

2022年度大学院博士前期課程一般入学試験（第I期）問題

研究科名	科目名
文学研究科 人文学専攻	英語

次の二つの英文をすべて和訳しなさい。（下線部については文末注を参照のこと）

Virtue ethics insists that we understand right action by reference to what a virtuous person would characteristically do. According to virtue ethicists, actions aren't right because of their results, or because they follow from some hard-and-fast rule. Rather, they are right because they would be done by someone of true virtue. This person is a moral exemplar — someone who sets a fine example and serves as a role model for the rest of us. The ideal of the wholly virtuous person provides the goal that we ought to aim for, even if, in reality, each of us will fall short of it in one way or another.

(Russ Shafer-Landau, *The Fundamentals of Ethics*)

Many if not most moral philosophers in modern times see their subject as having to do exclusively with relations between individuals or between an individual and society, and so with such things as obligations, duties, and charitable acts. It is for this reason that, of the four ancient cardinal virtues of justice, courage, temperance, and wisdom, only the first now seems to belong wholly to 'morality'. The other three virtues are recognized as necessary for the practice of 'morality' but are now thought of as having part of their exercise 'outside morality' in 'self-regarding' pursuits, 'moral' and 'prudential' considerations being contrasted in a way that was alien to Plato or Aristotle. J. S. Mill, for instance, expresses this modern point of view quite explicitly, saying in his essay *On Liberty* that 'A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit ... who cannot restrain himself from harmful indulgences' shows faults (Mill calls them 'self-regarding faults') which 'are not properly immoralities' and while they 'may be proofs of any amount of folly ... are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a breach of duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have care for himself.

There is of course nothing wrong with using the word 'moral' as Mill does. It fits in with much of our everyday usage, and I do not want to involve myself in a discussion of the variations in usage found even today. What concerns me is not the exact meaning of 'moral' when used as Mill used it but rather the substance, if there is any substance, of a distinction between 'moral' evaluation and the other evaluations of which he wrote in the passage just quoted. ... Words such as 'wicked' and 'evil' are applied to a deed such as murder but not to even the greatest act of self-destructive folly as such. Even to call an action 'wrong' outside some technical context is to imply that it is unjust, or perhaps uncharitable; that it has to do with conduct whose defect lies in what is done against other individuals or against the public good.

(Philippa Foot, *Natural Goodness*)

(注)

hard-and-fast: 厳密な、厳重な

cardinal: 主要な、基本的な

prudential: 自己利益に関する

rashness: 軽率さ

obstinacy: 頑固さ

self-conceit: うぬぼれ、虚栄心

folly: 愚かさ、愚行

reprobation: 非難