

PRESENTATION

Building a Security Community in
Northeast Asia:
Dealing with Painful History to Build a
Peaceful Present

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There is absolutely no doubt that the Northeast Asian region—China, Japan and Korea—is going to prove absolutely critical to global peace and stability in the 21st century. Northeast Asia is the center of global economic development. It has a land mass fifteen percent bigger than all of Europe and a combined population of 1.5 billion people or over one-fifth of all the people of the world. What happens in Northeast Asia (economically, socially and politically) is going to have a major impact on levels of prosperity, well-being and political stability in South East Asia and elsewhere.

It is vital, therefore, to ensure that the social, political and military relationships between all three countries are as positive as the economic links so that each country can contribute what it can to regional and, by extension, global peace and security.

There certainly is no space for competitive or, worse, destructive

nationalism, in Northeast Asia. If these countries were to revert to pre-Second World War and post war conflict patterns it would have major negative implications for regional and global peace and stability. The challenge, therefore, is how to deepen and expand strong and robust bilateral and trilateral socio-economic and political relationships within the region so that a genuine cooperative security regime might be developed capable of developing and guaranteeing stable peace.

If trilateral relationships flourish, Northeast Asia's claims to global economic and political leadership in the 21st century will be secure. If there are tensions in any one of these relationships then Northeast Asian global leadership will be less secure and once again Northeast Asia could become a region of instability rather than stability. The Northeast Asian region does not have any regional security architecture equivalent to that in South East Asia or Europe. It has maintained reasonable levels of political stability for the past 25 years mainly because of extensive economic relationships and a range of formal and informal relationships between policy makers and politicians in all three countries. These are beginning to get a little frayed in the 21st century. Emerging incompatibilities means that instead of focusing on ways in which security issues can be addressed collaboratively and cooperatively there has been a resurgence of neo-nationalism; expanded militarization and securitization of relationships and a willingness to project power and coercive diplomacy in Northeast Asia. There have been very few efforts, for example, to develop a shared vision on how to promote peace and security.

The election or (in China's case) selection of conservative nationalist leaders in Japan, South Korea and China has generated

additional instability as each country tries to make sense of the shifting dynamics and power transitions taking place in the region. All three countries are in transition. Despite a slowdown in its economic growth, China is the world's fastest rising economic power. Japan's economy is stagnant but it is still the third largest economy in the world and the Republic of Korea is emerging as a very robust middle power both economically and diplomatically.

Insofar as Chinese, Japanese and Korean national trajectories are convergent there is a reasonable likelihood of peace and stability. When they start to diverge the probability of political and/or economic stability diminishes. While China, Japan and Korea have relatively robust economic systems all three political systems often seem precarious and lack deep popular legitimacy. This sense of political fragility has contributed towards an upsurge of identity politics in North East Asia which means that Northeast Asian foreign policies are being driven by a complex combination of domestic as well as external dynamics. Nationalist identity politics have been driven by ruling elites in China, Japan and Korea wanting to consolidate their power and authority in order to boost popular support, grapple with corruption and political fragility and maintain domestic integration.

The major geo-political result of these domestic and triangular dynamics is that China is moving closer to South Korea while Japan is going in the opposite direction. The very successful summit between President's Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye in Beijing in June 2013, for example, was not reflected in a similar summit between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Xi Jin Ping. In fact, Japanese Foreign Ministry Officials continue to experience difficulties organizing summit meetings between the leaders of China and Japan

because Shinzo Abe remains unwilling to meet China's preconditions of: (i) no reinterpretation of war history and; (ii) an end to Japanese leadership visits to the Yasukuni shrine. The brief encounter between both political leaders at the Peking APEC meeting in November 2014, for example, did not amount to a summit meeting and was followed up by a range of parliamentary delegations to try and thaw frosty relations between both countries. The upshot of all these different processes is that China-Japan-Korean relationships have become more incompatible and tense.

While there have been many diplomatic efforts to address the tensions in the trilateral relationships they remain remarkably persistent and intractable. There was enormous anxiety, in China, for example, about how Japan would commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. As it turned out Prime Minister Abe's comments were less fulsome than those made by Prime Minister Murayama on the occasion of the 50th anniversary and did not satisfy the Chinese or Korean governments.

These incidents demonstrate that the past continues to impose itself on the present in ways which confound diplomats and political leaders who would like to move on from Second World War history and the painful traumatic memories afflicting all three countries.

This paper is interested, therefore, in how China, Japan and Korea can maintain and guarantee negative peace in Northeast Asia but more optimally what conditions and institutions are necessary to generate a more positive peace and the development of regional economic, social and political regimes capable of maintaining both.

Many of the issues that have been addressed in the Symposium, for example, such as North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programme; China's maritime assertiveness; Japan's reinterpretation

of its Pacifist Constitution and desire to become a “normal” nation, are all presenting rather than underlying problems. What I want to argue in this paper is that these presenting problems are symptoms of deeper tensions which are perhaps better explained in terms of domestic dynamics rather than geo-political big power competitive dynamics.

There has been negative peace in the region for the past 25 years largely because of a joint commitment to economic growth and development, a willingness to placate US strategic interests and a desire to coexist without raising uncomfortable questions about past painful history. In the past 10 years, however, as the leaderships of China, Japan and Korea have advocated strong nationalist sentiments; and xenophobic feelings about each other there has been an increase in state to state rivalry, military competition and a surprising re-activation of painful and unresolved issues from the Second World War.

While ASEAN, for example, developed strong norms of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states and a commitment to the peaceful resolution of state conflicts through such bodies as the ASEAN Regional Forum and in all the diverse Ministerial and other meetings no such development has occurred in Northeast Asia. There was considerable co-operation on economic growth and development issues but a strange neuralgia about developing regional security architecture. I was actively involved with Canadian colleagues, for example, in a range of Northeast Asian conversations on confidence building, arms control and disarmament and the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the 1990s but we made little progress. There was a willingness on the part of China, Japan and Korea, to deepen

economic interdependence and explore ways in which inter state cooperation could be advanced on a bilateral and trilateral basis but there was no willingness to develop regional institutional machinery to boost peace and stability in any systematic way.

In the 1990s to the early 2000s, for example, the ROK reached out economically to the DPRK and China joined the World Trade Organisation arguing that its primary purpose was a “a peaceful rise” in Asia and the rest of the world. There was sustained economic cooperation between Japan and the ROK and China, Japan and Korea all met and participated in different institutions of ASEAN. Within the region, the East Asia Summit; the Six Party Talks; and the creation of a Trilateral Secretariat linking China, Japan and South Korea also took place in this immediate post war period. The most important outcome of all these economic initiatives was that China became the number one destination for foreign direct investment and exports from both Japan and South Korea.

None of this cooperation eliminated conflict however, North Korea conducted its first missile and nuclear tests; China and Taiwan periodically clashed over sovereignty issues and independence claims and here was growing tension between Japan and the DPRK. But overall there was a sense that economic ties were driving peace within the region.¹

1 Stephan Haggard, “The Liberal View of the International Relations of Asia,” in Saadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill and Rosemary Foot (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 45-63 Robert. O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1984); John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, “Clear and Clean: The Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace.” *International Organization* (Spring, 2001)

The last 10 years, however, have seen a very rapid rise in interstate competition and rivalry. This has manifested itself in expensive military modernization and conflicts over a variety of maritime sovereignty claims. China's 2015 declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in areas under ROK and Japanese administrative control and its recent development of several reefs in the South China Seas to advance its 9 Dash line claim have not boosted regional cooperation and confidence. Similarly the DPRK's sinking of the South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, along with its shelling of Yeonpyeong Island plus renewed nuclear and missile tests have generated alarm throughout the region. America's pivot toward East Asia and Japan's identification of China and the DPRK as major security threats have all generated tension within the region. The Six Party Talks on North Korea, ground to a halt in 2007 and trilateral meetings among the leaders of China, Japan and Korea were frozen for three and a half years. There have also been a growing number of economic differences over things like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank developed by China and the TPP developed by the US and its allies. But what makes all of these "events" and incidents toxic is that they have increasingly been linked to contested and competing interpretations of painful history (particularly in Korea and China) and the re-emergence of xenophobic nationalism.

Northeast Asia is a complex security system which has developed some norms /conventions/ and economic arrangements which have governed relationships between the different states over the past thirty years. These cordial relations are under threat at the moment because political leaders in China, Japan, the ROK, DPRK, Russia

and the United States are all trying to satisfy large and growing numbers of citizens who feel economically, social and politically excluded from the benefits of their particular political and economic systems. Nationalism is an easy way of responding to generalized social, economic and political fears, anxieties and insecurities and as integrated threat theory suggests it can and does boost internal integration over the short term.

I want to argue, however, that nationalism is one of the most significant challenges to the development of an intentional co-operative security community in Northeast Asia and unless it is addressed as an impediment there will be no evolution of a robust security community in Northeast Asia. The absence of a security community does not mean that Northeast Asia will erupt into armed conflict any time soon but it does signal that there are conflictual relationships that are capable of undermining the collaborative and cooperative relationships.

China, Japan and the two Koreas have grappled with questions of national identity for many years but these have grown more acute since the end of the Cold War. All four countries have not hesitated to promote officially sanctioned nationalism when and as domestic politics demands it. The Chinese administration of Jiang Zemin, for example, launched “patriotic education” in the 1990s. This activated

2 Suisheng Chao, “A State-led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, (March, 1998) Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 287-302; Chung-In Moon and Seung-Won Suh, “Identity Politics, Nationalism, and the Future of Northeast Asian Order,” in G. John Ikenberry and Chung-In Moon, eds., *The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), pp. 193-229. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, “The Political and Security Dimension of Japan—China Relations: Strategic Mistrust and Fragile Stability*.” *Pacific Focus* Vol.; 26. No. 2 (August, 2011): 165-187.

a particular set of Second World War Narratives centering on Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion but it also succeeded in generating very negative views of Japan among the Chinese people.³ Patriotic fervour was promoted by the CCP to generate national unity and strengthen its ruling power.⁴ China's official encouragement of anti-Japanese sentiment stimulated anti Chinese feeling within Japan. Both have fuelled competitive nationalism in the region for the last decade.

The reactivation of Japanese nationalist sentiment since Shinzo Abe returned to power stimulated official ROK criticisms of Japan as well. Both China and the ROK, for example jointly developed a statue and memorial hall at Harbin railway station to commemorate the anti -Japanese Korean nationalist, An Jung-geun. This stoked anti Japanese nationalism in both Korea and China.⁵

Prime Minister Koizumi's, creation of a National Defence Agency with Ministerial status, for example, coupled with his desire that Japanese Textbooks erase reference to Japan's war time atrocities all "officially" nudged Japanese politics in a more right wing direction. His visit to the Yasakuni Shrine created a permissive environment for Shinzo Abe to promote a "Normal" Japan, by which he means a militarily powerful Japan, that would revise the Pacifist Constitution and decide for itself when and where it would utilize coercive

3 Minxin Pei and Michael Swaine, "Simmering Fire in Asia: Averting Sino-Japanese Strategic Conflict," *Policy Brief*, 44 (November 2005). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17720>.

4 Chung-In Moon and Seung-Won Suh, *op. cit.*, p. 208. As cited in Atanassova-Cornelia, *op. cit.* p. 173.

5 Asahi Shimbun, "China sets up memorial for Korean anti-Japanese activist," January 20, 2014 available at <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201401200074>.

diplomacy. This was also based on a strong reassertion of the US-Japan Security alliance even if this somewhat contradicts the nationalist impulses of many of his supporters.

“Abenomics” and Abe’s foreign policy have precipitated widespread civil society opposition in Japan but the political opposition to the LDP/Komeito coalition remains weak and so far incapable of resisting these new militarizing trends. When Japan reasserts its territorial claims to the Dokdo/Takeshima islands and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands they activate painful memories and generate deep anxiety in the ROK and in China. This has meant that when there have been incidents that would normally be managed with quiet diplomacy e.g conflicts over fishing rights, arrests of Japanese businessmen in China, they have generated megaphonic responses and both organised and spontaneous nationalist protests in Japan and China.

Shinzo Abe’s decisions to challenge the post war political agreement including the verdicts of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal; plus his continuation of Koizumi’s desire to sanitise the history books; and retreat from the war apologies of predecessors like Kono and Murayama have further fuelled Chinese and Korean anxiety about Japan’s political and military intentions. Imposing new Secrecy Laws, clamping down on internal political dissent and promoting the invigoration of Japanese defence industries have also generated alarm.

There have been parallel nationalist processes in the two Koreas as well. The election of President Lee Myung-Bak in 2008, for example, generated a more hardline Korean and Japanese response to the DPRK. President Lee was in favour of regional dialogues between Russia, China, Japan and Korea he was ambivalent and antagonistic to North Korea.

This hardline approach in Korea also resulted in a desire to change school texts promoted under the Kim-Roh regimes which President Lee claimed had denigrated the democratic and economic achievements of earlier leaders by adopting “an anti-market, anti-liberal democracy, anti-American, and pro-North Korean stance.” See Chung-in Moon (2009: 125)

This hardening of approach towards North Korea, undoubtedly fuelled nervousness in Pyongyang and provided external justification for its nuclear weapon and missile development. In particular President Lee’s insistence that continued economic support to the North was dependent on denuclearization and respect for human rights accelerated divisions between both countries.⁶ Despite relatively smooth bilateral relations between Japan and the ROK, Lee’s visit to the Dokdo/Takeshima island (contested by Japan) again reactivated painful memories about Japan-Korea relations.

When President Park Guen-hye, took power in 2012 she softened some of Lee’s approaches to the DPRK but joined China in criticism of Abe’s desire to move Japan in a more nationalist direction. She was particularly concerned about Shinzo Abe’s desire to reinterpret history in order to absolve the Japanese government for any responsibility for its employment of “comfort women.” during the Second World War. When Abe visited the Yasakuni shrine, Korean public opinion of him shifted in a very negative direction and fell to a level equal to that of Kim Jong-un.⁷

6 Haggard and Noland, “North Korea in 2008,” *Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform* p. 99.

7 Asan Institute, “Challenges and opportunities for Korea-Japan Relations in 2014,” available at <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/challenges-and-opportunities-for-korea-japan-relations-in-2014>.

The hardening of nationalist positions in China, Japan and the ROK, played neatly into the hands of the DPRK leadership. Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong-Un, for example, both hardened their desire for an autarkic nation state capable of repelling all invaders. Confronted by famines and a spluttering economy, however, neither leader has been able to balance the DPRK nuclear programme and expanding militarization (both conventional and nuclear) with economic development and growth. The only way in which the North can maintain internal control is by asserting that the DPRK is locked in threatening relationships with the ROK, the US, and Japan. Promoting these nationalist positions promotes an action-reaction dynamic that fuels vicious rather than virtuous cycles.


When the 6 party talks hit an impasse in 2008, for example, the military hardliners took over in the DPRK just as they did in China and the ROK. This resulted in the North reactivating its nuclear program, and expanding its conventional forces as well. This militarization could only be sustained by arguing for real and imagined national security threats from the US, Japan and the ROK. Kim Jong-Un made sure that these threats were not only imaginary but real by initiating military actions against the South and by his purge of roughly 40 percent of his top military leaders.⁸

If all the countries of Northeast Asia are interested in the denuclearization of North Korea, and the prevention of Japan and South Korea from going nuclear all four countries have got to start thinking of ways in which they can diminish nationalist rivalry; deal with painful history effectively and develop a join vision of a security

8 Alexandre Mansourov, "North Korea: Leadership Schisms and Consolidation During Kim Jong Un's Second Year in Power," *38 North* available at <http://38north.org/2014/01/amansourov012214>

community that will guarantee stable peace. This is an imperative because the tenuous security order that emerged during the cold war “stalemate” has disappeared and been replaced by national political rivalries that threaten to subvert the fragile peace gained by economic integration.


In order to clear the way for this to happen leaders in all four countries bilaterally and trilaterally have to initiate processes to change popular perceptions of the other. To illustrate what this might mean and how complicated the process is I want to focus on China-Japan, relations to demonstrate the ways in which personal opinion is driving national antagonism. The popular perceptions of each other are negative and high. The Genron Public Opinion Poll, for example, shows just how negative.⁹



The reasons for this unfavourable opinion are as follows.

As can be seen from these tables Painful History is the primary


9 See <http://www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/archives/5217.html>




driver of Chinese antagonism and Japanese Defensiveness. Japanese lack of a proper apology and remorse over the history of the invasion of China accounts for 70.5% of Chinese unfavorable views of Japan. On the other side 55.1% of Japanese unfavorable views of China are driven by irritation at the perceived sense of constant criticism for Second World War atrocities. The Japanese people and its current leadership- want China and Korea to forget the war and move on. To do this they are cultivating historical amnesia, wanting to renegotiate

the post war political settlement and “Normalise” Japan’s role in the world. They also feel that they have apologised enough!

In terms of divisive issues, Japanese concerns about China focus mainly on air pollution,(36.8%) and territorial disputes (20%) Although the territorial dispute is diminishing in importance from last year. For the Chinese, however, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands was most important at 50.6%. But the Nanjing Massacre came second at 47.9%. The interesting thing is that the percentage of people for whom this is important has grown from 35.5% in 2014 to nearly 48% last year. As the years recede and the direct participants die the painful memories in China are intensifying. But the public in both countries are deeply suspicious of the other and pessimistic about the future.



It is history Issues, a lack of trust and indifference to the identity needs of the other that are driving the antagonism between China and Japan. 60% of Japanese people mistrust the Chinese >40% of Chinese mistrust the Japanese. This mistrust is driven in part by territorial disputes but mainly unresolved history issues. It is the



unwillingness of either side to acknowledge the identity needs of the other that is fuelling the fundamental divisions between both countries.

10
 Social identity theories argue that the more important group identity is to self, then identification with that group or nation becomes a source of individual pride and self-esteem. Taken to extreme this often results in the xenophobic nationalism that we see in Northeast Asia. Individuals who identify highly with the nation are likely to collectively “forget” the nation’s past injustices and focus instead on past glories. The need for positive self-esteem and reputation on both sides has driven China and Japan in opposite directions. Japan’s nationalist elites elevate their “Chosen Glory” (narratives and myths about the nation’s glorious past and visions of a glorious future) and would rather not focus on any negative dimensions of their past.

China on the other hand has chosen to focus on past humiliations and “chosen trauma” while building a glorious future. In response

10 (Tajfel & Turner, 1986)

Japan introduces its own “Chosen Traumas”. Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Tokyo incendiary raids . These are useful reminders of the inhumanity of such weapons and such tactics but they are also used to diminish Japanese guilt for its past aggression. This results in “Competitive Victimhood” narratives which also work to impede the development of peaceful co-existence or better still reconciliation in North East Asia.

These competing narratives of “Chosen Glory” and “Chosen Trauma” serve very particular political purposes in both countries. Unless these narratives are addressed directly, however, it will not be possible to deal with their painful divisive history and relationships will always be fraught. The competitive victimhood dynamic, for example, gets translated into a competition for number one status. Prime Minister Abe asserts that “Japan is not and will never be a tier two country. That is the core message I’m here to make, and I should repeat it by saying I am back and so shall Japan be.” Abe and Hyakuta together have said “Japan! Be proud of yourself in the Center of the World.. And in August 2014, Abe asserted that those executed by the Allied Powers are “the foundation of the nation” and should be hailed for having “staked their souls to become the foundation of their nation so that Japan could achieve the peace and prosperity of today”

This is countered in China by President Xi Jin Ping stating that China has a dream too. This is his Chinese Dream. “This dream can be said to be the dream of a strong nation. And for the military, it is a dream of a strong military,” ... “To achieve the great revival of the Chinese nation, we must ensure there is unison between a prosperous country and strong military” He also wants recognition and an apology from Japan for the way in which it humiliated China

in the 1930s and 1940s. This is viewed as a pre-requisite for Chinese strength in the 21st century.

For Abe the political is deeply personal. He wishes to revisit Japanese war history and revoke the post war settlement which he sees as victor's justice. He also wants to change Article 9 of the Constitution, Remilitarise Japan so that it is seen as a "normal" nation and promote 21st century Japanese nationalism to exonerate his grandfather Nobosuke Kishi who was judged a Class A War Criminal.

There is no cordiality between Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe. Both are "princelings" from old political dynasties. Both have histories to reinterpret and both are utterly convinced of their own moral rectitude. Xi Jinping wants personal acknowledgement from Abe of Japanese responsibility for the war. Abe wants Chinese acknowledgement of Japanese wartime suffering and an end to repeated requests for apology. 74.1% of the Chinese polled were dissatisfied with Abe's statement on the 70th anniversary of the End of the Second World War. They felt that it was a watering down of the 1995 Murayama statement made on the 50th anniversary where Murayama made a very moving personal apology for the damage and suffering caused by Japan to its Asian neighbors. The statement was based on a Cabinet decision, requiring unanimous approval from the Cabinet members.

The fact is that there are divergent views on how to deal with painful history. 47% of Chinese (Up from 31.4% in 2014) believe that "China Japan relations will not develop unless the historical issues are resolved. 35.5% of Japanese polled think it will be impossible to resolve the history issues until there is an improvement in the relationships between both countries. So there is an impasse. My argument , based on a series of problem solving workshops that I

facilitated in Northeast Asia is that there will be no improvement in relationships until there is a recognition of the deeper identity needs of both sides and an effective apology from Japan acceptable to the Chinese.

According to Blatz, C. W., K. Schumann, and M. Ross.¹¹ effective apologies require the following 1) the perpetrator's acceptance of responsibility; 2) acknowledgement of harm and/or victim's suffering 3) expression of sorrow and remorse; 4) admission of injustice or wrongdoing; 5) forbearance, or promises to behave better and never repeat the mistake again and; 6) offers of reparations/to repair the damages . I would also want to add the following . (7) Sincerity. This is difficult to pin down but if it looks as though an apology is insincere or made for instrumental purposes it is unlikely to be effective. (8) Representation. If states wish to apologise then it's important that the victim knows how representative the apology is and finally Specificity and clear acknowledgement of the offence.

China and Korea feel aggrieved because of specific atrocities like the "rape of Nanjing," inhumane treatment of prisoners of war, the forced sexual services of "comfort women" for Japanese soldiers, medical experimentation in Manchuria and on a more general level, Japanese aggression, annexation and colonial rule in Asia during the 19th and 20th centuries. Japan, for its part has issued over 50 apologies since the Second World War and the Japanese government and people feel that this should be enough to resolve the unresolved history. So why haven't they been accepted and why hasn't there been some reconciliation between the victims and perpetrators? One of the major reasons has been the vagueness and non specificity

11 Blatz, C. W., K. Schumann, and M. Ross. 2009. "Government Apologies for Historical Injustices." *Political Psychology* 30 (2); 219-241

of the apology. For example the Japanese Foreign Ministry issued this statement in 2005.¹²

“During a certain period of the past, Japan followed a *mistaken national policy and caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those Asian nations, through its colonial rule and aggression*. Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a *spirit of humility*. With feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind, Japan, underpinned by its solid democracy, has resolutely and consistently strived for peace by adhering to a strictly defensive security policy, preventing the escalation of international conflict, and dedicating itself to international peace and stability by mobilizing all its resources...After the end of World War II, Japan renounced all rights, titles and claims to Korea, Taiwan, the Kurile islands, a portion of Sakhalin, and other territories, and accepted the judgments of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East (Tokyo Trial), in which 25 Japanese leaders had been convicted of war crimes. Many other Japanese were convicted in other war crimes courts. *Japan has dealt with the issues of reparations, property and claims, in accordance with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the bilateral peace treaties, agreements and instruments. Japan paid reparations to Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, while others waived them*. After the normalization of its relations with the Republic of Korea, China and other countries, *Japan extended a substantial amount of economic cooperation. With the parties to these documents, the issues of reparations, property and claims, including the claims by individuals, have been settled legally* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005, cited in Seaton 2007, 66).

12 (Seaton, 2007)

The apologies which China and Korea have felt more comfortable with have been personal and heart felt. Hosokawa Morihiro, for example made more than four official apologies for Japan's "aggressive acts" and "colonial rule" causing "intolerable pain and suffering" to the people of Asia and around the world. Hosokawa's statements were hailed as having shifted the apology discourse of the Japanese government. They were also perceived as sincere.

Similarly Murayama Tomiichi's, 1995 statement, could not get Diet support for an apology but with cabinet approval he said "In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse (*tsuuzetsu na hansei*) and state my heartfelt apology (*kokoro kara no owabi*)" Yohei Kono's apology in Korea for Comfort women in 1993 was of a similar order.

The problems with these specific apologies is they were considered personal rather than political-from the Left rather than the mainstream Right-Instrumental rather than heartfelt-but they were nevertheless accepted in Seoul and Beijing in the spirit within which they were given. Over the past 15 years (apart from the brief SDP interregnum) there has been a dramatic right wing shift in Japanese politics. From the 1980s to now. Apologies, expressions of remorse have been undercut by multiple Prime Ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and by a desire that Japan revisit its war history, the post war settlement and become a "normal nation" again.

Japan can only persuade its neighbours about its sincerity and address this painful history if it can establish its harmlessness to them. It cannot do this when it is intent on "normalising" and when it continues to celebrate those who were responsible for terrible acts of aggression. It cannot make an effective apology with non

specific expressions of remorse or by engaging in the dynamics of competitive victimhood and the promotion of collective amnesia. And it cannot do this by literally rewriting history.

There will be no trusting harmonious relationships in NorthEast Asia until the painful traumatic history is put to rest by effective and acceptable apologies and more empathetic, altruistic relationships . This is challenging because of unmet identity needs in all three countries. China feels that its victimisation and humiliation has never been adequately acknowledged by Japan. Japan feels that it has apologised enough and that its moral reputation is constantly being impugned. Apologies that do not pay explicit attention to each other's deeper identity needs are unlikely to be successful.

Moral Imagination is critical to transforming Sino-Japanese relations. Both China and Japan have to imagine themselves in an inclusive and expandable web of relationships with each other so that they might do no harm and deal with each other's deepest fears. They need to cultivate and sustain a problem solving curiosity that embraces the diverse complexities of their past and current relationships. Both China and Japan need to nurture each other's creative potential and both need courage to build confidence and trust between each other for the future. Unfortunately these are in short supply in Northeast Asia-but have to be discovered quickly if a security community is to be envisioned. This will require the reconvening of all the bilateral and trilateral summits, as well as the development of regional institutions to facilitate all of this. To move in this direction will also require a positive collective vision of how all four Northeast Asian countries might relate to each other over the rest of the 20th century.

Of one thing we can be sure. It is only after this painful history

has been put to rest that each country will be able to trust the other enough to boost confidence between their respective militaries; generate higher levels of political cooperation and create the transparent communications necessary to generating awareness of the others benign intentions. There will be no prospect of much movement on arms control and disarmament issues until these historic issues have been put to rest.

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