



Proceedings
Peace Forum in Okinawa 2017

**BUILDING A PEACE COMMUNITY
IN ASIA**



Proceedings Peace Forum in Okinawa 2017 BUILDING A PEACE COMMUNITY IN ASIA

A Joint Research Project of Kyungnam University, Soka University,
and Chinese Culture University

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A Message from the Soka University Founder

Daisaku Ikeda

The Founder of Soka University

Allow me to express my heartfelt felicitations on the holding of the 1st Peace Forum in Okinawa surrounded by the beautiful sea of *kariyushi* [“harbinger of happiness”] and the hills of Tancha. It is indeed a great privilege to hold today’s event with the participation of illustrious scholars from Kyungnam University and the Chinese Culture University, all of whom I hold in high esteem. I also express my appreciation to Eiki Senaha, President Emeritus of Meio University; distinguished members of the academia of Okinawa; Mayor Yoshimi Nagahama of Onna Village; and many others who have rendered their invaluable support in realizing today’s event.

Renowned for his outstanding leadership and commitment to education, President Park Jae-Kyu of Kyungnam University, who is also known as an authority on the reunification of the Korean peninsula, proposed that a joint research project be launched to advance peace in Asia and the rest of the world.

In March 2016, President Park visited war sites here that recount the bloody history of the Battle of Okinawa, reaffirming the profound personal pain and distress over the cruelty and destruction wrought by war that invariably divides ordinary people and exacts such a tragic toll. Driven by these sentiments, he called for renewed and united action amongst educators to initiate discourses on peace here in Okinawa.

I cannot help but appreciate the significance of today’s gathering in light of one philosophical insight from ancient China, which notes the importance of “the time of heaven” as well as “the advantage of earth” and “the harmony of men.”

As to “the time of heaven,” I would like to point out the timeliness of this Forum as it follows the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons at the UN General Assembly in New York in July. The preamble of this historic treaty declares, “Mindful of the unacceptable suffering of and harm caused to the victims of the use of nuclear weapons (*hibakusha*), as well as those affected by the testing of nuclear weapons...” It reflects the pacifist desire of the *hibakusha* and the citizens of the world who are determined to oppose war in any form so that such tragedies may never again occur. I, for one, believe that one of the key elements underlying the effort to build lasting peace is the crucial and irreplaceable role of carrying forward war experiences, which this Forum has also adopted as one of its themes.

The driving force behind the peace movement of the Soka Gakkai originates from two events: the refusal of its first president, Tsunesaburo Makiguchi, to compromise his beliefs in the face of Japan’s militarist wartime regime and, as a result, his death in prison in 1944; and the declaration of second president Josei Toda, my mentor in life, for the prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons in 1957, a core legacy that he entrusted to the young people of the world to actualize.

Today, the 8th of September is, in fact, the very day that Mr. Toda issued this historic declaration sixty years ago.

On this significant day, I renew my pledge to ensure that my mentor’s spirit will be embraced and carried forward by the generations of young people who follow, upholding his call that nuclear weapons are instruments of utter inhumanity and must be condemned as an “absolute evil” in order to protect and ensure the inalienable right of all people to live.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will be formally signed by UN member-states from September 20. It is paramount that public awareness be raised worldwide as the treaty’s preamble also highlights the importance of peace and disarmament education, which is why I believe this Forum’s “inheritance of war experience,” which serves as a crucial component of peace education, is so timely and relevant.

Next, I wish to talk about the significance of today’s Forum from the perspective of “the advantage of earth.” Okinawa for many years has spearheaded the effort to promote peace education. I, too, began writing *The Human Revolution* here, opening my novel with these words: “Nothing is more barbarous than war. Nothing is more cruel.” I did so in the hope that I may capture the sentiments of the people of Okinawa, who had to endure the war’s most unspeakable atrocities.

As you may know, this Soka Gakkai Okinawa Training Center was built on the site of a U.S. MACE B missile base. Working with my beloved friends in Okinawa, we set out to preserve the launch pad and bunker complex, pledging to transform what was once a facility to wage war into a center to convey the message of peace through doors open to Asia and the entire world. We were thus delighted when the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University — one of the top institutes of higher learning in Japan — was established here, making Onna Village a seat of academia as well where many of the world's leading scholars and researchers come together.

My Okinawan friends and I are honored to welcome all of you here today, enabling us to launch a new initiative for peace together with the sharpest, most sublime minds in the world, inspiring us not only with your fiery passion to rid the world of war but also for intrepidly acting upon your beliefs over so many years.

The Ryukyu Islands have since ancient times served as a bridge to the world, a paradise of flourishing peace and culture linking the seas of Asia and the world's oceans. It is a "Treasure Island" of peace and nonviolence underpinned by an abiding belief in life's inherent dignity and worth — that, as Okinawans often say, "life is indeed a treasure."

In response to President Park's firm resolve to hold a peace forum here, a new network of wisdom and friendship is sure to emerge and expand, one facilitating a grand transformation of the "seas of war" in the world into "seas of peace."

The third of the age-old Chinese insights is "the harmony of men."

Regrettably, given the escalating tension among various militaries in the seas surrounding the Korean peninsula and East Asia, millions of people are fraught with a sense of impending crisis and uncertainty.

It is precisely because we live in such perilous times that unwavering solidarity among universities and educators is now more paramount than ever. For therein lies an unflagging and vibrant ethos, focused on young people and their future, to overcome conflict and division and neutralize distrust and hatred in an effort to create a community of peace.

Professor Dr. Chang Chi-Yun, the founder of the Chinese Culture University, stated that the second Chinese character for "revolution" signified "life." It means to rejuvenate aging life and conceive from it new life. In other words, he explained, human beings were endowed with the power to shape not only the world but the times as well. It is the source from which human

dignity and the value of education springs.

Let us therefore come together in our faith in the power of people to restore and to effect dignity for all human beings as well as education's value.

A passage from the Buddhist scriptures that I have embraced since my youth reads, "All rivers flow into the sea, but does the sea turn back their waters?" My hope is that we, humanity, while inspiring one another to develop a spirit as expansive as the great sea, will strive to establish, now more than ever, a vast ocean of peace.

May all of the Forum participants gathered here today, each an established authority in your respective field, continue to serve as beacons casting the light of hope to pierce and banish the dark night with your brilliance.

In closing, I offer my heartfelt prayers that everyone here enjoy the best of health and success.

September 8, 2017

Peace Forum in Okinawa 2017

Schedule

7th September Reception at Rizzan Sea-Park Hotel Tancha-Bay



Welcoming the guests by Okinawa Dancing

8th September Symposium
“BUILDING A PEACE COMMUNITY IN ASIA”

Opening Session


- Greetings from the Host President Yoshihisa Baba, Soka University
- Opening Remarks President Jae Kyu Park, Kyungnam University
- Address by guests President Emeritus Eiki Senaha, Meio University



President Baba



President Park



Dr. Senaha



The guests and the panelists of the symposium

Symposium I

“Creating Future Peace: Inheritance of War Experience”

- Keynote report “Creating Future Peace: Inheritance of War Experience”
—Professor Hideki Tamai, Soka University
- Presentations “Case Studies of the actual activities of inheritance of war experience”
 - ◆ Thinking Peace for the Future: a case of peace campaign into the future in Okinawa
—Okinawa Soka Gakkai Peace Committee
 - ◆ Reconstructing the Cinematic Imagination of the Korean War:
The Value of a Local Film in the Age of Postmodernism
—Dr. Sung-Kyung Kim, Kyungnam University
 - ◆ Aiming for Real Peace: The Republic of China’s Efforts
in Building a Constitutional Democracy since WWII
—Dr. Wei-jen Hu, Chinese Culture University
- Panel Discussion



Guide Tour around the World Peace Hall*



*The venue of the symposium. The Soka Gakkai Okinawa Training Center used to be the US Nuclear Missile Site. Dr. Daisaku Ikeda proposed to change this war fortress into a fortress for peace, and then it was renovated to a peace museum in 1984.

Symposium II

“Making a Sea of Peace: the Collaborations for Human Security”

- Keynote report “Making a Sea of Peace: the Collaborations for Human Security”
—Professor Dr. Hironobu Asaga, Soka University
- Presentations “Case Studies of Peace and Security Issues in the region”
 - ◆ An Unlikely (but still Peaceful) Community: South Korea and its Neighbors
—Dr. Kim Jung, Kyungnam University
 - ◆ The Maritime environmental security and the Collaborative Confidence Building in the Northeast Asian region
—Dr. Dong-Yub Kim, Kyungnam University
 - ◆ Casting Swords into Plowshares: Experiences of Cross-Strait Rapprochement under President Ma Ying-Jeou
—Dr. Chien-min Chao, Chinese Culture University
 - ◆ Confucianism and Making a Sea of Peace in Northeast Asia
—Dr. Chien-kuo Pang, Chinese Culture University
 - ◆ Local Government Cooperation and Peace-Building in Northeast Asia—From the Viewpoint of “Sub-Regionalism”—
—Dr. Kenji Nakayama, Soka University
- Panel Discussion

9th September Guide Tour of Peace Memorials

Kakazu height (A site of fierce battle)



The ruins of Japanese fortress



A memorial monument for Korean victims

Memorial Monuments and Peace Museums in the Southern Okinawa



Himeyuri Memorial Monument



Himeyuri Peace Museum



Lecture by a young staff of the Himeyuri Museum



Mabuni Peace Memorial Park



Okinawa Prefectural Peace Museum



Cornerstones of Peace

Greetings from the Host

Yoshihisa Baba

President
Soka University

I would like to express my joy in holding the first Peace Forum today with Kyungnam University President Park Jae-kyu, who I respect, and researchers from Kyungnam University and Chinese Culture University.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the people of Onna Village, where today's forum is being held, as well as the researchers and educators representing Okinawa and everyone else who have supported this forum in one way or another.

This Peace Forum is being held based on the agreement between the presidents of Soka University, Kyungnam University, and Chinese Culture University so as to conduct joint research aimed at promoting peace in Asia and around the world.

President Park Jae-kyu of Kyungnam University proposed this joint research. He visited Okinawa in March last year and toured the Training Center in Onna Village along with the old war sites. When he visited Mabuni Hill, he learned that the names of people from South Korea and North Korea that died in the war are separately engraved on the Cornerstone of Peace, and he felt very sad to know there is a "38th parallel" even at Peace Memorial Park, which equally commemorates all those killed during the war. Thus, he called for action to create peace, starting here in Okinawa.

President Park Jae-kyu has been dedicating himself to end the tragedy of the Korean Peninsula, where the country's division continues even 25 years after the end of the Cold War. Not only has he worked as Minister of Unification in South Korea, he has worked to train the younger generation at Kyungnam University. The Institute for Far Eastern Studies at the university is well known around the world as the top research institute for the situation on the

Korean Peninsula. It was the Chinese Culture University of Taiwan that connected Soka University, a university still short in history, to this world-famous research and educational institute.

Chinese Culture University was established by Dr. Chang Chi-yun, who has contributed as Minister of Education to the development of the education system in Taiwan. It is a prestigious university that houses the widest range of faculties and departments in Taiwan, and has fostered many worthy graduates. As its name suggests, the university has expanded its network of education and peace through “culture.” As part of these efforts, the university has hosted the Peace Ideals Research Forum with invited researchers coming from within and outside Taiwan. President Park came to know about Soka University through this forum and quickly developed a friendship with us.

Despite the existence of Kyungnam University and Chinese Culture University, universities that are contributing to the creation of peace in Asia through academic and educational exchanges based on the initiatives taken by President Park and President Lee, division and conflict still exist in the Asian region and around the world.

In this symposium, we will have discussions based on the themes of “passing down stories of war experiences” and “building peace across the sea.” Even in Okinawa, which is said to have particularly extensive peace education, the difficulty of “passing down experiences of war” has been pointed out. It is important to accurately record the historical facts and properly pass down the memories of war victims with the aim of creating peace, while accepting their pain, suffering, anger, and sorrow. I look forward to the results of the research on how this can be made possible.

On the other hand, there are heightened military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and the countries involved have mentioned the use of force. Fortunately, many people are carefully observing without being disturbed by such widely talked-about crises. In a time like this, we are required to creatively overcome the differences and confrontations, based on “culture of peace.” I hope the top-class researchers in each field who are gathered here today will discuss the possibility of a creative solution to these difficult issues.

Although today, various groups oppose each other around the world in the field of international politics, the Ryukyu Kingdom once prospered as a “bridge of nations” that connected Asian countries via the ocean. Lastly, hoping that this Peace Forum held today here in Okinawa, the place that connects the world, will be extended from our three universities to the universities and researchers in Okinawa and throughout Asia, I would like to end my words. Thank you.

Opening Remarks

Jae Kyu Park

President
Kyungnam University

Dear Dr. Yoshihisa Baba, President of Soka University; invited scholars and distinguished guests.

I sincerely congratulate Soka University of Japan, Chinese Cultural University of Taiwan, and Kyungnam University of Korea for jointly hosting here at the Soka Gakkai Okinawa Training Center their first 'Peace Forum'. I would especially like to express my sincere thanks to President Baba for his efforts in making this first forum a success.

President Baba has already delivered a very moving speech highlighting the significance of this inaugural event. So I will keep my remarks brief.

The Soka Gakkai Okinawa Training Center is a monumental place. It was originally a US nuclear missile base. In 1977, thanks to the initiative of Ikeda Daisaku, founding President of Soka Gakkai International, this place was rebuilt as a 'fortress of peace'. Okinawa experienced the bitterness of World War II. So it is no coincidence that our first peace forum is being held here, and under the theme 'Building a Peace Community in Asia'.

This first peace forum is a timely event considering current tensions in the region. North Korea's nuclear and missile provocations have shaken the peace and stability of Northeast Asia. The first North Korean nuclear crisis began in 1993, following North Korea's statement that it was withdrawing from the NPT. A provisional resolution to the crisis was reached through the signing of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. Nevertheless, the cycle of tension and respite has been ongoing ever since.

Most recently, the Korean Peninsula is being pushed into an unprecedentedly tense phase. We see strong opposition, and saber-rattling, between the US Trump administration and North

Korea's Kim Jong Un regime. North Korea has threatened a missile strike on Guam, test-fired a missile over Japan, and conducted its sixth nuclear test. It is a highly distressing situation.

For peace on the peninsula and the region, the North Korean nuclear issue must be solved. It must be solved peacefully through communication and compromise. There must never be another war on the Korean Peninsula. To bring a resolution, Japan's active support and cooperation will be needed. In particular, the US is pushing for sanctions and pressure on North Korea, but that must not be the goal in itself; rather it should lead to negotiations to resolve the nuclear issue.

More than anyone, China will have to make more active efforts to convince North Korea to engage in serious negotiations and give up its nuclear weapons. North Korea will have to change its stance, stop provocations and nuclear threats, not exacerbate the situation, but rather resolve the problem through negotiation. Under the current situation, it is essential that all concerned countries gather their wisdom and closely cooperate to set a turning point for solving the problem.

This morning, scholars from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea will present and discuss on the theme "Creating Future Peace: Inheritance of War Experience." In the afternoon, the focus will be on "Making a Sea of Peace: Collaborations for Human Security."

I sincerely hope that a number of creative proposals may come out of today's discussions, as we all work to revive peace and prosperity in the region.

Thank you.

Address at Peace Forum

Eiki Senaha

President Emeritus
Meio University

Thank you for inviting me to attend and address today's gathering of researchers from Japan, Korea and Taiwan; I could not be more delighted or honored. To begin with, Okinawa is situated in the heart of East Asia, and it enjoyed a golden age of prosperity, unparalleled in history, through its peaceful diplomacy as the Ryukyu Kingdom. Also, postwar Japan has achieved unprecedented prosperity by not waging war in over seventy years.

In 1458, King Shō Taikyū of the Ryukyu Kingdom recited at the Bridge of Nations Bell in Shuri Castle that "The Ryukyu Kingdom is in the winning place in the southern seas; it gathers the greatness of the three Koreas; it maintains good relations with Ming and with Japan — a dependent state of Ming, and having a close relationship to Japan; lying between these two, it is a bejeweled island springing forth from the ocean. Ships ply toward us from across the seven seas, bringing abundant foreign goods."

Firstly, the splendid cultural heritage built by our ancestors suffered widespread destruction during the Second World War. Seventy-two years ago, over the space of three months, Okinawa became the only battleground in Japan in which the local civilians were caught up in the fighting as the Japanese and American forces fought a battle to the death. After the Battle of Okinawa, the islands fell under American control for a period of twenty-seven years.

Secondly, when we think about the recent nuclear tests and threats emanating from the neighboring country of North Korea, we certainly cannot say that the situation in East Asia is progressing towards peace. It is thus highly significant that Okinawa, with its history of suffering, is holding a Peace Forum appealing for everlasting world peace, and here let me offer my respects to both the organizers and participants.

I myself have experienced at first hand that war is in no way creative or productive, but destructive. I knew that this destruction was underway even before the fighting began. Here, I mean the war preparations that we had to do. We were set to building anti-aircraft positions in Yomitan Village, which is now a World Heritage site. To make these positions, we had to destroy Zakimi Castle, which had been built over five hundred years before. Not only was this cultural heritage lost, but nature itself, the very ground, was destroyed and disfigured. Also, we lost our schooling. I was in first grade in secondary school at the time, but the Japanese army took over the school and the dormitories. We schoolboys were put to work building a military base, and study was out of the question for us. We were also drafted to tramp down the sugarcane fields to build Kadena Air Base, today the greatest airbase in the East. Our teens are the years when our thirst for knowledge is the strongest. Nothing can damage a person more than losing the chance to study at that time of life. And the schools taught people to fear what they called “the Anglo-American beasts.” When the Americans did land, this fear drove many people to take their own lives in mass suicides at the landing zones.

When the Americans finally landed, the prefecture’s secondary-school students were organized into “Student Units of Blood and Iron for the Emperor.” Units were set up at every school, and sent out to fight the Americans. The schoolgirls worked as military nurses also in school units. The girls’ unit that took the heaviest casualties was the Himeyuri Students, or Lily Corps. They were recruited from the Girls’ Normal School and Daiichi Girls’ Secondary School. A film was made about the Himeyuri Students, and their story is very well known. This tragedy happened right here on the soil of Okinawa — a tragedy of young lives cut down in the midst of their studies.

When I was a foreign-exchange student in America, I learned from a Korean student that the same kind of thing had happened in Korea. A group of civilians fleeing from the north to the south of the country were attacked and massacred by the North Korean Army as they crossed a bridge from one territory to the other. I have also been to the Marco Polo Bridge, where the Second Sino-Japanese War was triggered, and I visited the war museum there. There I learned about an incident that happened during the Japanese Army’s attack on Nanjing. While the Chinese troops fled in boats across the Yangtze River, the civilians who had gathered on the bank had nowhere to run, and they died in great numbers in the Japanese assault. I understood very well that the army will not protect the people, no matter which country they are fighting for. It was the same here in Okinawa.

Before the Americans landed, their ships bombarded the Japanese Army’s positions. When they came ashore, the land was laid waste to the last blade of grass. An unthinkable total of over two hundred thousand precious lives were lost. When I was at the war museum in Nanjing, I came across a book called *An Outline of History of China*. According to this, homes were burned

and pillaged, and women were subjected to rape. What happened in Okinawa happened there. It is reported that three hundred thousand Chinese lives were lost, both military and civilian. Could any action be more inhumane, and more careless of human life? The massacre at Nanjing happened when I was in second grade at primary school. We were told nothing about it. Instead, we held torchlight parades to celebrate the Japanese Army's victory. Drunk with the fervor of war, we chanted "*Banzai!*" many times in celebration. My friend Jeanette K.Fink, who later served as head of education in the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, told me that she saw these events with her own eyes.

Not all problems will come to an end if war becomes a thing of the past. I have been to places where people don't have enough to eat, sleep on the grass, are thin as ghosts, suffering from malaria, and dying one after another.

We who have experienced war know how destructive it is, how inhumane it is, and our memories will never fade. We will hand down our memories to the next generation, and I pray that our memories will build an everlasting peace for the world, and that all the peoples of the world, regardless of nationality, may enjoy lives of happiness. To justify the decision to fight, Japan's declaration of war against the U.S. and Britain included the phrase "to enjoy prosperity in common with all nations."

In other words, the cause was presented as just, but I pray with all my heart that coexistence and co-prosperity in the true sense of the phrase can be achieved. I hope that this Peace Forum will contribute to the everlasting peace of not just of East Asia but of the entire world. Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.

Keynote report

Creating Future Peace: Inheritance of War Experience

Hideki Tamai

Professor
Soka University

1. The Peace Forum Initiative

Dr. Park Jae kyu, the president of Kyungnam University, felt such a strong empathy for the Okinawans who experienced the Battle of Okinawa, the last major battle of World War II, that he co-founded the joint research project—“Peace Forum”—between the Soka University, Kyungnam University, and the Chinese Culture University. In March 2016, President Park visited Okinawa and became convinced that those who had experienced the terrible war were still carrying its pain, and were hoping that such a tragedy would never be repeated.

After visiting Okinawa, President Park who visited Soka University to receive an honorary doctorate, made the following proposal: “There is the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University where research into problems in the Far East such as Northeast Asia and the situation in the Korean Peninsula is conducted. The research done here is also well known to those concerned at home and also abroad. Most peace scholars say that a prosperous Northeast Asia including South Korea and Japan is directly related to world peace. The ideas and actions of Dr. Daisaku Ikeda are mutually connected with the activities of our institute. I hope that from this point onward Soka University and Kyungnam University will deepen their relationship even more through long-term academic and educational exchange.” Soka University was established by Dr. Ikeda who expressed the following: “It is the Okinawan people who have suffered the most who should be the happiest.” It is only natural that there was deep empathy from Soka University for the Kyungnam University president’s proposal for peace.

Following this, a mutual understanding was established following the foundational principles of both Soka and Kyungnam universities. The joint research project for realizing peace in Asia was established in collaboration with the Chinese Culture University, which enjoys an academic and educational exchange with the two universities mentioned above.

The project aims for specific results such as the policies and proposals about the matters given below:

- (1) Passing on accurate records and memories of the war to the next generation, to avoid repeating the disaster of war.
- (2) Strengthening the cooperative structures for conflict resolution and peace building in the Northeast Asian region.

One of the common aims of the three universities that co-founded the Peace Forum is training those individuals who are devoted to the happiness of peoples. We believe that the basis of the pursuit of happiness is peace. Although peace, like happiness, can be defined in many ways, we want to stress that we have defined it here as not threatening people with unreasonable violence, alongside “freedom from terror” as it is defined in the Charter of the United Nations. Peace, when defined in this way, may be interchangeable with security.

The fact that everyone has a right to live without the fear of being threatened is self-evident. However, when individuals pursue this right, conflicts and wars often occur, as Hobbes stated long ago, which results in the paradoxical situation when people wishing to preserve peace are often threatened. In Northeast Asia, which is the region where we live, this paradox is a reality, and is causing division and conflict. Above all, in recent years, the conflict between nations is increasing the threat of the use of military force.

On the basis of such a reality, I want to show the viewpoint firstly that we cannot change a geopolitical neighbor, so that we should recognize Asia where we live in as one community inherently. Secondly, we should mutually accept our right to pursue security and prosperity as members of this collective community. We must change ideas that sacrificing others for one’s own survival is unavoidable like as zero-sum game.

When countries clash over ‘security’ that they are pursuing, one country attempts to achieve security for itself by eliminating the concerns of others and conflicts arise, regardless of the fact that common security can only be achieved collaboratively. These conflicts are getting serious and are causing division. Although there is a variety of research on the mechanism that gives rise to the security paradox mentioned above, the idea of securitization proposed by the Copenhagen School of International Relations Research has a great deal of merit.

According to the theory of securitization, a threat to security is understood by constructivism as a problem of intersubjective acknowledgment.¹ This means that in a community such as a

¹ BUZAN, Barry & HANSEN, Lene, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.212-217

nation state the perception of an existential threat arises, and a threat to security is created, when the securitizing actor spreads news of referentobjects assumed by the potential aggressor. The problem here is that the accuracy of the evidence that can be objectively verified as a “threat” tends not to be questioned.

During this securitization process, those who are considered a threat are often reframed as inhuman and are demonized. For example, institutions such as the Japanese government and the mass media criticize the Kim regime of North Korea as being a selfish nation that does not understand the international community. They stress that North Korea must first change. They criticize North Korea as a country that does not accept universal humanitarian values and ethics, and is difficult to understand. There is a tendency to accuse North Korea of being different from us in a negative way. This type of assertion can easily create the impression that something is a threat merely because it is different.

Of course, someone who has different values and a different sense of ethics is not necessarily a “threat.” However, during the process of securitization, it can be said that the perception of “a threat” is created due to this type of inference. Following this, the resistance the “threat” that has thus been created arises, driven by an intention to destroy the enemy that is different from us. However, the tragedy that this leads to is a foregone conclusion.

Fortunately, at this time, we have not experienced the worst case scenario. Although the problem of security is rooted in spreading perceptions of an intersubjective threat, from the standpoint of constructivism, this perception of a “threat” is resolved when de-securitization also becomes a possibility.

This Peace Forum sheds light on how to overcome the security dilemma which arises between groups at various levels and aims to make the collective community that is Asia a more peaceful place.

During the first forum, problems associated with passing on the war experience and military methods of resolving conflict in Northeast Asia were covered. The following thesis will examine the significance of learning lessons from war to overcome division and conflict and to prevent future wars.

2. The problems associated with passing on the war experience

The war that was fought in Okinawa was one of the most unusual wars involving Japan. The Japanese army had suffered one defeat after another at the island bases in the South Pacific at the hands of the American army. The Japanese army fought to the bitter end in Okinawa by dragging the local residents into the war.

Japan had a policy of dying in battle instead of surrendering to the enemy and America responded to this with a ferocious attack of naval gunfire. This American attack called the “Iron Storm” not only killed many Japanese soldiers but also many civilians who were residents of Okinawa. Many Okinawans were also victims of Japanese conscription and spy hunting. People

lost hope after the American invasion and died in large numbers after being cornered. They were not protected by the Japanese army, who they thought were on their side.

After the war was lost, Okinawa came under the control of America. It was not returned to Japan even after the San Francisco Peace Treaty and remained under American rule. America forged ahead, building military bases in Okinawa as bridgeheads to resist the Soviet and Chinese threat during the Cold War. While the people of Okinawa were recovering from the horrors of the end of WWII, there were many who were forced to live painful lives under the American military occupation, due to their loss of livelihood, such as farming, which was a direct result of the expansion of military bases through the use of guns and bulldozers.

In 1950, details of operation *Iron Storm* were published by the Okinawa Times. Back then, while the people of Okinawa were still suffering from the ghastly war, surviving was the most important thing. Therefore, it was not the time for a movement to emerge that would pass on Okinawa's war experiences to future generations.

When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the movement that chronicled the war in Okinawa began to take its first steps. In 1974, 'The regulations to determine the day of the Okinawa memorial service' was implemented. "Many people from our Prefecture of Okinawa died in World War II. We faced the grim historical fact that our property and cultural assets were lost and we solemnly accepted this. June 23 was decided on as 'memorial day' so that the calamitous war is never be repeated and also to remember those who had fallen in battle. We also hope for lasting peace which is universal".² General Mitsuru Ushijima's suicide on June 23 marked the end of Japan's organized resistance. Then, in 1975, the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Museum opened and began holding exhibits related to the war.

It was the youth division of Soka Gakkai that encouraged people to pass on their experiences of the war and publish a collection of people's accounts of surviving the war at this time. These were ground-breaking achievements. "Handing down memories of the calamitous war and keeping a record of them is the next step in transmitting the importance of peace to the next generation." It was this idea that was the basis for editing and publishing the 80-volume collection of testimonials of war experiences and notes, entitled "To generations who do not know war." It covers 3,400 people from every prefecture in Japan. More than 4,000 young people across Japan participated in this endeavour, including those from senior high schools. It took 12 years to complete. The first volume was *The Shattered Okinawa Island*, an edition on Okinawa that was published in 1974.³

This first volume was simply a matter of handing down, in interview format, the experiences

² Okinawa Prefectural Government:

http://www.pref.okinawa.lg.jp/reiki/34990101004200000000/34990101004200000000/firm_inyo_prag6.html

³ Soka Gakkai Official Site: <https://www.sokanet.jp/hbk/heiwa.html>

Soka Gakkai Okinawa Youth Division, *Okinawa 1944-1945: Thinking Peace for the Future True Stories from 14 Survivors*, Daisanbunmei-sha, 2016

of those who suffered during the war to young people who know nothing of it.

However, most people who experienced the war were reluctant to talk about it. The experience of the war consisted of the following: memories that could not be expressed in words, suffering and sorrow, anger, and a desire for revenge. Most people had suppressed these powerful emotions in an attempt to return to a normal life, therefore, only those who embodied the anti-war spirit could be referred to as “testimonial providers.” This only happens when survivors accept the suffering and sorrow, resentment and regret, and hope that there will never be anymore victims like them.

What deserves attention here is the fact that the process of the acceptance of war experiences is diverse. There are times when people are compelled to take revenge, overwhelmed by feelings of resentment as victims of the war. There are also times when they rationalise their participation in war activities as “doing our utmost to ensure justice.” This in turn leads to self-esteem. What we call “war experiences” should be recognized as the “memories” of some of those who experienced the war. These are people who have overcome their suffering and believe that war should be rejected.

The following people must also be taken into consideration: people who are not able to overcome their war experiences, those who do not want to recall what happened, those who are overwhelmed by resentment, and those who think about the war as past glory. However, in this thesis we want to think about how sharing war experiences may help to prevent such a war from breaking out again.

3. Handing down war experiences as a form of peace education

Talking about pre-war imperialist policies in a positive light became commonplace in the post-1980s era in Japan. The so-called history textbook problem arose in the 1980s. In the 1990s, a theory that strongly criticized any rejection of the war activities of the military regime era as being masochistic was published in some national newspapers. Also, there was a strong protest movement conducted by right-wing groups and politicians against an exhibit portraying the Japanese military’s invasion of China, held at the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, which was re-opened in 1996 and displayed at Osaka International Peace Center “Peace Osaka”. There was a problem about changes to the content of the exhibit which was held at the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Museum just before it opened in 1999.

There are people committed to a revisionist view of history, who uphold the ideology that even the testimonies of those who experienced the war in Japan should be rejected. This is causing fresh division and antagonism in Japan. In view of such a situation, accurately recording historical facts and the memories of those who have experienced the war has become increasingly important. Okinawa is also promoting the archiving of these testimonials in writing and video.

It goes without saying that it is important to preserve these primary resources. However,

what is more important is transmitting the memories of those who experienced the war as well as their anti-war message and sharing these resources with many people who have never experienced war. One method of doing this is allowing those who have not experienced the war to trade places with those who have experienced the war. They can then act as guides who talk about exhibits and war relics.

Currently in Okinawa, museums such as the Prefectural Peace Museum and the Himeyuri Peace Museum are training such guides. The aim of training guides at the Prefectural Peace Museum is expressed as follows:

At the end of March 1945, a ferocious attack was launched against Okinawa. The “Iron Storm” which lasted three months changed the shape of the mountains on the islands. Much cultural heritage was destroyed and more than 200,000 people lost their lives. Handing down accurate records of the historical lessons of the war in Okinawa to the next generation is important. In order to secure talented people to play an important role in peace education support activities in schools and in the region, “Okinawa Peace Museum Volunteers” will be trained.⁴

Okinawa is actively involved in peace education even at the administrative level. In 1993, “the guide to peace education” was formulated. The essence of peace education was expressed in the following way: “Based on the historical characteristics of Okinawa, we want to nurture peace values”.

In an attitude survey administered in 2012 by Toshifumi Murakami of Kyoto University of Education to the primary and junior high school students in Okinawa, more than 90% responded that they had heard of the war in Okinawa. The researcher concluded that this was because the memories of those who had experienced the war had reached a wide audience. Most respondents

The ratio of Agent of the Inheritance of the Battle of Okinawa for the secondary school student in Okinawa in 2012

Agent			ratio
Relatives	great-grand parents	9.6%	75.0%
	grandparents	50.1%	
	parents	15.3%	
people who experienced war.			66.0%
TV			70.2%
Books			37.3%
Internet			22.0%
others			3.7%

[Sample Number of the Survey]School=22 / Pupils=1,487(male:763, female:724)

MURAKAMI(2012)

4 TONOIKE, Satoshi, ‘Study about inheritance of telling war experience (1)—efforts of Okinawa as a case study—’ in *Bulletin of the Center for Educational Research and Practice, Faculty of Education and Human Studies, Akita University*, No.36, 1994, p.30

(70.2%) reported the source of their information about the war was TV. In addition, 66% of respondents also learned about it from those who had experienced the war directly, and 59.8% from their teachers.⁵

Also, 59.7% of students had heard accounts of war experiences from their great grandparents or grandparents. 15.3% had found out from a parent whom they believed had heard about it from their grandparents. 75% of students had found out about the war in Okinawa from their family. This represents a greater percentage than those who had found out about it from TV. It can be inferred that, to a great extent, students found out about the war from their families. Additionally, if they did not have a family member who had experienced the war, they had missed a vital source of information about the war.

The Ratio of Agent of the Inheritance of the WWII for the Junior High School students

AGENT \ PLACE	TOKYO	KYOTO	HIROSHIMA	NAHA	TOTAL	TOTAL in 2006
TV	82.4%	74.7%	76.5%	77.2%	77.9%	55.0%
Teachers	46.6%	61.4%	58.6%	59.8%	56.0%	77.0%
Grandparents and/or Great-grandparents	37.4%	33.4%	33.2%	42.9%	36.5%	37.8%
Internet	34.4%	37.0%	31.6%	41.7%	35.9%	-
Hibakusya	10.6%	21.4%	58.3%	26.4%	28.4%	21.4%
Newspapers	19.8%	23.7%	24.8%	31.9%	24.5%	25.9%
Parents	26.3%	18.8%	20.2%	16.9%	21.0%	18.6%
Other people experienced war than Hibakusya	13.6%	10.7%	17.9%	32.7%	17.9%	17.7%
Hiroshima Peace Note	1.6%	3.6%	40.1%	0.8%	11.5%	-
Others	8.1%	5.2%	3.6%	5.9%	5.8%	6.9%
TOTAL	280.8%	289.9%	364.8%	336.2%	315.4%	260.3%
the number of answerers	369	308	307	254	1,238	1,439

MURAKAMI(2016)

Murakami also administered “peace attitude” surveys to junior high school students in the four cities of Tokyo, Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Naha. During the 2016 survey, the students were asked about their sources of information about World War II. Most students responded that they had gained information from the TV. Teachers occupied the second spot. Compared to the survey that was administered 10 years ago, the primary and secondary sources of information had changed places. However, there was no great change in the percentage of students who had found out from their great grandparents or grandparents. When making comparisons between the four cities, Okinawa was about 10 points above the other cities. Also, in the case of Okinawa, it was clear that there was an increase in the percentage of students who had heard from people who

⁵ MURAKAMI, Toshifumi, ‘A Study on Peace Education in Okinawa : By the Survey of the Primary and Junior High School Students’ in *Hiroshima Peace Science*, No.34, 2012, pp. 33-59

had experienced the war, similar to the case of the atomic bomb victims of Hiroshima.⁶

The junior high school students who had an opportunity to talk to those who had experienced the war represented about 40% of the total. This situation should be evaluated as positive in terms of passing experiences of the war on to the next generation. However, there is a problem with the advanced age of those who had experienced the war. The 2016 survey administered by Murakami contained the following question: “Those who had a good recollection of the war were over eighty years of age. What do you think about the difficulties this caused when hearing about war experiences directly?”

Students Understanding of people who experienced war.

Those who had a good recollection of the war were over eighty years of age. What do you think about the difficulties this caused when hearing about war experiences directly?

	TOKYO	KYOTO	HIROSHIMA	NAHA	TOTAL
I am afraid that war will happen again.	32.9%	33.3%	25.8%	42.0%	33.0%
It is better to pass down war experiences.	26.9%	29.0%	34.4%	26.8%	29.3%
It is unavoidable that war experiences decrease.	11.6%	14.1%	14.0%	10.4%	12.6%
It is good that peace has been continued in Japan after WWII	12.4%	7.7%	12.4%	12.1%	11.2%
I think of nothing in particular	12.4%	11.4%	10.4%	6.1%	10.4%
The inheritance of war experiences is not necessary	2.0%	3.4%	1.3%	2.2%	2.2%
Others	1.7%	1.0%	1.7%	0.4%	1.3%
TOTAL	99.9%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
the number of answerers	346	297	299	231	1,173

MURAKAMI(2016)

There were problems with the choices provided. However, most students responded that the risk of another war will increase when all those who had experienced the war have died. Most students responded that war experiences should be handed down. This was the case in Hiroshima too. The number of students who selected the same option was not dramatically lower in Okinawa. However, of the four cities, this option was chosen by a smaller percentage of students in Okinawa.

According to the surveys administered by Murakami, we can surmise that handing down war experiences which convey the misery of the war and the longing for peace is something that has been happening regularly. There is a need for a new kind of passing on that embodies the anti-war and peace creation spirit that is widespread and common to all, even after those who have experienced the war pass away.

⁶ MURAKAMI, Toshifumi, ‘The Influence that Wartime Experience Gave to Peace Awareness: Chronological Analysis of the Attitude Surveys of Junior High School Students on War and Peace’ in *Hiroshima Peace Science*, No.38, 2016, pp.15-39

For example, teacher training in peace education is being conducted. One example is the training conducted at the Faculty of Education at the University of the Ryukyus, on how to teach people about the war in Okinawa. Moreover, it is important to train guides and successors who can explain things after learning about the war experience independently. The Peace Museum mentioned above and numerous citizen's groups are involved in this effort.

The Soka Gakkai Peace Committee reported to this symposium that young people are expected to trade places with those who have experienced the war, after hearing directly about their war experiences. It is also expected that they will talk about why "war should be rejected" and become individuals who are aware of the war experience, and talk about why "such a war should never be fought again."

A mere record of the facts related to the war is not a sufficient driving force for peace creation. We would like to stress that it is necessary to instil an awareness of the war experience that will ensure such a war is never fought again. This must be done by raising people's awareness of the destruction and slaughter brought about by the war, and of its being a plain folly that destroys people's spirits.

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Thinking Peace for the Future: a case of peace campaign into the future in Okinawa

Daigo Sunagawa, Takeo Nakamura

Sunagawa: Soka Gakkai Okinawa Peace Committee Chairperson

Nakamura: Soka Gakkai Okinawa Youth Division Leader

— Greeting and Awareness survey — (Presenter: Daigo Sunagawa)

Hello, everyone. I would like to offer my heart felt gratitude to all of you for choosing our home prefecture as a place to hold “Peace Forum in Okinawa,” an academic symposium of great significance held jointly by Kyungnam University, the Chinese Culture University and Soka University, based on the theme, “Building a Peace Community in Asia.”

I wish to thank you as well for the privilege of introducing on this precious occasion the activities the Soka Gakkai Okinawa Youth Division has been engaging in for the advancement of peace.

Seventy-two years have passed since the end of World War II and the number of those who survived to tell of its horrors is inexorably dwindling. Given this situation, the young people of the Soka Gakkai in Okinawa launched several initiatives to carry forward the tragic history of the Battle of Okinawa for the sake of future generations.

Described as “an aggregation of every conceivable hell,” the Battle of Okinawa claimed the lives of one out of every four Okinawans. We believe conveying the stark personal truths of that bloody campaign is not only sure to lead the world to a more peaceful place, but that it is our mission as youth to ensure that the lessons it imparts are never forgotten.

The first initiative was a survey to ascertain local awareness of and attitudes toward the Battle of Okinawa that we launched in 2015 in remembrance of the 70th year of the battle. By identifying the perceptions of young Okinawans regarding the Battle of Okinawa, we hoped to

create a knowledge base with which to develop meaningful follow-on initiatives. The survey was conducted under the expert supervision of Masaie Ishihara, a leading authority on local war experience studies and professor emeritus of the Okinawa International University.

The survey targeted an age bracket ranging from 12 to 43, the youngest comprised of junior high school students and the oldest being those who were born in 1972, when Okinawa reverted from U.S. control to Japan. It was conducted throughout the prefecture, with our Youth Division member spilling friends and acquaintances as well as eligible respondents on the street. A total of 34,894 people responded, making the survey among the largest of its kind that we conducted in Okinawa.

The following were among the questions asked and their corresponding results:

Question 1: Have you ever learned of someone's experience of the Battle of Okinawa? An overwhelming 97% answered that they have.

- As to the way they learned of a Battle of Okinawa eyewitness account, 42% of respondents said they heard it from a family member or relative; 68% replied that they did so in class at school; 46% pointed to books or television; and 41% responded they did so through a visit to the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum.
- The responses to Question 1 revealed that nearly half of the respondents reported they learned of such accounts from multiple sources, both direct and indirect. The other noteworthy finding was that a mere 3% said they never heard of a Battle of Okinawa account, with nearly every person in the targeted age bracket saying they were informed of some experience of the battle.

We believe that the result is indicative of persistent effort to convey these narratives by those who survived the battle, as well as by those who followed their lead in the postwar era. It is therefore clear that we, the young people of Okinawa, must work to sustain their effort and build upon it even further.

Question 2: Do you feel you should communicate what you learned of the Battle of Okinawa to others? We found that 64% of pollee replied "Yes," indicating that the level of intent was fairly widespread, while 4% said "No" and 29% were noncommittal — or, when combined, roughly one out of every three respondents felt less or no compulsion to do so.

While an overwhelming majority of people in the age bracket had learned of the horrific

experiences of the Battle of Okinawa, we found that not all were willing to carry these narratives forward.

Question 3: The most prominent reason cited by both those who responded that they would not convey what they learned of the Battle of Okinawa and the noncommittal group was the “difficulty in relaying the experiences to others,” with 33% choosing this answer. Another 21% said they simply lacked the time, while 12% reported they felt the effort was too depressing. Numerous respondents who opted to provide their own reasons said it was not in their place to convey such accounts, or that they believed it was inappropriate for them to do so because they had not experienced the tragedy in person. This finding indicates the challenges inherent in the continued communication of the war experience.

— Publication of Battle of Okinawa Testimonials — (Presenter: Takeo Nakamura)

When our organization began conducting a survey of local youth on their awareness of the Battle of Okinawa in 2015, I had the opportunity to interview my aunt regarding her war experience. She was six years old at the time, with two brothers, aged two and four, living with her mother and grandparents on Geruma, a lush island that belongs to the prefecture of Okinawa.

The U.S. landed military forces on Geruma on March 26, 1945. Because the islanders were taught that American soldiers would do hideous things to them, many chose to commit suicide rather than be caught and held prisoner. My aunt’s family also chose to kill themselves in a dark, dank cave. Her two younger brothers were the first to be strangled by a cord. My aunt, her mother and grandparents then attempted to strangle themselves as well, but as they were falling unconscious, the GIs called out to them, urging them to surrender. While my aunt and the three adult members of her family managed to crawl out of their cave, her two brothers, however, could not be revived.

On Geruma, 53 out of the 100 or so people who inhabited the island committed communal suicide. Those who survived knew who had killed whom, and for many years after the war, the islanders lived in profound shame, loathing and anguish.

I have, in the past, heard of my own family’s experience of the Battle of Okinawa on a number of occasions. But this time, for the first time in 70 years, I learned of a shocking truth: Up to that day, I was told that it was my aunt’s grandfather — my great-grandfather — who strangled her two infant brothers to death. However, I learned that it was in fact my aunt’s mother — my grandmother — who had strangled her own two-year-old son while breastfeeding him.

My grandmother passed away in 2014. I cannot even imagine the suffering and sadness she had to bear, having to live for decades knowing she had choked the life of her baby with her own hands, wracked to the very end with remorse.

Learning of this long-hidden family tragedy, it became painfully clear to me just how important it was for us to interview at this time the survivors of the war, and that this initiative was valuable particularly because it informs us of the ghastly experiences of those whom we hold the dearest — our families and kin.

The young people of the Soka Gakkai in Okinawa agree that we no longer have a moment to spare in learning from those who lived through the Battle of Okinawa, especially since this is likely to be the last opportunity to hear their accounts firsthand.

In 2015, we held sessions to share the war experiences of survivors with young people throughout Okinawa. We also began working to publish their narratives we collected through this initiative for the sake of those generations that are to follow.

In September 2016, our Youth Division published, *Thinking Peace for the Future — True Stories from 14 Survivors*, a work introducing the personal accounts of those who lived through the Battle of Okinawa. This book was also released in English out of our resolve to inform the world of the truth of that tragic campaign. It contains the story of my aunt as well.

Under a program we launched, *Thinking Peace* has now been donated to nearly every elementary and junior high school as well as public library in Okinawa.

— Illustrated Works of the Battle of Okinawa — (Presenter: Daigo Sunagawa)

For the final segment of this presentation, we would like to introduce our activities to encourage Battle of Okinawa survivors to illustrate their experience, an initiative the Soka Gakkai Youth Division has engaged in since 1981.

Nearly all photographs and film footage on the Battle of Okinawa that exist today were taken by the U.S. military. We, however, felt that these records alone fail to convey the horrific truth of that battle.

Every individual who lived through the Battle of Okinawa underwent an untold number of experiences. We hoped that their illustrations would inform future generations of the barbarity of war and the sublimity of peace.

Under this initiative, more than 700 works have been collected to date. It represents a core activity of our movement to advance peace, which we succeeded from those who preceded us.

In 2016, we presented these works for a public viewing in the “The Illustrated Art of the Battle of Okinawa” exhibition we held at the Okinawa Cellular Stadium in Naha City, the main venue for the 6th Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival organized by the Okinawa prefectural government from October 27 to October 30.

The Festival is held once every five years as an event for Okinawans living around the world to return to their home islands. Last year, some 7,300 men, women and children from 28 countries and territories attended the event, taking part in exchanges held at various locations throughout the prefecture.

A total of 6,800 people from Japan and abroad viewed our exhibition over the four-day Festival. One such visitor was a woman, a second generation Okinawan born in Hawaii, who traveled to Okinawa for the first time. She said she had heard stories of the Battle of Okinawa from her mother, but after seeing the exhibit, she was shocked to learn how horrendous the suffering people actually had to endure. She felt it was vital to communicate this history to as many people as possible.

On a message board we set up at the exhibition's exit, viewers posted messages for peace not only in Japanese but also in English, Spanish, Portuguese and other languages. "The Illustrated Art of the Battle of Okinawa" thus served as an invaluable teaching tool for people of numerous nationalities to learn of one of the bloodiest battles in World War II.

Panels featuring the illustrations are available to promote peace education at elementary and junior high schools throughout Okinawa. We have loaned the panels to four schools so far this year, and the response has been quite favorable. In the words of one teacher, "[The panels] enable students to learn of the tragedy of war with their own eyes."

This concludes our presentation of the Soka Gakkai Okinawa Youth Division's peace initiatives. Having taken part in them, one of the strongest takeaways I have is this: To the extent that we, as youth, take action, other youth will respond to us to the very same extent. We are committed to forging a new future with our youthful passion and energy, driven to create wave upon wave for peace that will expand ever outward.

Reconstructing the Cinematic Imagination of the Korean War: The Value of a Local Realistic Film in the Age of Postmodernism¹

Sung Kyung Kim

Assistant Professor
University of North Korean Studies

THE VALUE OF THE POSTMODERN TURN IN SOCIAL THEORY

The modern is a new epoch clearly distinguished from the ancient (Habermas, 1981: 3-4). Historically, the modern starts in Enlightenment thought and advocates its values such as rationality, progress, human emancipation, and science over religion. A more specific way of making this definition is offered by Giddens: the modern can be characterized through two dimensions, i.e., ‘industrialism’ and ‘capitalism’ (Giddens, 1991: 15-20). Modern societies and social life have experienced increasingly faster and wider ranges of social change brought about by industrialism and capitalism. Turner defines these as: the domination of asceticism, secularization, the universalistic claims of instrumental rationality, the differentiation of the various spheres of the life-world, and the bureaucratization of economic, political and military practices and the growing monetarization of values (1990: 6). Similarly, Bell (1976) conceptualises ‘industrial society’ as a key feature of modern social life, and argues for a new phase of industrial society, so-called ‘post-industrial society’, based on the centrality of knowledge and information that brings ‘post-modern’ society. In a post-industrial society, the

¹ This essay is based on the theoretical framework of previous publication. Kim Sung Kyung(2007) ‘Recovering Social and Cultural Resources in A Realistic Local Film’, *Development and Society*, 36(1).

unity, coherence and rationality of social systems, which could be found in previous industrial society, is no longer as distinct.

The postmodern turn, on the other hand, can be understood in various terms such as the 'computerization of society' and the 'end of metanarrative' (Lyotard, 1984); the 'information revolution' and 'post-industrial society' (Bell, 1976); 'time-space compression' (Harvey, 1989), 'simulacra' (Baudrillard, 1983), and the cultural domination of 'post-industrial society', 'consumer society', 'spectacle or image society', 'media society' and 'information society' (Jameson, 1991). In particular, Lyotard (1984), one of the pioneers in the debate on postmodernity, argues that modern ideas of universal truth and metanarrative, especially Marxism, are out-of-date in post-industrial societies. Instead of being pessimistic about this, he maintains that the replacement of metanarrative by language games would enable us to look at pluralistic perspectives and the diversity of local knowledge. Lyotard's claim of the end of metanarrative implies a focus on emerging voices, practices and the identities of marginalised people such as the black, women, sexual minorities and the 'Other.' McRobbie, in this sense, argues that a crisis in Western knowledge has opened the space for those who were ignored and isolated by the modern metanarrative to articulate their identities, cultures and practices (McRobbie, 1985: 61-74). Thus, the postmodern turn can be characterised as a postmodernism of resistance that engages in social criticism and subversion (Foster, 1983: ix-xvi). This is made possible through stressing 'otherness and marginality, valorising the culture and practices of individuals and groups excluded from mainstream culture, and thus generating a cultural studies of the margins and oppositional voices' (Durham and Kellner, 2001: 515; see also Best and Kellner, 1997: 9). One of the main advantages of postmodernism is indeed its challenge to modernist projects, which in its questioning of the grand narrative and the master claim of universal truth especially, breaks up modern, and overly narrow, dichotomous stereotypes of rationality over irrationality (emotion), unity over diversity, solidity over fluidity, fixity over openness, white over Others, and men over women.

Furthermore, these benefits help social science to enlarge its scope to include culture, art, humanities, identity, language, phenomenology, hermeneutics, emotion and unconsciousness, and adopt different methodological approaches. The influence of postmodernism leads social scientists to question a narrowly defined social science that must be 'scientific.' In this vein, Featherstone (1988: 205) argues that a postmodern sociology is required to overcome the generalizing, systematizing and rationalising tendencies in sociology. In addition, those areas that were considered as the periphery of social science, especially art, culture, and humanities, have become major areas of sociology in the postmodern turn (Featherstone, 1988).

While scientific social science analyses which are too narrowly defined drain rich essences of the postmodern sociology, an extreme postmodern sociology which dismisses 'scientific' approaches outright is hardly able to inherit the role of 'sociological imagination' in its analysis of the complicated relationship between society and the individual in the contemporary world. It

seems to us that the binary opposition between modernity and postmodernity based on the idea of 'rupture' and an 'epochal break' between the two is not sophisticated enough to capture the dynamic and rich mechanism of the social world and the self. The elements of the universal and the individual, of the rational and the irrational, of the objective and the subjective, and of the modern and the postmodern have been, and will be, mixed and dispersed in the social world. In this sense, combining the two perspectives appropriately depending on the context is perhaps crucial for social scientists. Thus, several social theorists, such as Bernstein, Fraser, Harding, Nicholson, Seidman and Stones, attempt to utilise postmodernism's value in order to rethink modern theory and (still) central features such as truth, reality, objectivity, ethics, and normative critique (Best and Kellner, 1997: 25).

FACING THE CONFUSION OF IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF POSTMODERNISM

A rather extreme view on postmodernism can be found in Baudrillard's claim of 'simulacra.' Baudrillard (1983) argues that we can no longer separate the economic from the realms of ideology or culture. Cultural artefacts, representations, and media images are overwhelmingly dominant so that these simulations have become more real than the real itself. In the realm of the hyperreal, the boundary between the 'real' and 'simulation' collapses. It is impossible to rediscover the real as well as illusion as 'illusion is no longer possible, because the real is no longer possible' (Baudrillard, 1994 in Durham and Kellner, 2001: 534). Baudrillard and other extreme postmodernists, in this sense, tend to call into question the existence of the real or of a single reality, and to dismiss modern projects completely (Baudrillard, 1983; Poster, 1995). However, his argument raises crucial ontological questions: is there no 'real' at all in the end? Can the real be dismissed so easily? If only simulations surround us, what do those simulations re-present? Are they merely replication, parody and pastiche?

It is an important point for us that the breakdown between the 'real' and images tends to exaggerate certain aspects of the postmodern. Stones argues that the massive influence of postmodernism in social theory mistakenly leads to the construction of an anti-realism. He maintains that postmodernism is valuable as a critique of modernism as it emphasises the importance of a plurality of perspective and local and contextual studies in the place of grand narratives. It also stresses fluidity, openness and disorder (1996: 22). However, postmodernism does not mean the rejection of all forms of reality and the absence of 'the real'. By accepting the contributions of postmodernism both to social theory and empirical research, we can grasp a richer level of the 'real'. The important thing is that postmodernism should be used for grasping 'the real' and its sophisticated features in more appropriate ways.

Furthermore, postmodernism also contributes to clarifying the postmodern social self. According to Hall (1992: 274-291), the modern social self, which is stable, fixed and constructed, seems to be replaced by the decentred or postmodern self that is open, contradictory, unfinished, and fragmented. Bauman clearly recognises the difference between a modern and a postmodern

identity as follows: ‘If the modern ‘problem of identity’ was how to construct an identity and keep it solid and stable, the postmodern ‘problem of identity’ is primarily how to avoid fixation and keep the options open. If the case of identity the catchword of modernity was creation; the catch world of postmodernity is recycling’ (Bauman, 1996: 18 cited in McCrone, 1998: 31). It is perhaps reasonable to say that individuals hold several competing identities at the same time, and they identify with different identities at different times and situations. Identity in the postmodern turn is indeed changeable or movable in relation to ‘the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us’ (Hall, 1992: 277).

Gergen, one of extreme postmodernists, criticises the unified and constructed modern identity by drawing on his psychological experiments as evidence. He argues that people have multiple or even ‘schizophrenic’ identities since they have diverse human relations with others (Gergen, 1991; 1995). Although Gergen recognises the central tendencies of the self, he argues that we fail to face up to the fact that there are many potential selves within us (Gergen, 1995). However interesting Gergen’s argument may be, it is open to two critical problems. First of all, Gergen’s evidence based on experiments to support his argument tends to be rather limited and superficial. The social world and human relations in the ‘real’ are perhaps far more complicated and contain many socio-cultural factors that cannot be controlled. Moreover, even if one behaves in a particular way in a constructed circumstance, it does not mean that this is merely the effect of a series of unrelated multiple identities. It is rather a question of diverse roles and behaviours rather than that of identities. These roles and actions could be interpreted further as a manifestation of the diversity of intentions; thus people adapt behaviour within multiple social settings in every single moment (MacIntyre, 1981/2; 190-5).

Secondly, Gergen does not pay enough attention to the essentialist notion of the self nor to a coherent and unified identity across diverse roles and selves. It becomes problematic if Gergen uses role, action and identity interchangeably, and then focuses on finding out the differences between each role and action. MacIntyre points out that the separation between the individual and the roles, and between different roles, prevents us from grasping the unity of a human life (MacIntyre, 1981/2: 190-1). People have diverse roles and masks, and change them depending on circumstances and social relations, but they still hold core and unified features rooted in the essential social self at a substantial level. Each mask, role and action retains a sense of continuity and also the unities of character and the self. In this sense, McRobbie argues that we should invest our best efforts in unearthing natural, unified and hidden identity. Without the discovery and realisation of this, McRobbie argues, it is impossible to (re)create hybridised, different and new identities in relation to diverse social relations and circumstances (McRobbie, 1985: 61-74; see also Hall, 1992).

Moreover, the idea of ‘schizophrenic identities’ in the postmodern turn suggests the loss of a sense of history and a general loss of meaning. The postmodern subject suffers from “historical amnesia” due to a lack of knowledge as to the correct language articulation between signifier and

signified (Jameson, 1985: 117-9). In other words, Jameson argues that ‘schizophrenic experience is an experience of isolated, disconnected, discontinuous, material signifiers which fail to link up into a coherent sequence. The schizophrenic thus does not know personal identity in our sense, since our feeling of identity depends on our sense of the persistence of the “I” and the “me” over time’ (Jameson, 1985: 119; see also Jameson, 1984). This leads to a claim of a crisis of identity. According to Hall (1990: 59), social and cultural identities are composed of both tradition- and future-based identities. While tradition-based cultural identities focus on a stable, fixed and unchanging cultural entity by tracing a common culture from the past, future-based identities are equally connected with both the future and the past. Identities are ‘subject to the continuous “play” of history, culture and power.’ That is, ‘we integrate the past, present and future, and thereby constitute stable, coherent identities on both a personal and communal level’ (Hinchman and Hinchman, 1997: 2).

Gaining a sense of history in order to avoid the postmodern confusion of identity requires that the human being, as a storyteller, must construct its own narrative of an individual life that usually interacts with historical and social narratives. A narrative of the self about oneself is a prerequisite for a unified identity (Hall, 1990). If a unified narrative cannot be constructed due to the lack of a sense of history and of belonging to a larger community, then a unified and coherent identity becomes impossible. Current identity crises and schizophrenic experiences disrupt people from constructing coherent narratives of themselves. Alasdair MacIntyre (1981/2: 205-6) argues that identity and memory are important as one’s individual life is dependent upon membership of the larger community and sharing in the past of that community. The unity of the self is simultaneously achieved through moral identity in which individuals internalise the norms, values, morality, virtues, vices and mutual understandings of their community through the memory of the shared past and tradition (MacIntyre, 1981/2: 205-9).

Identity and memory of the social self can be achieved through the realisation of the morality, virtues and norms of the past. Drawing from Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, it is a crucially important point for us that dispositions, including value, morality, virtue and norm from the past, help people create a strong connection to their communities as well as to histories. In the next section, I will argue that the media image, especially realistic film texts, can be seen as resources of dispositions for audiences. Watching these films, in this sense, is an important way for audiences to recognise their identity and memory and to overcome postmodern identity confusion.

BRINGING BACK THE ‘REALISTIC TEXT’: SPRING IN MY HOMETOWN (1997, SOUTH KOREA)

Schizophrenic experiences result in people’s wide feelings of anomie and in a crisis of identity in contemporary society. Through the recognition of these social, cultural and moral resources and dispositions, the crisis of identity can be alleviated. The mass media can provide a pivotal role in providing the resources and dispositions for audiences. Silverstone (1994) argues

that the mass media can offer a stronger sense of ‘ontological security’ as the media furnishes a sense of being-in-the world. Drawing from Giddens’ discussions of ‘ontological security’ and ‘trust’, Silverstone argues that active engagement in the world can be achieved in three ways: the first engagement is physical such as bodily presence, face-to-face interactions, communication, and language; the second is cognitive, for instance, understanding, memory, reflexivity, and an awareness of position in time and space; the last is affective engagement as in our relationships to material objects, to other people and to symbols (1994: 5-6). The media, especially in its use of realistic text, is an effective means of supplying cognitive and affective engagement by (re)constructing memory, mutual understanding, dispositions, virtue and morality, and reminding us of our affective engagement with certain cultural and historical objects and other members of communities. In this vein, I would maintain that *Spring in My Hometown* (1998) as an example successfully provides rich cultural resources for Korean audiences to track back their senses of history, place and society.

The film *Spring in My Hometown* (1998) narrates a locally shared past, that is, the Korean War in a realistic manner. As such, it seems to have spoken to the concerns of a significant diversity of contemporary Koreans in ways that are artistically challenging and engage with the re-framing and re-construction of contemporary everyday experiences. Moreover, the film deals with social issues that have dominated the development of Korean identities and influenced individual Korean life to some degree in sophisticated ways. According to Standish, films do much more than just ‘reflect’, and ‘they also actively explain and interpret the way in which the world is perceived and understood’ (cited in Dissanayake, 1994: 65-6). It has to be said that the film challenges the dominant perspective and represents “reality” by including, rather than repressing, many differences within, and fragmentations of, the society.

Spring in My Hometown (1997, Yi Kwangmo dir.) achieved relatively huge success at the box office considering its genre as an art film. In 1999, the production won the Best Picture Prize at the ‘Grand Bell Award’, Korea’s equivalent of the Academy Awards. The film also received the Grand Prix at the Vancouver Film Festival in 1998 and at the 52nd Locarno Film Festival in 1999. The film successfully constructs its own aesthetic style such as its distinctive mise-en-scene, mainly a dim yellowish colour, long-take and long shots, to narrate the story of Koreans’ painful memory of the Korean War (1950-1953) and the division between the North and the South. The latter is culturally and historically specific and is resonant with Korean audiences.

The film portrays the Korean War as experienced in a small village in South Korea. However, it does not merely depict cruel and brutal images of war. Instead, the film subtly conveys both the painful experiences of war, the effects of invasion by US military forces upon the everyday life of ordinary people, and the virtues and morality that they displayed. Each scene carefully unfolds a shared history and memory of Koreans through its representations of landscapes and places, and lives of characters located within a larger social and cultural history.

The film is situated in a small rural town far from the battleground at the time when the

Korean War was closed to ceasefire. Most of the people in the village appear to be peaceful — as if there is no war at all. However, several marks of war are seen here, there, and everywhere. These fragmented marks are powerful and terrible enough to ruin people's everyday lives. Instead of dramatising these as other popular genre films have done, the film carefully presents the traces of the war in the everyday lives of the Koreans, such as 'Red complex' among people, hatred towards communists, poverty, the sale of sex to an American soldier in order to gain money for a father's medicine. On the other hand, the film unfolds virtues, mutual understandings, value, and morality during the hardest times for Koreans. Combining these two aspects, the film can provide rich cultural resources for Korean audiences to (re)construct the narrative of the self in relation to a larger society as well as history.

SEARCHING FOR THE MARKS OF THE KOREAN WAR

This film is a story about the experiences of the Korean War through the eyes of a boy, Sung-Min. Sung-Min and Chang-Hee are best friends even though Chang-Hee's family rents a small room in Sung-Min's house. Chang-Hee's father has been reported missing in the battlefield, which has led to Chang-Hee's family becoming increasingly impoverished. They have been unable to pay the rent to Sung-Min's family for a long time. In contrast, Sung-Min's father, Mr. Choi, is indebted to his daughter and her American boyfriend, First Lieutenant Smith, for getting him a well-paid job in the US military base. When Chang-Hee's father fails to return home from the prison camp, Mr. Choi's lucrative employment changes the economic situation of Sung-Min's family which has migrated from North Korea. Although Sung-Min's family enjoys a better living condition, they suffer emotionally from the fact that they have left the eldest son, Sung-Min's older brother, and other family members in North Korea. Chang-Hee's mother was also able to get a new job with the help of Mr. Choi, washing US soldiers' underwear. However, when Chang-Hee's mother accidentally loses all the underwears one day, she is asked to have sex with a US soldier to recompense for the missing articles. Without having knowledge of these circumstances, the two boys happen to witness Chang-Hee's mother and the American soldier having sex, with Mr. Choi standing guard as her pimp. After this incident, Chang-Hee takes revenge on the soldier by setting fire to the mill, a secret place where the Americans go for sex. Chang-Hee then disappears. Despite the long search by American soldiers, Chang-Hee, is nowhere to be found.

Chang-Hee's father eventually returns from the prison camp and begins to discover the circumstances behind Chang-Hee's disappearance. At this time, the decomposed body of a child is found in the village. Everybody, including children, believe that the body must be Chang-Hee. The children prepare a funeral and dig a small grave. Finally, Sung-Min's family has to run away from their hometown when Sung-Min's father discloses the fact that he has been stealing goods from the US military base. During the night before Sung-Min's family's departure, Sung-Min dreams of Chang-Hee. Sung-Min believes that Chang-Hee must be alive somewhere.

The film mixes two perspectives: one is a distant and rather objective point of view from above; the other is Sung-Min's. Most scenes rely on the former through frequent long-take and long shots that play the role of providing an objective and distant perspective on the Korean War. On the other hand, the sequence of the whole story is narrated by Sung-Min and appears sporadically as a written commentary that is then combined with comments on historical facts between the film's twelve segments. The film faithfully follows the chronological order of events. The written commentary in portrayed events and actual historical facts play an important role in representing reality and in connecting individual lives to society and its history.

The film opens with a scene in which people violently apprehend a communist at the communal spring. One person, a teacher, is trying to dissuade people from both the condemnation and the assault in an attempt to save the communist. The communist, who is Sang-Un's father, is then whipped in front of his family including his son and daughter, by the townsfolk. As he is whipped, the camera angle is held at a long distance from the action in order to appear objective and to show that these violent incidents are daily events. The landscape, the sounds of a crying baby, a barking dog, and the people walking past are used to symbolise the characteristics of daily life. People fight, kill and discriminate against one another in everyday life. As the traditional sense of community breaks down, people no longer believe each other. The place where the communist was caught signifies the traditional communal place for everyone in the town. People traditionally gathered together, chatted and sustained close relationships at the communal well. However, in this scene the film deconstructs the traditional significance of the communal well, as it becomes a place that reconfirms a political cleavage amongst Korean people due to the war.

The cleavage, hatred and pain among Koreans at that time are portrayed through scenes such as that of the head teacher giving an aggressive address in the morning session of school as to how the communists (North Korea) should be defeated. Further scenes depict the sense of division amongst the Korean people: a demonstration against communists and ceasefire; Chang-Hee's mother selling most of clothes due to poverty brought about by the absence of her husband and the war; a girl selling sex to an American soldier in order to get some money for her sick father; a teacher treating her student, Sang-Un, cruelly as Sang-Un's father had killed her parents during the war; Sung-Min's uncle longing for his mother in the North; Sung-Min's mother always worrying about her son, Hyun-Min, in the North; and Chang-Hee's father coming back from the prison camp in very bad health.

The visual representations of these scenes are well controlled through the prevention of the exaggeration of horrifying aspects of the war. The emotions and hardship of the characters are never made explicit: for example, the poverty of Chang-Hee's family is merely hinted at through the conversation of characters, and wounded Chang-Hee's father is only seen in the background. A scene of a girl selling sex is shown in a very long shot, and the pain of the divided family is symbolically presented through the image of a broken mirror. Also a beggar boy serves as a

reminder of Sung-Min's lost brother. In terms of filmic technique, long-take shots function to show the everyday lives of Koreans in a more realistic and objective way. Minimising close-up shots and editing prevents the dramatisation of the violent past. Lengthy long shots prevent any sense of voyeuristic pleasure as they remove the explicit pictures of the horror and violence brought about by the Korean War as the emotional and physical aspects of the characters change in the horror, rape and violence.

Voyeurism and eroticism in rape scenes are also avoided; for example, the camera shows a soldier and a girl entering into the mill and then stops when the two people are about to have sex. The long shots of the scene barely show either erotic movement or the bodies of the two people. This tendency has become even clearer in the sequence depicting the rape of Chang-Hee's mother. The long distance shots prevent the audience from recognising the face of the woman. The characters in the sequence remain unidentifiable, until Mr. Choi calls the woman by her name. These negative pictures of the War are followed by rather hopeful aspects of everyday life that contain virtuous actions among Koreans such as that of Sung-Min sharing his lunch box with Chang-Hee; or of children playing around and helping one another although they sometimes beg for chocolates from US soldiers; Sung-Min's uncle showing sympathy as he secretly passes some rice to the commie's family. Other scenes show Chang-Hee always taking care of his sister and helping his mother; Mr. Choi always being a good father to Sung-Min. These are characteristic of the emerging theme of compassion that was seen in the scene of the children preparing a funeral and grave for Chang-Hee after he has disappeared. After the police had found out a dead boy's body, children believed that it must be Chang-Hee. Then, children prepare Chang-Hee's funeral all together; they are gathered to cut down a tree and to make his coffin. While children prepare for funeral, they wish Chang-Hee could live somewhere.

Girl 1: What if it (a dead body) is not Chang-Hee?

Boy 1: Chang-Hee is the only missing person in our village.

Girl 1: Chang-Hee could run away.

Boy 2: How could he run away? If he did, he should have contacted us.

Girl 1: I wish it (a dead body) would not be Chang-Hee.

Boy 2: We all feel the same.

During a funeral parade, some of children ran to follow an American army jeep in order to beg for chocolates. However, there is the majority of children keeping a rank. Then, one boy questions, 'Is a chocolate that good? Are you real friends?' Similarly, Sung-Min's mother is shown giving some food to a beggar boy. These scenes represent pure and genuine friendship and the virtue of the community.

Various objects and incidents are used to trigger devices to portray hopes and virtues. The objects and incidents portrayed are those that are to be always situated within daily experiences

and that occur in everyday lives. The lunch box suggests friendship between the two boys: since rice contains culturally specific meanings such as food in general, and life and hope for the future, it signifies not merely food or help, but also the possibility of forgiveness and compensation among people. Also, the warm father and son relationship between Mr. Choi and Sung-Min is shown through the homemade telescope which Mr. Choi has made for his son. Everyday images of a bicycle, a radio, and a school's sports day, and Chang-Hee's funeral loosely organised by children represent pure and genuine friendship and the virtue of the community. The director perhaps wants to show that even though the war ruined a lot of things, there are still beautiful things to be remembered. Indeed, the film concentrates on reflecting "reality" and the various faces of the war. It breaks down the stereotypical picture of the war and reconstructs alternative images of it. It remains a tragedy, but it is also seen as a beautiful time as long as people helped each other and did their best to keep their virtues and morality even in the hardest times.

Sung-Min's point of view takes the role of a commentary on the events in the text and makes a linkage between the events and wider history. That is, all these happenings in the characters' lives are carefully located into larger historical forces and social structures. The text inserts Sung-Min's written commentary on the happenings and the big historical events of that time in order between sequences. The film begins in 1953, the late period of the Korean War and a year of the armistice. Sung-Min's family obviously comes from the North, yet has become a divided family due to the conditions of the armistice. For a long time, Chang-Hee's father has been unable to return home as he has been held as a prisoner at the Gujae prison, one of the biggest and worst prison camps in history. Strong anti-communism and Red-hunts can be found everywhere. The turbulent lives of Sung-Min's and Chang-Hee's families are closely related to the political, social and economic circumstances of the late stages of the Korean War. Moreover, the circumstances of war are relatively well presented through the portrayal of diverse groups of people, and their distinctive lives and identities. The two different groups, the rich and the poor, are shown through Sung-Min's and Chang-Hee's families. The experience of divided people is presented through Sung-Min's uncle's yearning for his mother who has been left behind in the North. The contrasting lives of communists and pro-American people are also introduced by comparing the lives of Sang-Un and Sung-Min's family.

The film, *Spring in My Hometown*, returns the audience to the relatively recent past. Diverse cultural artefacts and practices, familiar landscapes, the lights and sounds of a typical village, and daily practices and languages are combined with one another in the text in order to evoke and represent the past. First of all, music as a cultural artefact is obviously important to signify nostalgia for the past (Powrie, 1997: 19). In the beginning of the film, a culturally embedded song, 'Spring in My Hometown' (I believe that the English title of the film comes from the title of the song), is used as a background music. Later, another scene shows children learning and singing this song in class. This song is perhaps the most culturally resonant song that is learnt by

all Koreans in their childhood. The lyrics are as follows.

Flowers bloomed in my hometown, long time ago.
Peaches, apples and apricots ... and pink blossoms too.
Red and violet of the rainbow, flowers paint the town.
I still long to go back to my hometown in the sun’.

Additionally, natural background sound, such as a barking dog, a crying baby, the sound of the wind and the droning of a cicada, is also a very important device for memory construction. Several recreations of children portrayed in film are also culturally resonant and nostalgic. There are such scenes as children watching stag beetles wrestling; children hopping and jumping, and children rolling a firing-can in winter.¹ All of these are considered to be traditional recreations that the Korean adults have played in their childhood.

Several culturally embedded behaviours, such as the manner in which Sung-Min’s mother treats her son when he feels unwell, and the way that Mr. Choi scolds at Sung-Min severely, are effective devices of nostalgia for childhood and the past. Furthermore, numbers of culturally resonant settings and the contextualisation of these settings are used to touch upon the memory of the past. It is known that the director spent enormous time and efforts to find the typical scenery of a Korean village. After looking at more than 100 places, the director decided to shoot the film in Eui Ryong Gun, Kyung Nam which is the southern part of South Korea. In this sense, places portrayed in the film such as a communal well, a mill and a school, paths, brooks, hills and the sky — all familiar landscapes — are perhaps at once common and significant reference points for Korean audiences to feel connected to the particular time and space. In particular, children running along a small path, and women washing clothes while children swim in a brook are perhaps typical nostalgic images of that time. Such imagery is effective in representing the Korean people’s own ways of living. Cultural objects such as a humble lunch box, a package of rice, traditional foods, chocolates from American troops, a lighter, a telescope, a mirror and a radio, are references to the feeling of nostalgia and are also used for the contextualisation of the text.

I hope to have argued that the postmodern turn in social science has brought positive consequences: firstly, the postmodern sociology has broadened its areas into the inclusion of art, humanity, emotion, ethnomethodology, and hermeneutics, and secondly, this tendency within sociology would be more effective to grasp the rich contexts of society and the social self. Given these, I have argued that the postmodern sociology should be balanced between too narrowly defined “scientific” perspectives and the extreme postmodern ones, and it can be more powerful once it reconciles with a realistic approach.

Drawing on positive aspects of postmodernism, but still holding key elements of realism, I have maintained that the problems of identity in postmodern society can be solved, and, in

particular, a realistic local film should be understood in more sociological ways in terms of its contributions to local audiences' anchoring their identities in history, place and society. As an example, I have closely analysed a film *Spring in My Home Town*, and I have argued that the film perhaps successfully presents the period and the everyday lives that belong to it. The text also achieves this by locating individuals into a larger social framework. In this sense, *Spring in My Hometown* taps into and artistically reconstructs memories of the past in ways that invoke parallels with and messages for contemporary experience and identity. In addition, the film uses artistic textuality, as is evident in its many long-take scenes, slow camera movements, lack of close-ups, limited artificial sounds, absence of dramatic changes of characters, and a peculiar lighting in-between yellow and green. These successful devices not only furnish the film with an artistic and authentic form, but also, more importantly, help spectators remember/ recapture the stories, experiences, and history of the Korean War. In this sense, this realistic local film is very important for audiences in terms of its cinematic achievements as well as its contributions to constitute rich cultural resources including local history, culture and memory.

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Aiming for Real Peace: The Republic of China's Efforts in Building a Democracy Since WWII

Wei-jen Hu

Professor

Chinese Culture University Team from Taiwan, ROC

Warm Greetings from Taiwan, the Republic of China!

It is indeed a great pleasure for me to participate in this conference and have the opportunity to share with you some perspectives about our country's road to a constitutional democracy.

As you are all aware, China in the 19th and 20th centuries was marked with many civil wars and wars against foreign invading forces; and China's defeats and humiliations prompted its people to stage a national revolution against the imperial government. One of the important goals of that revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen at the beginning of the 20th century was to build a united and democratic China so that she would be able to withstand foreign invasions while also maintaining a real peace for its people and for the entire region.

Although the national revolution succeeded in 1912 and the first republic in Asia, the Republic of China, was established, as a result of years of internal divisions and external conflicts, a modern day Constitution Draft was promulgated only 25 years later in 1936. Unfortunately, Japan started a war against China in the following year, 1937, so the process of formally enacting and implementing a democratic constitution was delayed until after the end of World War II.

On the day of Japan's surrender on August 15th, 1945, the Chairman of the National Government of the Republic of China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, sent a broadcast to the people of China and the world. In it, he quoted Christian values, and emphasized that now that

peace had finally arrived after an 8-year bitter war, Chinese people must remember that the war criminals were only the Japanese warlords, not the Japanese people. He exhorted the Chinese people to bear no grudges against the Japanese people and instead return good for evil. Subsequently, the Chinese National Government used its precious aid from the U.S. to ship more than 2 million Japanese military personnel and civilians from Mainland China and Taiwan back to Japan without demanding any indemnity. The main purpose for Chiang Kai-shek and his government was to form a long term and real peace between the Chinese and Japanese peoples; and as a result, we all witnessed that, in the following decades, many Japanese indeed felt indebted to the Republic of China and its people and maintained friendly relations. In this connection, I am pleased to find that in the book we received yesterday, with the kind compliments of President Baba, entitled "Okinawa 1944-1945" and published by Soka Gakkai Okinawa Youth Division, the authors concluded that "the essence of the Battle of Okinawa was the uncontrollable evil of militarism" and that "we should never forget the fiendish nature of authorities". Those statements also echoed the spirit of Chiang Kai-shek's broadcast message to the world at the end of the war.

In China, right after the war had finished and the National Government had regained control of most of the areas formerly occupied by the Japanese forces, it resumed the efforts to draft a constitution aiming to build China into a real democracy. In 1946, the Constitution of the ROC was finally adopted by the country's National Assembly, which was a body of representatives elected by Chinese citizens in the areas under government administration, totaling over 2000 of them, including 18 representatives from the newly recovered island of Taiwan, and 81 from the former Manchuria, as well as 24 from Tibet and 25 from Mongolia. Taiwan had been ceded to Japan 50 years prior by the imperial Chinese Government while the former Manchuria had been occupied by Japan by force since 14 years ago and by now had returned to the Republic of China. Despite the fact that the Chinese Communist Party did not participate in the process, this democratic constitution was passed by the National Assembly in 1946 and went into effect in 1947. It had been drafted in accordance with the teachings of the country's founding father, Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Basically, the political foundation of the Constitution was centered on the "Three Principles of the People," which calls for the establishment of a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. While a government of the people invokes the idea of civic nationalism standing up to imperialism, a government by the people seeks to create a parliamentary democracy and a separation of powers in order to protect human rights. A government for the people means that the government, to a certain extent, must provide services that are essential to its citizens' well-being. In addition to the establishment of the executive, legislative and judicial branches in the government, the Constitution also created separate branches of examination and control, according to traditional Chinese practice.

Although the process of constitutionalization and democratization of the ROC was further

suspended due to civil war between the National Government and the Chinese Communist forces, it was restarted after the government was relocated to Taiwan in 1949; the Constitution was finally implemented in Taiwan. The ROC Government implemented local elections for county magistrates and county legislators in the early 1950s in spite of its recent defeat by the communists in the mainland and the safeguarding of Taiwan was the first priority at the time. From the 1970s to the 90s, members of parliament who had taken on their positions decades prior were gradually replaced by newly elected representatives in Taiwan. In the meantime, education about democracy started taking root in Taiwan society. In 1996, the ROC even held its first direct presidential election.

Democratization is indeed a long journey. In the process, many have shed blood, sweat and tears, and even sacrificed their lives in the pursuit of its ideals. Fortunately, the political system of the ROC has gradually grown into a more mature democracy. Freedom, human rights, as well as the rule of law have also become the core values of Taiwan's people over time. Democracy is not just regarded as a political ideology in Taiwan. The Taiwanese people believe that democratization is necessary to enhance the country's strategic status, its state institutions, as well as the well-being of its people. Democracy has made our civil society what it is today. It is a civil society in which the spirit of openness and freedom has become the soil that nurtures creativity.

The ROC's democratic experience constitutes a crucial social experiment, as it is the first and the only democracy ever successfully developed and practiced in an ethnic Chinese society. Today there are over 200 legally registered political parties in Taiwan. A direct presidential election, relatively fair parliamentary elections, as well as elections at metropolitan and county levels are essential elements of our political system, and we have already witnessed three handovers of power between parties at the central government level. Moreover, active civil society also plays a key role in the policy-making process. Through the media, internet, and public demonstrations, our people engage in dynamic and diverse expressions of opinion on public affairs. They do so in an environment of free speech that is protected by the Constitution. So much so that in the Freedom Rankings published by US-based Freedom House, Taiwan has always been listed as "free" with high scores (higher than the U.S. in the latest scoring). On the other hand, as our people seek out opportunities to take part in society and contribute to it, freedom of expression has become an important part of what enables us to feel genuine concern for one another. This has become our precious asset.

Our experience in journeying down the road towards full democracy demonstrates that a democratic political system and way of life can really be developed in a society based on traditional Chinese or Asian values. In fact, the Constitution of the ROC also reflects the influence of traditional Chinese culture and Confucianism, such as the teachings of "policy being people-oriented" and "people being superior." Confucianism even emphasizes that "the will of the people" directly represents "the will of Heaven." The people's will is the ultimate source of

legitimacy for political power and regimes. While some people might mistakenly argue that Confucianism confines individual freedom and therefore contradicts the modern spirit of democracy, I wish to stress that it is actually compatible with and even supportive of the current trend of democracy in the world.

A free and democratic Republic of China has also earned respect in the international community. Nowadays a total of 165 countries and territories accord visa-free or landing visa or electronic visa treatment to ROC passport holders, and the ROC passport is ranked as one of the most useful in the world.

Our constitutional democracy also provides us with a foundation to form policies toward the Chinese Mainland and to preserve peace in the region. In 2008, when the KMT government under President Ma took office, exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits began to flourish. President Ma emphasized adherence to the ROC Constitution in crafting our cross Taiwan Strait policy:

As stated before, the ROC Constitution took effect in 1947, two years before the PRC was established in Beijing, so our constitution is indeed a one-China constitution. That means we uphold a one-China stance, that is the ROC. And the Constitution's additional articles amended in Taiwan also state clearly that they were created to meet the objective of national unification in the future. This position has been tacitly accepted by the mainland Chinese government as the foundation of the "1992 consensus of one China, respective interpretations." On the basis of this tacit agreement, the exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait increased dramatically and constructively during 2008 and 2016 when KMT was in power. The two sides of the Straits signed 23 agreements of cooperation, and began more than 800 flights a week carrying passengers and cargo across the Straits. Millions of mainland tourists came to visit Taiwan, while more than 1 million Taiwanese business people conduct business and reside in the mainland. As an increasing number of mainland Chinese visitors and exchange students set foot on the island of Taiwan, they realize what a full democracy is and how it works in a Chinese society. In other words, Taiwan is now sitting on a window of opportunity to magnify its soft power of democracy to the Chinese people, and therefore contribute to regional stability and peace.

It is a fact that for the past few years our people have encountered various challenges as our democracy has matured; these include delays in the passage of badly needed laws, or at times a lack of trust in our judicial system; reforms across various aspects of the society are clearly needed. Moreover, an obvious cool down of the cross Taiwan Strait relations has taken place since the DPP won both the presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan last year; as the current government in Taipei has not accepted the 1992 consensus. However, as our people has grown more mature in the democratic way of life, they will be able to exercise pressure one way or another to address the situation domestically and also help the government to implement policies that will maintain stability and peace in the Taiwan Strait and across the region. In other words, as far as peace in Taiwan Strait is concerned, I believe that we should be optimistic about

the future.

Thank you all, and I welcome your ideas and advice.

Keynote report

Making a Sea of Peace: the Collaborations for Human Security

Hironobu Asaga

Professor
Soka University

Abstract: In this research, I examined how cooperation can be promoted by various entities in order to establish human security. In the research, I was able to point out important elements to promote cooperation for human security and also mentioned sustainable development goals (SDGs) as concrete indicators for establishing human security.

Key words: Human Security, Collaborations, Global Warming, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Peace

1. Introduction

The objective of the symposium was to explore how we can create a new cooperative system in the Northeast Asian region to solve the problems occurring in opposing or contradictory perceptions and interests. I suggested the Collaborations for Human Security as the theme of “Making a Sea of Peace”, by taking up environmental issues, especially on reducing emissions of the greenhouse gases. We examined not only the national level cooperation but also the local level and civil society relations, and to make it clear that the regional cooperation contribute to solving a global issue (one of Human Security agenda) in this session. We offered some cases of the collaborations for Human Security in this session. I would like to examine also building peaceful relations among all parties in this area.

In this research, I examined how cooperation can be promoted by various entities in order to

establish human security. First, I reviewed the idea of human security, then focused on environmental issues and examined how to cooperate towards solving the global problem. Subsequently, I examined important factors to promote cooperation for human security. Finally, I explained about sustainable development goals (SDGs) as concrete indicators for human security. In the research, I was able to point out important elements to promote cooperation for human security.

2. Human Security

Human security means to protect people from a wide and serious threat to survival, living, and dignity (focusing on each individual), to realize the rich possibilities of each. It is a way of encouraging independence of individuals and society through sustainable capacity building. In today's world where globalization and interdependence are deepened, problems such as poverty, environmental destruction, natural disasters, infectious diseases, terrorism, sudden economic and financial crisis, are cross-border and interrelated, It has a serious impact on our lives. In order to deal with today's international challenges like this, the approach centered on the conventional nation is becoming inadequate. In addition, it is necessary to focus on "human beings" and to grasp cross-sectional and comprehensive the relationships among various entities and fields.

Japan declared that human security should be a pillar of diplomacy, and it has deepened this idea by establishing an international committee for human security with the participation of global experts. In January 2001, the "Human Security Committee" was founded. This committee aimed to propose concepts of human security and measures to be taken by the international community. In February 2003, the committee reported the contents of the final report to Prime Minister Koizumi (then) and submitted a report to the UN Secretary-General of Annan (then) in May.

In the report, it is necessary to rethink the theoretical framework of "security" and to expand the focus of security from those covering only the state to those including people, and a comprehensive and integrated approach is necessary to secure people's safety.

Human security was defined as "protecting the precious central part of human life, realizing the freedom and the possibilities of all people". In addition, the need for strategy for people's "protection" and "empowerment" was appealed in order to secure people's survival, living and dignity.

In addition, Human security was taken up in the outcome document at the United Nations Summit in 2005 and 2010, the G8, OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), TICAD (Africa Development Council), Pacific Islands Summit, World Financial and Economic Conference. Human security is deepening the international community's recognition as an important concept in tackling global issues.

At the UN General Assembly in September 2012, a general assembly resolution on common

understanding of human security¹ was adopted.

A common understanding on the concept of human security includes the following:

The General Assembly,

Agrees that human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people. Based on this, a common understanding on the notion of human security includes the following:

(a) The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential;

(b) Human security calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities;

(c) Human security recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights;

(d) The notion of human security is distinct from the responsibility to protect and its implementation;

(e) Human security does not entail the threat or the use of force or coercive measures. Human security does not replace State security;

(f) Human security is based on national ownership. Since the political, economic, social and cultural conditions for human security vary significantly across and within countries, and at different points in time, human security strengthens national solutions which are compatible with local realities;

(g) Governments retain the primary role and responsibility for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of their citizens. The role of the international community is to complement and provide the necessary support to Governments, upon their request, so as to strengthen their capacity to respond to current and emerging threats. Human security requires greater collaboration and partnership among Governments, international and regional organizations and civil society;

(h) Human security must be implemented with full respect for the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including full respect for the sovereignty of States, territorial integrity and non-interference in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Human security does not entail additional legal obligations on the part of States

¹ United Nations A/RES/66/290, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 10 September 2012, 66/290. Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome.

3. Global Issue: the threat to human security (Environmental Problem)

Environmental issues are an important factor in considering human security. Environmental problems occurring domestically or on a global scale pose a threat to current and future humanity. Environmental problems that pose a threat to humanity can be divided into domestic environmental problems and global environmental problems and are as follows.

(1) Domestic environmental problems

① deterioration of air / water quality due to concentration of cities of human activities, a decrease in water volume, a problem of loss of waterfront environment, ② Pollution: Air pollution, water pollution, soil contamination, noise, vibration, ground subsidence, foul smell, ③ The problems of exhaustion of resources and waste by social systems such as mass production, mass consumption, mass disposal, ④ Problems in which biodiversity is being lost in various ecosystems such as forests, wetlands, rural areas, urban areas, ⑤ Nuclear power regulation

(2) Global Environmental Issues

① Global warming problem, ② Ozone layer depletion, ③ Acid rain, ④ Reduction of tropical forest, ⑤ Desertification, ⑥ Pollution problems in developing countries, ⑦ Decrease in wildlife, ⑧ Marine pollution, ⑨ Trans-boundary movement of hazardous waste, ⑩ Global trade

4. Collaborations for Human Security

(1) Sharing Recognition

In November 2016, a new international framework for global warming and greenhouse gas reduction was adopted. Under the "Paris Agreement" of COP 21, 175 countries / regions around the world agreed to tackle global warming. Specifically, it will oblige countries to formulate voluntary goals and implement domestic measures. The reasons why many countries and regions have adopted simultaneously are the effects of climate change such as abnormal weather and sea level rise in a visible form, and It is because the sharing recognition that climate change is a serious issue for any country is progressing.

(2) Sharing Vision

In negotiations on the Paris Agreement,

Rather than discussing the theory of responsibility for global warming and countermeasures, efforts to discuss and realize the vision of the future that is desirable in any country, such as a low-carbon society was made.

(3) Education of Global Citizens

It can be said that it is important to nurture Global Citizens who think that "what can be done for the most suffering person" and cause behavior to solve the problem on the earth.

In Global Citizens education, followings are important.

- ① To experience of putting yourself in the position of those who suffer,
- ② To find something necessary to build a society that lives together,
- ③ To create a "safe space" from your feet with everyone together

In 2016, the annual general meeting of the United Nations Information Agency / NGO was held in Korea on the theme "Global citizen education — to achieve SDGs together", "Gyeongju Action Plan" was adopted.

(4) Solidarity of action

By making consciousness that the cities where each other lives are the same "environmental community", it becomes possible to broaden the relationship greatly. For example, a city with 2% of the earth's land area occupies more than 60% of energy consumption, with worldwide carbon emissions of 75%. If the city changes due to solidarity of citizen activities, the earth will change. It can be said that solutions to the global problem will be greatly advanced by citizens cooperating with each other's cities instead of country-specific countermeasures.

5. Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs) for Human Security

The SDGs have the following 17 areas and 169 objectives, and in order to advance these goals, "sharing recognition" and "solidarity of action" must be carried out².

(1) We resolve, between now and 2030, to end poverty and hunger everywhere; to combat inequalities within and among countries; to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies; to protect human rights and promote gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls; and to ensure the lasting protection of the planet and its natural resources. We resolve also to create conditions for sustainable, inclusive and sustained economic growth, shared prosperity and decent work for all, taking into account different levels of national development and capacities.

(2) As we embark on this great collective journey, we pledge that no one will be left behind. Recognizing that the dignity of the human person is fundamental, we wish to see the Goals and targets met for all nations and peoples and for all segments of society. And we will endeavour to reach the furthest behind first.

Sustainable Development Goals are as follows.

Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere

Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture

Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages

Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all

Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all

Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all

Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all

² United Nations A/70/L.1, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/L.1

Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation

Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries

Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns

Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts*

Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development

Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss

Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels

Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development

6. Conclusion

In this research, we examined methods and efforts for establishing human security for peace. Among them, I mentioned the importance of (1) Sharing Recognition, (2) Sharing Vision, (3) Education of Global Citizens, (4) Solidarity of action. Through environmental problems, I think that environmental problems will go towards resolving by cooperating with countries and countries, cities and cities, and people.

A peaceful society is a sustainable society and a society in which human security has been established. The achievement of SDGs, which is a specific goal for 2030, will be increasingly important from now on.

To promote action on the SDGs, Japan established the SDGs Promotion Headquarters, a Cabinet body headed by the Prime Minister with all ministers as its members in May 2016³. The headquarters formulated the SDGs Implementation Guiding Principles in December. These principles set out Japan's vision: "Become a leader toward a future where economic, social and environmental improvements are attained in an integrated, sustainable and resilient manner while leaving no one behind." These Principles also identify eight priority areas of focus by reconstructing the SDGs in light of the national context, and give concrete policies to implement. Focusing on these priority areas and utilizing the indicators set out at the same time to assess progress, the government plans to conduct its first follow-up and review process in 2019.

³ Annual Report on the Environment, the Sound Material-Cycle Society and Biodiversity in Japan 2017

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An Unlikely Security Community: South Korea and Its Neighbors

Jung Kim*

Assistant Professor
University of North Korean Studies

Introduction

Scholars and policymakers have proposed the idea of constructing a security community in East Asia to cope with changing regional dynamics and global power shifts.¹ Security communities, or more precisely, collective security organizations, can be defined as “institutions that facilitate cooperation among their members” under the presumption that “all states have a common interests in preventing war and aggression, regardless of who the perpetrator and victim are.”² Because they “forbid the use of military force by one member state against another,” an attack by one member against another “is considered to be a threat to the whole community” so that “the entire membership is responsible for coming to the aid of the victims of aggression.”³

* Jung Kim is assistant professor of political science at University of North Korean Studies and director for planning at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, of Kyungnam University in Seoul. He earned his doctoral degree in political science from Yale University and worked as senior research fellow at East Asia Institute.

1 Among others, see Donna Weeks, “An East Asian Security Community: Japan, Australia and Resources as ‘Security,’” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 65 (2011); Amitav Acharya, “Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in East Asia,” in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, eds., *International Relations of Asia* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); and Yukio Hatoyama, “A New Path for Japan,” *New York Times*, August 26 (2009) available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27iht-edhatoyama.html> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

2 Jeffrey A. Frieden, David A. Lake, and Kenneth A. Schultz, *World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions [Third Edition]* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2015), p. 206.


3 Ibid.

This paper, following this conceptual definition, examines the feasibility of building a security community in East Asia, focusing on how South Korea interacts with its regional neighbors — China, Japan, North Korea, and the United States.

In doing so, it characterizes each of South Korea’s bilateral relations with its regional neighbors as nuclear deadlock with North Korea, alliance dilemma with the United States, priority misalignment with China, and remembrance incongruence with Japan. It also shows that the main determinants that constrain the autonomy of Seoul’s defense policy involves security competition for regional hegemony between China and the United States, security-economy nexus that is produced by South Korea’s high trade dependence on Chinese markets, and the South Korean public’s anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment. It concludes with the finding that South Korea is facing multiple policy quandaries in security area that are more likely to diminish Seoul’s defense policy autonomy due to Sino-American rivalry, China’s influence over South Korea’s economy, and South Korea’s anti-Japanese nationalist attitude. As a result, the time for an East Asian security community seems not premature.

South Korea’s Bilateral Relations with Its Regional Neighbors

Figure 1 South Korea’s Bilateral Relations with Its Neighbors in the Security Area



Each of South Korea’s bilateral relations with its regional neighbors has its own unique characterization in the security area: (1) with North Korea, it is in *nuclear deadlock*; (2) with the United States, *alliance dilemma*; (3) with China, *priority misalignment*; and (4) with Japan, *remembrance incongruence*. Figure 1 schematizes each of these characterizations.

South Korea’s gravest security threat emanates from a North Korea that continues to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities. North Korea has tested nuclear explosive devices in 2006, 2009, 2013, twice in 2016, and 2017, deployed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, and successfully test-launched an intercontinental ballistic missile in 2017.⁴ While South Korea

⁴ See Chung-in Moon, Ren Xiao, Yasuhiro Izumikawa, Van Jackson, and Andrei Lankov, “Roundtable: The North Korean Nuclear Threat: Regional Perspectives on a Nuclear-Free Peninsula,” *Asia Policy*, no. 23 (2017). For details about the

has sought to find a diplomatic solution to this problem through bilateral—inter-Korean summits—and multilateral—Six-Party Talks—dialogues since the 1990s, this effort had led nowhere, with Seoul ending up joining in 2017 the sanctions regime of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 2371 and 2375 that restricts arms transfers and limits trade with North Korea.⁵ Even though some within US policy circles are starting to consider preemptive military measures,⁶ the predictable collateral damage makes Seoul hesitate to employ them in dissuading Pyongyang from developing nuclear weapons and missile programs. This *nuclear deadlock* that diplomatic solutions are unworkable while military measures are infeasible in dealing with the Kim Jong-un regime's nuclear ambition characterizes a critical aspect of South Korea's relations with North Korea.⁷

As North Korea expands its nuclear and missile capabilities, South Korea has to place greater demands on extended deterrence and assurance that its security ally, the United States, can provide. The demands inevitably raise the question in Seoul about the US commitments on the robustness of the alliance.⁸ A classic security dilemma in alliance politics involves either a fear of abandonment that the United States might not defend South Korea against North Korea despite alliance arrangement or a fear of entrapment that South Korea might be entangled in military conflicts with a country other than North Korea due to alliance arrangement. Whereas the recent agreements between Seoul and Washington to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korean territory provokes the resentment of China and thus represents a peril of entrapment,⁹ increasing doubts about the effectiveness of the US nuclear umbrella and calls for a South Korean nuclear deterrent to acquire indigenous nuclear weapons

development of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, see the country profile of North Korea of the Nuclear Threat Initiative available at <http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

5 For details about the history of international sanctions on North Korea, see chronology of U.S.-North Korean nuclear and missile diplomacy available at <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#2017> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

6 Mike Mullen, Sam Nuun, and Adam Mount, "A Sharper Choice on North Korea: Engaging China for a Stable Northeast Asia," Independent Task Force Report No. 74, Council on Foreign Relations (2016) available at <http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/sharper-choice-north-korea/p38259> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

7 Robert S. Litwak, *Preventing North Korea's Nuclear Breakout* (Washington, D. C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2017) available at <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/preventing-north-koreas-nuclear-breakout> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

8 Shane Smith, "Implications for US Extended Deterrence and Assurance in East Asia," North Korea's Nuclear Futures Series, US-Korea Institute at SAIS (2015) available at <http://uskoreainstitute.org/research/special-reports/nknc-smith/> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

9 Bonnie S. Glaser and Lisa Collins, "China's Rapprochement with South Korea: Who Won the THAAD Dispute?" *Foreign Affairs*, November 7 (2017) available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-07/chinas-rapprochement-south-korea> (accessed on November 12, 2017); Jin Kai, "THAAD Deployment: South Korea's Alliance Dilemma? South Korea's tough THAAD choice is a real-world example of the alliance dilemma," *Diplomat*, July 25 (2016) available at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/thaad-deployment-south-koreas-alliance-dilemma/> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

capabilities epitomize a peril of abandonment.¹⁰ This *alliance dilemma* that both abandonment and entrapment hazards should be avoided in managing security cooperation characterizes a crucial dimension of South Korea's relations with the United States.

To enforce the sanctions regime of UNSC Resolutions 2371 and 2375 that are expected to ease nuclear deadlock that South Korea faces, it is vital to obtain coordinated actions in implementing punitive measures from China. As North Korea's biggest trading partner and primary source of food, arms, and energy, China possesses incomparable economic leverage over Pyongyang. The expectation of Seoul for Beijing to apply pressure to the Kim Jong-un regime to renounce its nuclear ambition is incongruent with China's main security interest to ensure a friendly nation on its northeastern border and provide a buffer zone between the People's Liberation Army and US troops and marines stationed in South Korea.¹¹ The then President Park Geun-hye's presence at the military parade during China's commemoration of the 70th anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II, which provoked serious concerns from Washington, could not change anything with regard to the Xi Jinping government's security policy priorities that nuclear-armed North Korea would be better than the collapse of the Kim Jong-un regime and a refugee influx.¹² This *priority misalignment* that one prefers the preservation of the status quo to the revision of it while another prefers the revision of the status quo to the preservation of it characterizes a significant property of South Korea's relations with China.

To the extent that priority misalignment between South Korea and China is unresolvable in the near term, Seoul's reliance on US extended deterrence and security assurance has to deepen. As Pyongyang's nuclear and missile capabilities continue to develop and the frequency and severity of its aggressive behavior increase, South Korea and Japan, threatened by a common foe—North Korea—and coordinated by a common ally—the United States—share a common interest to tighten collaboration and strengthen their deterrence and defense posture. The formation of trilateral security cooperation partnership among South Korea, Japan, and the United States would be one of the most effective strategic assets to reduce North Korea's incentive to divide the three partners with selective military strikes.¹³ The desirable collective goods in the East Asian security sphere tend to be undersupplied not least due to the recurrent identity clashes between South Korea and Japan in the process of their historical reconciliation.

10 Lee Byung-Chul, "Preventing a Nuclear South Korea," *38 North*, September 16 (2016) available at <http://38north.org/2016/09/bclee091516/> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

11 Eleanor Albert and Beina Xu, "The China-North Korea Relationship," CFR Backgrounders, February 8 (2016) available at <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

12 Jonathan D. Pollack, "Park in Beijing: The Political Transformation of Northeast Asia," Brookings Order from Chaos, September 4 (2015) available at <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/09/04/park-in-beijing-the-political-transformation-of-northeast-asia/> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

13 Michael J. Green, "Strategic Asian Triangles," in Saadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot, eds., *Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

While President Moon Jae-in and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo have tried restoring the bilateral relationship, domestic controversies over an agreement on the comfort women issue in 2015 exemplifies the volatile nature of historical animosity between the two nations.¹⁴ This *remembrance incongruence* that one's over-demand for contrition generates apology fatigue while another's under-supply of remorse triggers the blame for historical amnesia characterizes an important feature of South Korea's relations with Japan.

In sum, South Korea and its regional neighbors have complex interactions that render community formation problematic in the security domain. The nuclear deadlock with North Korea may create a potential common threat by which South Korea and other neighbors can build the foundation of a collective security organization. However, in coping with the nuclear deadlock, South Korea, while it wants to avoid the danger of entrapment due to the alliance arrangement with the United States, fears the hazard of abandonment from its security sponsor. In addition to the alliance dilemma with the United States, South Korea suffers from the priority misalignment with China in which the former seeks denuclearization even at the cost of North Korea's regime change whereas the latter prioritizes the regime survival in dealing with Pyongyang's nuclear and missile capabilities problems. In constructing a robust deterrence system against North Korea's threats, while it is necessary for South Korea to have close security cooperation with Japan, the two nations are in long-time conflict about how to remember their history before World War II that results in remembrance incongruence. All in all, the situation surrounding South Korea and its neighbors seems anything but a fertile soil for building of a security community.

Structural Constraints on Seoul's Policy Autonomy

Despite the national capabilities that South Korea has developed over the past twenty-five years, Seoul's autonomy of defense policy is likely to dwindle.¹⁵ After overviewing South Korea's national capabilities, this section puts them in the East Asian regional contexts and shows that Sino-American security competition for regional hegemony, security-economy nexus originating from South Korea's trade dependence on China, and anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment among the South Korean public constitute the main determinants of Seoul's autonomy of defense policy.


South Korea has steadily nurtured its economic muscle since the end of the Cold War. While its gross domestic product (GDP) came close to 250 billion US dollars in 1989, the size has quintupled over the last quarter-century, amounting to nearly 1.4 trillion US dollars in 2015.

14 Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder, "Prospects for Japan-South Korea Cooperation Under Moon Jae-in," *Council on Foreign Relations' Asia Bound Blog*, June 2 (2017) available at <https://www.cfr.org/blog/prospects-japan-south-korea-cooperation-under-moon-jae> (accessed on November 12, 2017); Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder, *Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

15 Ashley J. Tellis, "Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific," *Strategic Asia 2016-17: Understanding Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific* (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016).

As the eleventh largest economy in the world, it outperforms Russia, of which the GDP is about 1.3 trillion US dollars, or Spain, of which the figure is about 1.2 trillion US dollars.¹⁶ South Korea has certainly cultivated its military prowess as well. Whereas its military expenditure approximated 9.5 billion US dollars in 1989, the volume has quadrupled in the past twenty-five years, reaching roughly 36 billion US dollars in 2015. As the world's tenth largest military spender, it outstrips Italy, of which the military expenditure is about 24 billion US dollars, and comes near to Germany, of which the figure is about 39 billion US dollars.¹⁷ In short, during the post-Cold War period, South Korea has made itself a 'richer' nation and 'stronger' army. If the nation had inhabited a corner of the European Continent, it should have found its rightful place 'comparable' with Russia or Spain in the production of economic power, or Italy or Germany in the production of military power.¹⁸

Figure 2 GDP and Military Expenditure in South Korea and Its Neighbors, 1989-2015



Sources: For GDP, the World Bank open data available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD> (accessed on November 12, 2017); For military expenditure, military expenditure database of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute available at <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

¹⁶ All estimations are based on information of the World Bank open data available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

¹⁷ All estimations are based on information of the military expenditure database of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute available at <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> (accessed on November 12, 2017).


¹⁸ Ashley J. Tellis, "Assessing National Power in Asia," Tellis, ed., *Strategic Asia 2015-16: Foundations of National Power in the Asia-Pacific* (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2015).

This counterfactual turns pale at the regional neighbors surrounding South Korea in East Asia. As shown in the upper panel of Figure 2, the country is encircled by the world's three largest economies: the United States, of which the GDP is about 18 trillion US dollars; China, of which the figure is about 11 trillion US dollars; and Japan, of which the figure is about 4 trillion US dollars. Unlike the European counterfactual in the realm of economic power production, the East Asian regional neighbors overshadow South Korea. Likewise, in the realm of military power production, as displayed in the lower panel of Figure 2, South Korea is encompassed by the world's top, second-, and eighth-largest military spenders: the United States, of which the military expenditure is about 600 billion US dollars; China, of which the figure is about 215 billion US dollars; and Japan, of which the figure is about 41 billion US dollars. Unlike the European counterfactual in the realm of military power production, the East Asian regional neighbors outshine South Korea. In short, South Korea is the smallest economic power and weakest military power in East Asia.

As a small and weak nation, South Korea is less likely to constrain the behavior of its regional neighbors; rather it is more likely to be constrained by the behavior of its regional neighbors. For starters, as shown in Figure 2, over the last quarter-century China has amplified its economic might by thirty times and military weight by nineteen times. During the same period, the United States has tripled its economic power and doubled its military power. As a result, China, surpassing Japan during the 2000s, catches up to 60 percent of the US economic capabilities and 36 percent of US military capabilities. Such game-changing power dynamics, according to the forecast of power transition theory, might produce, as a by-product of differential growth, the high potential for conflict between a challenger—China—and a dominant nation—the United States. The US 'rebalancing' policy to Asia and China's 'counter-balancing' policy manifest such a conflict potential.

This *Sino-American competition for regional hegemony* underlies security milieu surrounding South Korea and its neighbors in dealing with nuclear deadlock. In other words, what Seoul and Washington see as defensive actions against North Korea's military threat could be interpreted by Beijing as offensive actions against China's interest. The issue of THAAD is case in point. The hegemonic competition between the United States and China magnifies the regional implication of South Korea's defense policy toward nuclear-armed North Korea so as to produce centrifugal force that wedges between Seoul and Beijing. As Sino-America competition for regional hegemony intensifies, the situation for South Korea can degenerate into an awkward position that reduces Seoul's autonomy of defense policy.¹⁹

19 Azriel Bermant and Igor Sutyagin, "Moving Forward with THAAD: Why Unpopular Deterrence is still Necessary," *Foreign Affairs*, August 21 (2017) available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-korea/2017-08-21/moving-forward-thaad> (accessed on November 12, 2017); Ellen Kim and Victor D. Cha, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: South Korea's Strategic Dilemmas with China and the United States," *Asia Policy*, no. 21 (2016).

Figure 3 Trade Dependence of South Korea's Economy with Its Neighbors, 2000-2015

Source: Trade statistics of Korea Customs Service available at https://unipass.customs.go.kr:38030/ets/index_eng.do (available on November 12, 2017).

Second, the trade dependence of South Korea's economy is the highest—85 percent of the GDP in 2015—among the East Asian countries—41 percent of China; 37 percent of Japan; and 28 percent of the United States. South Korea's economic relations with its neighbors have ramifications beyond the realm of economic transactions.²⁰ As shown in Figure 3, the United States and Japan were the largest trading partners with South Korea in the early 2000s.

In 2000, 22 percent of South Korea's exports were destined to the United States and 12 percent to Japan. Likewise, 18 percent of South Korea's imports originated from the United States and 20 percent from Japan. China's share was 11 percent in exports and 8 percent in imports in the same year. Since the late 2000s, the trading picture has reversed. In 2015, 26 percent of South Korea's exports are destined to China, 13 percent to the United States, and 5 percent to Japan. Similarly, 21 percent of South Korea's imports originate from China, 11 percent from Japan, and 10 percent from the United States. Today, China is South Korea's largest trading partner.²¹

South Korea's trade dependence on China poses a distinctive *security-economy nexus* that is


²⁰ All estimations are based on information of the World Bank open data available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

²¹ Jae Ho Chung and Jiyeon Kim, "Is South Korea in China's Orbit? Assessing Seoul's Perceptions and Policies," *Asia Policy*, no. 21 (2016).

mostly unfavorable to Seoul's defense policy autonomy. In addition to Sino-American hegemonic competition that makes it hard to decouple the defensive coordination between Seoul and Washington against Pyongyang from the offensive actions against Beijing, South Korea's unusual trade dependence on China is more likely to deteriorate South Korea's already-vulnerable defense posture.²²

Last, as a vibrant democracy, Seoul's policymakers pay critical attention to the public's perception of their regional neighbors that can constrain the choices for national defense. Figure 4 illustrates longitudinal changes in South Koreans' unfavorable attitudes toward their neighbors. As for the United States, South Koreans have showed over the past ten years consistently low levels of unfavorability that declines from 25 percent in 2007 to 7 percent in 2015. As for Japan, by contrast, South Koreans have displayed unfailingly high levels of unfavorability that increases from 39 percent in 2007 to 53 percent in 2015. As for China, South Koreans have revealed gradually improving levels of unfavorability that decreases from 34 percent in 2007 to 26 percent in 2015. As for North Korea, South Koreans have indicated steadily worsening levels of unfavorability that increases from 18 percent in 2007 to 40 percent in 2015.

Figure 4 South Koreans' Unfavorability toward Their Neighbors, 2007-2015



Source: Unification attitude survey 2007-2015 of Seoul National University's Institute for Peace and Unification Studies available at <http://tongil.snu.ac.kr/ipus/> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

²² Steven Denney, "South Korea's Economic Dependence on China," *Diplomat*, September 4 (2015) available at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-koreas-economic-dependence-on-china/> (accessed on November 12, 2017).

Here emerges another constraint on the defense policy autonomy of South Korea: The formation of trilateral security cooperation arrangements is desirable; but it seems very hard to forge a domestic political support base for such a policy plan due to the public's high level of negative attitude toward Japan. Note that the unfavorability toward Japan is even higher than that of North Korea. This South Korean public's *anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment* critically constrains the autonomy of Seoul's defense policy.²³

In sum, South Korea's policy autonomy, by which Seoul can design a regional architecture for a security community and reconcile diverging security interests among its neighbors, is strongly constrained by international as well as domestic factors. Above all, any efforts of South Korea to build a security community must take into account the unpredictable impacts emanating from Sino-American competition for regional hegemony. As South Korea accommodates the rise of China, it distances itself from the security collaboration with Japan and the United States. Likewise, as South Korea takes counter-balancing measures with Japan and the United States, it starts to estrange China. When Seoul needs to put some distance from itself and Beijing, however, its high trade dependence is used by China as an effective leverage to counteract South Korea's balancing act. When Seoul wants to elaborate security cooperation with Tokyo as well as Washington, its strong anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment hinders South Korea from developing trilateral defense collaboration. All in all, structural constraints on South Korea's policy autonomy, be it international or domestic, are so substantial that Seoul can do little in constructing a security community in East Asia.

Conclusion

In building a collective security organization among South Korea and its regional neighbors, there are a number of challenges for Seoul to cope with. With North Korea, South Korea has to resolve nuclear deadlock in which diplomatic solutions are not workable and military options are not feasible. With the United States, it has to manage alliance dilemma in which both entrapment and abandonment perils need to be prevented. With China, it has to deal with priority misalignment in which they have different preferences between denuclearization and regime change in Pyongyang. With Japan, it has to solve remembrance incongruence in which Seoul blames Tokyo for historical amnesia and Tokyo criticizes Seoul for apology fatigue.

In coping with these daunting challenges, Seoul's policy autonomy that makes critical assets for constructing the foundation of regional security community is under great strain internationally as well as domestically. South Korea's foreign policy strategies to design security architecture are shaped by Sino-American competition for regional hegemony that put Seoul in a position of hardship. To employ a hedging strategy, South Korea's foreign policy needs to be

23 Jung Kim, "Unravelling Japan-South Korean Relations: An Empirical Analysis," *Soka University Peace Research*, nos. 30/31 (2017).

flexible between China on the one hand and the United States and Japan on the other hand. The security-economy nexus created by trade dependence of South Korea on China, however, make it difficult for Seoul to move far away from Beijing. The anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment of the South Korean public narrows down Seoul's policy flexibility to move closer to Tokyo.

In a nutshell, South Korea, which has little latitude in developing policy autonomy and flexibility, is facing unprecedented security challenges with its regional neighbors. Under the situation confronting Seoul, South Korea seems unlikely to figure out a feasible path toward building a security community. To maintain regional peace, it is reasonable for South Korea and its regional neighbors to explore ways of security collaboration to preserve the status quo in East Asia.

The Maritime Environmental Security and the Collaborative Confidence Building in the Northeast Asian Region

Dong-Yub Kim

Assistant Professor

The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University

The topic of this session is “Making a Sea of Peace: the Collaborations for Human Security. And therefore I want to emphasize the words such as sea, peace and human as reflecting my hope that individuals, groups of people, and countries can enjoy and utilize the sea in a peaceful manner. The term sea here does not necessarily mean the ocean we see on the beach. The sea means the entire world. The sea is not always calm and peaceful like we imagine our holidays at sea. I’ve served in the navy for 20 years but am still afraid of the ocean, because it is never predictable. Nevertheless, the sea reminds us of the words such as happiness, calmness, rest and peace.

The sea is the origin of life and even life itself. Humans are also born from the little sea called mother’s womb. The world we are living in is also the sea of life. Students are living in the sea of school system; salary men are swimming in the sea of competition. Although we stand on the ground, we are like swimming in pursuit of happiness in a sense.

Today, I am going to talk about making a peaceful sea. It’s an effort to bridge the sea, the ground and humans. Particularly, I’d like to mention how we can live a happier life together with the sea in the Northeast Asian region.


New approach and conceptual expansion of the maritime environmental security

To collaborate for the sea in Northeast Asia, we need a new approach and conceptual expansion about the sea. Today’s maritime paradigm was changed from liberty paradigm to

management paradigm. According to Mare Liberum in the 16th century by Hugo Grotius, the sea, particularly high seas, cannot be possessed by an individual or a country, and everyone has freedom to use and develop the ocean infinitely. However, as times passed by, people came to acknowledge that the sea can be easily polluted and we must well preserve the sea for the next generation. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: UNCLOS in the late 20th century offered us the new perspective how we could control the paradigm of Mare Liberum and manage the sea well.

Management paradigm is an approach to newly define the relation between human activities and the ocean in a given situation. The scope of Maritime Management includes both Maritime Environment and Maritime Security. Maritime Environment focuses the relation between the conditions of human survival and the nature. On the other hand, Maritime Security concentrates on human efforts for survival, conflicts, violence and wars. Therefore, I believe we can expand the concept of Maritime environmental security to security area beyond the environmental concept.

The concept of Maritime environmental security can be expanded into human security the non-traditional security field because Maritime environmental security also has humans in the environments and violence as the common factor. We cannot limit Maritime environmental security to resource wars between countries or destructive activities in international relations from the environmental preservation or traditional security point of view. In Maritime environmental security, maritime ecological security is rather important, which is interested in the negative changes of environment that influence the conditions for human survival and existence. In addition, Maritime environmental security belongs to both national and human securities; thus we must understand that traditional security and non-traditional security are complementary to each other.



The new maritime environmental security issues & the maritime management regime

As maritime environmental security on the basis of maritime management principles

emerged, new maritime environment security issues were discussed. Generally, major international issues in maritime environments are maritime pollution, weather, sea level rise, fishery resource management, whaling, deep seabed mineral resources, coastal management, etc. Major issues in maritime security are maritime jurisdiction, islands conflict, military activities in the sea, public safety, piracy, sea route protection, etc.

These days, most conflict issues occurred in the ocean are related to protecting the lives and properties of citizens from marine ecological dangers such as fishing stock or competition over maritime resources rather than direct conflict of naval power between countries. Likewise, environmental and securities issues overlap in various areas.

To manage this new maritime environment security issues, today's marine management regime evolves differently from that in the past. Since the marine management regime on the basis of freedom of the seas and open-pool resource is transformed into common-pool resource regime, we need a new collaboration system.

For instance, maritime resources such as fisheries, submarine minerals and maritime space have the characteristics of common resources which have strong rivalry and weak excludability. Hence, maritime powers come to possess a larger portion of ocean resources. Thus, we need to manage the ocean as shared resource at the international level. Plus, we need preventive maritime management which costs less and solves problems more easily and effectively than restoring after the marine ecosystem is damaged.

Complexity and limitation of maritime management in the Northeast Asian region

We need a new collaborative maritime management system in the Northeast Asian region. The Northeast Asia has a complicated constraint factors as well as opportunity factors in ocean management. Since inter-state relation was established through the medium of the seas in Northeast Asia for geographical reasons, the countries have both exclusive interests and shared interests in the oceans. In this region, the ocean causes political and military conflicts while making economic, social, cultural coexistence possible. The ocean will lead us to various conflicts as well as collaborations in the future.

As mentioned, the maritime issues of Northeast Asia are multi-layered, so not easy to solve. For example, there are disputes over the dominium of islands and maritime jurisdiction, including the 4 northern islands between Japan and Russia, Senkaku Islands, and Paracel and Spratly Islands between China and Southeast Asian countries. We also have the potential instability of Sea Lines of Communication derived from the coastal states' demand for expansion of maritime jurisdiction. Maritime crimes such as piracy, maritime terrorism, human smuggling, drugtrafficking and illegal fisheries are also significant issues. These crimes seem like traditional securities issues, but actually include non-traditional security elements. This is why we need a new collaborative system.


There are prerequisites for maritime cooperation among the Northeast Asian countries. First

of all, we must prevent possible maritime conflicts which can be caused by the unilateral and illegal assertion of a particular country. Secondly, related countries must thoroughly abide by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in order to solve maritime issues reasonably and legally. Lastly, the countries must respect the marine areas of other countries and understand the importance of public ownership of the ocean for its peaceful use. Not only the governmental efforts but also collaborative academic efforts from the private sector are required. In this sense, I think today's seminar has a significant meaning.

Turn of the maritime environmental security to achieve a maritime cooperation

I mentioned about maritime environmental security, which may sound unfamiliar to many people. I'd also like to propose the turn of maritime environmental security for maritime cooperation in Northeast Asia. It means the close connection between the order both in the land and in the ocean. Maintaining the good order in the ocean will bring the good order in the land, and vice versa.

I expect that cooperative interdependence and confidence building will serve as a factor promoting the inter-state cooperation in the region not only in non-tradition and human security but also in traditional security. Confidence building through maritime cooperation will help in that countries can coexist by collaboration and harmony, and not just conflicts or confrontations. Particularly, the confidence building on the ocean in Northeast Asia can play a positive and preventive role in the inter-state relations.



The confidence building through the open seas is critical in terms of building peace in Northeast Asia. In Northeast Asia, there are many conflicts and cooperation in different fields regarding the ocean due to the multi-layers of states-districts-enterprises-individuals. Thus, for the peace of this region, we need to acknowledge the value of open and flexible human-oriented maritime environmental security, rather than closed and fixed traditional security on the basis of inter-state relations.

We should create more opportunities to promote maritime governance at the small unit such as civic groups and academic circles, not to mention implementing declaratory measures. Through these opportunities, we will establish a long-term roadmap which reflects the political,

social, economic, cultural, historical interests of this region as well as conduct broad research and discussion to build architecture for confidence building regarding the ocean. Above all, these efforts must be made not just for once but on the constant and gradual basis. I hope the confidence building efforts in Northeast Asia through maritime environmental security collaborations will bring all the people living in Northeast Asia the opportunity to swim in the sea of peace.

Confucianism and Creating a Sea of Peace in Northeast Asia

Chien-Kuo Pang^{*}

Professor
Chinese Culture University

Abstract: At the end of the twentieth century, the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave credence to Francis Fukuyama's theory of 'the end of history' and this view prevailed for quite a while. However, this perspective changed after the start of the twenty-first century, with the 9/11 attacks in the United States and subsequent global terrorist attacks, making Samuel P. Huntington's theory of 'the clash of civilizations' more relevant. This article argues that the rise of China, accompanied by the revitalization of Confucianism, may offer an alternative to the 'clash of civilizations' and create a sea of peace in Northeast Asia.

Keywords: Confucianism, Northeast Asia, the end of history, the clash of civilizations, the rise of China

Introduction

In 2016, two major events occurred that took most people completely by surprise: Britain voting to exit the European Union (Brexit), and the victory of Donald Trump in the presidential election in the United States. Both events seemed to indicate that there was a trend towards the setback of globalization and the rise of economic nationalism, as well as right-wing populism. A

^{*} Chien-kuo Pang is the professor of the Graduate Institute of National Development and Mainland China Studies at Chinese Cultural University in Taiwan. E-mail address: pangck168@gmail.com.

critical question arose: will these events reverse the trend of globalization and significantly change the current world order, temporarily or even permanently?

In this article, the author analyzes the situation according to two theories. One is the relatively optimistic theory of ‘the end of history’ advocated by Francis Fukuyama; the other is the relatively pessimistic theory of ‘the clash of civilizations’ asserted by Samuel P. Huntington. The ‘the end of history’ theory had been prevalent during the final two decades of the twentieth century, but the 9/11 attack at the beginning of the twenty-first century and ongoing terrorist attacks have changed public opinion to a certain degree. The global financial tsunami in 2008 and the subsequent anti-globalization events, including Brexit and Trump’s victory, seem to have made ‘the clash of civilizations’ theory more credible and popular.

Is there any way to escape from the dilemma of the ‘clash of civilizations’? This article argues that the rise of China and with it, the revitalization of Confucianism may offer an alternative to the ‘clash of civilizations’.

The Emergence of the Theory of the End of History

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the communist regimes of the Eastern Bloc, including Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, collapsed one by one. The Berlin Wall came down on November 9, 1989, unifying East and West Germany; Yugoslavia was divided into Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia, etc., and the various areas became embroiled in a civil war. The Soviet Union was dissolved in December of 1991.¹ Thus, the Cold War between the Capitalist Bloc, led by the United States, and the Eastern Bloc, led by the Soviet Union, ended.

Japanese-American scholar Francis Fukuyama believes that the end of the Cold War marked the demise of communism and the final victory of Western liberal democracy. In an article entitled “The End of History?” published in 1989, Fukuyama stated, “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”² He extended his argument in a book entitled *The End of History and the Last Man* published in 1992.³

In his theory of the end of history, Fukuyama identifies on some level with Karl Marx, but basically adopts Hegel’s viewpoint of the historical development of human society, and Russian-born French philosopher, Alexandre Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel. According to Fukuyama, Hegel believes that human history has to do with the ongoing evolution of social institutions. In

1 “Revolutions of 1989”, *Wikipedia*, retrieved August 20, 2017, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutions_of_1989>.

2 Francis Fukuyama, 1989. “The End of History?” *The National Interest*. Vol.16 (Summer), p.3.

3 Francis Fukuyama, 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: The Free Press.

the process, humans are constantly seeking the right to be recognized as equals. This desire encourages people in different generations to resist and reshape the unequal social institutions they experience. As a result, human society will go through a dialectical process of evolution until it achieves the ideal state. In the ideal state, freedom can be fully demonstrated and complete equality implemented. History will thus come to the end.

The view that human history is about the evolving of social institutions which will eventually reach the ideal state or enter a certain stage also appears in the thoughts of Marx. However, in contrast to Hegel's assertion that the dynamics of history come from the spiritual desire for equality, Marx claims that the dynamics come from the material desire for a better life. The material desire has continuously promoted innovations in the means of production, increased productivity, and changed the relationships of those involved in production. In terms of production, Marx argues that society can generally be divided into two classes: the dominant class which owns the means of production and the subordinate class which owns none. The disparity between the dominant class and the subordinate class will be intensified and bring about class struggles and social revolution. When the mode of production becomes capitalistic, the main disparity will be between the capitalists and the proletariat. After the success of the proletarian revolution, all social institutions will be communist. In a communist society, the means of production will be owned jointly by all the people rather than by a certain group, and the disparity between classes will be eliminated. In this society, people will cooperate in the production process, productivity will vastly improve and the ideal quality of life will be realized. History will thus come to an end.

Based on Hegel's doctrine, Kojève put forward his own view of 'the end of history'. Considering the ideological and ideational levels, Kojève maintains that history had already come to the end at the time of the outbreak of the French Revolution and when Napoleon Bonaparte was in power. In the French Revolution, the ultimate values of human society: freedom and equality, had already been upheld. Napoleon took the values espoused by the French Revolution to Hegel's homeland, Germany when he defeated Prussia in 1806, and freedom and equality became universal values. Since the French Revolution, therefore, all discussions of ideas and the constructions of ideology have merely been about elaborating on the ultimate values of freedom and equality. History thus has come to the end.

Using the doctrines of Hegel, Marx and Kojève, Fukuyama believes that human's historical development is a general history moving towards the institutional arrangement of liberal democracy, or a process of modernization with modernity spreading out to the whole world. The liberal democratic system is the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the final form of human government. With the collapse of the Eastern European communist regimes and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the institutional arrangement of liberal democracy, the market economy and the civilization of modernity led by the United States has prevailed. There will be no further changes in the institutional arrangement of human society. History thus comes to the end.

The Rise of the Theory of the Clash of Civilizations

Fukuyama's argument has attracted much criticism and the theory of 'the clash of civilizations' advocated by Samuel P. Huntington (Fukuyama's mentor at Harvard University) has often been cited to refute the theory of the end of history. In an article entitled "The Clash of Civilizations?" published in 1993, Huntington disagreed with Fukuyama's theory.⁴ He later expanded his theory in a book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, published in 1996.⁵

Huntington maintains that the fundamental source of conflict in the post-Cold War era will not be ideological or economic; it will have to do with cultures and will be brought about by the great divisions among humankind. In global politics, the principal conflicts will be between nations and different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics and will appear in two forms: fault-line conflicts and core-state conflicts. *Fault-line conflicts* are local: between neighboring states with different population groups or among different population groups within a country. *Core-state conflicts* are global and involve different countries. Fault-line conflicts can escalate to core-state conflicts. These conflicts may have a number of causes: relative influence or power (military or economic), discrimination against people from a different population group, intervention to protect kinsmen, or different values and culture, particularly when one group attempts to impose its values on people of a different group.

Huntington further maintains that conflict is most likely to occur between the world's major civilizations rather than between the capitalist West and the communist East (to put it simplistically), as was the case in the Cold War. The major civilizations are: the West, which comprises those countries associated with western culture and the Christian religion, which includes Western Europe, North America, Central American and South American; those countries that adhere to the Islamic faith and culture; the Sinic countries which comprise China, North and South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Vietnam; those countries that adhere to the Hindu faith, such as India, Bhutan and Nepal; the former Soviet Union and most of Eastern Europe; the Japanese civilization which is considered to be a hybrid of Confucianism and the older Altaic pattern; and the African civilization.

He gives six reasons why civilizations will clash: every civilization has at its foundation its history, language, culture, traditions, and most importantly, religion which are all deeply rooted and have developed over centuries. It is implausible to expect rapid changes. Due to improved communication, travel and information technology, the world is becoming smaller. It is possible now to instantly become aware of what is happening in other countries. Through television, news broadcasts and social media, 'civilization consciousness' has intensified the awareness of

4 Samuel P. Huntington, 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 72, No.3, pp.22-49.

5 Samuel P. Huntington, 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

differences and commonalities. Economic development and social change have meant that people increasingly are disengaging from their longstanding local identities and communities. Often, when people feel disconnected, religion fills the gap; religion can offer its adherents a sense of identity and encourage a level of commitment that transcends national boundaries, uniting people of different populations or nationalities. Huntington believes that the growth of civilization consciousness is enhanced by two factors: on the one hand, the West is perceived to be very powerful but on the other hand, there is a rise in a 'return-to-your-roots' phenomenon among non-Western people. Thus, the powerful West may well confront those from non-Western countries who have the desire, the will and increasingly, the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways. Certainly, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones, but economic regionalism is increasing. Successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization consciousness, but may only succeed when it is rooted in a common civilization.⁶

According to Huntington, in the future, the central axis of world politics will tend to entail the conflict between Western and non-Western civilizations. Non-Western countries have three options available: they can attempt to isolate themselves to preserve their own values and protect themselves from Western invasion; they can accept Western values, or they can try to balance Western power with modernization, that is, they can develop economic and military power and cooperate with other non-Western countries to stand against the West while still preserving their own values and institutions.

With the developing international power of non-Western civilizations, the West may realize that it needs to develop a better understanding of other civilizations' cultures. In this case, Western civilization will cease to be regarded as universal, and different civilizations will learn to coexist and unite to shape the future world. However, a more negative scenario may prevail: the clash of civilizations may become more intense, especially between the Islamic and Western civilizations. There are historic resentments between these two world views, but also additional factors that would certainly contribute to a conflict between other religions, especially Christianity and Islam: both are missionary religions and seek the conversion of others; both are universal or all-or-nothing religions in the sense that both believe that only theirs is the true faith; both are teleological religions, believing that their values and beliefs represent the goals and the purpose of human existence; and both perceive those who are not of their faith as violating their basic principles, and to be furthering their own pointless aims. These traits can easily lead to violent interactions.

Huntington maintains that cultural divides are difficult to bridge, and the theory of 'the end of history' is too naive. He further postulates that two factors could result in a bloody clash between the Islamic and Western civilizations: one is the Islamic Resurgence that began in the

⁶ Clash of Civilizations", *Wikipedia*, retrieved August 22, 2017, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clash_of_Civilizations>.

1970s with a demographic explosion among Muslims, and the second involves the concept of Western universalism which has to do with the belief that all civilizations should adopt Western values. This infuriates Muslim fundamentalists. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to a long war and turmoil in the Middle East. The ongoing terrorist attacks and racial conflicts around the world have encouraged an acceptance of the theory of the clash of civilizations.

Overcoming the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ with Confucianism

Will society move towards the ‘end of history’ or be trapped in the ‘clash of civilizations’? The trends shown in social changes since the late 1980s, and the state of the world since the beginning of the twenty-first century, make the theory of the ‘clash of civilizations’ more plausible than that of the ‘end of history’. It is possible to consider the situation in terms of three aspects: socioeconomic development, political systems, and racial and international relations.

Trends and Challenges of Contemporary Society

In terms of socioeconomic development, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the global financial crisis of 2008 indicated that globalization has resulted in increasing interconnections between countries. The concepts of ‘Japan is number one’ and the United States being an example of the ultimate in social institutional arrangements and historical evolution no longer apply. However, China’s development since the two financial crises has made the concepts of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ and ‘the Chinese model’ worth serious discussion.

It is perceived that capitalism as a system may result in a financial tsunami; because of its inherent nature, there is a worsening state of wealth distribution. Joseph E. Stiglitz strongly criticizes inequality in the United States and globalization led by American capitalism. He contends that inequality in the United States is self-perpetuating due to the vast amount of political power the wealthy hold, enabling them to control legislative and regulatory activity. Politics have shaped the market in ways that advantage the wealthiest one percent of Americans at the expense of the other 99 percent.⁷ Furthermore, because globalization has lacked the necessary governance mechanisms, inequality in terms of economic growth between developed and developing countries, as well as within developing countries, has increased and is now a serious problem. This situation means that developing countries find it very difficult to experience economic growth.⁸

As well as slow economic growth, the problem of inequality has worsened in the twenty-first century. This can be noticed indifferent countries, different classes, and from generation to generation: people from the poorer sectors and younger people in many countries are

⁷ Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2012. *The Price of Inequality*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

⁸ Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2006. *Making Globalization Work*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

experiencing great anxiety and anger. Resentment of the wealthy is pervasive. Policymakers are facing the challenges of extreme populism, radical nationalism, and economic issues becoming political ideology. If they cannot offer convincing arguments and policies, the situation often tends to escalate.

With regard to political systems, although the collapse of the Eastern European communist regimes and the dissolution of the Soviet Union made the theory of the ‘end of history’ (advocated by Fukuyama) popular for a while, the process of democratization has not been easy either in the former socialist bloc or in the ranks of developing countries. Fukuyama expresses a high degree of confidence in American style liberal democracy and believes that the institutional arrangements of other countries will come close to that of the United States sooner or later. But by sending troops to Iraq, President George W. Bush found out that even if liberal democracy is desirable, it needs the support of social conditions. Without such support, the institutional systems of liberal democracy will merely repeat the same mistakes that lead to political decay.⁹

Fukuyama has subsequently reexamined the theory of the ‘end of history’ and modified his argument. In his recent work, Fukuyama identifies three pillars of the modern state: an effective state, rule of law, and democratic accountability.¹⁰ Of these, Fukuyama emphasizes the importance of an effective state. He takes modern China as an example of an effective state with competent governance. In contrast, the United States is experiencing political decay as indicated by a declining quality of bureaucracy, dysfunctional political divides and government structures being captured by special interests rather than considering the wider public good. In other words, American liberal democracy is no longer the ultimate example for the other countries to follow. There is still a long way to go before we reach the ‘end of history’.

With reference to racial and international relations, the result of globalization has been that different countries and groups have closer and more frequent interactions. Despite this, according to Huntington, conflicts and wars between races and nations have not decreased. On September 11, 2001, the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda launched four coordinated terrorist attacks on the United States. These included hijacking two airplanes and flying them into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York. This attack led to a sharp increase in conflict between the United States and Islamic forces. The United States then formed an alliance with Britain and other countries and sent troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. The conflict continued for nearly ten years and is still on-going to a degree. The situation in the Middle East is still unstable.¹¹ In

9 Francis Fukuyama, 2006. *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

10 Francis Fukuyama, 2012. *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; Francis Fukuyama, 2014. *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

11 War in Afghanistan (2001-present)”, *Wikipedia*, retrieved August 24, 2017, <[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan\(2001-present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan(2001-present))>; “Iraq War”, *Wikipedia*, retrieved August 24, 2017, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War>.

addition, after the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” at the end of 2010, refugees have been flocking into Europe from the Middle East and North Africa, resulting in some conflict between those from Islamic countries and those in Western countries. The terrorist attacks by the Islamic State have caused panic and stirred up right-wing populism against immigrants in many European countries.¹² Britain’s exit from the European Union and Trump’s victory in the American presidential election have resulted in trade protectionism in Europe and the United States, and nationalist sentiment around the world.

In addition to the clash between Islamic and Western civilizations, the rise of China and the corresponding attempts to contain China by the United States constitute another fault line in the ‘clash of civilizations’. Feeling a threat to the hegemony of the United States by China’s rapid rise, former president Barack Obama initiated the strategies of ‘Pivot to Asia’ and the ‘Asia Pacific Rebalance’ the intention of which was to form an alliance with the countries in East Asia to contain the rise of China. Donald Trump claimed that he would not follow Obama’s foreign policy. However, the strategy of containing the rise of China has not changed significantly and has perhaps even intensified in terms of trade since Trump assumed office. Moreover, Trump’s white supremacist utterances have caused tension in racial relations and increased the divisions in American society. All these factors seem to support Huntington’s theory over Fukuyama’s.

The Essence and Teaching of Confucianism

According to Huntington, China’s Confucian heritage, with its emphasis on authority, order, hierarchy, and the supremacy of the collective over the individual is the antithesis of democratic values and is in sharp contrast with the American cultural heritage that emphasizes freedom, equality, democracy, and individualism.¹³ Therefore, the rise of China will result in a clash with the United States because of the social and cultural differences. Nonetheless, for those who really understand the essence of Confucianism, Huntington’s view would seem to be rather superficial. The core value of Confucianism is renai (仁愛), or loving kindness, specifically to others. The teaching of Confucianism has the three characteristics which would be helpful in mitigating any clash of civilizations.

The first characteristic is its open and inclusive view of religions. Confucianism is a set of secular life teachings rather than a monotheistic belief in one true God. Because its attitude to the supernatural is “Confucius did not speak of strange events, violence, riots and the supernatural” (子不語怪、力、亂、神), Confucianism easily coexists with different religions such as Taoism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity and it is why there are virtually no religious wars in Chinese history. In contrast to the clash of civilizations after the Cold War, mainly due to the beliefs of different religions, the open and inclusive view of Confucianism is conducive to resolving religious conflicts.

12 “Arab Spring”, *Wikipedia*, retrieved August 24, 2017, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring>.

13 Huntington, 1996, p.238.

The second characteristic has to do with the attitude of “do unto others; do not impose on others”(己所不欲 , 勿施於人). This famous quote expresses the basic view of Confucianism about the way of individuals, groups, and countries should get along with others. Western civilization proposes that there are universal values that need to be accepted by all. In this, cultural differences, backgrounds, spaces and degrees of development are not respected. The Confucian attitude to people and life is one of gentleness and humility. Applying this attitude to international relations, foreign policy from a Confucian perspective would resist interfering in another country’s internal affairs. This is different from the United States’ strategy that tends to put pressure on other countries in the name of human rights or sends troops to other countries in the name of anti-terrorism. The Confucian way of dealing with the differences between civilizations would reduce the likelihood of clashes.

The third characteristic is the cosmopolitan spirit of the “kingly way” (王道), or ruling over the world with benevolence. Confucianism’s core value of renai of was extended by Mencius (孟子) to “behaving as a king and implementing a policy of benevolence” (行王道 , 施仁政). Mencius believed that a ruler who could behave as a king and implement a policy of benevolence would be able to overcome all challenges and win global support. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, having inherited the teaching of Confucius, applied it to his principle of nationalism: when China becomes strong, it has to be the guardian of the kingly way rather than the aggressor with overbearing hegemony. According to Sun, in the pursuit of its own wealth accumulation and power, China should associate with the countries that treat each other as equals, help the weak, and aid the needy to move towards the realm of global harmony together.

Foreign policy derived from Confucianism with its characteristics, as mentioned above, will not impose its own values or institutional structures on other countries. Instead, the Confucian way of managing foreign relations is to seek mutual trust and understanding. According to the Confucian philosophy of harmony in diversity (和而不同), the ‘clash of civilizations’ is neither destined to happen nor impossible to overcome.

Conclusion

On September 24, 2014, an international conference to commemorate the 2,565th anniversary of Confucius’ birth was held in Beijing. At the opening ceremony, the president of the PRC, Xi Jinping, gave a speech during which he stated that the Chinese nation had always been peace-loving, an attitude deeply rooted in Confucianism. Since ancient times, Chinese people had always valued ideas proclaiming peace, such as “co-operate and seek harmony with all nations”, “associating with the benevolent and befriending neighbors is a precious virtue of the state”, “within the four seas, all men are brothers”, “a distant relative is not as helpful as a close neighbor”, “neighbors wish each other well, just as loved ones do”, and “a warlike state dies eventually, no matter how big it is”. The love of peace is firmly embedded in the spiritual beliefs of the Chinese nation, and undergirds China’s attitude to international relations.

Furthermore, Xi said: “The ideals and struggles as well as the values and spiritual world of the Chinese people have always been deeply rooted in the fertile soil of the fine Chinese traditional culture, and have constantly advanced and been renewed in step with the times”, and “We have consciously absorbed sustenance from the teachings of Confucius and added it to those of Sun Yat-sen.”¹⁴

The author believes that the rise of China accompanied by the revitalization of Confucianism may offer an alternative to the ‘clash of civilizations’. If China can apply the teaching of Confucianism to its foreign relations and how it handles international affairs, it will be able to make significant contributions to a peaceful world order. Since China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan all share the heritage of Confucianism, we should try to work together to make a sea of peace in Northeast Asia.

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14 “Xi Jinping’s Speech in commemoration of the 2,565th Anniversary of Confucius’ Birth”, *China-US Focus*, retrieved August 26, 2017, <<http://library.chinausfocus.com/article-1534.html>>.

Local Government Cooperation and Peace-Making in Northeast Asia: A "Sub-Regionalism" Perspective

Kenji Nakayama

Associate Professor
Soka University

Introduction

International relations in Northeast Asia (NEA) have been deeply influenced by the lingering effects of the Cold War, including the division between north and south on the Korean peninsula, and between China and Taiwan, as well as North Korea's development of nuclear power and missiles. The resulting tensions among nations continue to this day, and therefore the prospects for the implementation of concepts or projects promoting regional peace and prosperity, including the "Northeast Asian Community" (Morishima 2000; Matuno et al. 2006), "A Common House in Northeast Asia" (Kan 2001; Wada 2003), and "Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea 2014), appear uncertain.

National cooperation in NEA is certainly progressing to some extent on a working-level. While tensions between nations remain high, there is still an important degree of mutual economic dependence. However, if one assumes that national cooperation will simply proceed linearly toward regional integration, then one inevitably confronts the issue of having to solve problems associated with establishing cooperative relations within often extremely tense circumstances. Furthermore, the process of establishing peaceful relations through efforts made at the individual and local level tends not to be given due weight. Yet without support from citizens at the local level, the promotion of regionalism for establishing peaceful relations will not succeed. However, many regionalism studies on NEA are hampered due to "methodological

nationalism,” based on concepts like “the nation” and “national borders.”¹ I consider that methods to advance peaceful relations in NEA can no longer rely on analytical frameworks that assume “national cooperation” to be the standard vehicle.

Taking a different view point, this paper draws on a methodology that approaches international relations from the perspective of the lived experiences of daily life. Specifically, I define local governments, the most familiar form of government for citizens, as international actors and examine their efforts at forming peaceful spheres of activity through interaction, cooperation, and networking that supersedes national boundaries. I then consider the possibility of creating spontaneous regional order and the significance of such behavior, as such efforts have already led to the creation of inter-local regional structures in which local governments participate. Examples include the Association of North East Asia Regional Governments (NEAR) and the Organization for the East Asia Economic Development (OEAED). I consider that shedding light on regional cooperation based on these local efforts offers a specific framework for a sustainable peace-making process in NEA.

In the first section, I provide a historical overview of research on the issue of local government as an international actor. In the second section, I compare, classify, and extract the defining features of cases of local government cooperation networks across NEA. Finally, in the third section, I examine whether intensifying and expanding local government networks can create the dynamism required to affect change in NEA, where “the nation” and “borders” remain fundamental concepts.

1. Local Government as an International Actor

Previously, local government has not been thought of as an international actor. According to Scott (1967, 37-38), an “international actor” is an entity possessing the following four characteristics, namely: “ (A) *Be clearly identifiable*, (B) *Have the capacity for a degree of freedom of decision and action on the international scene*, (C) *Interact with other actors and have a verifiable impact upon their calculations*, and (D) *Persist over a period of time*.” In light of this definition, local government lacks the legally-authorized capacity to make decisions or act on the international scene. In the early 1970s, as the movement of people, goods, and money across borders began to increase, approaches such as “transnational relations” and “interdependence” began to appear, and “non-state actors” began to attract increasing amounts of attention (Keohane and Nye 1971, 1977). However, local governments were still not considered international actors.

A clear recognition of local government as capable of being an international actor occurred chiefly through groundbreaking work, such as in “Complex Conglomerate System” theory (Mansbach et al. 1976, 32-45). This theory identified “Governmental Non-central,” that is, forms

¹ This approach placed a priority on the fact that many countries in the region did not have long histories as sovereign nations and, as a result, needed to preserve or reinforce their national territoriality (Taga 2005a, 83).

of regional, provincial, or municipal authorities, as international actors (see Figure 1). In Japan, not long after the publication of this work, Banba (1978, 1980) defined local governments as "trans-national actors" and, in the context of identity politics, conducted a careful analysis of regional international relations using examples such as Quebec, Hokkaido, and Hiroshima.

Figure 1 Alignments in a Complex Conglomerate System

	INTERSTATE GOVERNMENTAL	INTERSTATE NON- GOVERNMENTAL	NATION-STATE	GOVERNMENTAL NONCENTRAL	INTRASTATE NON- GOVERNMENTAL	INDIVIDUAL
INTERSTATE GOVERNMENTAL	UN-NATO (1950)	UN-International Red Cross (Palestine)	EEC-Franco- phone African states	OAU- Biafra	Arab League- Al Fatah	Grand Mufti of Jerusalem- Arab League
INTERSTATE NONGOVERNMENTAL	UN-International Red Cross (Palestine)	Shell Oil- ESSO (1972)	USSR- Comintern (1920's)	IBM- Scotland	ITT-Allende opposition (Chile)	Sun-Yat-sen- Comintern
NATION-STATE	EEC-Franco- phone African states	USSR- Comintern (1920's)	"traditional alliances" (NATO)	Belgium- Katanga (1960)	North Vietnam- Viet Cong	U. S. - James Donovan
GOVERNMENTAL NONCENTRAL	OAU- Biafra	IBM- Scotland	Belgium- Katanga (1960)	N. Y. Mayor- Moscow Mayor (1973)	Algerian rebels- French Socialists (1954)	South African mercenaries- Katanga
INTRASTATE NONGOVERNMENTAL	Arab League- Al Fatah	ITT-Allende Opposition (Chile)	North Vietnam- Viet Cong	Ulster- Protestant Vanguard (1970)	Communist Party-USSR- Communist Party-German Democratic Republic	George Grivas- Greek Cypriots
INDIVIDUAL	Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Arab League	Sun-Yat-sen- Comintern	U. S. - James Donovan	South African mercenaries- Katanga (1960)	George Grivas- Greek Cypriots	Louis of Conde- Gaspard de Coligny (1562)

Source: Mansbach, Ferguson and Lampert (1976, 40).


From the late 1980s, international activity due to local governments has become increasingly dynamic around the world. In this situation, the concept of "para-diplomacy" has become widely known. It can be classified into the following three types based on geographical range: (1) "Trans-border Regional Para-diplomacy," involving twin cities along the border; (2) "Trans-regional Para-diplomacy," involving links between non-central governments whose territorial jurisdictions are not contiguous but whose national governments are neighbors; and (3) "Global Para-diplomacy," involving contacts between non-central governments and foreign central governments (Duchacek 1990, 15-16, see Figure 2). Following this work, interest in "para-diplomacy" has spread (for example, Aldecoa and Keating 1999; Lachapelle and Paquin 2005; Tavares 2016).

As the concept of local government as an international actor gained greater attention, the focus on the international activities of local governments shifted from exchange to cooperation (CDI-JAPAN and Shuman 2001). This was evidenced with, the theme of the 1995 General

Conference of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) being “Municipal International Cooperation (MIC).” In Europe, progress was made in systematizing the EU trans-border regional cooperation program known as INTERREG, and cross-border cooperation in the so-called “Euroregion” significantly improved.²

Through these means, local governments have already secured positions as international actors. Nevertheless, in NEA, relatively few studies have been conducted on the concept of local government as an international actor,³ and understanding of the current state and formation mechanisms of transnational relations is limited. Given the limited number of studies on the robust regionalism of nations in NEA and the methodological problems present in existing studies, further research is necessary. Despite these challenges, in the next section, I identify as clearly as possible the current state of local government cooperation networks across NEA and explore their defining features.

Figure 2 Case of “Para-diplomacy” on North America



Source: Duchacek (1990, 19).

2. Increasingly Pluralistic Local Government Cooperation Networks across NEA

How have local government cooperation networks across NEA formed and developed? Table 1 shows the networks in terms of their founding years. A pioneering network was launched in 1970, the Japan-Soviet (now Japan-Russia) Coastal Mayors' Association (JRCMA), initiated through Niigata City in Japan. For more than 40 years, it has encouraged youth and community

² See the Interreg Europe website (<https://www.interregeurope.eu/>, accessed December 15, 2017).

³ These studies have included the following: Yabuno (1995), Postel-Vinay (1996), Hook (1999), Arase (2002), Iwashita (2007), Jain (2007), and Yamashita (2008).

members to send individuals to conduct practical work and to present petitions to governments to promote friendship and economic cooperation among municipalities (Ichioka 2000).⁴

The major surge in the creation of networks within NEA took place in the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War. In 1991, on the initiative of the City of Kitakyushu, which advocated the Yellow Sea Rim Economic Zone concept, the Pan Yellow Sea City Conference (PYSCC) was launched. Participants initially totaled six cities in three countries.⁵ Although China and South Korea had not yet established diplomatic relations, PYSCC involved meetings among academics as well as business people from these countries. In 1993, the PYSCC organized a Conference of Mayors to mark the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea. Also, the Permanent Joint Committee on Economic Cooperation between Hokkaido and the Russian Far East (PJCECHRFE)⁶ was launched in 1992, as was the Japan-Korea Strait Governor Meeting (JKSGM).⁷

Thereafter, networks continued to be created and, as a result, relations improved. In 1994, on the initiative of Tottori Prefecture, the Summit for International Exchange and Cooperation of Regional Governments around the Sea of Japan (SIECRGSJ, later SIECRGNEA), involving a framework for dialogue among five national and regional governments in NEA, was launched.⁸ That same year, a network of 12 municipalities in Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia, known as the Conference of Major Cities in the Japan (East) Sea Rim Region (CMCJSRR),⁹ was also founded. In 1996, the NEAR was launched at North Gyeongsang in South Korea. The NEAR has attracted a great deal of attention, as its membership in 2017 comprised 77 regional governments from six countries, including Mongolia and North Korea.¹⁰ In 1999, the Japan-China-South Korea Trilateral Local Government Exchange Conference began in an attempt to support international cooperation at various administrative levels.

Other recent developments in local government networks include the Golden Triangle of Busan, Shanghai, and Osaka (GTBSO), launched in 2007, for the purpose of promoting tourism

4 See the JRCMA website (<http://www.nichienkai.jp/index.html>, accessed December 15, 2017).

5 The participants included Kitakyushu & Shimonoseki (Japan), Dailan & Qingdao (China), and Incheon & Busan (S. Korea).

6 See the Hokkaido government website (<http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ss/tsk/russia/russia/r-keizai/jousetugoudouinkai/index-ke.htm>, accessed December 15, 2017).

7 The participants totaled eight municipalities in two countries: Fukuoka, Saga, Nagasaki, & Yamaguchi Prefectures (Japan), Busan, South Jeolla Province, South Gyeongsang Province, & Jeju Province (S. Korea). See website of JKSGM (<http://www.japan-korea-strait8.org/>, accessed December 15, 2017).

8 The participants totaled five regional governments in five countries: Tottori Prefecture (Japan), Jilin Province (China), Gangwon Province (S. Korea), Russian Maritime Provinces, & Tov Province of Mongolia. See website of Tottori prefecture (<http://www.pref.tottori.lg.jp/dd.aspx?menuid=37627>, accessed December 15, 2017).

9 The participating cities were: Yonago, Sakaiminato, & Tottori (Japan), Sokcho, Donghae, & Pohang (S. Korea), Hunchun, Yanji, & Tumen (China), Vladivostok, Nakhodka, & Khasan (Russia). See website of CMCJSRR (<http://www.city.tottori.lg.jp/kannihonkai/top.html>, accessed December 15, 2017).

10 See website of NEAR (<http://www.neargov.org/jp/>, accessed December 15, 2017).

Table 1 Local Government Networks in NEA (in chronological order by year of start)

start	Framework	Japan	China	S.Korea	Russia	N.Korea	Mongolia
1970	a. <u>The Japan-Soviet Coastal Mayors' Association (JSCMA)*¹</u>	◎			◎		
1972	b. <u>The Conference of Japan Sea Coastal Cities for Japan-North Korea Friendship and Trade Promotion*²</u>	◎				△	
1991	c. <u>The Pan Yellow Sea City Conference (PYSCC)</u>	◎	◎	◎			
1992	d. <u>Permanent Joint Committee on Economic Cooperation between Hokkaido and the Russian Far East (PJCECHRFE)</u>	◎			◎		
	e. <u>The Japan-Korea Strait Governor Meeting (JKSGM)</u>	◎		◎			
1993	f. <u>The Conference of North East Asia Regional Governments</u>	◎	◎	◎			
	g. <u>Three-Municipality Interaction between Japan, China, and South Korea (e.g., Karatsu – Yangzhou – Yeosu)</u>	◎	◎	◎			
1994	h. <u>The Summit for International Exchange and Cooperation of Regional Governments around the Sea of Japan (SIECRGSJ)*³</u>	◎	◎	◎	◎	▲	◎
	i. <u>The Conference of Major Cities in the Japan (East) Sea Rim Region (CMCJRR)</u>	◎	◎	◎		▲	
1996	f*. <u>The Association of North East Asia Regional Governments (NEAR)</u>	◎	◎	◎	◎	○	○
	j. <u>Friendship Province Interaction Conference (Kanagawa – Liaoning – Gyeonggi)</u>	◎	◎	◎			
1997	k. <u>Three Province Triangle Interaction (Yamaguchi – Shandong - Gyeongsangnam)</u>	◎	◎	◎			
1999	l. <u>The Japan-China-South Korea Trilateral Local Government Exchange Conference</u>	◎	◎	◎			
	m. <u>Japan-S. Korea Governors' Conference</u>	◎		◎			
2004	c*. <u>The Organization for the East Asia Economic Development (OEAED)</u>	◎	◎	◎			
2007	n. <u>The Golden Triangle of Busan, Shanghai, and Osaka(GTBSO)</u>	◎	◎	◎			
2010	o. <u>Japan-Russia Governors' Conference (re-start)</u>	◎			◎		
2012	p. <u>Japan-China Governors' Provincial Forum</u>	◎	◎				
2014	q. <u>Northeast Asian Mayors' Forum (NAMF)</u>	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎	◎

1 : In 1993, this was renamed as “the Japan-Russia Coastal Mayors’ Association (JRCMA).”

2 : It was initiated through Niigata City in Japan and provided an opportunity to engage with North Korea, a country that severely restricts interaction with outsiders. However, at the 2002 Japan-North Korea Summit, North Korea admitted to having kidnapped Japanese citizens in the past and, as a result, activities were suspended in 2003.

3 : In 2002, this was renamed as “The Summit for International Exchange and Cooperation of Regional Governments in Northeast Asia (SIECRGNEA).”

4 : The underlined networks are of the “Japan-China-S. Korea trans-border” type; the double underlined networks are of the “regional trans-border” type, as discussed below.

5 : ◎ indicates that at the launch time the country was a member nation. ○ indicates that the country became a member government after the launch. △ indicates that the organizational structure of the country in question (North Korea) could not be confirmed. ▲ indicates that the country is preparing to participate.

Source: A variety of reference materials. Mainly website-based.

and interaction.¹¹ Projects initiated by the National Governors' Association of Japan (NGAJ) include the 2010 restoration of the Japan-Russia Governors' Conference, originally founded in 1968, and discontinued in 1997, as well as the 2012 inauguration of the Japan-China Governors' Forum.¹² More recently, the Northeast Asian Mayors' Forum (NAMF) was newly launched in 2014, on the initiative of Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.¹³

11 See website of Osaka Prefectural Government (<http://www.osaka-info.jp/gt/>, accessed December 15, 2017).





12 See website of NGAJ (<http://www.nga.gr.jp/data/activity/international/index.html>, accessed December 15, 2017).

13 See website of NAMF (<http://neamf.ulaanbaatar.mn/>, accessed December 15, 2017).

It is clear that local government networks have increased in number throughout NEA, and some distinctive features of these networks can be highlighted. First, the membership, according to affiliated country, indicates the wide variety of networks in existence. Countries are involved in two-nation trans-border type networks (a, b, d, e, m, o, p), Japan-China-S. Korea trans-border type networks (c, g, j, k, l, n), and regional trans-border type networks (f, h, i, q). When the focus is shifted to the initiative that led to the launch of the network, it can be seen that in many cases municipalities took the lead in establishing networks as a method of revitalizing their local communities. However, in recent years, there have been more frequent examples of greater coordination with national strategies (e.g., the Japan-China-South Korea Trilateral Local Government Exchange Conference, the Japan-South Korea Governors' Conference, the Japan-Russia Governors' Conference, and the Japan-China Governors' Conference).

Next, turning to the organizational structure of the networks, Table 2 shows network classifications according to Taga (2005b, 291-304, 331). "Network types" are designed mainly to function for specific purposes, and "region-building types" are designed to integrate an entire region. Region-building type networks have gradually become more organized since the mid-2000s. For example, in 2004, PYSCC founded the OEAED to reinforce the connections between the Mayors' Conference and the Business Meeting. The OEAED was then further sub-divided into four sub-committees (international business, environment, logistics, and tourism) (OECD 2009).¹⁴ In 2005, after approximately 10 years of discussions, the NEAR established a permanent office in Pohang, South Korea, to support 14 sub-committees in promoting exchange and cooperation among local governments (Nakayama 2015).

Table 2 Comparison of Organizational Structure Classifications

Structure	Classification and illustration	Cases in NEA
Network	3-4 linear interaction 	g. Japan-China-S. Korea 3-City Interaction j. Friendship Province Interaction Conference k. Three Province Triangle Interaction n. GTBSO
	Spider-web (equal city links) 	a. JRCMA, d. PJCECHRFE h. CMCJRR, i. SIECRGNEA m. Japan-S. Korea Governors' Conference o. Japan-Russia Governors' Conference p. Japan-China Governors' Forum
	Hub & spokes (cities linked to a central city) 	q. NAMF
Region-building	Region-building 	c. PYSCC • OEAED e. JKSGM f. NEAR

Source: Added to and revised based on Taga (2005, 291-304, 331). However, the "functional aspect" component has been omitted.

¹⁴ See website of OEAED (<http://www.oeaed.com/jp/>, accessed December 15, 2017).


These gradually emerging organizations have been run strictly to reinforce political problem-solving measures. That is, local governments have begun to expand political expectations, formerly restricted to a single geographical sphere, into different spheres. This can be interpreted as a sign of future changes that will occur within the regional space of NEA, where international order has been based on nations and borders. In the following section, I examine whether local government cooperation can create the dynamism required to affect change in NEA.

3. Sub-Regionalism and Restructuring “Territoriality”

As mentioned, since the end of the Cold War, trans-border local government cooperation has emerged around the world. In Europe, trans-border inter-regional cooperative programs, such as INTERREG, have been established and, for 20 years, have actively carried out a variety of trans-border cooperative activities. Local governments, previously termed “sub-state units” and subsumed under national governments, have begun to utilize the financial and legal systems of the EU, a supranational entity, to participate directly in the governance of a new type of trans-national space (Kojimoto 2014). Even in East Asia, although the objectives, formation processes, and administrative structures all differ among countries, local trans-border cooperation in the Greater Tumen Sub-region (GTS), in the Bohai/Yellow Sea Sub-region (BYSS), in the Greater Southeast China Sub-region (GSCS), in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), and in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand (IMT) Growth Triangle has increased (Chen 2005; OECD 2009; Kim et al. 2011).

The formation of “regional aggregates among local entities” within multiple sovereign nations is commonly referred to as “sub-regionalism.” Figure 3 shows a conceptual diagram of “sub-regionalism.” Solid lines indicate that the territory is national (a sovereign nation). “Local” is shown in the diagram as existing institutionally within the sovereign nation. “Region” and “sub-region” territories are in the process of being formed; thus, given that they are currently incomplete, they are shown with dotted lines. Sub-regions are attracting attention as new social units of international society never before observed, in the hope that: 1) they will function as

Figure 3 Sub-region and Restructuring “Territoriality”



Source: Author

buffer zones within often tense international relations; 2) they will eliminate dependency structures such as “central nations”/“central regions” vs. “peripheral nations”/“peripheral regions;” and 3) they will contribute to the realization of “active peace” based at a local level (Igarashi 2016). Consequently, trans-border cooperation by non-nation actors at the local level is likely to result in more contestation within a global system based on the nation-state, in a process characterized as “de- and re-territorialization” (Sum 2002, 55).

Nevertheless, it cannot be assumed that local government cooperation automatically has a

Table 3 Comparison of Types of Memberships

Framework		JRCMA (1970)	PYSCC/OEAED (1991)	PJCECHRFE (1992)	JKSGM (1992)	SIECRGSJ (1994)	CMCJRR (1994)	NEAR (1996)	Province Friendship Interaction Conference (1996)	Three Province Triangle Interaction (1997)	Japan-S. Korea Governors' Conference (2007)	Japan-Russia Governors' Conference (2010)	Japan-China Governors' Provincial Forum (2012)	NAMF (2014)	
		Local government													
China	Shandong							✓		✓					
	Ningxia							✓					✓		
	Tianjin		✓											✓	
Japan	Hokkaido			✓											
	Yamagata							✓							
	Niigata							✓							
	Toyama							✓							
	Kyoto							✓							
	Tottori					✓		✓							
	Shimane							✓							
	Fukuoka					✓							✓		
	Saga					✓							✓		
	Niigata City	✓												✓	
	S.Korea	Busan		✓		✓			✓						
		Incheon		✓					✓						
Daejeon								✓							
Ulsan			✓					✓							
Sejong City								✓							
Gyeonggi								✓	✓						
Gangwon							✓	✓							
North Chungcheong								✓							
South Jeolla						✓		✓							
South Gyeongsang						✓		✓		✓					
Jeju						✓		✓			✓				
Mongolia	Ulaanbaatar							✓						✓	
	Tov Province					✓		✓							
Russia	Khabarovsk			✓				✓				✓			
	OblastMaritime			✓		✓		✓							
	Sakhalin			✓				✓				✓			
	Kamchatka Peninsula							✓				✓			
	Vladivostok	✓					✓							✓	
	Irkutsk	✓												✓	
	Yakutsk	✓												✓	

Note: ✓ indicates membership in the framework.


Source: Author, based on the websites of each local government cooperation networks.

non-territorial or trans-territorial character in NEA, as local governments have hybrid characteristics exhibiting trans-national behavior while simultaneously existing legally as sub-state organizations subsumed by their respective nations.¹⁵ Especially in NEA, local government cooperation is often related to national strategies of leading and surrounding nations, so may rather be better understood as a political phenomenon based on national territoriality. Accordingly, I identify some characteristic aspects of local government cooperation in NEA.


It is noteworthy that membership in two or more networks in NEA is on the rise. Table 3 shows the membership overlaps across the networks, indicating there are no mutually-exclusive relationships. Such arrangements, in which local government identities are mixed, indicate intrinsic developments specific to local governments and differ from national government strategies. An intensification and expansion of local government cooperation in NEA is likely to break down established spaces characterized as “the nation” and “national borders,” nurturing multiple identities beyond national borders among all actors. Figure 4 depicts multiple identities beyond borders, that is, identities involving local level actors affiliated not only within a national territoriality divided through borders, but belonging rather to various frameworks. I consider that

Figure 4 Depiction of Multiple Identities beyond National Border

(Identities within national borders)



(Multiple identities beyond national borders)



Source: Tosa (2014, 13), modified by the author.


¹⁵ Given that local governments are typically undeveloped, even local autonomy is regarded with skepticism (Rozman 1999).

fostering multiple identities is a key factor in promoting regional peace-making in NEA.

Next, I focus on the diversity of the factors involved. The local government cooperation in NEA discussed in this paper has also become more focused on intercity cooperation concerning the environment, disaster prevention, education/culture, and other non-economic areas. This demonstrates that, unlike in the past, when these networks were limited to forming local economic spheres, these networks are engaged in an array of issues. The local governments in NEA focus on issues relevant to the new relationships they have developed within the framework of regional inter-governmental networks. For example, environmental cooperation amongst the NEAR members can be identified as an "issue-oriented goal" that attempts to resolve growing regional environmental problems, including the presence of waste in the sea and "yellow dust," referring to particle pollutants that cover and pollute parts of East Asia (Nakayama 2015). Such efforts suggest that local actors are working toward trans-border governance in NEA and have begun using novel problem-solving styles in newly identified "places" (see Figure 5).

From this perspective, local government cooperation networks across NEA have taken on non-territorial or trans-territorial characteristics, and are no longer restricted to a subordinate role in spaces dominated by nations. In this regard, local government cooperation in NEA, especially the region-building initiatives, illustrates how sub-regionalism may be providing an alternative to the less flexible nature of engagement undertaken through nation-states.

Figure 5 Toward Trans-border Governance in NEA



Conclusion

This paper demonstrated the following major points. First, local government cooperation networks across NEA, involving "para-diplomacy," have increased in number. Second, the region-building network type has gradually become more organized. Third, the intensifying and expanding nature of local government cooperation networks has brought about multiple identities beyond national borders for citizens at the local level, and thus helped to build trans-border

governance in NEA. In this way, local government cooperation across NEA illustrates how sub-regionalism may be altering, on multiple levels, the less flexible nature of the territorially-defined state.

Finally, several further aspects merit emphasis. While emerging concepts of regionalism may appear as attempts to confront nationalistic tendencies to help establish peaceful relations, they are really intended to encourage re-examining an overemphasis on nation-centered thinking which could otherwise undermine regionalism. In general, nationalistic policies tend to marginalize local regions as the relationships between nations and markets receive more attention and local regions receive less. Therefore, without support from citizens at the local level, regionalism will not succeed. It is through strengthening trans-border relationships that bind local actors to one another irrespective of national borders, that individuals, communities, and regions can work toward peaceful relations and development in NEA.

This paper did not include an analysis of specific allocations of power, such as financial power and authority, in relation to local government cooperation across NEA. In that respect, the study of local government cooperation in NEA is hampered by analytical limitations as NEA lacks both supranational organizations, similar to the EU in Europe, and developed systems for new trans-border units. Thus, in order to further investigate the potential for new peace-making mechanisms in NEA, additional case studies of local government cooperation in familiar, everyday settings is required, as is an analysis of the specific order-forming mechanisms created by non-state actors at the local level.

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SOKA UNIVERSITY

Hideki Tamai

He is a Professor of Peace Studies, International Relations at Soka University and Director of Soka University Peace Research Institute (SUPRI). He earned BA (Sociology) at Soka University in 1985 and MA (International Relations) at Soka University in 1989. He started to work at Soka University Peace Research Institute in 1990. He was appointed director of SUPRI and Associate Professor of Faculty of Letters at Soka University in 2008. His study topics are Peace Studies, Peacebuilding and Human Security. He has published articles including ‘The Problems of Human Insecurity in Japan: the case of the US military bases in Okinawa’, ‘Development of Japanese Government Strategy of Peacebuilding in Post-Cold War Era’, ‘Possibilities of the Northeast Asian Community: the view point of Okinawa’, ‘The importance and Difficulties of Reconciliation in the Peacebuilding Process’ and so on.

Hironobu Asaga

He is a Professor of Environmental Law, Administrative Law at Soka University. He earned BA (Law) at Soka University in 1993, MA (Environmental Sciences) at University of Tsukuba in 1988, and PhD (Real Estate Studies; Environmental Law and Policy) at Meikai University. He worked at Meiji University Law School in 2004-2005, Okinawa University in 2005-2012. He joined Soka University in 2012-present. His study topics are Environmental Law and Policy. He received Academic Award of Research Division of the Japan Society for Impact Assessment in 2010. He belongs to Japan Society for Impact Assessment (Managing Director, Editor-in-Chief), Japan Land Environment Society (Managing Director, Secretary of the research presentation committee), Environmental Law and Policy Association (Editorial Board). He has published numerous articles in academic journals.

Kenji Nakayama

He is an Associate professor at the Faculty of Law, Soka University. He earned his Ph. D. degree in social science from Waseda University (2014) and is specialized in International Relations. He had served as a staff of Secretariat of the House of Representatives (Shugiin) and a research assistant of Waseda University before joining the Soka University. He has published a book entitled “*A Study of Endogenous Governance and Transnational Actor in Northeast Asia*” (Waseda University Press, 2015).

KYUNGNAM UNIVERSITY**Jung Kim**

He is an Assistant Professor of political science at University of North Korean Studies (UNKS) and director for planning at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) of Kyungnam University in Seoul. He is also a lecturer at Graduate School of International Studies and Underwood International College of Yonsei University. Prior to joining UNKS, he worked at East Asia Institute (2009-2013) and IFES (1996-2002) as a senior research fellow and held a visiting research position in Advanced Social and International Studies at University of Tokyo as a Fox International Fellow (2004-2005). He earned his undergraduate degree in political science from Korea University and graduated from Yale University with his doctoral degree in political science. He has published numerous articles in academic journals, including *Asian Perspective*, *Asian Survey*, and *Journal of International and Area Studies* and edited volumes, including *Adapt, Fragment, Transform: Corporate Restructuring and System Reform in South Korea* and *Routledge Handbook of Democratization in East Asia*.

Dong-Yub Kim

Assistant Professor, Ph. D.

The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University

Kim Dong-Yub has received Ph.D. in North Korean Studies (Military & Security) at University of North Korean Studies. He is currently an assistant professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam University and an advisor in The National Unification Advisor council. He lectures at Kyungnam University and Korea Naval Academy. His academic interests are North Korean military, North Korean nuclear issue, northeast Asian security, military negotiation and peace regime.

He had a successful twenty-year career in the ROK Navy before retiring as a commander. He holds a B.A. at the Korea Naval Academy and MA in International Relations at Korea National Defense University. Previously, he had served as a North Korea specialist at the Ministry of National Defence taking part in several military talks between North and South Korea.

Sung Kyung Kim

She is an Assistant Professor at University of North Korean Studies, and the director of research at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University. She received her Ph.D. from University of Essex (2006) in England, where she was trained in cultural sociology. She worked in Sungkonghoe University and National University of Singapore before joining the University of North Korean Studies. She has published on books and articles in the areas of culture industry focusing on film industry, cultural mobility, and North Korean border crossing. Her current research examines North Korean society in a cultural perspective.

CHINESE CULTURE UNIVERSITY

Chien-kuo Pang

Chien-kuo Pang earned his Ph. D. degree in Sociology from Brown University of the United States and is specialized in the comparative study of national development. He had served as Associate Professor of National Taiwan University, Taipei City Councilman, Legislator of the Republic of China (Taiwan), and Advisor of the Strait Exchange Foundation. Dr. Pang currently is Professor of the Graduate Institute of National Development and Mainland China Studies at Chinese Culture University.

Chien-min Chao

Dr. Chien-min Chao is a Distinguished Chair Professor at the Graduate Institute for National Development and Mainland China Studies, the Chinese Culture University. Dr. Chao also serves as Dean of the College of Social Sciences at the CCU. Between 2008 and 2012, Dr. Chao was a Deputy Minister for the Mainland Affairs Council at the ROC government. Dr. Chao was a visiting distinguished professor at the George Washington University and visiting teaching professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Dr. Chao has written and edited twelve books, including *Decision-making in China: Leadership, Process and Mechanism* (Taipei, 2014); *Introduction to China and Cross-Strait Relations* (Taipei, 2010); *Lee Teng-hui's Legacy* (M.E. Sharpe, 2002); *Rethinking the Chinese State* (Routledge, 2001); *Analysis to Contemporary Chinese Politics* (Taipei, 1997); *Authoritarian Politics* (Taipei, 1994). Dr. Chao has also produced over 100 articles in academic journals such as the *Asian Affairs*, *Asian Survey*, the *China Quarterly*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, *Pacific Affairs*, *Issues & Studies*, *Chinese Law and Government*, *Zhongguo dalu yanjiu*.

Wei-jen Hu

Wei-jen Hu is the President of the Sino-American Cultural and Economic Association and an Adjunct Chair Professor at Chung Yuan Christian University. As the Standing Supervisor of the Association of Foreign Relations in Taiwan, he holds a Ph.D. from the University of Pretoria, an MS from Georgetown University, and has been a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University twice. A veteran diplomat and government official, Hu has served the Republic of China for about forty years in the fields of foreign affairs and national security. His various posts include Representative (Ambassador) to Germany, Representative to Singapore, Deputy Director General of the National Security Bureau, Deputy Secretary General of the National Security Council, the Secretary General of the National Security Council, and Senior Advisor to the President. Since 2001, Professor Hu has written and assisted in editing ten books mainly covering Sino-American relations and the history of his father, four-star General Hu Tsung-nan. He has authored around twenty articles in recent years. Hu has received the Order of the Bright Star and other medals

from the ROC and foreign governments in recognition of and appreciation for his public service.

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Soka University Peace Research Institute

Tangi-machi 1-236, Hachioji, Tokyo

192-8577 Japan

Tel/Fax:042-691-5333

<https://www.soka.ac.jp/pri/>