Peace Forum 2020
Proceedings

Creative Collaboration for a Resilient World
Creating New Shared Values and New Policies in the Post-pandemic World

Peace Forum 2020
Proceedings

Creative Collaboration for a Resilient World

Creating New Shared Values and New Policies in the Post-pandemic World

International Symposium
Co-sponsored by Soka University and Kyungnam University
and Chinese Culture University

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International Symposium

Co-sponsored by Soka University and Kyungnam University and Chinese Culture University

Peace Forum 2020

Creative Collaboration for a Resilient World

Creating New Shared Values and New Policies in the Post-pandemic World

An online meeting

12th December 2020 (Japan Time)

Hosted by Soka University

Program

09:00 **Opening**

    -Greeting from the host (President BABA, Yoshihsa, SU)

    -Opening Remarks (President PARK, Jae Kyu, KU)

    -Opening Remarks (Vice President Wang, Shu-Yin, CCU)

09:15 **Keynote Speech**

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    'The World Maps in 2100: Freedom in the Age of Great Migration'

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    -Comments

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- Presentation

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'What Makes States More Successful at Containing the Pandemic?'
-Comments

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12:10 Break

12:25 **Session III "The Cross-Straight Relationships and Prospects after the American Presidential Election in 2020"**
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- Presentation

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'The Cross-Straight Relationships and Prospects after the American Presidential Election in 2020'
-Comments

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13:25 Closing
(Address by the next host, Co-Host Meeting for the next year forum)

The Panelists Information

Keynote Speech

Professor MINE, Yoichi (Doshisha University)

Dr. Yoichi Mine is Professor at the Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan; Visiting Fellow at JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development, Tokyo, Japan; and Professor Extraordinaire at the Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa.

Professor Mine's research interest lies in human security, international relations, global history and African political economy. He is the founding Secretaries-General of the Japan Association for Human Security Studies and the Japan Society for Afrasian Studies. He has published widely in Japanese including several acclaimed books on African development and conflict resolution. His English publications include: Yoichi Mine, Frances Stewart, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Thandika Mkandawire eds, *Preventing Violent Conflict in Africa: Inequalities, Perceptions and Institutions*, (Palgrave, 2013); Sam Moyo and Yoichi Mine eds, *What Colonialism Ignored: 'African Potentials' for Resolving Conflicts in Southern Africa* (Langaa RPCIG, 2016); Scarlett Cornelissen and Yoichi Mine eds, *Migration and Agency: Afro-Asian Encounters* (Palgrave, 2018); Carolina Hernandez, Eun Mee Kim, Yoichi Mine and Ren Xiao eds, *Human Security and Cross-Border Cooperation* (Palgrave, 2018) and Yoichi Mine, Oscar A. Gómez and Ako Muto eds, *Human Security Norms in East Asia* (Palgrave, 2018). Currently, he is writing an oral history of Japan's development cooperation that will be published by The University of Tokyo Press in 2021.

Professor Mine graduated from the Department of History, Kyoto University, and took his master's degree from the Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University. He taught at the College of International Studies, Chubu University, and the Graduate School of Human Sciences, Osaka University, before moving to Doshisha. He has been awarded the Okita Memorial Prize for International Development Research (2000) by the Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development (FASID), Tokyo, and the Okita Commemorative Award for Policy Research (2001) by the National Institute of Research Advancement (NIRA), Tokyo.

Session I

Moderator

Professor KOIDE, Minoru (Soka University)

Minoru Koide is the Dean of the Graduate School of International Peace Studies at Soka University from April 2018. Koide has also been a professor of international relations at the

Faculty of International Liberal Arts since 2014. After graduating from Soka University with BA (1985) and MA (1987) in law, Koide studied at the School of International Relations, the University of Southern California where he received a Ph.D. in international relations (1994). Koide has been teaching at Soka University since 1995, first at its peace research institute, then at the Faculty of Law. In 2005-2006, Koide was a visiting researcher at American University, Washington, D.C. Koide has published articles in English and Japanese on Japanese foreign policy, Japan-South Korea relations, and region building in Asia.

Presentation: 'Creative Collaboration for a Resilient World'

Abstract

In this presentation, by examining the impact of the spread of COVID-19 infection in Japan and the measures taken by the Japanese government, it is clarified that the vulnerability of globalization, which was the premise of our daily life, was revealed by the pandemic. Then, it considers the ideal way of globalization that enables the contradictory efforts to prevent the damage caused by infectious diseases without exacerbating the damage caused by poverty without being left behind.

We cannot escape from disasters that are difficult to predict concretely, such as pandemics. That is why it is necessary to be prepared for people to survive with dignity even in the event of such a sudden disaster. Since such disasters are unpredictable, it is inevitable that they will suffer considerable damage in the event of a disaster. Therefore, it is important to improve the resilience to recover quickly from damage as well as to prevent disasters.

In this presentation it uses the resilience theory by Zolli & Healy (2012) to consider the requirements of a resilient global system that draws on the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic. In envisioning a resilience world, what the keynote speech by Professor Mine, who presents the idea of a new community called Afrasia and shows the vision of the world 100 years from now, is an important basis. We want to think about how we should "change" toward a world where everyone can enjoy the freedom to live with dignity.

Presenter: Professor TAMAI, Hideki (Soka University)

Mr. Tamai is a Professor of Peace Studies, International Relations at Soka University and Director of Soka University Peace Research Institute (SUPRI). He earned BA (Sociology) at Soka University in 1985 and MA (International Relations) at Soka University in 1989. He started to work at Soka University Peace Research Institute in 1990. He was appointed director of SUPRI and Associate Professor of Faculty of Letters at Soka University in 2008.

His research examines and promotes Human Security in terms of norm entrepreneurship and in terms of policy making and implementation ['Development of Japanese Government Strategy of Peacebuilding in Post-Cold War era' (2010); 'Issues with Human Insecurity in Japan: the Case of US Military Bases in Okinawa' (2015)] He has been studying also Global

Governance for Human Security, for example his analysis of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) presented it uniquely as a novel type of international regime from the perspective of constructivism ['Forming of a Human Security Regime and International Organization' (Yamamoto et.al. eds., *International Organizations and International Institutions*, Shigakusha, Inc. Tokyo, 2017)]

He is also very experienced in leading many international conferences, such as the International Symposium "Human Security in Asia", "Global Governance for Human Security", and "Building a Peace Community in Asia".

Discussant

Professor KIM, Sung Kyung
(University of North Korean Studies/Kyungnam University)

Dr. Sung Kyung Kim received her Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Essex in UK. She is Associate Professor at the University of North Korean Studies since 2014, and currently work as a deputy director of the Center for North-South Korea Mind Integration at the University of North Korean Studies. She is an editor-in-chief in Review of North Korean Studies which is a Korean Citation Index Journal (KCI) issued by Korean Research Foundation. She previously served as a lecturer in the Department of Sociology and a senior visiting fellow in Asia Research Institute(ARI) at the National University of Singapore(NUS). She is a member of Peace and Prosperity Division in the Presidential Commission on Policy-Planning and a board member in Ministry of Unification, ROK. Her research interests are North Korean mobility; Sociology of emotion and affect; cultural geography and etc. Recent publications are in the field of Asian mobility, North Korean defectors, migration studies, and cultural industry.

Discussant

Professor PANG, Chien-kuo (Chinese Culture University)

Chien-kuo Pang earned his Ph. D. degree in Sociology from Brown University of the United States. His doctoral dissertation, The State and Economic Transformation: The Taiwan Case, was selected as one of the ten best theses on the economic development of developing countries in the United States in 1987 and published by Garland Publishing, Inc. in 1992. Mr. Pang is specialized in the fields of comparative study of national development, international political economy, globalization, and Sun Yat-sen's thought. He had served as Associate Professor of the Department and Graduate Institute of Sociology at National Taiwan University (1987-1994), Taipei City Councilman (1994-2001), Legislator of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (2002-2005), Advisor of National Policy Foundation (2005-), Deputy Convener of Advisory Board of Taipei City Government (2007-2015), Advisor of the Strait Exchange Foundation (2008-2016), and Chairman of Taiwan Competitiveness Forum (2017-2019). He currently is Professor of the Graduate Institute of National Development and Mainland China Studies at Chinese Culture

University. He has published 3 books and numerous articles in academic journals and edited volumes.

Session II

Moderator

Professor KIM, Jung (University of North Korean Studies/Kyungnam University)

Dr. Jung Kim is an Assistant Professor at the University of North Korean Studies and Visiting Professor at Yonsei University, South Korea. He is currently a member of Policy Advisory Committee of Ministry of National Defense and of Ministry of Unification. He is also a regional coordinator of Asia Democracy Research Network. Prior to this, he was a Chief Researcher at East Asia Institute and Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University. He received his B.A. and M.A. in Political Science at Korea University and his Ph.D. in Political Science at Yale University. His research interests include Comparative Politics and International Relations in East Asia.

Presentation: 'What Makes States More Successful at Containing the Pandemic?'
Abstract

This paper aims to explore what factors make states more successful at containing the spread of a pandemic such as COVID 19. Witnessing the global spread and rampancy of the COVID 19 pandemic, we bring up a question, "Why are some states more successful at containing the spread of the pandemic disease, while others are not?" By way of answering the question raised above, this study focuses on the fact that a state's effort to stop the spread of the disease requires individual citizens' cooperative behaviors such as wearing masks, visiting a medical institution when suspected to get infected, avoiding social gatherings, etc., most of which are costly, with varying degrees of cost, to each and every individual. This implies that a state's quarantine effort will bear fruit only when citizens are willing to comply with the prevention guidelines provided by the government. Using a simple game theoretical model, this study attempts to analyze what incentivizes citizens to align themselves with the government's quarantine effort. Based on the findings from the model, this study compares and evaluates the administrative performance of three governments in South Korea, Japan and Taiwan.

Presenter: Professor CHUNG, Jaewook (Kyungnam University)

Dr. Jaewook Chung is a Professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam University, Lecturer at Kyonggi University, and Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of International Studies, Seoul National University. He received his B.A. and M.A. in Political Science from Seoul National University and earned his Ph. D degree in Political Science from Rice University, Houston, Texas. His research interests include international security, especially

military alliances, Northeast Asian security affairs, international political economy, quantitative research and game theory. His research appeared in the Korean Journal of International Studies and the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis.

Discussant

Dr. WANG, Shun-Wen (Chinese Culture University)

Associate Professor Shun-Wen Wang is a faculty member of Department of Public Administration and Management at Chinese Culture University. He received his PhD in Political Science from National Taiwan University.

His main research interests lie in the fields of Middle East(especially focus on Turkey and Iraq), Cross-Strait Relations, and conflict resilience and has published some papers related to these subjects. Dr. Wang got projects from the Ministry of Science and Technology and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For example, MOST's project "Conflict Resilience in Iraq" mainly discusses on Conflict resilience after 2017 KRG independence referendum and 2018 KRG parliamentary election, sectarianism and the Arba'een pilgrimage with field study in KRG, Iraq. He was also a visiting scholar at AVIM center in Ankara under MOFA's project "Turkey's reaction on the Chinese 'One-Belt-One-Road' policy".

His recent projects are related to Turkish strategic role under presidential system, Kurdish factors on U.S.-Turkey relations and Cross-Strait relations under U.S presidential campaign. Current course offerings range from Public Policy, Constitution, Middle East Politics, Political Science and Management.

Discussant

Professor SASAKI, Satoshi (Soka University)

Dr. Satoshi Sasaki is a Professor of Faculty of Nursing, Soka University. He received his MA degree in Law from Soka University and Ph.D. degree in Medicine from Niigata University, Japan. His research interests include infectious disease control and prevention of infant and maternal mortality in developing counties. He was involved in Japanese ODA project to mobilize local community to improve infectious disease morbidity in Africa for ten years. He published his research paper in the American Journal of Public Health, the Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health and the Tropical Medicine and International Health.

Session III

Moderator

Professor CHAO, Chien-min (Chinese Culture University)

Dr. Chien-min Chao is a Distinguished Chair Professor at the Graduate Institute for National Development and Mainland China Studies, and also Dean of the College of Social Science of the

Chinese Culture University. Between 2008 and 2012, Dr. Chao served as a Deputy Minister for the Mainland Affairs Council in the ROC government. Dr. Chao was a visiting distinguished professor at the George Washington University and visiting teaching professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Dr. Chao has written and edited thirteen books, including Decision-making in China: Leadership, Process and Mechanism (Taipei, 2014). The book has won him a distinguished award here in Taiwan and has been translated into Korean. Other publications include Introduction to China and Cross-Strait Relations (Taipei, 2010); Lee Teng-hui's Legacy (M.E. Sharpe, 2002); Rethinking the Chinese State (Routledge, 2001); Analysis to Contemporary Chinese Politics (Taipei, 1997); Authoritarian Politics (Taipei, 1994). Dr. Chao has also produced over 100 articles in academic journals such as the Asian Affairs, Asian Survey, the China Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary China, Pacific Affairs, Issues & Studies, Chinese Law and Government, Zhongguo dalu yanjiu. The most recent article appeared at the July issue of the Journal of Contemporary China in 2018.

Presentation: 'The Cross-Straight Relationships and Prospects after the American Presidential Election in 2020'

Abstract:

The fierce outcome of the American Presidential Election in 2020, no matter will Donald Trump or Biden get elected as the President, the strategic settings in both the US and China would continue on. Based on the China's national President Xi Jin-Ping's avoiding the U.S.-Taiwan relationship to be over-close, thus provoke its domestic hard-liners rising to create the over-large domestic pressures and even stir up the war. Therefore, after the American Presidential election, the mainland China would be able to recover its connection with Taiwan. For the Taiwan's DPP Governmental position would avoid becoming serious anti-China pawn of the U.S. and turn it down to avoid the over stimulating language and actions against China. At the same time, the DPP government would maintain not overly hostile with China to expect to maintain peaceful state across the strait. Also, even the U.S. and China have been in New Cold War state. The United States tried to search the beneficial political-economic negotiations' room with the Mainland China. After all, the U.S. has taken the extremely tough policy toward China which may not necessarily advantageous toward its politics and economy. Thus, before the election the too hot relationship will slow down between US and Taiwan after election.

Presenter: Dr. YU, Hsiao-Yun (Chinese Culture University)

Dr. Hsiao-Yun Yu is the chair and Professor of the Department of Public Administration and Management of the College of Social Sciences in the Chinese Culture University in Taiwan. She was once the correspondent and Journalist of the Congress of the R.O.C. and also used be in charge of coordinating and reconciliation tasks when she was a staff of The Executive Yuan. Her academic major fields include Comparative politics, American Politics, and Judicial Politics.

Presenter: <u>Dr. SHAW, Johnny (Chinese Culture University)</u>

Dr. Johnny Shaw is the associate professor of the Department of Public Administration and Management of the College of Social Sciences in the Chinese Culture University in Taiwan. He has experienced several foreign affairs services in both China and United States as chief interpreter and liaison. His academic major fields are developmental public administration, comparative public administration and Taiwan – China relationships.

Discussant

<u>Dr. LEE, Byong-Chul (Kyungnam University)</u>

Dr. Byong-Chul Lee is Assistant Professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam University. His research interests include North Korean denuclearization, nuclear non-proliferation and policies on the ROK-US relations. His recent research has focused primarily on "What explains variation in South Korea's commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime?" Before joining the IFES, Dr. Lee worked as an aide to the Presidential Senior Secretary for Foreign and National Security Affairs and served as foreign and national security policy planning staff member at the Presidential Office of South Korea from 1993 to 1999. He also served as a special aide and policy planning secretary to the Speaker of National Assembly from 2015 to 2016. He received a Ph.D. in North Korean Studies from Korea University. His op-ed pieces and comments have appeared in The New York Times, 38North, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, YaleGlobal, Project Syndicate, The South China Morning Post, among other publications.

Discussant

<u>Professor POPOVSKI, Vesselin (Soka University)</u>

Vesselin Popovski is Professor in the School of International Peace Studies (SIPS) at Soka University, leading the research group on Sustainable Development at its Peace Research Institute and teaching SIPS main course "International Relations Theory". Prior to that Popovski was Professor, Vice Dean Law School, and Executive Director of the Centre for UN Studies at Jindal Global University in India. In 2004-2014 Popovski served as Senior Academic Officer at UN University in Tokyo. In 2002-2004 he co-directed the EU project 'Legal Protection of Individual Rights in Russia', and in 1999-2002 he was assistant professor at the University of Exeter. His career started as a Bulgarian diplomat serving in Sofia, New York and London.

Popovski published numerous articles in peer-reviewed journals, wrote or edited over twenty books, among them: Fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals (2021), Palgrave Handbook on Global Approaches to Peace (2019), Implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2018), Emotions in International Politics (2016); Ethical Values and Integrity of the Climate Change Regime (2015); Security Council as Global Legislator (2014); International Rule of Law and Professional Ethics (2014); Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (2012),

World Religions and Norms of War (2009); International Criminal Accountability and Children's Rights (2006).

Popovski is visiting senior fellow at Pace University, New York; member of the Working Group on Global Governance, Innovation and Renewal; and the Just Security Program of the Stimson Centre, Washington DC. Also member of the Advisory Boards of the 'Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies', and 'Asian International Studies Review'. Contributed to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and its Report 'Responsibility to Protect' (2001), and the Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, producing 'The Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction' (2001). Popovski has a Ph.D. from King's College London, M.Sc. from London School of Economics, and B.A./M.A. from Moscow Institute of International Relations.

Greeting from the Host

BABA, Yoshihisa

President
Soka University

On behalf of the co-organizing universities, I would like to greet you all at the start of this 4th Peace Forum. I would like to thank President Park of Kyungnam University, Vice President Wang of Chinese Culture University, and the professors and students from both universities for attending this forum from the early morning.

Soka University will mark its 50th anniversary in April 2021 and has been planning and holding various commemorative events since last year. As part of this 50th-anniversary project, we have held an event series called "Value Creation × SDGs," which combines the university's efforts toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with its educational philosophy of "Value-Creating Education." We started the "Value Creation × SDGs" Week yesterday, and will hold a series of events until the 17th of next week, including symposiums, exhibitions, and events organized by students on the common theme of "Peace and Human Rights."

With having the opportunity of holding this Peace Forum at a time of a milestone in the university's history, we had set out our intention to provide an opportunity to discuss with the professors of the co-organizing universities how to exert creativity for building peace and what shape "Value Creation" should take in the modern world.

However, as we were preparing, we were hit by the calamity of the COVID-19 pandemic. We had been looking forward to welcoming professors from Kyungnam University and Chinese Culture University to our campus in Hachioji, but the unexpected spread of the new coronavirus led us to hold an online forum as our first attempt.

In addition to the venue, we also adjusted the theme of the Peace Forum to "Creative Collaboration for a Resilient World—Creating New Shared Values and New Policies in the Post-pandemic World." This indicates our intention to create value so as to overcome the various

problems caused by the COVID-19 crisis.

Today, we are urgently required to mitigate the sacrifices caused by infectious diseases and the economic difficulties resulting from infection control. This severe challenge has made us keenly aware of the vulnerability of the current social and economic systems. Many intellectuals argue that human society requires an innovation that brings us the resilience to respond to disasters such as pandemics. Prominent intellectuals such as Yuval Harari and Jared Diamond say that the COVID-19 crisis is a turning point in human history.

In this forum, we are fortunate to welcome Professor Yoichi Mine of Doshisha University as a keynote speaker. I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Professor Mine for accepting our request despite his busy schedule. Thank you so much, Professor Mine.

As is well known, Professor Mine has made great achievements in development economics and African studies. He has also made significant contributions not only to academic research but also to the practical areas of peacebuilding and development assistance. Based on these achievements, Professor Mine has, in recent years, presented a vision of what the world will be like in 100 years based on a global analysis of demographics. Today, which, as mentioned, is being referred to as a turning point in human civilization, it is truly timely to hear Professor Mine's story, and I hope that his lecture will make today's discussions even more fruitful.

Even though this Peace Forum is held online due to an unexpected reason, about 200 people have registered to participate, which is an unprecedented scale among our past forums. I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to everyone that is participating today. Thank you.

In closing, I would like to express my wish that we can demonstrate creative wisdom regardless of various obstacles in the future and that the network of the Peace Forum will develop into a global one.

Thank you for your kind attention.

Opening Remarks

PARK, Jae Kyu

President
Kyungnam University
Former ROK Minister of Unification

Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen.

It is wonderful to see you here at our 4th Peace Forum.
I'd like to express my deepest thanks to President Baba Yoshihisa of Soka University for hosting this event. I am also thankful to Vice-President Wang Shu-Yin of Chinese Culture University for working hard to further the friendship and cooperation among our three universities.

Let me also congratulate President Baba and the faculty, staff, and students of Soka University on the 50th anniversary of its foundation. For 50 years Soka University has made countless contributions to life and humanity in the pursuit of peace and a better future for mankind. In my heart I know Soka University will continue to grow and flourish.

The memories of our last forum at Jeju Island are still fresh in my mind. Our discussions on the peace in East Asia were inclusive. We shared our expertise about Korea-Japan relations, cross-Strait relations, and inter-Korean relations, among other topics. Many of the scholars who are here today were also at the forum in Jeju. Taking this opportunity, let me thank all of you once again for gathering to share your expert views and insightful thoughts.

We are here to deepen the discussions we've had at past conferences in Okinawa, Taipei, and Jeju under the theme of peace in East Asia. Regrettably, we cannot meet in person. But technology allows us to meet together online. For this, I am truly grateful.

Adding to our customary examination of peace and security issues, at today's conference we are going to discuss how to achieve human security and creatively collaborate to make the world safer and resilient as we contend with the COVID-19 pandemic. We need to understand the

ongoing situation, examine our needs, and share the experiences and perspectives of our three countries which have been successfully coping with the pandemic.

Today, I also look forward to having deeper discussion on the changing world order, regional order, and subsequent correlations.

This conference provides an opportunity to envision a peaceful and safe East Asia through our ideas on the existing and future challenges.

Through our sharing, I believe we will come to more completely understand one another's sources of distress, current needs, and points of view in this turbulent period in history. We will also be better able to find what is mutually best in our pursuit of peace.

Let me conclude by saying, 'Thank you all' for your contribution to the peace among our three countries and the cooperation among our three universities. May our friendship endure. May our health remain strong. And may we all stay safe so we can see one another again, in Taiwan, next year.

Thank you.

Opening Remarks

WANG, Shu-Yin

Vice President
Chinese Culture University

Good morning, everybody. On behalf of the Chinese Culture University, I am honored to attend this opening ceremony this morning, and I would like to thank the Soka University to host this forum, and thank President Baba and President Park for their excellent opening remarks.

The Peace Forum has always been a platform for people from all three countries to get together, not only to exchange our research interests, but also to build up our friendship and maintain our long-lasting friendship.

Unfortunately, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we cannot get together face-to-face this time. However, it also pushed us quickly to adopt new technology. So today, I wish to thank all the technical personnel in all three countries. If not for them, we might not be able to hold this online conference today.

Two years ago, I met some of you in Taiwan, and we had a great time then, and I hope that next year we all have the opportunity to communicate face-to-face. So today I wish this conference a great success, and I wish the best for all the participants and staff members.

Thank you very much.

Keynote

The World Maps in 2100:
Freedom in the Age of Great Migration

MINE, Yoichi

Professor
Doshisha University

Introduciton

We now live in the age of pandemic. I do not think there has ever been a time when the question of appropriate distance between people has been discussed so passionately. The present havoc should end sooner or later. After the present storm is over, however, we will find ourselves living in a very different world.

In this lecture, I would like to discuss first about the trend of global population change. In the past, human beings used to live in a spacious world; numerous villages were surrounded by open frontiers. Then, the human race witnessed the age of industrialisation, urbanisation, and imperial colonisation. Now in the 21st century, with a rapid increase of population in Asia, and then in Africa, people in Asia and Africa started to migrate actively in their regions, as well as globally, spreading infectious diseases from time to time.

Then, in the second half of today's discussion, I would like to think about multiculturalism as a state in which people move around, join together, split away, keep distance, and still co-exist and create a common value. I believe that finding an appropriate way of co-existence is one of the major challenges that post-covid society will face.

1. The Rise of Afrasia

To start the discussion, I propose a geographic framing of Afrasia (Figure 1). The term, Afrasia, was coined by the British historian, Arnold Toynbee, to refer to the cradle of civilisations in North Africa and West Asia. The term, Afrasian Sea, is also used to refer to the western part of

the Indian Ocean, the Swahili world, where elements of the Arabic and African cultures mixed through trade and migration in the past centuries. In this paper, I use the word, Afrasia, to refer to a combination of the whole of Africa and Asia, which occupies about a half of the total land area of world nations.

Figure 1

People of Afrasia are expected to become an overwhelming majority of the world population by the end of the 21st century. In order to present the future shape of this megaregion, I have crafted a number of maps in collaboration with engineers of geographic information system (GIS).

According to a projection released by the Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the global population will expand from 6.2 billion in 2001 (Figure 2) to 9.8 billion in 2050 (Figure 3) and eventually to 11.2 billion in 2100, the final year of the 21st century (Figure 4). These figures show the increase of population through the expansion of the area, and the most conspicuous feature of these cartograms is the massive growth of the people living on the African continent.


2001 年
（口絵 2）

2050 年
（口絵 3）

Figure 2, 3

2100 年
(口絵 4)

アジア
アフリカ
ヨーロッパ
南北アメリカ
オセアニア

口絵 2-4　人口規模のカルトグラム（2001-2100 年）
出典 : United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division,
World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision.
https://population.un.org/wpp/download/

Figure 4

The African population is projected to increase five times in the 21st century. This means that, by 2100, the population density of Africa will become almost the same as the population density of Asia. The areas of Africa and Asia are almost equal, and the population size will also become similar by 2100 (Figures 5 and 6). Therefore, the population densities of the two regions will become almost the same by the end of this century. You can see the noticeable change in the population density of Africa.

1 平方キロあたり人数
250 ～
100 ～ 250
50 ～ 100
20 ～ 50
～ 20
データなし

口絵 5　世界の人口密度（2015 年）
出典 : 口絵 2 と同じ

Figure 5

1 平方キロあたり人数
250 ～
100 ～ 250
50 ～ 100
20 ～ 50
～ 20
データなし

口絵 6　世界の人口密度（2100 年）
出典 : 口絵 2 と同じ

Figure 6

In 2100, the total population of Asia and Africa will constitute about 83 per cent of the world population. Afrasian people will become an absolute majority of the world population quite soon. If we look at nations, in terms of population size, by 2100, China will be overtaken by India and followed by Nigeria. The share of the European population in the world will be

reduced from 12 per cent to 6 per cent. And, the share of the East Asian population (China, Korea, Japan and Mongolia) will also decrease from 24 per cent to only 11 per cent.

What will happen to the wealth of nations, given such a global demographic change? The cartogram of Figure 7 illustrates the concentration of world GDP in three major economic centres of the world: East Asia, Western Europe and North America. Africa's GDP share is meagre. However, the future story may be completely different. Figure 8 shows that Africa will be the only region that enjoys a substantial demographic dividend, a ratio of the economically active population to the total population, in the latter half of this century. In the coming decades, Africa will abound in young population and have much fewer elderly people. The continent will not be facing an ageing problem in contrast to East Asia.

Figure 7

Figure 8

There are only three factors that determine demographic transition: fertility, mortality and migration. The most important factor among them is fertility, the entry of new generations into society. According to Thomas Malthus, without moral checks, population increases exponentially, while agricultural production grows only arithmetically. The dramatic rise in African population projected by the UN demographers may give an impression that the African population continue to grow to the point of collision with the environmental constraints (Figure 9).

However, Malthusian scenario conceived in the late 18th century has proved to be wrong; the population did not keep growing exponentially in any society, and the agricultural production

Figure 9

has grown steadily to accommodate the aggregate needs of the global population at least until today. There is much evidence to show that women's education and their involvement in economic employment outside the home tend to lower the fertility rate. The fertility rate is the average number of children a woman in a society is expected to have in her lifetime. Rising costs of childbearing, urbanisation, as well as the spread of contraception, also contribute to the decline of fertility. In short, the evidence shows that the Malthusian catastrophe of population explosion is avoidable through the empowerment of women.

The UN population projection is based on the assumption that the fertility rate declines in all regions and nations. As shown in the right side of Figure 10, the fertility rate of African women has already started to decline in the 1980s. As long as the fertility remains as high as four and five, the absolute size of the population in Africa will continue to expand. However, in future Africa just as in the rest of the world, the fertility rate is expected to drop gradually and settle down to the replacement level, two. The UN projection, therefore, predicts that Afrasia's '80 per cent majority' situation in the early 22nd century will be a sort of "stationary state", an equilibrium, rather than one stage in an endless population explosion.


Figure 10

2. New Migration Patterns

In the 22nd century, people from Africa and Asia will be an absolute majority of the global population. This population growth in Africa and Asia will have a number of consequences, but one of the most impactful will be the accelerated migration of people. As the growth centre shifts and the population pressure increases especially in rural Africa, more and more people are expected to decide to leave their home villages and towns to cities, and from some cities to others. In the second part of this lecture, I will discuss the prospects of people's movement across Africa and Asia and the potential of co-existence between new-comers and old citizens.

Figure 11 shows that the major pattern of migration is shifting from South-North to South-South. An increasing number of researches is being conducted about the new waves of migration between Africa and Asia, such as Chinese in Africa or Africans in China. In the age of imperialism and colonialism, a massive number of people were displaced and forced to move, but this option of organised migration is not realistic in our time. Domestic relocation of surplus population to land-abundant areas is not feasible in most countries though there have been some experiments in places like Indonesia and Ethiopia.

Figure 11

Free movement of people across borders is not allowed in the modern world where land and people are captured, measured, counted and registered by a central authority. Travel is the act of a person to move by free will.

But, if the endpoint of the movement is different from the starting point, the person will be re-registered at the destination. This is the rule of modern society. Despite such limitations, in our time, people still move on, just as fishermen in Southeast Asia sailed to different islands. For example, international students may form new families and settle down in the country they have studied in; they may be disappointed and return to their home countries or head for a new land to start over, and so on. The directions vary, but the movement of people across borders is increasingly becoming a phenomenon in the South, not necessarily between the South and the North.

3. Multiculturalism in the West

Under these circumstances, encounters between new migrants and citizens in host countries occur in various places. To control the relationship between hosts and guests, many Western countries paid attention to a policy principle called multiculturalism. Perhaps the most systematic advocate of this principle was the Canadian political scientist, Will Kymlicka, though his prescription was not as tolerant as we might imagine from the word. Kymlicka argued that people who voluntarily left their country of origin should be gradually integrated into the society and culture of the host country. These minorities were not entitled to demand public education in their own ethnic languages. The host country is not obliged to inject public money into projects for the consolidation of partial ethnic identity, because they abandoned their home nation at their own will.

In his framework, a high degree of autonomy will only be considered in case of a large national group within a federal framework such as the French-speaking community in Canada. Some cases involving African Americans and Native Americans require moral prudence and historical justice, but for those who crossed the boundaries voluntarily, full integration into the host society should be the default option.

However, this sort of framework came under fierce attack in North America and Europe after September 11. The argument was that multiculturalism spoiled minorities and embolden religious fundamentalists who eventually attempted to destroy the democratic social order. The minority side generally did not try to defend a paternalistic multiculturalist order either. At the beginning of the 21st century, multiculturalism was rejected by the conservatives as well as by the progressives, and its power as a social norm quickly withered.

4. Multiculturalism without Seeking Integration

Multiculturalism as a policy principle may be over. Still, I wonder if it is not possible to envision multiculturalism without seeking integration. The dream is to have multicultural conviviality as a 'state' rather than a 'goal' in which cultural groups, large and small, co-exist and respect each other. I came up with such an idea when I was living in a downtown of Tokyo with my family. Judging by the words passers-by uttered, I surmised that Japanese were about two-thirds of the people walking around the shopping area, though more or less one-third were probably Filipinos, Nepalese, Pakistanis, Chinese, Koreans, Europeans and others. Aside from shopping, there was no sign of active interaction between the locals and the foreign residents. The same appeared true of the interaction among foreigners who hailed from a variety of places and settled in the same town. Still, there was no sense of hostility among people, even though they were not very interested in each other. As the boisterous samba floats paraded through the shopping street at a local festival, people looked on curiously in places a little away from the scene. The feeling of something resonating with each other while keeping the distance was unexpectedly pleasant for me.

In *Colonial Policy and Practice* published in1948, British colonial officer J. S. Furnivall characterised Southeast Asian society as a plural society. Majority locals (such as Malays) and minorities (such as Indians and Chinese) exchange goods and money in the marketplace, but do not attempt to nurture a national unity from the bottom up. As cited often, 'They mix but do not combine'. The convention of co-existing while living apart can still be seen in multi-ethnic urban societies of today's Southeast Asian countries.

There are a significant number of Chinese migrants living on the African continent today. Both Africans and Chinese speak ill of each other often in private circles, but the mutual distance usually does not develop into confrontations. In the first place, Chinese shops have local customers, which is why their business can be established in Africa. I am often surprised to see Chinese traders living in slums and villages in African countries, without speaking local languages, nor English. Conversely, African merchants who travel to Chinese cities to purchase IT gadgets and commodities are also becoming prominent. The Africans are often angry at the discriminatory behaviours of local Chinese, but they want to continue trading, and their business is also thriving.

5. Aloof Co-existence

The era of multiculturalism in the West may be over, but in Afrasian countries, there are spaces in which 'aloof co-existence' prevails. The notion of governance based on the social contract of abstract individuals is a product of thought experiments in the West. By contrast, there seems no grand social theory of co-existence in the non-Western world. The government sometimes threatens to expel those who do not comply, but, maybe not. The state of co-existence in those countries can be a fragile equilibrium. Decisions on whether to promote peaceful co-existence or take coercive measures are haphazard.

Here is a question. Though it may sound ironic, can such a state of equilibrium not be presented as an ideal situation? In other words, is it possible to propose a system of society in which people can freely enter an association and exit from it, keeping in mind real persons with diverse orientations?

6. The Liberal Archipelago

People move and settle. If a conflict arises or is expected to arise, they walk away. There is no institutional barrier that prevents people's exit and entry. Chandran Kukathas, the philosopher born in Malaysia as a citizen of Indian descent, portrayed something close to this natural state, once envisioned by the French philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

The premise of *The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom* (2003) by Kukathas is to acknowledge human diversity – diversity as a fact rather than a value. Because of the real diversity of human beings, the liberal idea of non-interference in the affairs of others becomes essential. At the root of liberalism lies the principle of freedom of association, which

involves freedom of dissociation and mutual tolerance between groups. According to Kukathas, freedom of association is necessary because of freedom of conscience. A person should not be forced to act in the same way as others if her course of action in accordance with her conscience is different from those of others. This means that people should be able to act differently. This is why diverse people form diverse associations. They are not forced to 'cohere' but should acknowledge their differences, and try to 'co-exist'. Thus, the liberal society that guarantees freedom to its members takes a form of an 'archipelago' made up of multiple competing and overlapping authorities.

For this mechanism to work well, it is necessary that freedom to leave an organisation is guaranteed and that there exist other organisations that are willing to accept individuals who have quit the original group. Kukathas argues that sovereignty is a matter of degree, as the government is also just one of many associations. Let us assume that all migration control were removed in international society. The state of the world would be closer to the normative liberal society that the Kukathas envisions like this:

International society is an archipelago – a sea with numerous islands. Each island is a separate domain, cut-off from others by waters which are indifferent to its circumstances or to its fate. The majority are inhabited by people most of whom are there by chance rather than by intention… The people who populate these islands differ in aspiration and in temperament. Some are content where they are…, and would not dream of risking a venture onto the ocean; while others are restless and anxious to leave the most paradisaical surrounds for unknown opportunities across the water. Each is at liberty to leave, and the sea is thus dotted with vessels, some moving along established routes, others wandering into uncharted areas... (Kukathas, *The Liberal Archipelago*, Oxford University Press, pp. 28-9).

The free oceanic world in the ancient past may have looked like this. It is amusing to dream of the emergence of a totally free world such as this Kukathas's metaphor describes. You wander around the world like you travel in your country and find your new home somewhere.

The problem is that such freedom of movement, association and dissociation is not ensured in many parts of the world. The minority Rohingya in Myanmar are expelled from their villages where they were born. Palestinians living in Gaza are confined to the over-populated strip and fall victim to merciless shelling. At the same time as I witnessed the aloof co-existence in downtown Tokyo, there were xenophobic street campaigns against Koreans in parts of Tokyo. Those who cannot move are driven out, and those who want to move are locked in. Moreover, there are underground networks of human trafficking across the world. The right of voluntary movement is denied often, and this fact underscores the critical importance of this very right.

Conclusion: Living Apart, Living Together

The Western experiments with multiculturalism may have broken down, but it is too early to give up the idea entirely. Let us turn to the experiment of co-existence in the Afrasian world with as much curiosity as we turn to the Western experiments.

In Tanzania in East Africa, it has been an unspoken rule for Christians and Muslims to rotate the presidency since 1964. In apartheid South Africa, Christians, Muslims and Jews took to the streets together in protest of institutional racism. Turning to Southeast Asia, Malaysia's Bumiputra policy has gained widespread attention as a systematic affirmative action to improve the status of majority Malay citizens. Malays are overwhelmingly Muslim, and the minorities are Buddhists, Taoists, Christians and Hindus. However, the government's preferential treatment of the relatively poor Malays has not provoked notable backlash. On the other hand, in the Philippines where Christians are the clear majority, the Muslim-led autonomous government is being established in the south of the country, Mindanao.

In Afrasia, there is a very rich history of experiments and practical knowledge that would promote the co-existence of people of diverse origins. These modalities of co-existence were not brought in from outside but developed locally and internally. Rather than by valuing diversity per se, these modalities have developed through the experience of adapting to given situations and working out differences between people with diverse backgrounds. As Asians and Africans are becoming the majority of the world's population, we enter an era of cross-border migration throughout Afrasia. The question is how to transform the encounter of various cultures into a peaceful co-existence. Peace cannot be forced from outside either. It is time to learn from the wisdom of Afrasian co-existence rather than look to the outside world for a universal model.

The French philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, once traced the origin of human language to passions, emotions, and affections. "All the passions tend to bring people back together again, but the necessity of seeking a livelihood forces them apart. It is neither hunger nor thirst but love, hatred, pity, anger, which drew from them, the first words" (*On the Origins of Language*). We live separately for survival but are bound together by affections. That is why language was born.

I hope that this gathering today will be an opportunity to promote communication among the peoples of East Asia in Afrasia and in the wider world. It is communication with words, not force, that binds us together. Such lively communication is really indispensable as we prepare for the post-Covid era.

Presentation

Creative Collaboration for a Resilient World: A Perspective from Japan

TAMAI, Hideki

Professor
Soka University

Introduciton

The difficulties of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic were not limited to the major medical and epidemiological challenges posed in the form of the growing health hazards of unknown pathogens. Because of the present lack of vaccines and efficacious antivirals, the only way to prevent the epidemic spread of the disease is to cut off the ability for the infection to spread. However, this prevention measure also entailed halting normal social and economic activity. Many are in danger of having a reduced standard of living and even threats to their survival as a result of the decrease in income they have experienced due to the economic stagnation. The restrictions required to prevent the epidemic disease spread and the necessity of economic activity for survival are in conflict, and we are nevertheless unable to control COVID-19.

Some developments have emerged that can help respond more effectively to this unprecedented disaster. Particularly, technologies to enable noncontact communication have become widespread, and new avenues for economic growth are appearing, such as the accelerated commercialization of virtual reality. However, these avenues are also faced with inevitable challenges that come when new technologies and economic activities are born: the gap between those who can enjoy this new life and those who cannot. Here the pandemic is emphasizing the difficulty of creating a society where no one is left behind, which encapsulates

the philosophy of the SDGs.

In this presentation, the impact of the spread of COVID-19 infection in Japan and the response of the Japanese government are investigated, and the vulnerability of globalization, a premise of contemporary daily life, is examined in the context of the pandemic. I also consider ideal strategies for globalization and how they enable the contradictory efforts to prevent damage caused by infectious diseases without aggravating the damage due to poverty.

Unpredictable disasters, such as pandemics, are inescapable. For this reason, it is necessary to prepare ways for people to live with dignity, even in the event of a sudden disaster. Because such disasters are unpredictable, it is inevitable that individuals will suffer considerable damage in the event of a disaster. Therefore, it is crucial to work toward preventing such disasters and increasing resilience to recover quickly from the damage.

In this presentation, I adopt the concept of resilience presented by Zolli and Healy (2012) considering the requirements of a more resilient global system that draws lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic. For developing a vision of a resilient world, the keynote speech by Professor Mine is an important foundation, with its idea of a new community known as Afrasia and vision of the world in 100 years. In an effort to develop a world where everyone has the freedom to live with dignity, we should think about how we as individuals can work toward the change.

1. Impact of COVID-19: The Case of Japan

On October 25, an extraordinary investigation committee based in the private sector released a report that analyzed the Japanese government's response to the spread of the novel coronavirus infection epidemiologically.[1]

The report defined the Japanese model as follows.

The approach of the Japanese government was intended to achieve both suppression of the infection its spread with only limited economic damage, enabled by combining behavior-modification policies centered on individual case tracking with cluster measures, self-restraint requests without penalties, and the granting of leave requests without employing legally enforceable behavior restriction measures.

The situation in Japan till August 2020 was as follows:

(1) Japan succeeded in keeping its mortality rate per capita low, despite its high aging rate.
(2) The Japanese economy has barely held up, and social stability has been maintained

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[1] アジア・パシフィック・イニシアティブ『新型コロナ対応民間臨時調査会　調査・検証報告書』ディスカバー・トウエンティワン　2020年10月25日 (Asia Pacific Initiative "Temporary Investigation Committee for New Corona Response Survey/Verification Report" Discover Twenty One, October 25, 2020)

through a soft lockdown, without the use of coercion.

The Commission's report stated that the government could proceed with the following three points, taking the advice of experts on how to successfully control mortality.

(1) Early detection and early response to clusters
(2) Early diagnosis of patients, enhancement of intensive care for severely ill patients, and provision of secured medical care provision system
(3) Behavior changes among citizens

Conversely, problems remain, such as the insufficient capacity for PCR tests, lack of human resources at the public health centers that perform actual measures as cluster tracking, and inefficient administrative systems that, for instance, require data on the level of COVID-19 transmission and the number of indiduals being infected through handwritten notes or faxing. The report noted that the current medical system remains vulnerable to the spread of infection, and further the medical care system remains at risk of collapse.

日本国内の感染者数（NHKまとめ）

12月10日時点 **172411人**

Number of people infected with of COVID-19 in Japan (cumulative)
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/special/coronavirus/data-all/

As of August, it was thought that measures called the "Japanese model" could suppress the increase in serious illness and death to some extent, but it is thought that the third wave of infection spread began in November. Therefore, it is difficult to control the infection without taking new measures.

日本国内の死者数（NHKまとめ）

12月10日時点 **2513人**

○ 1日ごとの発表数　◉ 累計

Number of deaths due to COVID-19 in Japan (cumulative)

https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/special/coronavirus/data-all/

日本国内の重症者数

12月10日時点 **543人**

Number of Seriously Ill of COVID-19 in Japan (cumulative)

https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/special/coronavirus/data-all/

The number of daily deaths has been on the rise since November, and a total of 2,513 deaths have been reported as of December 10. In addition, the total number of seriously ill is 543, which has also increased since November.

The committee survey found that the economic and social situation was barely holding up, and since August, economic indicators have been deteriorating. It has become clear that the victims are increasing due to refraining from going out as an infection control measure and restricting economic activities.

The *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* reported on the deterioration of the employment situation as follows:

The employment situation continues to gradually deteriorate. The unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted) in August was 3.0%, up 0.1 points from the previous month. This is the first time the rate has reached 3% in three years and three months. The number of the unemployed is 200. The number of employees exceeds 10,000, and the number of unemployed individuals has increased. Additionally, the number of nonregular employees, such as part-timers and contract employees, has decreased. It was at a low level.[2]

According to the investigation of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW), from the end of January to the 6th of this month, the number of people who lost their jobs due to dismissal or "stop hiring" was 70,242.[3] Since the number of people can be grasped by the government office, it seems that there are actually more people who have lost their jobs. The number of people who lost their jobs due to the effects of the new coronavirus exceeded 10,000 on May 21, 50,000 on August 31, 60,000 on September 23. It keeps increasing.

The National Police Agency reported that the number of suicides each month was less than the previous year's figures from January to June, but it increased for each of the 4 months beginning in July, reaching 2,153 in the preliminary figures for October. Of these, 1,302 were male, an increase of 21.3% from the same month of the previous year, and 851 were females, an increase of 82.6% from the same month of the previous year.[4]

The Japan Suicide Countermeasures Promotion Center presented the following analysis in an emergency report.[5]

Women's suicide can have many causes, such as economic problems, work problems, domestic violence, child-rearing worries, long-term care fatigue, and mental illness. The causal factors are becoming more serious, and these may be affecting the number of female suicides. For example, the decrease in nonregular employment has been most remarkable in women, and coronavirus has led to a large number of women losing their jobs, which has led to suicide for some.

November has witnessed the largest increase in COVID-19 infections in Japan, clearly demonstrating that the crisis of the pandemic has not yet been overcome.

2『日本経済新聞』https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO64513520S0A001C2MM0000/

3『日本経済新聞』https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO65990940Z01C20A1EE8000

4 https://www.npa.go.jp/safetylife/seianki/jisatsu/R02/zantei0210.pdf

5 https://3112052d-38f7-4601-af43-2555a2470f1f.filesusr.com/ugd/0c32a8_91d15d66d1bf41a69a1f41e8064f4b2b.pdf

2. Recovery from Unanticipated Disaster

Because of the pandemic, the following has occurred:

■ Increased negative health outcomes due to the collapse of the medical system

■ Restriction of rights due to infection prevention measures (movement restrictions/ lockdowns) and invasion of privacy stemming from a strengthened national surveillance system

■ Stagnant manufacturing and distribution due to infection prevention measures (restriction of the movement of people/lockdown) and stagnant economic activity

■ Export stagnation due to supply chain damage/manufacturing line stagnation, with a shortage of supplies (e.g., mask shortages)

⇒ Evaporation of inbound consumption

⇒ Decrease in personal consumption

■ The gap between those who can resist economic stagnation (greater financial resources) and those who cannot

⇒ Aggravated effects of poverty for those with fewer resources to deal with economic stagnation

⇒ Discrimination and suppression regarding infection risk (self-restraint police) and social divisions

Unlike centuries ago during the plague in Europe, modern medical science has begun to analyze pathogenicity at the genetic level, develop treatments, and manufacture vaccines. However, the spread of the infection before the development of effective treatments has propelled the use of medical services, such as hospitals, beyond their capacity.

Where medical care is not able to manage, social infection prevention must be strengthened. However, there has been widespread concern that the enforcement of behavioral restrictions in a lockdown scenario would lead to a strengthening of government surveillance and infringe on the rights and privacy of private citizens.

Yuval Harari has called for a way to avoid strengthening public surveillance in these circumstances.

Centralized monitoring and harsh punishments aren't the only way to make people comply with beneficial guidelines. When people are told the scientific facts, and when people trust public authorities to tell them these facts, citizens can do the right thing even without a Big Brother watching over their shoulders. A self-motivated and well-informed population is usually far more powerful and effective than a policed, ignorant population.[6]

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6 Yuval Noah Harari, "The world after coronavirus", *Financial Times*, March 20, 2020.
  https://www.ft.com/content/19d90308-6858-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75

Social measures for infection control have caused even greater economic damage. This unanticipated pandemic has come to be the basis for our daily life, that is, the form of an unchanging universal life, presupposing an economic arrangement in line with globalized neoliberalism. Here, globalization has been shown to be vulnerable.

A human security approach should be taken against vulnerabilities of this kind. Human security approaches routinely address real-life, unsafe situations, and foreseeable unsafety, and in the event of an unexpected disaster, they can prepare for unforeseen, sudden failure. Actions of this kind can increase resilience to allow early recovery.

Prime Minister Suga's speech at the 75th UN General Assembly notes that the pandemic is a human security issue.[7]

> The spread of the coronavirus is a human security crisis, posing a threat to the lives, livelihoods, and dignity of people across the globe. The guiding principle for us to overcome this crisis must be "leave no one behind."
>
> Looking forward, we need to "build back better" from the COVID-19 pandemic and create a flexible yet resilient society where the SDGs have been achieved and a virtuous cycle of environment and growth is generated. The ongoing crisis is heavily impacting the education of children and the youth who shape the future. It is also affecting women among others. In order to create a better and more inclusive society, there are three points that I consider to be of paramount importance.

Zolli defined resilience as"the capacity of a system, enterprise, or a person to maintain its core purpose and integrity in the face of dramatically changed circumstances."[8] Here, the following requirements must be met to foster social resilience:

> These elements—beliefs, values, and habits of mind; trust and cooperation; cognitive diversity; strong communities, translational leadership, and adaptive governance—make up the rich soil in which social resilience grows. Taken together, they suggest new ways to bolster the resilience of communities and organizations, and the people who live within them.[9]

How can we meet these requirements?

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7 https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp_a/page4e_001095.html

8 Andrew Zolli and Ann Marie Healy, *Resilience: Why Things Bounce Back*, Simon & Schuster, 2013, p. 7

9 Ibid. pp. 15–16

3. Action for a Resilient World

How can we change to adapt to the situation and produce a new normal? Let us consider the factors that will encourage action to support human security.

First, let us recall the core values of human security: survival, livelihood, and dignity. To ensure survival against disasters such as infectious diseases, a population must understand and trust scientific consensus on risk and take action as a result.

NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) analyzed 200,000 academic reports of medical and epidemiological research on the COVID pandemic using artificial intelligence. This has elucidated the state of creative collaboration within the scientific community. However, the precise policy that should emerge from these scientific findings remains an open question.

For example, in the United States (US) politics, a division became prominent, where the political party in power refused to enact policy based on the scientific knowledge, and in some cases, to perform personal health-promoting behavior, such as wearing a mask. Other issues, such as assigning blame for the pandemic to China, criticism of the World Health Organization, and withdrawal from the international health cooperation regime, have been features of the political landscape within the US.

To protect livelihoods during the COVID pandemic, economic reforms to encourage noncontact services, new working styles including remote work, and improvements to the supply chain have been considered. In Japan, the social reform concept Society 5.0[10] has been implemented, prioritizing information and communication technology. Moreover, the Japanese government is accelerating social reform through the creation of a new normal in the wake of the onset of the COVID pandemic. The government announced its Policy Toward the Construction of New Everyday Life by Utilizing New Technology on October 9, 2020, in the following way.[11]

> To respond quickly and effectively to the novel coronavirus, the introduction and dissemination of new technologies possessed by Japan are key, and it is important for both the public and private sectors to accelerate their efforts in this area.
>
> In particular, in daily life, infection prevention technology is becoming widespread in all contexts, including workplaces, schools, hospitals, public transportation arenas, shops, and event venues, and business practices and services themselves are using new technology.
>
> To effectively promote these efforts, the Cabinet Secretariat's New Coronavirus Infectious Disease Control Promotion Office, the Cabinet Secretariat's IT Comprehensive Strategy Office, and the Cabinet Office's Policy Director (in charge of science and

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10 On January 22, 2016, the 5th Basic Plan for 2016–2020 was approved by the Cabinet.

"It refers to a new society following the hunting society (Society 1.0), agricultural society (Society 2.0), industrial society (Society 3.0), and information society (Society 4.0). The concept of Society 5.0 is that a human-centered society that achieves both economic development and solution of social issues through a system that highly integrates cyber space (virtual space) and physical space (real space)." https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/society5_0/

11 https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/201009shingijutu.html

technology/innovation) will collaborate with each ministry and agency to make new COVID-19 policy. We will collect information on new technologies for use in preventing viruses and present demonstration projects that use them. Further, we will promote their effective use and dissemination.

This will resolve the social issues that have become increasingly apparent due to the novel coronavirus and propel new innovations that can realize Society 5.0.

In response to these economic and social changes, conflict of opinions regarding the pros and cons of change will arise due to differences in values and beliefs, and disparities between those who can take advantage of change and those who cannot will be exaggerated. For everyone to enjoy the freedom to live with dignity, it is necessary to acknowledge various ways of perceiving change and to take care not to disadvantage any person or group.

Conclusion

What approaches can bring about a more resilient world to protect and promote the human security values of survival, livelihood, and dignity? I believe that this approach presents a major challenge to dignity. The challenge here is to increase adherence to the idea that society should enable everyone to live with dignity.

As we face this challenge, we can recall the words of today's keynote speaker, Professor Mine: "Looking at the history of humankind, there have been many times when important policy changes have been realized on the basis of moral correctness."[12] We should bear this in mind. As a moral basis for making a necessary policy shift in response to our contemporary world, I reaffirm the idea that society should enable everyone to live with dignity.

Tsunesaburo Makiguchi, the founder of Soka Education, foresaw an era of humanitarian competition that incorporates the development stage of humankind in his successful work, *A Geography of Human Life*. This book was published in 1903, at a moment when competition among the imperialist powers was intensifying. Makiguchi described the humanitarian method as follows.

The important thing is the setting of a goal of well being and protection of all people, including oneself but not at the increase of self interest alone. In other words, the aim is the betterment of others and in doing so, one chooses ways that will yield personal benefit as well as benefit to others. It is a conscious effort to create a more harmonious community life, and it will take considerable time for us to achieve.[13]

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12 峯陽一『2100年の世界地図――アフラシアの時代』岩波新書 2019年 p. 134

13 Tsunesaburo Makiguchi, Dayle M. Bethel ed., *A Geography of Human Life*, English Edition, Caddo Gap Press (San Francisco) 2002/7/1, 286 p.

Makiguchi considered this approach to be possible at the interstate level, so long as this type of life was realized among educated people.

The idea of Soka (value creation), which originates in Makuuchi's thinking, is expressed as not "seeking one's own happiness on the misery of others." This is in line with the philosophy of the 2030 Agenda to leave no one behind. It also resonates with the following call given by Professor Mine describing a way to overcome colonialism.

The basis for bundling Afrasia is the recognition that colonial rule should not be repeated. What should be presented there is a historical determination and wisdom that, in retrospect of the colonial rule by the Western powers, we do not deprive others of their freedom, do not parasitize, and do not seek hegemony.[14]

Since the United Nations has adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which calls for no one to be left behind, we may say that this idea has reached universal acceptance in the 21st century.

However, the problem of conflict among nations remains, or the conflict seeking freedom for all to live with dignity. Regarding the COVID-19 pandemic alone, at a national level, their words and deeds prioritize the interests of one country over the safety of people in others.

It must be remembered that the ideology that denies the existence of those who do not accept our justice, as represented by IS, continues to have great influence. How we deal with ideas that reject others' values is a major challenge for us.

As Professor Mine shows, we must "cultivate a democratic culture on a global scale that celebrates diversity and enjoys conflicts and intersections of different opinions."[15]

Even as the desire to share new values remains in progress, it is necessary to take action to realize such new values as well. Regardless of human ideology, we as a species are equally endangered by viral infections, such as COVID-19. We must ensure human security by encouraging cooperation as human beings based on this simple fact.

A range of task forces have helped bring about necessary changes. The COVAX Facility,[16] to support the spread of vaccines, has recently drawn greater attention. Professor Daisaku Higashi of Sophia University has also proposed an approach to COVID-19 in relation to human security and characterized the COVAX Facility in the following way:

When an effective and safe vaccine for corona is in the process of development, 170 countries have already announced their participation in the new global framework of the COVAX Facility to disseminate the vaccine worldwide, and Japan officially participated.

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14 峯，ibid. p. 149

15 峯，ibid. p. 184

16 https://www.gavi.org/covax-facility

Expressed.

Regarding COVAX, China announced its participation in October, but the US and Russia have not yet participated (as of October 21). It is also expected that Japan, which maintains good relations with both countries, will persistently encourage the US and Russia to participate in this framework.[17]

The COVAX Facility seeks to secure and deliver vaccines to protect all people, without following the speculative approach of any great power that seeks to use vaccine development as a means to pursue its own interests. Here, we see a type of global governance in action.

In our world, the security dilemma is prominent even during the human crisis of this pandemic. We should recall the utility of global governance to overcome the dilemma of interstate relations. Creative collaboration is also important here, in terms of restraint and cooperation at a multidimensional level, from individuals to international organizations. Through repeating these practices, it will be possible to alter the progress of human history for the better. We should continue to take on this challenge.

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17 東大作「コロナ禍を人間の安全保障で～世界的解決に向けた日本の役割～」（日本国際問題研究所「研究レポート」2020年10月28日）[HIGASHI, Daisaku, [Research Report] Corona in Human Security—Japan's Role in a Global Solution] https://www.jiia.or.jp/column/post-15.html

Comments

KIM, Sung Kyung

Professor, University of North Korean Studies / Kyungnam University

Thank you for giving me this opportunity to be a part of the conference. I understand that it has been already a couple of years that Kyungnam, Soka and Chinese Culture University cooperate with one another by discussing the various issues of contemporary society. As we all know, this year and its predominant phenomenon would be Covid 19 pandemic. Given the current situation of the pandemic in worldwide, it is very interesting to get to know about how to handle the pandemic in Japan. It seems that Japan has its own way to deal with Covid 19, especially successfully controlling mortality. Japanese government attempts to get going economy through a soft lock down, without the use of coercion. It is in particular impressive that Japanese people tend to cooperate with the government's guidance by changing their behavior.

I think it is also true that South Korea is known to be one of the successful models to combat the Cove 19 pandemic. Similar to Japan, South Korea did not implement lockdown so far and even proceeded the general election, nationwide university entrance exam, and everyday business as usual. Several measures contributed to South Korea's success, but three measures would be critical in the country's ability to battle against the pandemic. These are 3- T (Test, Track, and Treat). South Korean government began testing for covid 19 at massive scale over 440000 people which essentially covered all those with symptoms. And People who test positive are quarantined in Covid 19 special units and treated.

More importantly, South Korea has implemented tracing system for individuals diagnosed with the disease who may have come in contact with the infected individuals. It is known as the Covid-19 Smart management System(SMS). South Korea's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(KCDC) runs the contact tracing system that uses data from 28 organizations such as National Police Agency, The Credit Finance Association, three telecommunication companies, and 22 credit card companies to trace the movement of individuals with Covid-19.

Here is the competing argument arises in terms of individual's private information. Many argue against this tracing system as a kind of 'Big Brother'. On the other hands, in pandemic situation, the use of private information should be open to some extent for public purpose. Whichever argument you go, it is probably fair to say that South Korea's model against the covid 19 strongly rely on the system in which the government can access personal information if there are public issues such as infected disease pandemic and so on. Here I have to mention that this system has been prepared after the 2015 Mers outbreak when the government learned that tracing

the movement of infected individuals and people who came in contact with them is crucial. As a safety measure, only epidemic investigators at KCDC can access the location information and once the Covid 19 outbreak is over, the personal information used for the contact tracing will be purged.

Now let me move to the social impact of the pandemic. I would like to spell out the five key features of the condition. First of all, the pandemic will question the current forms of globalization especially GVC and global governing system. It might be a bit strong argument, but I think 20th century model of global governance and neo-liberal economy has to go through reform to some extent. The second would be the emergence of mega- nation state. This is the point why the controlling system of South Korea needs to be critically evaluated. The third point is the importance of public services especially public health. Many countries which went through the privatization of public health system did not respond the pandemic effectively at all. So it is now the time to bring the public health for the people. The fourth feature would be the emergence of the importance of environmental issue. Final feature would be the dramatic changes of everyday lives of people. People do not have face-to-face interaction much in these days, and technology will change our way of living, thinking and doing. In sum, it might be a bit radical to say, but the world will be completely different after the Covid 19 pandemic.

Then, the remaining question would whether we are well prepared for this change. Are we ready to move to the different world? How do we foresee the future? Can we sustain our ways of living?

PANG, Chien-kuo
Professor, Chinese Culture University

I am very happy and honored to serve as discussant for the first session of the Forum and give comments on Keynote Speaker Professor Mine's thought-provoking speech and Professor Tamai's wonderful paper.

Firstly, let me talk about my comments on the keynote speech delivered by Professor Mine. Professor Mine's speech is full of humanistic care and philosophical wisdom. He points out an important trend in the development of the world's population, that is, The Rise of Afrasia. In addition to population growth in African and Asia, it also includes the expansion of cross-border migration between the two continents. At the same time, he questioned the multiculturalism led by the West and called for exploring the possibility of creating a kind of multiculturalism without seeking integration and making the members of international society can coexist like an archipelago where you wander around the world like you travel around your country and find your new home somewhere.

I fully agree with Professor Mine's point of view, especially what he mentioned in the

conclusion, that is, when the Western experiment with multiculturalism may have gone awry, we may try the experiment of tolerance and coexistence in the non-Western world with as much practical and intellectual curiosity as we turn to the attempts in the West. We are entering an era that Asians and Africans are becoming the majority of the world's population and cross-border migration throughout Afrasia becoming significant. We need to turn the encounter of various cultures into a peaceful coexistence rather than a conflict one. It is time to learn from the wisdom of Afrasian coexistence rather than look to the outside world for a "one-size-fit-all" model.

While agreeing with the view of Professor Mine, as a discussant, allow me to provide some personal comprehension and suggestion. My comprehension and suggestion are that in terms of creating a kind of multiculturalism without seeking integration, I believe that Chinese Confucianism could be a source of inspiration. For example, the teaching of "do unto others, do not impose on others"(己所不欲，勿施於人). This famous quote of Confucius expresses the basic view of Confucianism about the way of individuals, groups, and countries to get along with others. In contrast to Western civilization which emphasizes universal values and likes to force others to accept the same belief without respecting to the differences of cultural background, time and space, as well as the degree of development, Confucian's attitude towards people and life are relatively gentle and humble, that is, harmony but different(和而不同). The Confucian way of dealing with the differences between cultures or civilizations will reduce the likelihood of clash with each other.

Secondly, let me talk about Professor Tamai's paper. Professor Tamai briefly illustrates the COVID-19 epidemic in Japan and the various measures taken by the Japanese government to respond to the epidemic. He echoes Professor Mine' appeal which advocates cultivating a democratic culture on a global scale that celebrates diversity and enjoys conflicts and intersections of different opinions and highlights the idea that society should enable everyone to live with dignity.

Similarly, I totally agree with Professor Tamai's argument, especially what he emphasizes at the end of his conclusion, that is, we should recall the utility of global governance to overcome the dilemma of interstate relations and creative collaboration at multidimensional level for a resilient world. This advice reminds me of Confucian doctrine of "carrying out kingly way and implementing policy of benevolence"(行王道，施仁政). Mencius, an important figure in Confucianism second only to Confucius, believes that a ruler who can carry out kingly way and implement policy of benevolence will be able to overcome all challenges and win supports everywhere. We hope that all countries in the world, especially those powerful countries, can establish a cooperative mechanism for global governance based on this principle to fight against Coronavirus disease. A good example is China's leader Xi Jinping declares that the COVID-19 vaccine developed by China will be contributed to the world as public good, especially for those poorer developing countries. You can see that such actions have actually started. For example, Indonesia has already received 1.2 million vaccines given by China.

Finally, let me go to the conclusion of my comment. In my superficial understanding, whether it is Chinese Confucianism or the purpose of the Soka Gakkai, it is consistent with the philosophy of sustainable development goals and is committed to creating a society where no one is left behind. Although the COVID-19 pandemic is still raging, I believe this forum can make some contributions to these goals. Let us work together towards a better cooperation between Japan, Korea and Taiwan!

Thank you very much for listening.

As Francis Fukuyama said in Foreign Affairs (issue of July/August 2020), an important factor explaining the different performance of different countries in the fight against COVID-19 pandemic is the firm action taken by the state and the cooperation by the people. Therefore, in addition to international cooperation, we also need to encourage the governments of various countries to take firm and effective actions and the full cooperation of the people. This is another thing worthy of our efforts. Again, let us work together to move towards a better situation whether in Japan, Korea or Taiwan.

Presentation

What Makes States More Effective at Containing the Spread of the Pandemic? A Theoretical Approach

CHUNG, Jaewook

Professor
IFES, Kyungnam University

Abstract

This paper attempts to explore what makes a state effective at containing the spread of a pandemic such as COVID 19. Despite the unprecedentedly rapid and extensive spread of the disease at the global level, we also witness variation in the dispersal and frequency of this pandemic across the world, leading us to pose a question, "Why are some states more successful at containing the spread of the pandemic disease, while others are not?" By way of answering the question raised above, this study focuses on the fact that a state's effort to cope with the infectious disease requires individual citizens' cooperative behaviors such as wearing masks, visiting a medical institution when suspected to get infected, avoiding social gatherings, etc., most of which are costly to each and every individual. This implies that a state's effort to contain the spread of the pandemic will bear fruit only when citizens are willing to comply with the prevention guidelines provided by the government. Using a simple game theoretical model, this study attempts to analyze what incentivizes citizens to align themselves with their governmental effort to stop the spread of the disease. By analyzing the game theoretic model, this study finds two subgame perfect equilibria (SPE), labelled as *No Request Equilibrium* and *Cooperation Equilibrium*. The equilibrium analysis, producing eight testable hypotheses, suggests that a state's administrative power to penetrate the society and the state's ability to have their citizens hold a firm, positive belief about the effectiveness of their cooperative behaviors matter.

Introduction

Since the outbreak of the coronavirus in late December 2019 in China, we have witnessed the spread of an infectious disease at an unprecedented level in terms of its geographical scope and rapidity. But we also witness variation across countries in terms of the number of confirmed cases and deaths. What causes these differences among countries? That is, what makes states more successful at stopping or slowing the spread of the pandemic and resultingly protecting their own citizens more effectively?[1] To answer this question, this study looks more closely at how the government and citizens interact to contain the spread of the pandemic. In particular, this research is primarily intended to figure out what incentivizes citizens to comply voluntarily with recommendations or guidelines offered by the government,[2] central or local, that may help, if observed, curb the spread of the disease but are also costly, with varying degrees, for citizens to follow. Given the nature of the problem, the infectious disease, it would be impossible for the government, no matter what and how much effort it makes, to address this problem effectively, without support or cooperation on the side of citizens.

To this end, this study employs a simple game theoretic model to investigate the strategic interaction between the government and citizens. What I mean by "strategic" suggests the following: First of all, this means that I do not assume that citizens simply comply with the government's recommendations based on a moral principle such as that they should observe the guidelines not to do harm to others. Obviously, we cannot rule out the possibility that some people follow the recommendations for a moral reason, and, in reality, the underlying motives for observing the prevention guidelines recommended by the government are highly likely to be mixed, egoistic and altruistic. Nonetheless, this paper focuses on the former aspect. Second, and related to the first, it is assumed that citizens' decisions on whether to follow the recommendations or not, will hinge on the result of cost-benefit analysis; if they find it too costly to comply with the government guidelines, they may decide not to do so. Similarly, whether the government offers prevention guidelines and requests citizens to follow them will also depend on its cost-benefit analysis because asking for cooperation also entails costs. Thus, if the government finds it costly to request cooperation from its citizens, it will give up asking citizens for cooperation from the outset. In this regard, the game theoretic model may be instrumental in capturing and analyzing the strategic aspect of the citizen-government interaction. By analyzing the game theoretic model, this study finds two subgame perfect equilibria (SPE), labelled as *No*

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1 Of course, all the records on the pandemic at the national level are not necessarily attributed to the performance of the government. Several other factors unrelated to the government performance may influence the spread of the pandemic, but the focus of this study is on the administrative aspect that allows states to cope effectively with the disease.

2 These recommendations and guidelines provided by the government are primarily aimed at preventing citizens from getting infected with the coronavirus or if suspected of getting infected, from spreading to other citizens. These recommendations include social distancing, wearing masks, reporting to the disease control center if suspected of getting infected, self-isolating if suspected or confirmed, refraining from all kinds of social gatherings, etc.

Request Equilibrium and *Cooperation Equilibrium*. The equilibrium analysis, producing eight testable hypotheses, suggests that a state's administrative power to penetrate the society and the state's ability to have their citizens hold a firm, positive belief about the effectiveness of their cooperative behaviors matter.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I present a game theoretic model for analyzing the citizen-government interaction. In the third section, I present the two subgame perfect equilibria and analyze these two equilibria to draw out testable hypotheses. In the final section, I conclude with a summary of this research and a few policy suggestions.

The Model

What incentivizes citizens to cooperate?

Figure 1

What Incentivizes Citizens to Cooperate?

Table 1. Notations, Assumptions and Meaning

Notations	Assumptions	Meaning
c_R	$c_R > 0$	The cost that the government incurs when requesting cooperation from the citizen
c_G	$c_G > 0$	The cost that the citizen incurs when she cooperates
c_I	$c_I > 0$	The cost that the citizen incurs when getting infected with the disease
q	$q > 0$	The cost of quarantine[3] that the government bears
p_H	$p_H \in [0,1]$	The probability that the citizen gets infected when she cooperates
p_L	$p_L \in [0,1]$	The probability that the citizen gets infected when she refuses to cooperate
$p_H - p_L$	$p_H - p_L > 0$	The probability of infection is lower when the citizen cooperates
r	$r \in (0,1)$	r is a ratio associated with the effect of cooperation; the larger the effect of cooperation, the smaller r becomes.

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3 Here I use the term "quarantine" in a broader sense. In a narrow sense, it means almost the same as isolation. But here by the term quarantine I mean encompassing activities carried out by the government to deal with an infectious disease.

Figure 1 presented above illustrates the game theoretic model used here and Table 1 offers a brief summary of the assumptions and meanings of the notations used in the game. In what follows, I describe how this game unfolds.

The game is composed of two stages and two players, the government and the citizen.[4] At the first stage, the game starts with the first move by the government, which decides whether to request cooperation from the citizen or not. If the government decides not to ask for cooperation, the game ends, with the government bearing the full cost associated with the spread of a pandemic, q > 0. Here it is assumed that no request for cooperation by the government exposes the citizen to a higher probability of infection to the disease, denoted by p_H, because no request for cooperation is likely to leave the citizen more vulnerable to infection to the disease.[5] Then, the total payoff that the citizen earns can be calculated by choosing a lottery,[6] $p_H \times (-c_I) + (1 - p_H) \times 0 = -p_H c_I$. Here c_I (> 0) denotes the cost that the citizen incurs when she gets infected with the disease,[7] and the expression shown above indicates that if the citizen gets infected with the disease, with probability p_H, her corresponding payoff is $-c_I$, but if she does not contract the virus, with probability $1 - p_H$, she does not pay any cost, 0, resulting in the final payoff, $-p_H c_I$.

If the government decides to request the citizen to cooperate, the game proceeds to the second stage. At this stage, the citizen decides whether to cooperate or not. Here cooperation means observing the government's prevention guidelines and the citizen's cooperative behaviors include—and may not be limited to—a set of behaviors such as social distancing, wearing masks, reporting to the disease control center if suspected of getting infected, self-isolating if suspected or confirmed, refraining from all sorts of social gatherings, etc. It is worth pointing out that abiding by the preventive measures entails cost to the citizen, and thus her decision on whether to follow them or not may depend on how much cost she is willing to pay. Here the citizen's cost to pay when following the instructions is denoted by c_G (> 0). If she decides to cooperate, then her

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4 Here I assume that the citizen represents a typical one in a country and most of the other citizens in the country follow the behavior of the typical citizen.

5 Some might argue that this could be too strong an assumption because people would take protective measures without the government recommendations or guidelines. It must be true that some people are ready to protect themselves from the coronavirus without the government recommendations or guidelines. But their efforts to do so, without the government's subsequent support, would be highly limited, and entail higher costs, making those efforts less sustainable and prompting them to give up on them earlier than with the government's support. In this regard, definitely, I do not deny the possibility of self-protection measures by citizens, but also believe that this assumption still holds.

6 With regard to the notion of a lottery in a game theoretic model, refer to Nolan McCarty and Adam Meirowitz, *Political Game Theory: An Introduction*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 27-38.

7 In actuality, the cost that citizens bear when getting infected with the infectious disease may vary among individuals from suffering from light symptoms even to death. But for the sake of simplicity, I assume that c_I is an exogenously given value. This may sound a strong assumption. But if we assume that c_I follows a normal distribution, for example, then the actual c_I can be considered a mean value from the distribution because we assume that the citizen is a typical person in the country. However, afterwards this assumption will be a little bit relaxed.

payoff is equal to $-p_L c_I - c_G$. Here I assume that observing the guidelines reduces the probability of getting infected with the disease and this lower probability is denoted by p_L. Evidently, it is assumed that $p_L < p_H$; that is, those who follow the government recommendations are exposed to a lower risk of infection than those who do not. The final payoff, $-p_L c_I - c_G$, can be obtained in a similar way we did right above: $p_L \times (-c_I) + (1-p_L) \times 0 - c_G = -p_L c_I - c_G$. In words, if she gets infected with the disease with probability pL, then she incurs the cost, cI; otherwise, she does not pay any cost; but in this case, the cost of cooperation, cG, is subtracted from the lottery, resulting in the final payoff $-p_L c_I - c_G$.

By contrast, if the citizen refuses to cooperate, she does not need to bear the cost of cooperation, c_G, but becomes more vulnerable to infection as higher probability p_H indicates. As a result, the payoff from no cooperation is assumed to be equal to the payoff that she earns when the government does not request cooperation in the first place, $-p_H c_I$.

Finally, let me describe what happens to the government's payoff, depending on the citizen's decision on cooperation. The government's payoff accruing from the citizen's cooperation is equal to $-c_R - rq$. Here I denote by c_R the administrative costs that the government must bear when requesting cooperation from the citizen. Administrative measures that encourage or help citizens to follow the government's instructions may include the following: reporting the number of confirmed cases on a relevant time basis and releasing information about the confirmed patients' contacts and paths; broadcasting or advertising the prevention guidelines on TV or other social media; developing mobile apps that enable the government to manage self-isolating people; distributing free face masks, etc. Here I assume that these administrative measures that are intended to promote citizens' participation in cooperative behaviors contribute to reducing the cost of quarantine, q, to some extent. To represent the reduction in the cost of quarantine, let $r \in (0,1)$ denote a ratio for the quarantine cost.[8] This implies that the government strongly prefers the citizen's cooperation to non-cooperation once it asks for it because it is self-evident that $-c_R - rq > -c_R - q$.

There are three outcomes in this game. One outcome occurs when the government decides not to make any request for cooperation, and in this case, the government and the citizen ends up with earning the payoffs, $-q$, and $-p_H c_I$, respectively. A second outcome takes place when the citizen responds positively to the government's request for cooperation with the government and the citizen receiving the payoffs, $-c_R - rq$, and $-p_L c_I - c_G$, respectively. The final outcome emerges when the citizen responds negatively to the government's request for cooperation, and the government and the citizen receive the payoffs $-c_R - q$, and $-p_H c_I$.

So far, I have described how this game plays out with additional explanations for the notations used in this game and assumptions applied to this game. In the next section, I proceed

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8 The size of r is determined by the effect of cooperation. The more effective at curbing the expansion of the pandemic, the smaller r becomes. For example, $r \approx 0$, the government does not need to pay for the quarantine because $rq \approx 0$.

with the analysis of the model, presenting two subgame perfect equilibria and looking closely at each equilibrium in turn.

Equilibrium and Analysis

This is a simple extensive form game with the assumption of perfect and complete information. Thus, I employ Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) as a solution concept, which requires backwards induction to solve the game.[9] There are two equilibria in this game depending on the parameter condition.[10] I label one as *No Request Equilibrium* and the other as *Cooperation Equilibrium*. In the former equilibrium, as the name suggests, the government makes no request for cooperation from the citizen in the first place, and in the latter equilibrium, the government requests cooperation, and the citizen responds favorably to the request. Note that there is no subgame perfect equilibrium where the citizen makes a negative response to the government's call for cooperation.[11] In what follows, I analyze each equilibrium in turn in more detail.

No Request Equilibrium

No request equilibrium simply appears to suggest that the government makes no request for cooperation. But a closer examination of this equilibrium reveals that there are two different reasons why the government does so. One reason for no request stems from the citizen's response: the inability of the citizen to cooperate with the government because her cost for cooperation outweighs the benefit from it: $c_G > (p_H - p_L) c_I$. Under this condition, the government has no reason to ask the citizen for cooperation because it is simply a waste of time and money given that it *knows* that the citizen does not participate in cooperation.

However, it is important to note that this lack of an ability of the citizen to respond favorably to the government's request may be due to the government's failure to provide an incentive for the citizen to cooperate. Let me elaborate this point clearly below. Here I assume that two things may incentivize citizens to comply with government recommendations: First, following the recommendations reduces the risk of infection, which is suggested by the lower probability of infection, p_L. The greater the difference between p_H and p_L, the more likely the citizen is to follow the guidelines recommended or instructed by the government. Second, the citizen favors conforming to the government recommendations if the cost of complying with the recommendations is not severe. More precisely, only when the cost of the compliance does not exceed the cost they have to pay, given the reduced probability of infection, does the citizen follow the recommendations provided by the government. That is, $c_G > (p_H - p_L) c_I$. Of these two

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9 Ibid, pp. 171-184.

10 A brief mathematical proof is provided in the Appendix.

11 It is highly probable in the real world that the citizen does not accept the government's request for cooperation. But this combination of strategies (request, ~cooperate) does not constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium here primarily because all the payoffs are assumed to be common knowledge. Therefore, if the government *knows* that the citizen is not willing to cooperate, it does not make any request for cooperation in the first place to save its resources.

incentives, the government might find it more effective to offer some incentive for the latter, i.e., to reduce the cost of cooperation, c_G, than for the former (p_H-p_L) because for the government the former is less tractable than the latter.

Let me take a couple of examples from South Korea where the government policy helped cut down the cost for cooperation on the part of citizens. In South Korea, individuals who are suspected of contracting the disease are recommended to report voluntarily to the local disease control center and are subject to diagnostic testing once judged by the control center to be a suspect case for COVID 19. Once a person is classified as a suspect case by the disease control center, then the person gets tested for the coronavirus for free, which was definitely a way of reducing the cooperation cost. In addition, the well-known drive-through testing method was an innovative way of enabling time-saving. These examples suggest that the failure on the government side to offer an incentive to lower the cost of cooperation may lead to a negative response from its citizens, and this anticipation ultimately leads to no request for cooperation.

The other reason for the government not requesting cooperation from the citizen may have something to do with the government's lack of resources and/or administrative inefficiency.[12] Even though the citizen is ready to accommodate the demand for cooperation from the government (i.e. $c_G< (p_H-p_L)\ c_I$), the government itself is unable to bear the cost of requesting cooperation (i.e. $c_R> (1-r)\ q$).[13] Given that the quarantine cost is generally substantial, it is less likely, albeit often possible, that the cost of cooperation is higher than the quarantine cost even if it is discounted by $(1-r)$. But if this were the case, it could be interpreted in two ways. First, this problem may arise primarily from a lack of fiscal resources available. That is, a national government may suffer from such a severe lack of resources that it cannot afford to allocate sufficient resources to promote cooperation from civil society. In particular, this lack-of-resources situation most likely occurs in a poor country at an early stage of the outbreak when there are relatively a small number of confirmed cases. Despite the relatively low quarantine cost at the initial stage, the poor government may not be able to finance the expenditure for asking for cooperation. Second, this problem may also arise from the inefficiency of administration. That is, if a state's infrastructural power to penetrate the society is lacking, no doubt it will struggle in vain to cope with this pandemic situation. For example, in South Korea, the disease control centers collect information about confirmed cases, and distribute the collected information instantly to each and every individual with a mobile phone by using the mobile phone text message service, not only alerting citizens so that they can avoid the paths and contacts that confirmed patients visited, but also promoting their self-reporting if they suspect themselves of getting infected. Therefore, this established infrastructural power that enables the government to

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12 For the concept of administrative power, refer to Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology*, Basil Blackwell, 1988, Ch. 1.

13 Here let me set aside the effect of cooperation reflected in r for the time being, assuming that r is fixed at a certain level.

reach out to its citizens, if necessary, must be one of the essential factors that makes a state effective at fighting against the pandemic.

Before proceeding to the next equilibrium, it is worth pointing out that no request on the side of the government for cooperation from its citizens may by itself have a side effect of accelerating the spread of the disease.[14] The silence of the government could send out a wrong signal, albeit unintentional, to their citizens that the disease is not a serious problem, and might precipitate citizens' moral hazard, making them more absent-minded and consequently vulnerable to the infectious disease. Again, this reminds us of the importance of administrative power to support its citizens' cooperative behaviors.

Cooperation Equilibrium

Now, let us look at *Cooperation Equilibrium*. Conceivably, this equilibrium must be closely related to *No Request Equilibrium*, although the former equilibrium is not exactly the opposite of the latter. Thus, in the following, I will analyze the nature of this equilibrium with the possibility of redundancy in mind.

Most of all, it is important to note that $c_G < (p_H - p_L) \, c_I$ is not a sufficient condition for *Cooperation Equilibrium*. Even if $c_G < (p_H - p_L) \, c_I$, the government fails to ask the citizen to comply with the guidelines if $c_R > (1-r) \, q$. That is, if the cost of taking administrative measures that could facilitate citizens' cooperative behaviors were high enough to exceed the reduced quarantine expenditure, the government would decide not to request cooperation from their citizens. As discussed above, this may take place primarily because the government suffers from a lack of fiscal resources available and/or of administrative power. Therefore, *Cooperation Equilibrium* results only when two conditions are met: (i) $c_G < (p_H - p_L) \, c_I$ and (ii) $c_R < (1-r) \, q$.

The first condition implies that the cooperation cost that the citizen incurs must be smaller than the cost she has to bear given the reduced probability of getting infected. The second condition implies that the government cost generated by requesting cooperation must be smaller than the reduced quarantine cost resulting from citizens' voluntary support. These two prerequisites for *Cooperation Equilibrium* suggest that the desirable outcome might not be easy to attain. As the conditions for *Cooperation Equilibrium* suggests, the creation of a virtuous circle requires efforts on both sides. Then, let us consider in more detail what is to be done.

Earlier, we already discussed issues related to c_G and c_R. But when it comes to the citizen's cooperation cost, c_G, we focused on the supply side; that is, we were concerned with how the government can support individuals to reduce the cooperation cost. But it is also necessary to look at this issue from the citizen's perspective by focusing on conditions under which the citizen

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14 If this is the case, and the effect of no request for cooperation on the quarantine cost is severe, I have to revise the game model offered here. I mean, the quarantine cost, q, in the first stage must be different from that in the second stage. If I denote the second stage quarantine cost by q', then $q > q'$. But for the sake of convenience, I do not take this likely difference into consideration.

is incentivized to participate in cooperation or discouraged from doing so. Thus, in the following I focus on how the probability difference, and the cost of infection affect the citizen's motivation to cooperate.

The first condition suggests two things. First, *ceteris paribus*, the larger the difference between the probability of getting infected when they cooperate and when they do not, the more incentive citizens have to comply with government recommendations.[15] The larger difference means that following the recommendations really works and helps prevent the citizen from getting infected with the disease. Here we have assumed that this probability (both p_H and p_L) is exogenously given and is common knowledge. But relaxing this assumption, to some extent, and assuming that this probability has something to do with the citizen's belief,[16] we can say that when the citizen believes that the difference $(p_H - p_L)$ is substantially significant, she has a strong incentive to follow the government recommendations. However, if she believes otherwise, it may prompt her to lessen her willingness to comply. In an extreme case where she believes that there is little difference in the probability of getting infected, for example, whether you wear a face mask or not, she finds it totally a waste of time and effort to observe the recommendations because $c_G < (p_H - p_L) \, c_I \approx 0$.[17] Of course, this is a highly extreme situation, but a situation close to this may exacerbate the moral hazard problem, and everyone may find protective measures ineffective and useless, causing the pandemic to spread at an exponential rate. This implies that how citizens form a belief about the effect of complying with the recommendations really matters, and thus it is imperative for the government to inform citizens in a timely manner of successful cases showing that following the government instructions really helps so that they can hold a firm, positive belief about the effectiveness of their protective behaviors.

Second, *ceteris paribus*, the larger the cost of infection, c_I, the stronger the incentive for citizens to cooperate.[18] That is, as the cost of infection increases, the citizen finds complying with the guidelines relatively cheap, and is motivated to cooperate. However, the government should obviously not exaggerate the cost of infection to encourage citizens to comply, but nor should it *downplay* the cost of infection. If citizens believe that $c_I \approx 0$ (i.e., getting infected with the coronavirus is not costly at all), they will switch quickly to defectors because their effort to protect themselves turns out to be nothing more than a waste of time and money.[19] Nowadays we often hear the news about the development of new vaccines for the coronavirus pandemic. This

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15 Actually, this statement can be drawn from comparative statics analysis. For example, holding both c_G and c_I constant, raising $p_H - p_L$ generates the effect of lowering c_G. That is, a larger difference between p_H and p_L is associated with a lower cost of cooperation, c_G.

16 By the term "belief" I mean that the probability reflects one's perception of the outside world rather than the reality of the outside world itself.

17 Definitely, $c_G < 0$ is a nonsense because it contradicts the assumption that $c_G > 0$. The inequality above actually means that the citizen switches quickly to a defector as $p_H - p_L$ converges to 0.

18 Note that we have assumed, as with the probability of infection, that this cost is exogenously given, with a typical citizen in mind. But I relax this assumption a little bit at this point for comparative statics analysis.

19 Refer to fn. 16.

must be good news. It is worth pointing out, however, that this good news may embolden citizens to lower their guard against the coronavirus and precipitate their moral hazard, with the result that people start to consider the cost of infection almost equal to zero.

In sum, by analyzing the first condition, $c_G < (p_H - p_L) c_I$, we draw out two policy implications: First, the government should promote the effectiveness of cooperative, or protective measures so that citizens have a firm belief that their protective measures make a difference, and second, the government must make sure that their citizens keep alert about the seriousness of the disease. Considering these two implications drawn out from the first condition, it turns out that what U.S. President Donald Trump did was the exact opposite of what this research suggests. He laughed at those who wear masks, and said that contracting the coronavirus is just like catching the seasonal flu, although he seems to have changed his position afterwards.[20] Given his position and influence, this study suggests, his public reluctance to wear masks and downplay of the seriousness of the coronavirus must have had a serious, negative effect on containing the spread of the pandemic in the U.S. at its early stage.

So far, we have examined the first condition. Now let us turn our attention to the second condition, $c_R < (1 - r) q$, and see what implications we can draw from it. Since we discussed the issue about q and c_R with reference to administrative power right above, here I focus on the effect of r. Here r denotes a ratio associated with the effect of cooperation among citizens, and is assumed to be caused by the citizen's cooperation. Note that r is introduced to the game with the citizen's decision to accommodate the government's request for cooperation. Without cooperation on the part of the citizen, r would not come into being. Therefore, for the government, r is *the rationale* behind its demand for cooperation.[21] The more effective the quarantine effort, the lower r because it is associated with the reduced cost of quarantine by $1 - r$.[22] Therefore, the larger $1 - r$, the better off the government. Let us label this $1 - r$ an effectiveness ratio. Then, this ratio is highly likely to be positively correlated to the probability difference, $p_H - p_L$ because in some sense the latter also represents the effectiveness of cooperation

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20 Daniel Victor et al., "In his own words, Trump on the coronavirus and masks," *New York Times*, October 2, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/us/politics/donald-trump-masks.html (accessed December 2, 2020); Brad Brooks, "Like the flu? Trump's coronavirus messaging confuses public, pandemic researchers say," *Reuters*, March 14, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-mixed-messages-idUSKBN2102GY (accessed December 2, 2020).

21 In a similar vein, for citizens, it is the difference between P_H and P_L that serves as the rationale behind their cooperation.

22 For a more intuitive understanding, let me take a numerical example. Let us assume that r=0.9 and q=10. This means that following the guidelines recommended by the government makes the quarantine cost equal to 0.9x10=9. Note that in the game the payoff for the government was $-c_R - rq$ when the citizen cooperates. Now let us assume that r=0.1 with q remaining intact. Then the government quarantine cost is equal to 1. This illustrates that the lower r, the lower the quarantine cost (rq). In addition, note that the reduced quarantine cost is equal to $(1-r) q$. In the former example, it was (1-0.9)10=1, and in the latter example, it was (1-0.1)10=9. Therefore, when r=0.1, it reduced the quarantine cost as much as 9.

and quarantine efforts.[23] In addition, it can be said that while $1-r$ overall represents a degree of the effectiveness of quarantine measures on the government side, p_H-p_L stands for a degree of the effectiveness of cooperation on the civil-society side. Both indicators, if observed, may exhibit the extent to which the government and citizens are willing to continue with their efforts to fight against the pandemic.

Testable Hypotheses

In the following, I advance a set of testable hypotheses drawn from the equilibrium analysis. Since the hypotheses listed below are already explained in the previous sections and all of them are straightforward and clear enough, I do not elaborate on them.

H1. A poor country whose fiscal resources are lacking is less likely to take measures to promote cooperative behaviors from its citizens even at an early stage of a pandemic.

H2. A country whose infrastructural power is weak (regardless of the availability of fiscal resources) is less likely to take measures to promote cooperative behaviors from its citizens.

H3: The larger the difference between p_H-p_L, the more likely citizens are to comply with government recommendations.

H4: The stronger citizens' belief that the difference between p_H-p_L is large, the more likely citizens are to comply with government recommendations.

H5: The higher the cost of infection, C_I, the more likely citizens are to comply with government recommendations.

H6: The stronger citizens' belief that the cost of infection is high, the more likely citizens are to comply with government recommendations.

H7: The larger the effectiveness ratio, $1-r$, the government is more likely to continue requesting cooperation from citizens.

H8: The effectiveness ratio, $1-r$, is likely to be positively correlated to the probability difference in infection, p_H-p_L.

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23 As suggested earlier, p_H-p_L also predicts the likelihood of cooperation among citizens. The higher p_H-p_L, the more likely citizens are to cooperate.

Conclusion: By Way of Policy Implications

This study was intended to ascertain what makes a state more effective at containing the spread of the pandemic such as COVID 19, with a focus on incentives for citizens to comply with the government recommendations aimed at curbing the spread of the disease among citizens. To that end, this research employed a simple game theoretic model to analyze the strategic interaction aspect between the government and citizens. In particular, the analysis of the two equilibria, labelled as *No Request Equilibrium* and *Cooperation Equilibrium*, allowed us to obtain the theoretical findings expressed in the form of testable hypotheses as listed above. For example, one of the interesting hypotheses, I suppose, is that a country where infrastructural power is weak (regardless of the availability of fiscal resources) is less likely to take measures to promote cooperative behaviors from its citizens (H2). Another interesting hypothesis might be that the stronger citizens' belief that the cost of infection is high, the more likely citizens are to comply with government recommendations (H6).

Then, let me return to the key question that motivated this study in the first place, "What makes a state more effective at containing the spread of the pandemic?" The answer to this question, I believe, is already suggested in this paper, especially in the form of hypotheses.[24] In fact, Hypothesis 2 suggests that the state apparatus matters, and Hypothesis 6 suggests that citizens' perception also counts. But here I would like to reframe the key question raised earlier in the following manner, "What are the long-term capabilities, and are there any short-term capabilities that the state can and/or should seek out to cope with this pandemic crisis?" The reason why I rephrase the original question into the new one is because the latter one seems to be more policy relevant. For example, the new question allows us to raise a subsequent question as follows: What if all the capabilities were long-term ones and if there were no short-term capabilities? If that were the case that there were no short-term capabilities effective at dealing with a pandemic, it would mean that any short-term effort made by the government to fight off the pandemic would not work. Fortunately, however, this analysis suggests that there could be also short-term capabilities, albeit far from complete. Then what constitutes long-term capabilities and what constitutes short-term ones? Let me briefly discuss each capability in turn. As suggested above, long-term capabilities might have something to do with the state apparatus; that is, the availability of fiscal resources, and more importantly, a state's infrastructural power to penetrate the society. The reason why I call these capabilities long-term solutions is that they are hard to achieve in a short period. However, this kind of long-term capability is not a sufficient condition, but rather a necessary condition for an effective state, as the analysis of *Cooperation Equilibrium* illustrates. That is, without these capabilities the state could hardly be effective at fighting against a pandemic, but they are not enough. The United States under President Donald Trump is a case in point, let alone many countries in Europe. This is where a state's short-term

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24 I have to admit that since these hypotheses have not been subject to an empirical test, their empirical validity is somewhat (or quite) dubious for now. But I proceed with these hypotheses, assuming tentative validity.

capability must come in. Presumably, how to incentivize citizens to respond favorably to a state's request for cooperation might have as much to do with a state's short-term capability as with long-term capability. As shown above, how strong a belief each citizen holds regarding the effectiveness of their protective measures, the belief that their cooperative behaviors make a difference, really matters because those citizens' firm beliefs prevent the community from plunging into disorder and chaos. Besides, it is also important that citizens have accurate information about a pandemic they face; if the government plays down its severity, it could precipitate moral hazard, wreaking havoc on the community. Therefore, a state's ability to have their citizens hold a positive belief about their cooperative behaviors and to provide them with a set of accurate information must not be ignored.

<Appendix>

I solve this game by using backwards induction as follows:

1. At the final node, the citizen decides whether to cooperate or not.

(a) If $c_G < (p_H - p_L) \, c_I$, the citizen decides to cooperate.

(b) If $c_G > (p_H - p_L) \, c_I$, the citizen decides not to cooperate.

2. At the first node, the government decides whether to request cooperation from the citizen or not.

(a) If the citizen cooperates, the government asks for cooperation if $c_R < (1-r) \, q$; otherwise, not.

(b) If the citizen does not cooperate, the government does not ask for cooperation because $-q > -c_R - q$.

3. Therefore, two equilibria result depending on parameter conditions.

(a) *Cooperation Equilibrium* results if $c_G < (p_H - p_L) \, c_I$ and $c_R < (1-r) \, q$.

(b) *No Request Equilibrium* results either if $c_G > (p_H - p_L) \, c_I$ or if $_G < (p_H - p_L) \, c_I$ and $c_R > (1-r) \, q$.

Comments

WANG, Shun-Wen

Associate Professor, Chinese Culture University

Professor Chung's paper, "What makes states more successful at containing the pandemic?" extensively reviews the state-society-citizens relations. Through the discussion of the paper, it uses "game model" to examine the cost-benefit calculations among government decision on requesting for cooperation, citizen responding to the request and citizen responding negatively. It starts from fiscal or infrastructure factors and their relation with government's request. Then, it focuses on why citizen comply and what is the belief of cooperative behaviors. These discussions can improve the traditional idea of "legitimacy triangle", which are security, economic and statecraft. Also, it can echo the "whole of society" proposal from the United Nations. Therefore, it is a very important academic paper.

However, I would like to raise some discussions on this paper: 1. Difficulties of calculation on some issues. 2. Differences from long-term and short-term cooperation. 3. Regional cooperation issues related to the paper, such as nationalism, populism, trade protectionism and the role of China. As for the first question, there are some issues hardly to be calculated. For example, privacy is hard to be calculated in the pure cost and benefit analysis. As we have discussed at the last seminar on the issue of privacy, government always "plays too much role" rather than constrains themselves. Once government holds the power to track or influence citizen's privacy, it might be hard for citizen to "calculate" how much they have already lost because of the asymmetric ability of gaining information.

Second, the issue of how citizen to calculate on their compensation is also related to "how long their cooperative belief will last". As we can see on many countries, citizen will cooperate and are satisfied more in a short term, but in a long term, they might be more impatient and non-cooperative. This paper might consider more on this difference.

Finally, I would like to use the paper's Hypothesis 6 and replace it with some keywords as follows: "The stronger the countries in Asia's believe that the cost of some global problems, the more possibilities that they will comply to China's recommendations". Maybe we can discuss more in the future through this hypothesis on the geopolitical competition between the United States and China. It will be a fruitful deliberation when connecting to our Keynote speaker prof. MINE's idea of "paradox of geopolitics and nationalism in the post-pandemic" and Prof. TAMAI's "gap of economic stagnation" in Asia.

SASAKI, Satoshi

Professor, Soka University

I find it is very interesting that a model of effective control measures for COVID-19 is analyzed using a simple game theory, subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) and the effects of country-specific measures. You shared important new contributive discoveries. I would like to make comment on three points.

First of all, my perspectives are based on my specialty, epidemiology and global health. There are three factors that can be a cause of infectious disease a transmission to occur. The first is the presence of pathogens; the second is the presence of the modes of transmission; and the third is the presence of host or human beings. In epidemiology, infection control can be possible if we can cut the chain of infection. For instance, historically many pandemics had been successfully controlled by removing pathogen such as smallpox. The block of possible portal of entry would also prevent from the spread of infection. Protecting the host themselves by receiving vaccinations may help individual's ability to resist infection or to limit pathogenicity. For COVID-19 eliminating the virus and boosting immunity through vaccination is not yet available in many areas even though some countries such as the UK had authorized the coronavirus vaccine for use. It may take a considerable amount of time to distribute to sufficient population. In that respect, the only control available at this time may be a block the transmission route. The modes of transmission of COVID-19 are direct contact and droplet spread. Wearing a mask, washing hands, and taking a physical distance can be effective to prevent from dissemination of infectious agents. Also, receiving PCR screening for people with suspicious symptoms and staying home would be important if the test result was positive. It is, therefore, highly relevant from an epidemiological point of view that the analysis is considered to be greatly contributive to control the current pandemic.

Second, this research pointed out that incentives are the contributing factors for the citizens to comply with recommendations or guidelines offered by the government. That means the cost is less if the citizen cooperates. I am also interested that "belief" of the citizens really matters and it is necessary for them to clearly understand about the cost. You state, "how strong a belief each citizen holds regarding the effectiveness of their protective measures, the belief that their cooperative behaviors make a difference, really matters because those citizens' firm beliefs prevent the community from plunging into disorder and chaos." Here I would like to share my thoughts on what makes citizen's belief more firmed in three different views. First, evidence-based policy, that is what enhances their belief. The government has to analyze the effectiveness of infectious control policy based on empirical evidence and offer an effective and feasible policy. Second, message has to be clear and simple when distributing to the citizens. In Japan, the early stage of the spread of COVID19, the government sent a message to citizens to reduce their person to person contact by 80%. This message encouraged people to stay home and reduce

social movement and contributed to curb the spread of COVID 19. Third, the government administrative leadership also plays a crucial role to support people. If the citizen understood the value of the policy that the government public health officials provided, they would follow; therefore, the outbreaks can be well controlled.

For infectious control, especially the early stage of outbreak, rapid and comprehensive response is indispensable. The leader needs to speak to the citizens clearly and convincingly about control policy and guidelines that they have to follow. If they succeed to change their behavior, the outbreaks can be controlled at the early stage. We can see the good example in New Zealand, prime minister Jacinda Ardern demonstrated her strong leadership and successfully contain the COVID19. She explained control policy directly to the citizens using the alert level chart and conduct lockdown. She also delivered clear message "go hard, go early" to make them understand and share common goal to overcome the tragedy.

Finally, I would like to comment from a point of view of human security. COVID19 is a heavy threat to human security. Especially for the vulnerable, such as extremely disadvantaged, refugees and internal displaced people face more serious threats to the health and risk of COVID 19. According to this research, "a poor country where fiscal resources are lacking is less likely to take measures to promote cooperative behaviors from its citizens, a country where infrastructural power is weak is less likely to take measures to promote cooperative behaviors from its citizens" this research gives us an opportunity to think about what kind of intervention and support are required from human security point of view. For example, in developing countries, it is difficult to continue strict infection control measures for a long period of time. A recent survey of 20 African countries found that more than 70% of countries are at risk of food shortages if urban lockdown last for more than two weeks. At that time, it was important for developed countries and international organizations to provide them "essential needs" such as necessary medicines and consumables. From a public health perspective, it is vital to empower residents and to encourage them to follow preventative measures which are sustainable. This study may have implications not only for presenting typologies of successful cases of infection control, but also for suggesting what efforts are needed for vulnerable countries and regions.

Presentation

Cross-Strait Relations under the US-China Framework after the US Presidential Election

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Chinese Culure University

Abstract

No matter who is to control the White House, the U.S. president would in the first place be guided by U.S. interests. And they will continue to compete on trade,
technology and military capabilities. The U.S. would not change its policy for 'strategic ambiguity' on Taiwan, while the U.S. and China would continue to have confrontations and cooperation. Biden would probably place more emphasis on maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Biden will keep playing the Taiwan card. He would handle security, economic and diplomatic issues separately when it came to managing Washington's relations with Beijing and Taipei. The Biden administration will continue arms sales to Taiwan, but he knows how to seek a balance. Washington would still adhere to the US-Taiwan Relations Act and adopt a "strategic ambiguity" toward cross-strait relations. China would not attack Taiwan, as long as President Tsai Ing-Wen (蔡英文) does not push for de jure independence or moves to rely on foreign countries for security. For Taiwan, it needs its own strategy, and cannot just follow the

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U.S. policy as before. Taiwan must adjust its hostile attitude towards China. Taiwan may stay closer to the U.S. but unnecessarily anti and hate China. Taiwan has to carefully and closely observe changes in US-China-Taiwan relations to find the most appropriate approach going forward.

If without other conditions, Joseph R. Biden should be American newly-elected president. The interactions between the U.S. and China under Biden's administration will have potential impact on cross-strait relations. This article discusses cross-strait relations after the U.S. Presidential election. This paper's framework will analyze Biden's China policy upon his position, and China's responsive attitudes under which the U.S.-Taiwan relations and the cross-strait relations will be analyzed.

Biden's China Policy

As president, Biden will face deep dilemmas, and a lot of unfinished business, stemming from President Trump's four years anti-China. In addition to a deadly pandemic and a weakened economy, Biden will inherit a toxic relationship with China when he takes office in 2021.

President Trump has placed tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of products from China, imposed sanctions and restricted Chinese companies from buying American technology. Trump at the same time issued an executive order barring investments in Chinese firms with military ties. In addition to Huawei Technologies Company, recently Trump has stepped up to blacklist SMIC, China's largest and most technological advanced circuit chip Manufacturing Company, and strengthened monitor of Chinese companies in the United States. This is Trump's a multiyear onslaught for forcing Beijing to change its trade model and as punishment for China's authoritarian ways.[1]

The hard choices for Biden will include deciding whether to maintain tariffs on about $360 billion worth of Chinese imports. These tariffs have raised costs for American businesses and consumers. On the other hand Biden will face whether to relax those levies in exchange for concessions on economic issues or other fronts, like climate change. Biden must be very careful and may need to take a smarter approach that combines working with the Chinese on some issues like global warming and the pandemic, while competing with them on technological leadership and confronting them on other issues like military expansionism, human rights violations or unfair trade.[2]

Biden is an experienced politician and more adapt at foreign affairs than President Trump. He would adopt a diplomatic approach that focuses on communication and coordination. Biden may depart from Trump's punishing approach. At the same time his administration will be eager to maintain leverage over China to accomplish its own policy goals. On the other hand, Biden's administration will face pressure from lawmakers in both parties who view China as a national

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1 Ana Swanson, 'Biden's China Policy? A Balancing Act for a Toxic Relationship', *New York Times*, (16 Nov. 2020), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/16/business/economy/biden-china-trade-policy.html.

2 Ibid.

security threat and have introduced legislation aimed at penalizing Beijing for its human rights abuses, global influence operations and economic practices. Therefore, Biden will face pressure from both parties not to revert to the approach that he and many of his predecessors had earlier embraced in trying to transform China's economic practices by bringing it into the global economy.[3]

In the 1990s and early 2000s, Biden was friendly to China and argued that integrating China into the global trading system would force Beijing to play by international rules, to the benefit of American workers. In 2000, he voted to grant China permanent normal trading relations, which paved the way for China's entry into the World Trade Organization and deeper global economic ties. However, two decades later, Biden acknowledges that China exploited the international system, and he has called for a more aggressive approach. Biden has said the United States must get "tough with China," and referred to Xi Jinping, the Chinese President, as a "thug."[4] And the U.S. Congress is also relatively unified on taking a tough stance on China. Hundreds of China-related bills are circulating, including several bipartisan efforts. It will remind Biden's emphasis on competing with China by investing in American industries like quantum computing and artificial intelligence upon his presidency.

President Trump has adopted a tough stance on China, and this probably doesn't give Biden a lot of political flexibility early on, but Biden's administration will expect a significant departure from Trump's administration in tone, style and process. Biden may see China as a competitor, but not necessarily an adversary.

Trump's administration shows no signs of backing off a confrontational approach and shows no sign of letting up in his final days in office. For example, Trump's administration has begun economic talks with Taiwan that are likely to rankle Beijing after he lost the election. Trump's administration has other measures to punish China, including sanctions related to China's security crackdowns in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang region, where the Chinese government has carried out mass detentions and harsh policing of ethnic minorities. However, most of what Trump could do is through executive orders and executive actions. These executive acts can be reversed by a Biden administration. Biden's team has a moderate track record on trade and China, believing they can work with Chinese leaders on some issues even as they challenge them on others.[5] With performance in foreign diplomacy and national security, Biden should be a tough and rational policy decision-maker as well as a realistic under multilateralism.[6] There are a lot of tools in that toolbox. The Biden administration may be thoughtful and strategic about how

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3 Ana Swanson, 'Biden's China Policy? A Balancing Act for a Toxic Relationship', *New York Times*, (16 Nov. 2020), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/16/world/asia/china-united-states-biden.html?ga= 2.149483254.1547904328.1605588097-514297481.1605588097

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Yong-ming Yang, ' 拜登之中美台三角關係 ' ['Biden's China-US-Taiwan relationship'], 聯合報 [*The United Dairy News*], (29 Nov. 2020), available at: https://udn.com/news/story/7339/5051478.

to use them.

China's Responsive Attitudes toward Biden

China also faces a new administration that has vowed to be equally tough. Biden's election victory will not fundamentally affect the core policies of Beijing. Those core policies are being driven by the increasingly hard-line, one-man rule of Xi Jinping, the Chinese President and his desire to reassert party power throughout Chinese society. Biden's views on China have hardened since he was vice president in the Obama administration. However, Biden believe that some of Trump's anti-China policies are costly and unstrategy. And he appears determined to leave in place many of President Trump's harshest measures, including tariffs and restrictions on Chinese technology. On the campaign trail, he called Xi "a thug" and vowed he would more forcefully address human rights violations, including mass detentions and forced labor in the western region of Xinjiang.[7] It can be seen that Biden's policy toward China is soft but hard.

In the post-pandemic era, the structural tensions between China and the United States are even sharper, and it will be very hard for 'technical measures' to resolve or ease them. It clashed with India over their disputed border in the Himalayas, cracked down on promised freedoms in Hong Kong, targeted Australia with restrictions on exports of wine, barley and coal. Especially before and after the election, China continues to threaten Taiwan with force and interference of aircraft crossing the border. It has also responded to each punitive step by Trump's government with measures of its own, barring travel by administration officials and lawmakers, imposing sanctions on companies and expelling American journalists.

Biden has offered relatively few concrete proposals for dealing with China. In his victory speech, Biden said clear that his first priority would be fighting the coronavirus pandemic at home. It could be months into 2021 before he turns his full attention to America's most vexing geopolitical relationship. However, Biden's victory has raised hopes in some quarters that the two countries could resume cooperation on at least some issues, especially climate change and nuclear proliferation by North Korea and Iran. The Chinese would welcome the "breathing space" to defuse tensions. That also gives them more time to build China's own strength, economically and militarily.

The unchecked spread of the virus and continuing political tumult in the United States have reinforced Beijing's view that the United States is in decline. So even as the Chinese leadership sees abundant domestic and international risks, it is becoming more confident in its efforts to resist international pressure on issues that are core to its domestic legitimacy and regime security. Xi has used China's success in fighting the pandemic to set a political and economic agenda to make the country less dependent on the rest of the world in crucial fields. China would enhance

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7 Steven Lee Myers, 'Buffeted by Trump, China Has Little Hope for Warmer Relations With Biden', *New York Times*, (9 Nov. 2020), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/world/asia/china-united-states-biden.html?ga=2.148082423.1547904328.1605558097-514297481.1605558097.

its dominance of industrial supply chains as a potential weapon to strike back against protectionist threats from abroad, especially the U. S.

Xi is marching ahead with a new five-year plan. The plan will guide policy starting in 2021. An outline carries the stamp of Xi, who reinforced his gloomy prognosis of the global pressures at an important party gathering. Xi has made a layout without heirs and does not intend to retire. With a likely third term beginning in 2022, he stands to be in power. Beijing gutted Hong Kong's legislature by allowing the disqualification of lawmakers deemed "unpatriotic." The move reflected Beijing's aim to consolidate its position while much of the world is distracted by the coronavirus pandemic. China's government recognized the strategic opportunity of the domestic distractions in the United States. But Beijing has also been careful about which fights it picked at this time, given the domestic challenges on its plate, such as a slowing economy. Xi's approach was cautious and prudent and legally correct, China hoped the Biden administration would bring some improvement in U.S.-China relations.

Basically the Biden victory has sent mixed signals on its China policies, pledging to get tough with Beijing but also laying out key areas for cooperation, including climate change, global health and nuclear non-proliferation. Biden and his diplomatic team were the right people to deal with US-China relations. Biden, who was known as a unifier and problem solver. He had many qualities that would qualify his work on foreign relations, including ties with China.[8] The diplomatic team of Biden's administration is the highest quality. They are sensible, centrist, very process-oriented, very deep thinking and long-term thinking. As China flexes its muscles, Asian countries are looking forward to a stable U.S. government. Biden is offering assurances to America's top allies in the Asia-Pacific region that he is not going to be a soft touch. Biden spoke with the leaders of Australia, Japan and South Korea underlining in each call his commitment to "strengthen" their bilateral alliance.[9]

What Trump has done in the past four years has a large social base in America that is driven by populism, anti-globalization and narrow nationalism. Some people call "Trumpism". However, Trump has gained over 70 million votes, so the social base is very much there. It will continue to affect American foreign policy.[10] Washington and Beijing should work out their

8 Steven Lee Myers, 'Buffeted by Trump, China Has Little Hope for Warmer Relations With Biden', *New York Times*, (9 Nov. 2020), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/world/asia/china-united-states-biden.html?ga= 2.148082423.1547904328.1605588097-514297481.1605588097.

9 Steven Lee Myers, 'Buffeted by Trump, China Has Little Hope for Warmer Relations With Biden', *New York Times*, (9 Nov. 2020), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/world/asia/china-united-states-biden.html?ga= 2.148082423.1547904328.1605588097-514297481.1605588097; Simon Denyer and Eva Dou, 'Biden vows to defend U.S. allies as China asserts power in Asia', *the Washington Post*, (12 November 2020), available at: https:// www.washington post.com/world/asia_pacific/biden-china-japan-korea-allies/2020/11/12/6cf6e212-24af-11eb-9c4a-0dc6242c4814_story.html.

10 Echo Xie, 'US-China relations: Trump divisions could haunt Biden presidency', *South China Morning Post*, (12 Nov, 2020), available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3109496/us-china-relations-could-haunt-biden.

different issues in a face-to-face way, Biden and Xi Jinping should also get together as soon as possible. China and the US could restart a dialogue with a series of issues, including finance, cyberspace, public health, reform of the World Trade Organization, and revisiting a crisis management mechanism between the two countries in the South China Sea. We should not expect Biden to soft-pedal on China. The U.S. Congress is not in a friendly mood with regard to China. However, it may expect a more cooperative style of diplomacy from a Biden administration, but these thorny issues and problems will not go away automatically.

Despite differences in political ideology, there could still be opportunities for long-term cooperation between U.S. and China relations. Multilateralism is very much needed at this critical moment. A Biden administration is expected to build multinational coalitions and tackle global issues through multilateralism – a course largely abandoned by the Trump administration.[11] The international community expect a more stable and predictable policy towards the rising superpower compared to the Trump years.

Cross-Strait Relations

Confrontation and the risk of military conflict over Taiwan between Beijing and Washington look set to continue under the Biden administration.

Bipartisan support in the US Congress for President Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy – widely seen as targeting Beijing – which indicated key Washington policies of a strategic global retrenchment and more investment in the Pacific to counteract a rising China were likely to continue. However, Biden is expected to take a less openly confrontational approach. Unlike Trump's rude and fierce style, Biden would be more moderate and stable when dealing with Beijing.

The Biden's administration may use salami tactics to help Taiwan strengthen its defensive capability or postpone arms sales to Taiwan, instead of Trump's administration large packages of arms deals and other drastic moves to infuriate China. Despite concerns in both the U.S. and China about the possibility of a major conflict between the two powers – and continuing dialogue to keep military-to-military relations stable – the bipartisan coalition in the US against China meant the risks of a misstep in the Taiwan Strait amid ongoing tensions would continue to exist.[12]

Biden will keep playing the Taiwan card, like Trump, because it is always the most effective measure to strike China hardliners. China's hardline insistence that the Taiwan issue is a 'bottom line' means military confrontations between the China's PLA and the US military in the Taiwan Strait will become a constant reality in the future. China regards Taiwan as a breakaway province that must eventually be reunited with the mainland, by force if necessary. Consequently, any

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11 Ibid.

12 Echo Xie, 'US-China relations: Biden expected to keep Taiwan card in play against Beijing', *South China Morning Post*, (16 Nov, 2020), available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3110016/us-china-relations-biden-expected-keep-taiwan-card-play.

move to encourage Taiwan towards independence would be considered as a violation of the one-China policy and an unacceptable challenge to China's bottom line.

An indication of Biden's approach to the Taiwan issue was gleaned from an article Biden wrote for World Journal, published two weeks before the presidential election. In article Biden promised to rebuild relationships with Washington's closest partners in the Pacific. "That includes deepening our ties with Taiwan, a leading democracy, major economy, technology powerhouse – and a shining example of how an open society can effectively contain Covid-19," Biden wrote. At the same time. Biden added that "Washington would collaborate with Beijing when it was in American interests, including on public health and climate change." This implied Biden would handle security, economic and diplomatic issues separately when it came to managing the U.S. relations with China and Taiwan. The Biden administration may continue or postpone arms sales to Taiwan. There may no let-up to US sales of advance weaponry to Taiwan. In short, he should be a wise politician who knows how to balance the relationship between the U.S., China and Taiwan.

The Trump administration has approved 18 arms sale deals to Taiwan, compared to 17 during Barack Obama's eight years in office. But it was under Obama in 2013 that the U.S. enhanced Taiwan's strategic role when the U.S. Air Force upgraded the long-range early warning radar surveillance system on Taiwan's Leshan mountain. The system had dramatically strengthened Taiwan's military surveillance of airspace from the Korean peninsula to the southernmost part of the South China Sea. That meant it was able to monitor both China's PLA aircraft movements and missiles, as well as North Korean ballistic missile tests.[13] The Trump administration has included Taiwan as one of its close partners in its Indo-Pacific strategy. The act and effort of the Trump administration is consolidating its maritime domination in the Pacific.

With the help of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) solutions, the U.S. is able to intervene in the Taiwan issue once some indications emerge to show the PLA is going to take action against Taiwan. In other words, if China keeps reinforcing suppression on Taiwan, it may prompt The U.S. to play up Taiwan's role in its Indo-Pacific strategy.

In the two weeks leading up to the presidential election, Trump approved three more arms deals for Taiwan, including four weapons-ready MQ-9B Sea Guardian armed drones, 11 HIMARS truck-based rocket launchers, 135 Boeing AGM-84H SLAM-ER missiles and related equipment, and six MS-110 Recce external sensor pods made by Collins Aerospace for planes. This package followed the biggest ever arms deal to Taiwan, finalized in August with the sale of 90 F-16 viper fighter jets equipped with the most advanced fifth generation AESA radar systems – eclipsing former president George H.W. Bush's approval for the sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan in 1992.[14]

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13 Ibid.

14 Echo Xie, 'US-China relations: Biden expected to keep Taiwan card in play against Beijing', *South China Morning Post*, (16 Nov, 2020), available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3110016/us-china-relations-biden-expected-keep-taiwan-card-play.

In order to help the Taiwan military to counter the PLA, the US has reserved hardware and software back doors in many of the arms sales to Taiwan for future upgrading. According to the US State Department, the F-16 viper jets, MQ-98 armed drones, HIMARS, and SLAM-ER missiles are advanced and offensive weapons that will not only enhance the Taiwanese military's surveillance capability, but will also help Taiwan employ a highly reliable and effective system to counter or deter maritime aggression, coastal blockades and amphibious assaults. Trump's weapon deals with Taiwan had exposed Washington's long-foreseeable hidden strategy that it had spent four decades preparing.

For China, Beijing has been strengthening its coastal forces for decades, to be combat-ready for a possible invasion of Taiwan, with two aircraft carrier strike groups, more than 1,000 fighter jets, and the recent deployment of its most advanced DF-17 hypersonic missiles and other powerful weapons systems to the PLA's Eastern and Southern theatre commands overseeing the Taiwan Strait. However, taking back Taiwan by force was not a priority for Beijing. There is no timetable for a Taiwan reunification plan. Beijing's current key concern is how to govern Taiwan and keep the island's prosperity in the future, rather than to liberate it. And, the protests and political turmoil in Hong Kong had reminded the China's leadership that they would face more and worse resistance when dealing with Taiwanese people if they used force to take back Taiwan without comprehensive plans and preparations. Therefore, before coming up with a comprehensive plan about how to govern Taiwan after reunification, China prefers to maintain the status quo of Taiwan.[15]

Some scholars analyze that China would not attack Taiwan before 2024, as long as President Tsai Ing-Wen (蔡英文) does not push for *de jure* independence or moves to rely on foreign countries for security. The U.S. would not change its policy for 'strategic ambiguity' on Taiwan, while the U.S. and China would continue to have confrontations and cooperation.[16]

The key for Taiwan is to avoid becoming embroiled in US-China conflicts, while striving for inclusion on issues where the two sides cooperate. Next year Beijing is to celebrate the 100-year anniversary of the founding of CCP, so it is highly unlikely that China would start a war. And the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would hold its 20th National Congress in 2022. During this period China should not attack Taiwan. In addition, the CCP's deadline to complete its military modernization effort is 2027, when it would mark the 100-year anniversary of the Chinese Red Army, the predecessor of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Therefore, as long as President Tsai does not push for *de jure* independence, and avoids overreliance on foreign countries for security, then China would not attack Taiwan before 2024.[17]

Donald Trump and Joe Biden contender in presidential election, all agreed on deterring

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15 Ibid.

16 Sherry Hsiao, 'KMT think tank urges link to Biden', *Taipei times*, (6 Nov, 2020), available at: https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/11/06/2003746470.

17 Chen Yu-Fu and Jason Pan, 'Attack by China unlikely before 2024, academic says', *Taipei times*, (6 Nov, 2020), available at: https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/11/06/2003746471.

China's rise as a regional power, and confrontations between the nations would continue in the long term. Biden may favor multilateralism, while he is against decoupling from China. Therefore Taiwan needs its own strategy, and cannot just follow the U.S. policy as before.

Traditionally, US foreign policy has been bipartisan, the general attitudes and policies of both major US parties are similar, although their approaches might be different. The strength of their support of Taiwan is about the same, But the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government has given people the illusion or feeling that Taiwan relationship with the U.S. has improved a lot. In fact, the U.S. has its "bottom line," the U.S. would still adhere to the US-Taiwan Relations Act and adopt a "strategic ambiguity" toward cross-strait relations. A Biden presidency would likely mean fewer "diplomatic surprises" from Washington, such as clashes with Beijing. And this might be good for Taiwan. Biden would probably place more emphasis on maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

No matter who is to control the White House, the U.S. president would in the first place be guided by US interests. And they will continue to compete on trade, technology and military capabilities. Most importantly, Taiwan must insist on its positions on freedom and democracy. It should closely cooperate with the U.S. The KMT and the DPP both maintain a pro-US stance. However, it must not become a chess piece.

The former Secretary of the State Pompeo who clearly said that "Taiwan is not part of China" which are inappropriate words and deeds. President Tsai Ing-Wen responds that "Taiwan is an independent sovereignty country" which should be an appropriate expression. The only thing that the Tsai's national state security team must adjust its hostile attitude towards China. Taiwan may stay closer to the U.S. but unnecessarily anti and hate China. The most important thing is Taiwan efforts over the past few years and has gained a global economic competitive advantage. Due to the strong sanction imposed by the U.S. on China's technology, factories, Taiwan has become the lifeline of controlling the global semiconductor. This is Taiwan's advantage. At the same time, Taiwan's success in fighting COV19 has made President Tsai Ing-Wen the second woman to win the International Leadership Pioneer Award after the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. All of these need to be cherished. Taiwan must have confidence in itself.

In conclusion, no matter which candidate ends up in the White House, the U.S. and China will continue to compete on trade, technology and military capabilities. The Harvard University professor Graham Allison who put forward the "Thucydides' Trap," Graham Allison said that unless the U.S. and China form a new type of cooperation between superpowers, Taiwan will likely become a time-bomb and may be in danger.[18] Therefore, Taiwan has to carefully and closely observe changes in US-China-Taiwan relations to find the most appropriate approach

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18 'Transcript of Ambassador Cui Tiankai's Dialogue with Professor Graham Allison at the Annual Conference of the Institute for China-America Studies', *Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America*, (5 Dec, 2020), available at: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgxss/t1838064.htm.

going forward.

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Comments

LEE, Byong-Chul

Assistant Professor, IFES/Kyungnam University

Good afternoon everyone. Let me begin by saying that I'm honored to join the trilateral seminar. And it's a great delight to have an opportunity to read Dr. Yu's wonderful paper, which touched upon the perspective of the Biden administration over the troubled Taiwan-China relations.

Fundamentally, I do not disagree with Professor Yu's analysis and his insight over the future of international order. In particular, with regard to America's China policy, Professor Yu predicted that the Biden administration would "walk a careful line." I agree.

Many policy experts and pundits argue that the geopolitical competition between China and the United States will continue for the next decade or two.

Although the outgoing President Donald Trump has divided America, he has received bipartisan support for his trade and technological war against China. Even George Soros, who spent millions of dollars trying to prevent Trump from being elected, has praised Trump on China. In truth, many Americans believe that China represents a threat to America.

We understand that the primary challenge president-elect Joe Biden confronts is fixing America's broken reputation not only at home but also abroad. But as you know, it's not so easy to mend the broken Empire. From Day One, President Biden and his team will face the unique circumstances, specifically, a ranging from pandemic and a changing climate that will put the world into dancer. It is my judgement that it's almost impossible to fix it completely during Joe Biden's tenure.

Sullivan grew up with four siblings in a middle-class home in Minneapolis. His father worked on the business side of the Minneapolis Star-Tribune and later at the University of Minnesota's journalism school, and his mother worked as a public school teacher. They were strict and determined that their kids prioritize education. All five Sullivan kids attended either Yale, as Jake did for undergrad and law school, or Cornell.

Biden said that "America is back." After four years of Trump's unrelenting attacks on norms and institutions, both domestic and foreign, America now needs to persuade other countries.

I am not an expert on the US-China relations, but as a researcher who is interested in the trend of the US foreign policy, I think that the Biden administration will not spend much time and efforts rebuilding the broken foreign relations in the first year of the administration. It means that it will take much more time than you expect to return on the normal path the US previously

walked on.

The Biden administration will also need to persuade the American public that foreign policy matters for more Americans beyond the elites in Washington. Given deep anxieties over the economy, especially in the midst of a pandemic, the administration will need to identify how foreign policy objectives relate to the people's concerns, such as job-creation.

In the eyes of the world, American democracy has been severely tarnished; the bungling of the pandemic has damaged American people's pride. Indeed, many of American allies seek greater strategic autonomy from the United States. America is no longer the big dog on the block. It is my bleak assessment that the emerging China's future will not be so different in nature from what it did in the past. China will likely have centrifugal forces that are strong enough to stand up against the center.

POPOVSKI, Vesselin
Professor, Soka University

Thank you, Prof. Tamai, for inviting me to be a commentator in the third session of the 4th Peace Forum. I would like also to thank our colleagues in the Chinese Culture University, particularly Prof. Chao for organizing this panel on such an important topic "The Cross-Straight Relationships and Prospects after the American Presidential Election in 2020", and especially Dr. Yu, for her excellent presentation today.

I share the comment made by the first commentator, Dr. Lee from Kyungnam University, that uncertainty will continue to characterize the relationship between China and U.S.A. for some time. I would add that this uncertainty would be a result not only of the change in the U.S. Administration from Trump to Biden, but also a continuation of a global uncertainty that exists generally in international relations, where all states, including in East Asia, face tremendous challenges because of climate change, pandemics, natural disasters, nuclear proliferation etc.

The response of China to the result of the U.S. elections was mixed: on one hand Beijing was happy to see the end of Trump, whose rhetoric was anti-Chinese re. Covid-19, Huawei and other issues, and who imposed tariffs and other trade restrictions on China. But on another hand, China would not have been also unhappy with Trump staying for a second term and destroying further the U.S. power and respect in the world, effectively diminishing further the only big competitor on the global arena.

The Biden administration was not immediately welcomed by China, at one point Biden referred to President Xi as a 'thug', and this offence will not easily go away. Also Biden Administration will be more critical to the human rights record of China, much more than Trump, who never cared about human rights anywhere (apart from Venezuela) in the world. However, the new U.S. Administration also presents a chance for improving the U.S. – China relationship, as Biden will be more predictable, respectful, diplomatic, and reasonable. The two

big powers can find certain avenues for co-operation – for example on issues of sustainability, climate change, resilience to natural disasters, science, global health. China will be preparing for the U.S. re-engaging with the world on those issues and seeking possible mutual benefits.

We can expect a significant change of style in the White House once moving from an incompetent and chaotic Trump administration to a serious and reasonable Biden administration; but simultaneously we can face a sense of continuity and predictability, as Biden will run similar to Barack Obama foreign policy. Some of the early appointments – Antony Blinken as Secretary of State, Janet Yellen as Treasury Secretary, John Kerry as Climate Change Envoy – signaled such consistency and continuity from the foreign policy of Obama.

Joe Biden will inherit a very divided political situation domestically, and the biggest challenge would be whether he will be able to become a unifier of the American people, or whether the deep current divisions will persist. This will depend on the elections for the remaining two seats for senators in Georgia, to be elected in January, to find out whether the Senate will end up in the hands of a Republican narrow majority, and if so, some initiatives by Biden might face the opposition of the Senate. The fact remains that 75 millions of Trump voters would not accept a change towards multilateral foreign policy, and Biden will have to make difficult choices. If Biden can unify the divided country, we can see a stronger American global role. But if the domestic divisions persist, the American global role might continue to decline, as it did during the last 4 years. Certainly this is what China (and also Russia) would like to see – weakening of the American global power.

To sum up, Biden would be more predictable and more respected by the Chinese, who will be expecting some relief of the imposed by Trump tariffs, in exchange of Chinese co-operation on climate change, cyber-security, North Korea etc. I fully agree with Dr. Yu presentation in this regard. However, China should also expect a firm voice from Washington DC on human rights, and these include criticism for the mass detention of Uyghur minority people in Xinjiang, and for attempts to disrespect the special status of Hong Kong.

The UN Secretary-General yesterday made it clear that in the midst of the worst global pandemic Covid-19 we should not reduce our commitments to other huge global challenges – climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and cyber security. Covid-19 presented the humanity with five crucial tests: test of leadership, test of international co-operation, test of medical capacity, test of human-human relationship and test of human relationship with nature. East Asia showed an excellent example of dealing with Covid-19, and if we examine the responses of various governments to Covid-19, we will find out certainly proper measures and good governance of Taiwan, South Korea and Japan (our three countries), but not as good and proper response in the U.S., Latin America, the U.K. and some other countries in Europe. It is important that all countries 'build back better' and recover their economies and public health systems in the post-pandemic world.

The new Joe Biden Administration will declare that it would like to see China not as an

adversary, but as a competitor. The U.S. – once moving to more multilateral foreign policy - would need the co-operation of China on all big global issues – non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (deals with North Korea and Iran), cyber-security, climate change and implementation of the SDGs.

In the end of this excellent 4th Peace Forum I would like once again to commend the excellent paper presented by Dr. Yu on a difficult but very important topic, and finish by offering my hope – similar to the one in her presentation - how crucial will the next 4 years be with the new U.S. Administration able to work with China and manage peaceful cross-strait relationships in East Asia.

Thank you for your attention.

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