet addiction compared to those residing in China. Regarding differences in interpersonal health based on the current place of residence, the results showed significant differences

with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 124.847$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Macao had higher interpersonal health problems related to internet addiction compared to those residing in Taiwan and China, while adolescents in Taiwan had higher interpersonal health problems related to internet addiction compared to those residing in China. (noted as Table 8).

Table 8 Anova of Internet Addiction-Related Issues by Residential Area from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong Adolescents

n = 10,131

Variable	Residential Area	n	Mean	Standard Deviation	F	P	Scheffe Post Hoc Comparison
Time Management	Mainland China	6166	10.2063	4.73454	159.950	.000	Macao>Mainland China ; Taiwan>Mainland China
	Macao	2478	12.0291	4.92650			
	Taiwan	1487	11.7915	4.71141			
Interpersonal Health	Mainland China	6166	14.4444	6.66017	124.847	.000	Macao>Taiwan>Mainland China
	Macao	2478	16.7817	6.36930			
	Taiwan	1487	15.9670	6.09179			

6. Real-Life Interpersonal Interaction

The differences in variables related to real-life interpersonal interaction among the "current place of residence" background variables were analyzed using independent samples one-way ANOVA. The results showed significant differences in intimacy with family members with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 110.193$, $p = .000 < .001$, indicating significant differences in intimacy with family members based on the current place of residence. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in China had higher intimacy with family members in real-life interpersonal interaction compared to those residing in Macao, while adolescents in Taiwan had higher intimacy with family members in real-life interpersonal interaction compared to those residing in Macao. Regarding differences in intimacy with peer friends based on the current place of residence, the results showed significant differences with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 84.364$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Taiwan had higher intimacy with peer friends in real-life interpersonal interaction compared to those residing in China and Macao, while adolescents in China had higher intimacy with peer friends in real-life interpersonal interaction compared to those residing in Macao. Additionally, regarding differences in informational communication with peer friends based on the current place of residence, the results showed significant differences with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 84.277$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Taiwan had higher informational communication with peer friends in real-life interpersonal interaction compared to those

residing in China and Macau, while adolescents in China had higher informational communication with peer friends in real-life interpersonal interaction compared to those residing in Macau. (noted as Table 9).

Table 9 Anova of Real-Life Interpersonal Interaction by Residential Area from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong Adolescents

n =10,131

Variable	Residential Area	n	Mean	Standard Deviation	F	P	Scheffe Post Hoc Comparison
Intimacy with Family Members	Mainland China	6166	26.3086	9.08071	110.193	.000	Mainland China>Macao ; Taiwan>Macao
	Macao	2478	23.2861	7.76081			
	Taiwan	1487	25.8736	8.01270			
Intimacy with Peer Friends	Mainland China	6166	20.0929	6.46781	84.364	.000	Taiwan>Mainland China>Macao
	Macao	2478	19.1715	5.86988			
	Taiwan	1487	21.8050	5.45737			
Informational Communication with Peer Friends	Mainland China	6166	17.9020	5.52016	84.277	.000	Taiwan>Mainland China>Macao
	Macao	2478	16.9564	4.69365			
	Taiwan	1487	19.1258	3.92472			

7. Online Interpersonal Interaction

The differences in variables related to online interpersonal interaction among the "current place of residence" background variables were analyzed using independent samples one-way ANOVA. The results showed significant differences in intimacy with online friends with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 70.177$, $p = .000 < .001$, indicating significant differences in intimacy with online friends based on the current place of residence. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in China had higher intimacy with online friends in online interpersonal interaction compared to those residing in Taiwan and Macau, while adolescents in Taiwan had higher intimacy with online friends in online interpersonal interaction compared to those residing in Macau. Regarding differences in informational communication with online friends based on the current place of residence, the results showed significant differences with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 57.007$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in China had higher informational communication with online friends in online interpersonal interaction compared to those residing in Taiwan and Macau, while adolescents in Taiwan had higher informational communication with online friends in online interpersonal interaction compared to those residing in Macau. (noted as Table 10).

Table 10 Anova of Online Interpersonal Interaction by Residential Area from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong Adolescents

n = 10,131

Variable	Residential Area	n	Mean	Standard Deviation	F	P	Scheffe Post Hoc Comparison
Intimacy with Online Friends	Mainland China	6166	15.1776	6.85827	70.177	.000	Mainland China>Taiwan>Macao
	Macao	2478	13.2902	6.39484			
	Taiwan	1487	14.3040	7.02086			
Informational Communication with Online Friends	Mainland China	6166	13.2423	6.06916	57.007	.000	Mainland China>Taiwan>Macao
	Macao	2478	11.8010	5.55666			
	Taiwan	1487	12.3033	6.01469			

8. Social Support

(1) Family Social Support

The differences in variables related to family social support among the "current place of residence" background variables were analyzed using independent samples one-way ANOVA. The results showed significant differences in emotional support with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 49.314$, $p = .000 < .001$, indicating significant differences in emotional support based on the current place of residence. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Taiwan had higher levels of emotional support from their family compared to those residing in Macau. Regarding differences in instrumental support based on the current place of residence, the results showed significant differences with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 29.871$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Taiwan received higher levels of instrumental support from their family compared to those residing in China and Macau, while adolescents residing in China had a higher perception of instrumental support from their family compared to those residing in Macau. Regarding differences in informational support based on the current place of residence, the results showed significant differences with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 35.922$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Taiwan perceived higher levels of informational support from their family compared to those residing in China and Macau, while adolescents residing in China had a higher perception of informational support from their family compared to those residing in Macau. (noted as Table 11).

(2) Peer Social Support

The differences in variables related to peer social support among the "current place of residence" background variables were analyzed using independent samples one-way ANOVA. The results showed significant differences in emotional support with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 69.986$, $p = .000 < .001$, indicating significant differences in emotional support based on the current place of residence. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed

Table 11 Anova of Social Support by Residential Area from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong Adolescents

n = 10,131

Variable	Residential Area	n	Mean	Standard Deviation	F	P	Scheffe Post Hoc Comparison
Emotional Support	Mainland China	6166	14.8323	4.40932	49.314	.000	Taiwan>Macao
	Macao	2478	13.9395	3.63987			
	Taiwan	1487	15.0397	3.66760			
Instrumental Support	Mainland China	6166	18.6959	5.31577	29.871	.000	Taiwan>Mainland China>Macao
	Macao	2478	18.3204	4.04444			
	Taiwan	1487	19.5474	4.13406			
Informational Support	Mainland China	6166	15.0131	4.36594	35.922	.000	Taiwan>Mainland China>Macao
	Macao	2478	14.3144	3.75416			
	Taiwan	1487	15.3484	3.71816			

that adolescents residing in Taiwan had higher levels of emotional support from their peers compared to those residing in China and Macau. Adolescents residing in China also had a higher perception of emotional support from their peers compared to those residing in Macau. Regarding differences in instrumental support based on the current place of residence, the results showed significant differences with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 43.977$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Taiwan had higher levels of instrumental support from their peers compared to those residing in China and Macau. Adolescents residing in China also had a higher perception of instrumental support from their peers compared to those residing in Macau. Regarding differences in informational support based on the current place of residence, the results showed significant differences with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 128.769$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in Taiwan had higher levels of informational support from their peers compared to those residing in China and Macau. Adolescents residing in China also had a higher perception of informational support from their peers compared to those residing in Macau. (See Table 12)

(3) Teacher or Government Agency Social Support

The differences in variables related to social support from teachers or government agencies among the "current place of residence" background variables were analyzed using independent samples one-way ANOVA. The results showed significant differences in emotional support with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 113.760$, $p = .000 < .01$, indicating significant differences in emotional support based on the current place of residence. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in China perceived higher levels of emotional support from teachers or government agencies

Table 12 Anova of Peer Social Support by Residential Area from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong Adolescents

n = 10,131

Variable	Residential Area	n	Mean	Standard Deviation	F	P	Scheffe Post Hoc Comparison
Emotional Support	Mainland China	6166	14.9092	4.08123	69.986	.000	Taiwan>Mainland China>Macao
	Macao	2478	14.0101	3.45399			
	Taiwan	1487	15.3497	3.27232			
Instrumental Support	Mainland China	6166	14.7738	4.06487	43.977	.000	Taiwan>Mainland China>Macao
	Macao	2478	14.0896	3.54327			
	Taiwan	1487	15.1876	3.35000			
Informational Support	Mainland China	6166	17.3871	5.07371	128.769	.000	Taiwan>Mainland China>Macao
	Macao	2478	15.5690	4.16212			
	Taiwan	1487	16.9254	4.36744			

compared to those residing in Taiwan and Macau. Adolescents residing in Taiwan also perceived higher levels of emotional support from teachers or government agencies compared to those residing in Macau. Regarding differences in instrumental support based on the current place of residence, the results showed significant differences with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 308.099$, $p = .000 < .01$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in China had a higher perception of instrumental support from teachers or government agencies compared to those residing in Taiwan and Macau. Adolescents residing in Taiwan also had a higher perception of instrumental support from teachers or government agencies compared to those residing in Macau. Regarding differences in informational support based on the current place of residence, the results showed significant differences with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 57.579$, $p = .000 < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method revealed that adolescents residing in China had a higher perception of informational support from teachers or government agencies compared to those residing in Taiwan and Macau. Adolescents residing in Taiwan also had a higher perception of informational support from teachers or government agencies compared to those residing in Macau. (See Table 13).

9. Self-Resilience

The differences in variables related to self-resilience among the "current place of residence" background variables were analyzed using independent samples one-way ANOVA. The results revealed significant differences in self-resilience with $F_{(2,10,128)} = 103.094$, $p = .000 < .001$, indicating significant differences in self-resilience based on the current place of residence. Post-hoc comparisons using Scheffe's method showed that adolescents residing in China had higher levels of self-resilience compared to those

Table 13 Anova of Teacher or Government Agency Social Support by Residential Area from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong Adolescents

n =10,131

Variable	Residential Area	n	Mean	Standard Deviation	F	P	Scheffe Post Hoc Comparison
Emotional Support	Mainland China	6166	14.2824	4.03973	113.760	.000	Mainland China>Taiwan>Macao
	Macao	2478	12.9310	3.53546			
	Taiwan	1487	13.5736	3.47590			
Instrumental Support	Mainland China	6166	16.8153	5.03307	308.099	.000	Mainland China>Taiwan>Macao
	Macao	2478	14.1275	4.04774			
	Taiwan	1487	15.2582	4.18506			
Informational Support	Mainland China	6166	14.6575	4.02938	57.579	.000	Mainland China>Taiwan>Macao
	Macao	2478	13.6687	3.81586			
	Taiwan	1487	14.5407	3.56947			

residing in Taiwan and Macau. Adolescents residing in Taiwan also had higher levels of self-resilience compared to those residing in Macau (See Table 14).

Table 14 Anova of Self-resilience T by Residential Area from Taiwan, Mainland China as well as Macao and Hong Kong Adolescents

n =10,131

Variable	Residential Area	n	Mean	Standard Deviation	F	P	Scheffe Post Hoc Comparison
Self-resilience	Mainland China	6166	38.9377	9.84590	103.094	.000	Mainland China>Taiwan>Macao
	Macao	2478	35.7938	8.02171			
	Taiwan	1487	38.0256	8.25221			

III. Hierarchical Analysis of Internet Behavior, Interpersonal Relationships, Social Support, Self-Resilience, and Psychological Well-being among Adolescents in Mainland China, Taiwan, and Macau

1. Mainland China

(1) Prediction of Interpersonal Distress on Psychological Well-being Social/consumer motivation for internet use, instrumental motivation, time management and interpersonal health related to internet addiction issues, intimacy with family and peers in real-life interactions, intimacy with online friends in internet interpersonal interactions, family support, and support from teachers or government institutions can predict 24.1% of interpersonal distress. The results indicate that higher levels of social/consumer motivation for internet use, instrumental motivation, time management and interpersonal health related to internet addiction, intimacy with peers in real-life interactions, and

intimacy with online friends are associated with higher levels of interpersonal distress. Conversely, higher levels of intimacy with family in real-life interactions, family support, and support from teachers or government institutions are associated with lower levels of interpersonal distress.

- (2) Prediction of Academic Distress on Psychological Well-being Social/consumer motivation for internet use, tolerance and symptoms of internet addiction, intimacy with family, informational intimacy with peers, intimacy with online friends, family social support, peer social support, and self-resilience can predict 25.5% of academic distress. The results indicate that higher levels of social/consumer motivation for internet use, tolerance and symptoms of internet addiction, informational intimacy with peers, intimacy with online friends, and family social support are associated with higher levels of academic distress. Conversely, higher levels of intimacy with family, intimacy with online friends, peer social support, and self-resilience are associated with lower levels of academic distress.
- (3) Prediction of Stress and Anxiety on Psychological Well-being Social/consumer motivation for internet use, tolerance and symptoms of internet addiction, interpersonal health related to internet addiction issues, intimacy with family, informational intimacy with peers, peer social support, and self-resilience can predict 26.3% of stress and anxiety. The results indicate that higher levels of social/consumer motivation for internet use, tolerance and symptoms of internet addiction, interpersonal health related to internet addiction, and informational intimacy with peers are associated with higher levels of perceived stress and anxiety. Conversely, higher levels of intimacy with family, peer social support, and self-resilience are associated with lower levels of perceived stress and anxiety.
- (4) Prediction of Anxiety on Psychological Well-being Social/consumer motivation for internet use, tolerance and symptoms of internet addiction, time management and interpersonal health related to internet addiction, intimacy with family, informational intimacy with peers, and support from teachers or government institutions can predict 23.2% of anxiety. The results indicate that higher levels of social/consumer motivation for internet use, tolerance and symptoms of internet addiction, time management and interpersonal health related to internet addiction, informational intimacy with peers, and support from teachers or government institutions are associated with higher levels of perceived anxiety. Conversely, higher levels of intimacy with family are associated with lower levels of perceived anxiety.
- (5) Prediction of Depression on Psychological Well-being Social/consumer motivation for internet use, tolerance and symptoms of internet addiction, time management and interpersonal health related to internet addiction, intimacy with family, informational intimacy with peers, intimacy with online friends, family social support, peer social

support, and self-resilience can predict 22.4% of depression. Higher levels of social/consumer motivation for internet use, tolerance and symptoms of internet addiction, time management and interpersonal health related to internet addiction, informational intimacy with peers, intimacy with online friends, family social support, and peer social support are associated with higher levels of perceived depression. Conversely, higher levels of intimacy with family and support from family and peers are associated with lower levels of perceived depression.

2. Macao, China

- (1) Prediction of Interpersonal Distress on Psychological Well-being Social/consumer motivation for internet use, core withdrawal symptoms of internet addiction, time management and interpersonal health related to internet addiction, intimacy with family in real-life interactions, intimacy with peers in real-life interactions, family social support, and social support from teachers or government institutions can predict 21.9% of interpersonal distress. The results indicate that higher levels of social/consumer motivation for internet use, core withdrawal symptoms of internet addiction, time management and interpersonal health related to internet addiction, intimacy with peers in real-life interactions are associated with higher levels of interpersonal distress. Conversely, higher levels of intimacy with family in real-life interactions, family social support, and social support from teachers or government institutions are associated with lower levels of interpersonal distress.
- (2) Prediction of Academic Distress on Psychological Well-being Instrumental motivation for internet use, tolerance of internet addiction, interpersonal health related to internet addiction, intimacy with family in real-life interactions, intimacy with online friends, informational intimacy with online friends, and self-resilience can predict 11.2% of academic distress. The results indicate that higher levels of instrumental motivation for internet use, tolerance of internet addiction, interpersonal health related to internet addiction, and informational intimacy with online friends are associated with higher levels of academic distress. Conversely, higher levels of intimacy with family in real-life interactions, intimacy with online friends, peer social support, and self-resilience are associated with lower levels of academic distress.
- (3) Prediction of Stress and Anxiety on Psychological Well-being Instrumental motivation for internet use, tolerance of internet addiction, interpersonal health related to internet addiction, intimacy with family in real-life interactions, and family social support can predict 17.4% of stress and anxiety. The results indicate that higher levels of instrumental motivation for internet use, tolerance of internet addiction, interpersonal health related to internet addiction, and intimacy with family in real-life interactions are associated with higher levels of perceived stress and anxiety. Conversely, higher levels of intimacy with

family in real-life interactions, intimacy with online friends, and family social support are associated with lower levels of perceived stress and anxiety.

- (4) Prediction of Anxiety on Psychological Well-being Social/consumer motivation for internet use, tolerance of internet addiction, interpersonal health related to internet addiction, intimacy with family in real-life interactions, intimacy with peers in real-life interactions, family social support, and self-resilience can predict 14.4% of anxiety. The results indicate that higher levels of social/consumer motivation for internet use, tolerance of internet addiction, interpersonal health related to internet addiction, intimacy with peers in real-life interactions are associated with higher levels of perceived anxiety. Conversely, higher levels of intimacy with family in real-life interactions, family social support, and self-resilience are associated with lower levels of perceived anxiety.
- (5) Prediction of Depression on Psychological Well-being Tolerance of internet addiction, time management and interpersonal health related to internet addiction, intimacy with family in real-life interactions, intimacy with peers in real-life interactions, intimacy with online friends, family social support, and self-resilience can predict 20.9% of depression. The results indicate that higher levels of tolerance of internet addiction, time management and interpersonal health related to internet addiction, intimacy with peers in real-life interactions, and intimacy with online friends are associated with higher levels of perceived depression. Conversely, higher levels of intimacy with family in real-life interactions, family social support, and self-resilience are associated with lower levels of perceived depression.

3. Taipei/New Taipei City, Taiwan

- (1) Predicting Interpersonal Distress in Psychological Health Motives for internet use such as social/consumption motives, intimacy with family members and peers in real-life interactions, informational intimacy with online friends, and peer support can predict interpersonal distress by 16.2%. The results indicate that higher levels of social/consumption motives for internet use, intimacy with peers in real-life interactions, and informational intimacy with online friends are associated with higher levels of interpersonal distress. Conversely, higher levels of intimacy with family members and peer support are associated with lower levels of interpersonal distress.
- (2) Predicting Academic Distress in Psychological Health Motives for internet use such as instrumental motives, tolerance for internet addiction, interpersonal health problems related to internet addiction, intimacy with family members in real-life interactions, informational intimacy with online friends, and self-resilience can predict academic distress by 11.2%. The results suggest that higher levels of instrumental motives for internet use, tolerance for internet addiction, interpersonal health problems related to internet addiction, and informational intimacy with online friends are associated with

higher levels of academic distress. Conversely, higher levels of intimacy with family members and peer support, as well as self-resilience, are associated with lower levels of perceived academic distress.

- (3) Predicting Stress and Anxiety in Psychological Health Motives for internet use such as instrumental motives, tolerance for internet addiction, interpersonal health problems related to internet addiction, intimacy with family members in real-life interactions, and family support can predict stress and anxiety by 17.4%. The results indicate that higher levels of instrumental motives for internet use, tolerance for internet addiction, and interpersonal health problems related to internet addiction are associated with higher levels of stress and anxiety. Conversely, lower levels of intimacy with family members, intimacy with online friends, and family support are associated with higher levels of perceived stress and anxiety.
- (4) Predicting Anxiety in Psychological Health Motives for internet use such as social/consumption motives, tolerance for internet addiction, interpersonal health problems related to internet addiction, intimacy with family members and peers in real-life interactions, family support, and self-resilience can predict anxiety by 14.4%. The results suggest that higher levels of social/consumption motives for internet use, tolerance for internet addiction, interpersonal health problems related to internet addiction, and intimacy with peers in real-life interactions are associated with higher levels of anxiety. Conversely, higher levels of intimacy with family members, family support, and self-resilience are associated with lower levels of perceived anxiety.
- (5) Predicting Depression in Psychological Health Tolerance for internet addiction, time management and interpersonal health problems related to internet addiction, intimacy with family members and peers in real-life interactions, intimacy with online friends, family support, and self-resilience can predict depression by 20.9%. The results indicate that higher levels of tolerance for internet addiction, time management and interpersonal health problems related to internet addiction, intimacy with peers in real-life interactions, and intimacy with online friends are associated with higher levels of depression. Conversely, higher levels of intimacy with family members, family support, and self-resilience are associated with lower levels of perceived depression.

Conclusions

Under the Covid pandemic, the perceptions of mental health among teenagers in different regions and under different administrative and support systems vary slightly. The findings are as follows:

1. Teenagers living in Macau have a higher perception of interpersonal distress compared to those living in China and Taiwan. Teenagers living in Macau also have a higher perception of academic distress compared to those living in Taiwan and China.

Additionally, teenagers living in Taiwan have a higher perception of academic distress compared to those living in China.

2. Teenagers living in Taiwan have a higher perception of stress/anxiety compared to those living in China and Macau. Teenagers living in China also have a higher perception of stress/anxiety compared to those living in Macau. Teenagers living in China and Taiwan have a higher perception of anxiety symptoms compared to those living in Macau. Teenagers living in China and Taiwan have a higher perception of depression symptoms compared to those living in Macau.
3. Teenagers living in Taiwan have a higher motivation for using social/consumption tools on the internet compared to those living in Macau and China. Additionally, teenagers living in Macau have a higher motivation for using instrumental tools on the internet compared to those living in China.
4. Teenagers living in Macau have a higher tolerance for internet addiction and compulsive internet use symptoms compared to those living in Taiwan and China. Additionally, teenagers living in Taiwan have a higher tolerance for internet addiction and compulsive internet use symptoms compared to those living in China. However, teenagers living in Macau and Taiwan have a higher perception of withdrawal symptoms related to internet addiction compared to those living in China. Teenagers living in have a higher perception of withdrawal symptoms related to internet addiction compared to those living in China.
5. Teenagers living in Macau have a higher perception of interpersonal problems related to internet addiction compared to those living in Taiwan and China. Additionally, teenagers living in Taiwan have a higher perception of interpersonal problems related to internet addiction compared to those living in China. However, teenagers living in Macau and Taiwan have a higher perception of time management issues related to internet addiction compared to those living in China.
6. Teenagers living in Taiwan have a higher perception of the intimacy and informational aspects of real-life social interaction with friends and peers compared to those living in Macau and China. Additionally, teenagers living in China have a higher perception of the intimacy and informational aspects of real-life social interaction with friends and peers compared to those living in Macau. However, teenagers living in China and Taiwan have a higher perception of the intimacy with family members in real-life social interaction compared to those living in Macau.
7. Teenagers living in China have a higher perception of the intimacy and informational aspects of online social interaction with internet friends compared to those living in Taiwan and Macau. Additionally, teenagers living in Taiwan have a higher perception of the informational aspects of online social interaction with internet friends compared to those living in Macau.
8. Teenagers living in Taiwan perceive higher levels of instrumental and informational

support from family members compared to those living in China and Macau. Additionally, teenagers living in China have a higher perception of instrumental and informational support from family members compared to those living in Macau. However, teenagers living in Taiwan perceive higher levels of emotional support from family members compared to those living in Macau.

9. Teenagers living in China have a higher perception of self-resilience compared to those living in Taiwan and Macau. Additionally, teenagers living in Taiwan have a higher perception of self-resilience compared to those living in Macau.

10. Tolerance to internet addiction, time management and interpersonal health issues related to internet addiction, intimacy with family members and informational aspects of real-life social interaction with peers and friends, intimacy with internet friends, family social support, and self-resilience can predict psychological health, including interpersonal distress, academic distress, stress and anxiety, and depression. The predictive power is highest for teenagers living in China, ranging from 20% to 25%, while those living in Macau and Taiwan have similar predictive power, ranging from 11% to 20%.

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Comment

Dr. Kim, Sangbum

Professor, the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University

I commend four professors, including Professor Lau Ping-Kuen of Chinese Culture University, who completed a large-scale research project. This study highlights the relevance of the social safety net concerns produced by the COVID pandemic, as well as how the COVID pandemic has changed the perceptions and attitudes of young generations in China, Taiwan, and Macau.

In particular, the problem of addiction to humans was the domain of adults, but the COVID pandemic has shown that the youth generation can no longer be an exception. The essence of this study, in my opinion, appears to be the investigation of adolescents' psychological well-being. This is not a story about China, Taiwan, or Macau, but about a real problem that is arising right next to us, and I believe it is an issue that should be properly examined and resolved by researchers from Taiwan, Japan, and Korea. In this regard, the study's subject is regarded as very significant.

I would like to provide some suggestions to improve the completeness of the research. First, because this is a study on the relationship between Internet addiction and young psychological well-being, it is also vital to highlight the major elements that contribute to psychological well-being in China, Taiwan, and Macau, as well as explain how this is changing as a result of the COVID pandemic.

In general, parents' involvement in family environment factors, relationships with teachers as school environment factors, and the number of peers describe the primary variables of teenagers' psychological well-being. Self-esteem is a positive aspect of psychological well-being, while depression is a negative aspect.

Because of China's 30-year birth limitation strategy, only children now account for a substantial proportion of youngsters and adolescents. As a result, comparative studies between only children and siblings are becoming more common, with the emphasis mostly on variations in personality traits, sociality, and psychological health levels. One regrettable aspect of this study is that in terms of psychological welfare research, it does not seem to be surveying only children and brothers separately.

For example, are there differences in self-esteem and depression among Chinese adolescents based on their siblings and gender? What's the connection between this and the COVID pandemic? What does it mean? So what should we do? I think it can be linked to that answer.

This is because there may be differences in the level of psychological welfare of adolescents depending on the composition of brothers.

Second, I believe the authors should inform us about the study's shortcomings. For instance, what type of city does Mainland China have in China? Second, there are other factors that can be used to assess the psychological well-being of adolescents, but in this study, only Internet addiction, self-esteem, and depression were chosen.

Third, it appears that scholarly and policy consequences must be presented. As far as I am aware, China has no central department dedicated to youth policy. According to the report, improving laws and policies to improve youth rights and welfare, as well as youth unemployment, is critical, particularly in preparing young people for developmental concerns such as education, physical and mental health, and community engagement. As a result, I believe it will be a more complete research if we give a policy solution for resolving these concerns.

Fourth, the authors used examples from the United States and Turkey in our study to explain youth in China, Taiwan, and Macau. I need to explain the significance. Fifth, the age of adolescents surveyed on page 16 was defined as 18 years or older, and it is necessary to explain how China, Taiwan, and Macau define the age of adolescents. I think this study is very important in providing basic data on the development of programs to improve the psychological welfare of young people in China, Taiwan, and Macau. Thank you for your time.

Responses

Dr. Kuo, Jing-Houng

Professor, Chinese Culture University

Thank you for your comments on the paper of “The Crisis and Turning Point of Adolescents in the Post-Pandemic Era in Greater China: A Comparative Analysis of Social Care, Integration Promotion, and Mental and Physical Health”. I strongly agree that there is no exception how the COVID pandemic has affected people’s the perception , attitude and behavior all over the world.

Nevertheless, this is a joint project among China, Macau and Taiwan. The first data collection was conducted in 2018 before the COVID pandemic, focusing on family functioning and resilience towards the influence of the adolescent’s negative emotional state and disturbance; the second data collection was conducted in 2022 during the COVID pandemic, focusing on internet use, social support resilience towards the influence of the approach to screen up the predictive variables to account for the adolescent’s negative emotional state and disturbance.

In this study, we just described the societal phenomenon among the cities of three regions (China, Taiwan, and Macao) as well as tried to find the major predictable variables to account for the adolescent’s negative emotional state and disturbance. Besides, these findings will contrast the data in 2018. In general, we found the family functioning and internet use were the key influences on the adolescent’s negative emotional state and disturbance.

We appreciated of Dr. Kim’s comments and suggestions which will refine our study. We will separate suggestions in the different regions and take the sibling variable into account.

Dr. Lin, Hsuan-Hsiang

Professor, Chinese Culture University

Thanks a lot for Prof. Kim’s comments and the questions from the audience.

Since I did not write the paper, and the topic of the paper is not my expertise, it is very difficult for me to respond to Prof. Kim's comments on behalf of Dean Kuo. However, I have taken notes of the main points of Prof. Kim's comments, and I will take your comments back to Taiwan and convey them to Dean Kuo.

I would like to take a moment to illustrate the connection between mental health, social welfare and peace. In the field of international relations, when we talk about war and peace, the first relevant factors that come to mind are geopolitics, economic interdependence, international

institutions, regime type, technological and weaponry development, etc. Constructivists may also add ideological factors such as identity and ideology (e.g. nationalism). Therefore, according to the conventional thinking in international relations, mental health and social welfare may be relegated to the status of so-called “low politics”.

In recent years, however, the IR community has begun to pay attention to the impact of emotions on international relations, and new area of research called “emotion and IR” has emerged. Such research can help us understand empirically how emotions play a role in international relations. On a normative level, however, emotions can have negative effects on international relations, such as making people less willing to compromise, or even escalating conflict. In the case of the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we can see that the words and actions of the parties involved are full of emotions. In such a situation, it is difficult for rational dialogue to exist. From this point of view, it can be said that there is a close relationship between emotion management and peace, and that emotion management should also become an important topic in peace study.

But how is emotion management possible? My hypothesis is that the more mentally healthy a person is, the more likely she is capable of managing her emotions. If this hypothesis can be proven to be valid, then a positive relationship between mental health and peace can be established. Inspired by Dean Kuo's paper, I further hypothesize that if people are exposed to unfavorable social environments such as poverty and isolation over a long period of time, it will have a negative impact on their mental health, causing them to become depressed, anxious, and thus more aggressive. As we all know, adolescence is an important stage of personality formation, and once a distorted personality develops in adolescence, its impact on mental health may last for a lifetime. Therefore, according to Dean Kuo's study, the government has the responsibility to improve the social conditions that affect mental health through social welfare policies and measures.

Based on the above discussion, my reasoning is that for the sake of peace, we must consider the possible negative impact of emotions on peace. In order to manage emotions, we must pay attention to mental health, especially the mental health of the youth, and therefore the government must improve the social conditions affecting mental health through social welfare policies. Following this line of thought, youth mental health and social welfare is no longer just an issue of “low politics”, but an important issue concerning peace and war.

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