

活動報告

SUPRI Project Annual Report April 2018 - March 2019

Group 4 “Peacebuilding in Africa”

Group Members:

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Research Subject

“The Promise of a Peace Dividend: Economic Aid and the Facilitation of a Sustainable Peace”

Since submitting the Kakenhi Grant (C) application in early November 2018, Professors Emmanuel and Sasaki have taken four steps to advance Group 4’s project on the relationship between foreign aid and peace processes in Africa and beyond.

First, we put together our thoughts on the patterns in the aid-peace relationship in the manuscript, “Patterns of Economic Aid and Peace Processes in Africa”. In doing so, one of the key efforts went into (1) gathering key literature on the topic and (2) looking for cases that could be used to illustrate the patterns that are clear in the aid-peace relationship. The two steps in outlining these patterns provide an excellent starting point for our project.

Second, Nikolas Emmanuel is in the process of using my personal research funds to purchase access to the online monthly journals *Africa Research Bulletin and Africa Confidential*. These journals and their archives are critical resources necessary to help outline the histories of the cases used in our study.

Third, in order to advance the book project, Nikolas Emmanuel contacted the editor for the African International Relations group at Routledge. Professor Emmanuel will travel to France this summer to talk with him. While in France, he will also undertake archival research at several university libraries that specialize on Africa.

Finally, Nikolas Emmanuel has submitted a paper proposal to participate in the International Studies Association (ISA) conference in Accra, Ghana that will take place from August 1-3, 2019. This conference will focus on African affairs and would be a perfect opportunity to get our first feedback on the project.

It is our hope that these four activities will serve to advance our project into the end of 2019.

Patterns of Economic Aid and Peace Processes in Africa

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Introduction:

Donors can have a significant impact on the behavior of aid recipient countries, far beyond the projects they finance. Accordingly, external economic assistance represents a potentially strong incentive for peace after conflict has ended (Emmanuel and Rothchild, 2007; Emmanuel, 2015). This research advances the point put forward by Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick (2000: 1), who argue that aid funds can “persuade formerly warring parties to resolve conflicts peacefully.” The end of warfare brings widespread hopes on the part of the exhausted rivals that the international community will support peace with increased economic aid. Some, such as Abu Bah (2013), have gone further and argued that this is in evidence as an emerging “new humanitarianism”, in which donors provide critical aid to help propel the recipients through the peace process and beyond. When aid providers back peace processes with financial resources, there appears to be a significantly higher likelihood that peace will last

longer than those that do not receive such funding. That is to say, one should expect periods of post-conflict peace to be longer when supported by donors with significant packages of economic aid.

Inversely, this research points to the conclusion that there is a higher likelihood that peace will breakdown and the conflict will recommence if donors do not provide significant post-conflict economic assistance. As Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2002: 5) argue, after the achievement of peace “[t]here is a considerable risk that conflict will resume and *aid might directly reduce this risk*” (my emphasis). Susan Woodward et al. (2005: 331) also point out in a similar manner that there is a “widely accepted notion that an immediate “peace dividend,” rapid reconstruction, specific schemes such as financing reforms required in the peace agreement, and early, large-scale employment of demobilized soldiers are important to solidify the peace”. This study supports the assertion that economic aid can help solidify peace. This article proposes an empirical study that will examine the role of foreign assistance in seventy-one post-conflict peace processes across Africa between 1989 and 2006 (Harbom, Hogbladh, Wallensteen 2006; Hogbladh 2012). We examine these dates due to the dramatic increase in the use of peace agreements to settle intrastate wars during the period following the Cold War, as well as the increased availability of data on the subject. The end date of 2006 allows for five years of economic assistance data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in order to examine the trajectory of aid flows after a given peace settlement. We argue here that this aid pattern is critical in the success or failure of peace agreements. This is an important discussion since the literature has largely ignored the impact of the pattern of aid distribution provided to support peace processes in

Africa and beyond.

Peace incentives, defined here as an extensive post-conflict economic development assistance package aimed at enticing the various parties involved in the conflict to favor pursuing peaceful interactions, have deep implications for donors and recipients alike (Woodward 2002). Donors can have a positive impact using their aid to help bolster post-conflict peace, helping stabilize the international system, reducing negative externalities, alleviate human suffering, etc. For the recipients, economic assistance should provide an incentive for peace, allowing former warring parties to bargain (Rothchild and Emmanuel 2006: 28). In the wake of a devastating war, societies find themselves in desperate need of resources to rebuild. Part of the logic behind providing a peace incentive after the end of conflict is that by holding out the prospect of economic aid to meet these needs, the external actor or actors are attempting to promote peace by making the former warring parties stakeholders in the new and hopefully more prosperous post-conflict order (Emmanuel and Rothchild 2007). It seems apparent that offers of donor assistance should influence states and non-state rebel groups alike and encourage them to pursue more peaceful interactions. Furthermore, a post-conflict peace incentive can assist in alleviating the initial grievances that led to conflict in the first place. Former warring parties can convince their respective constituencies to pursue peace by touting the benefits of economic aid, including humanitarian assistance, reintegration of combatants, economic recovery, the rebuilding physical infrastructure, among other activities. As David Cortright (1997: 273) argues, aid should make the prospect of peaceful relations generally more attractive. The aim here is to establish the claim that aid matters in achieving lasting peace.

However, some identify a growing “peacebuilding malaise” in the international community and among academics (Duffield 2012). It is clear that what the literature refers to as the security-development nexus matters in this discussion. Aid is particularly problematic in this relationship. As Mark Duffield (2010: 54) points out, “rather than aid being a neutral institution, would-be recipients have come to see international assistance as an extension of Western foreign policy.” Although this understanding is nothing new in itself, the recent use of “development-based counter insurgency” strategies, with donor money at its center, in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan has undermined the idea of aid neutrality even further. While considering this critical view, the research presented in this study takes a slightly different approach. We examine whether economic aid can act as an incentive to convince former warring parties to stick to a peace process. Here, we ask about the strength of aid as an incentive in building peace.

In order to address this topic, the following paper is broken down in two sections. The first part frames economic aid as an incentive offered during peace processes. Second, we discuss the three central aid patterns provided by donors after civil conflicts.

Aid as an Incentive during Peace Processes in Africa.

Peace processes are attempts to end violence between at least two opposing belligerents in a conflict and efforts to resolve the groups’ incompatibilities that led to the conflict. According to Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg (1997: 342), peace agreements, the potential end product, are fundamentally an understanding on how the parties will “explicitly regulate or resolve their basic

incompatibility.” In addressing these problems, the resulting agreements spell out how the “warring parties contract to halt organized violence and redress outstanding political, social, and/or economic grievances” (Toft 2010, p.150). In the period following the Second World War, the vast majority of civil wars end in outright military victory of either the state or rebels (Pillar 1983; Stedman 1991). This changed as the global system shifted after the Cold War. Since then, many intrastate conflicts have ended through the achievement of peace agreements between the belligerents (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007: 10; Toft 2010: 7). Civil wars in Africa have specifically seen a dramatic increase in the use of bargaining and negotiated peace processes to end warfare since the fall of the Berlin Wall (Harbom et al 2006).

However, it is important to note that conflicts do not only end with negotiations and bargaining. Certainly, many conflicts in Africa and elsewhere do not simply end because of a negotiated settlement that emerges from the give and take of a peace process. Quite to the contrary, many civil conflicts end in outright military victories by one side or the other (Luttwak 1999). The example of the war between the Angolan government under the control of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the rebel movement União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) illustrates this point. In the long, vicious Angolan civil war, attempted negotiated settlements came and went with the conflict only ending when the MPLA government defeated UNITA on the battlefield (Emmanuel and Rothchild 2007: 182-184). Furthermore, a number of civil conflicts in Africa have ended in external military interventions, the recent French-led intervention in Mali comes to mind (Poirson and Tarrit 2013).

Peace is not easily achieved through bargaining. This is because the stakes are extremely high in war, especially in internal conflicts. As Roy Licklider (1995: 681) points out, a key assumption is that civil wars are “difficult to resolve by negotiation” because the rival parties have to share the same state institutions and resources, and live next to each other as neighbors once the fighting subsides. The civil wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or the Cote d’Ivoire, among others, illustrate this point. This leads to an exceptionally high risk of reoccurring violence and the frequent failure of peace processes, in Africa, like elsewhere. Peace process can be perilous for the involved parties (Bah 2010; Stedman et al. 2002). Fundamentally, it is hard to judge if the other side’s commitment to peace is genuine. It is extremely difficult to obtain accurate and reliable information about an adversary’s intentions. Are they using the peace process to stall and rearm? After an agreement, will the other side abide by it in the future? These are among the many questions that plague peace processes. Some argue that this period is so difficult that most agreements never even last long enough to attain the implementation period (Stedman et al. 2002: 663). Licklider (1995: 685) adds empirical support for the fact that peace agreements break down into renewed fighting much more often than do out-right military victories by the state or rebel groups. Yet, what are the patterns in the relationship between economic aid and peace?

Foreign assistance after a devastating civil conflict can have deep implications for donors and recipients alike. Donors historically direct large amounts of foreign economic and humanitarian assistance to help facilitate peace and stabilize post-conflict situations after the achievement of an agreement. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan all illustrate international efforts to use aid to ease peace processes and

increase their likelihood of the end of conflict. Donors clearly desire to have a positive impact in these instances. They gain from the resulting goodwill, a strengthening of the international state system, the enhancement of international norms, and the extension of a zone of peace in which they can engage in commerce and investment. For the war-ravaged recipients, donor assistance should provide a strong incentive for peace. Extensive economic aid packages promised after the conclusion of a civil war can increase the size of the pie available for division among former warring factions.

In an important example, the aid package offered by the international donor community to Burundi in the five years that followed the 2003 Pretoria Protocol represented a 118% increase in total aid flow from the five years before the negotiated settlement. Aid providers tried to use aid to facilitate the peace process. Countries such as Burundi find themselves in desperate demand of resources to rebuild out of the ashes of war. External donor assistance should clearly help to meet some of these needs. When donors inject aid into a peace process, it represents a clear incentive for peace. This should dramatically reduce the likelihood that civil conflict will reoccur.

Economic support is an important non-coercive incentive (Rothchild and Emmanel 2010). These types of incentives emerge when outside third parties (i.e., donors) offer material benefits to draw parties that are "sufficiently dissatisfied with their present costs... or future prospects" into a bargaining process (Zartman 2001: 301). When third parties offer incentives to raise the costs of continued war or to firm up existing agreements, they expand the benefits that follow from abiding by the new rules of relationship. The adversaries should desire to agree to peace in order to gain the benefits that follow from ending the uncertainty of protracted conflict and creating new

possibilities for economic development. In this context, incentives consist of distributive rewards that encourage the government and the insurgents to shift their priorities and agree to a compromise on the major issues in contention (Rothchild 1997). For all parties involved, the incentives provided by an externally provided peace incentive represent a significant investment in peace. Furthermore, and perhaps more centrally to the argument presented in this research, peace incentives encourage commitment to agreed political institutions and norms, and raise the costs of breaking the new social contract and returning to war.

Part of the logic behind providing a peace incentive during a peace process is that by holding out the prospect of aid, the external actor or actors are attempting to promote a successful settlement of the conflict by making the warring parties stakeholders in the new and hopefully more prosperous post-conflict order. Once a peace process has begun, packages of economic assistance should influence states and rebel groups alike. Centrally, a peace incentive can assist in alleviating the initial grievances that led to the conflict in the first place. Warring parties can convince their respective constituencies to pursue peace by touting the benefits of economic aid, including humanitarian assistance, reintegration of former warring parties, economic recovery, the rebuilding physical infrastructure such as schools and hospitals, among other activities.

Patterns in Post-Conflict Aid Distributions.

Foreign assistance donors can have a significant impact on peace. However, as pointed out in this study, aid providers do not always

provide a peace incentive to post-conflict societies.¹ Out of the 71 negotiated settlements in Africa between 1989 and 2006, 35 (or 49.3%) received an increase in aid from the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors after they signed a peace agreement. We argue here that when donors do provide incentives to support peace, as with these 35 cases, it is more likely that peaceful relations will endure. That is to say, the provision of a peace incentive should lower the likelihood that civil conflict will reoccur. It appears that this is evident given this sample of recent African cases.

Three distinct patterns are present in the aid trajectories of post-conflict countries: 1) an aid increase, 2) no increase, and 3) a decline in economic assistance. In the Pattern 1 cases, donors frequently provide substantial reconstruction and development assistance following a peace agreement. This prolonged increase in development aid aims to rebuild the infrastructure and capacity of economies shattered by a civil war. I posit that this type of donor response can have enduring consequences and support the conditions for lasting peace. Pattern 2 cases experience no increase in post-conflict economic assistance. Pattern 3 sees a decline in foreign aid outlays. Patterns 2 and 3 do not help facilitate given peace processes. Nonetheless, each of these aid distributions has a distinct impact on the success of a given peace process.

Pattern 1: Sustained Increase in Post-Conflict Economic Assistance.

In Pattern 1 cases, donors provide substantial amounts of aid over an extended period of time (normally from five to ten years)

1 This study uses total aid distributions from all OECD/DAC donors. These means that the aid flows used in the analysis presented here are actual deliveries, not aid promises from donors.

to facilitate reconstruction and development, helping push along the peace process and strengthening the likelihood that conflict will not re-occur. In the best of all worlds, economic assistance would “gradually rise during the first four years, and gradually taper back to normal levels by the end of the first post-conflict decade” (Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 16). This aid distribution pattern can be seen in the cases of Burundi, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Sudan. OECD/DAC donors attempted to use aid as an incentive to encourage peace. These cases underline the central hypothesis of this research, which posits that this type of increased economic aid pattern can have enduring consequences, and should provide support for the conditions for a lasting peace. It appears logical that the provision of substantial amounts of economic reconstruction and development assistance over an extended period of time should have a positive impact on peace processes (Rothchild and Emmanuel 2006; Emmanuel and Rothchild 2007). However, this is not always the case. Donors do not always support peace agreements with increased aid, as seen with the decreases in aid deliveries to Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, or Somalia.

Understandably, rebuilding from the destruction of protracted warfare can prove extremely costly. Infrastructure lies in tatters and agricultural capacity is frequently devastated. A prolonged increase in aid can help rebuild the capacity of the economies in countries shattered by an internal conflict. Furthermore, under such conditions, donor contributions towards reconstruction and development can play a large part in keeping the warring parties on the path to reconciliation once the process of peace implementation begins. This offer of economic assistance should provide a significant incentive to bargaining parties to sign on to agreements and stick to them.

Centrally, donor aid presents them with resources for use in co-opting support from their various constituencies. The hope is that the offer is enticing enough to harden "the political resolve of internal actors to maintain the momentum of the peace process" (Boyce 1996: 130). In pattern 1 cases, we argue that aid donors can exert a considerable amount of influence on the behavior of the various actors negotiating peace accords.

Pattern 2: No Increase in Post-Conflict Economic Aid

Cases in Pattern 2 see no increase in their aid allocations during a peace process, leaving a flat aid distribution. Here donors have little faith in the peace process or the former warring parties and decide to maintain previous economic aid levels, but not to fund additional reconstruction and development projects. This aid distribution pattern does not have a positive impact on the ability of the former warring parties to reach a lasting peace. Since aid incentives are expected to help encourage bargaining and therefore facilitate peace, maintaining the size of the aid pie would not change the willingness of the combatting parties to continue the peace process. In these instances, there is no peace incentive and donors do not provide any significant increase in aid after the termination of the conflict. Cote d'Ivoire during the 2005 Pretoria Agreement is a clear example of this pattern.

Pattern 3: A Decrease in Post-Conflict Economic Aid

A surprisingly common pattern seen in this research is a significant decline in economic aid across the five years following a peace agreement (compared with the aid levels in the five years before a peace accord). In these cases, donors demonstrate a complete lack

of confidence in the given peace process and opt not to provide their support for it. One can distinguish a number of cases that follow this negative aid pattern, including Chad, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, and Somalia, among others. This type of aid distribution does not represent an incentive for actors involved in peace process, and does not appear to support their efforts to secure peace. However, Pattern 3 brings up an important general point concerning peace processes and aid incentives. Flows of international donor assistance are the result of donor choices, based on their perceived national interests and the desire to have their aid programs look successful. This means that donors may decide only to send their assistance to recipients that they believe are highly likely to achieve a lasting peace. Donors may select not to fund peace processes in which they have little confidence. For example, critical international aid providers such as France and Germany decided to reduce funding to Chad across most of its failed peace processes since 1989 (Emmanuel and Rothchild 2007). That is to say, donors actively send their economic aid to recipients that they believe will have successful peace processes, and denying it to those that they think will fail. This concentration of assistance to support cases that appear to be on the right track strengthens this study's claims that aid can be used to facilitate peace, but that there are also limits to the impact of donor aid. This needs to be explored in future research.

Conclusion:

This study asks two critical questions. First, how does economic assistance influence the success or failure of peace processes in Africa? Second, can economic assistance act as an incentive to

facilitate an end to conflict? The literature on the subject largely ignores aid as a factor supporting peace processes. In addressing this topic, the current study tries to assess the impact of donor economic aid on recent African peace processes. This research points to the conclusion that international assistance can be a positive incentive for a lasting peace if provided as an incentive for peace.

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