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目　次

タマサート大学―創価大学共同セミナー

Role of Research and Pedagogy in the Promotion of Peace,
Sustainable Development and Global Citizenship

研究所報

(Soka University) Peace Research

No. 34, 2019

Contents

Preface

Special Issue

Special Symposium at Jeju National University

Peace Forum 2019

Conflict, Cooperation, and Peace in East Asia

Thammasat University — Soka University Joint Seminar

Role of Research and Pedagogy in the Promotion of Peace,
Sustainable Development and Global Citizenship

Presentation

Reports of SUPRI Research Projects

Announcements

<u>**巻 頭 言**</u>

SDGs へのチャレンジと価値創造

<div align="center">創価大学平和問題研究所 所長　**玉　井　秀　樹**</div>

　2019年秋、人間の安全保障担当の国連事務総長特別顧問である高須幸雄先生が進められてきた「人間の安全保障指標」をつくるというプロジェクトが結実し、『全国データ　SDGS と日本　誰も取り残されないための人間の安全保障指標』が上梓された。

　同プロジェクトは高須先生の下、NPO 法人「人間の安全保障フォーラム」及び人間の安全保障学会の有志によって進められてきた。平和問題研究所として筆者も打ち合わせ会合に参加させていただき、また、佐々木諭教授は高齢者問題の分野の執筆を担当している。

　なぜ、人間の安全保障の達成状況・課題を日本でこそ指標化すべきなのかという、このプロジェクトの企図・意義については本書を手に取って確かめていただければと思うが、「すべての人が価値ある人間として敬意を持って受け入れられるように尊厳をいかに確保するかが現在の日本社会で重要な課題である」との指摘がとりわけ重要な点であろう。なぜなら、筆者はこの視点が平和学の今日的課題の中心をなしていると考えるからである。

　平和学における中心的問題関心は何かということについては、研究者によってその見解を異にするであろうが、筆者は平和学の中心課題、すなわち達成すべき平和の認識・定義は以下のように変化してきたと考えている。

　1950年代に米ソ核戦争勃発の危険性の高まりの中で、人類を絶滅させかねないこの戦争をいかに回避するかということが世界的関心となった。世界平和運

動や原水禁運動が広がり、ラッセル・アインシュタイン宣言に呼応してパグウォッシュ会議が開催される時期である。平和学／平和研究はそうした核戦争回避の運動の一翼を担う形で「戦争防止の学」として誕生した。つまり、「戦争のない世界」としての平和を生み出すための科学として出発したといえよう。

1960年代に入るとキューバ危機を経て米ソ関係は変化し、米ソ核戦争の危険度は下がったとみなされるようになる一方で、国際平和研究学会などを舞台として、「戦争さえなければ平和といえるのか」という鋭い問題提起がなされることになる。南北問題として取り上げられるようになる経済格差・貧困が人々の生命を奪うほどの苛烈さを持つことが指摘され、このような社会的不正義を糾すことこそ平和研究のめざすべき進路であるとの議論がなされた。

社会的不正義を解消する方途として暴力革命すら主張する研究者に対して、暴力を行使することなく社会的不正義を解消すべきと応答したのがヨハン・ガルトゥングであった。彼の暴力論が提示されたことで、平和研究者の多くが「暴力のない世界」としての平和をめぐる研究に取り組んできたといってよいだろう。

ガルトゥングは、人間の潜在的可能性の発現を妨げる働きを暴力と定義したが、より実践的には人々の生存を脅かす戦争や革命に象徴されるような直接的暴力、極度の貧困のような構造的暴力の解消が取り組むべき課題と認識されてきた。ガルトゥングは、直接・間接の暴力を生み出す素地として文化、価値観の問題を重視し、暴力を容認する文化的暴力を指摘している。

我々、人類社会もこうした暴力に無策でいたわけではない。国際連合が創設され、主権国家による武力行使は統制されてきたし、国連を舞台として世界人権宣言が採択され、国際的な人権擁護レジームの整備をすすめ、また、UNDPなど貧困問題解消のための国際的取り組みがなされてきた。1989年には米ソ首脳が冷戦終結を宣言し、平和的国際秩序の形成が期待された。

しかしながら、21世紀を目前にして、武力紛争による大量殺戮が再び繰り広げられ、かつてない規模の難民が生み出され、経済格差が拡大するという、様々な暴力が横行する時代になった。乗り越えたはずの人間の危機に直面し

て、国際社会における新たな行動規範として改めて人間の尊厳が注目されることになったのである。そして、「人間の安全保障」は UNDP が提示したアイデアから発展し、人間が尊厳をもって生きることめざす規範概念となってきた。筆者は、「人間の安全保障」概念が示す「あらゆる人が尊厳をもって生きる自由」を妨げる働きこそ今日の平和学が第一義的に取り組むべき「暴力」であろうと考えている。

　平和学における学問的研究課題として、そのような「暴力」の存在を究明することも重要であるが、「暴力」を乗り越えて「平和」＝「あらゆる人が尊厳をもって生きる自由」をどう実現するかということがさらに重要であろう。前掲の『SDGs と日本』でも示されているが、SDGs は「あらゆる人が尊厳をもって生きる自由」を実現するための行動計画であるともいえよう。

　その"実効性"について、慶応大学の蟹江憲史教授は「グローバル・ガバナンスの新戦略」という観点で評価されている。国際社会における各アクターが、"法"の強制力によってではなく、自主的に「野心的な目標」の達成を競い合うという効果をもたらすという指摘である。

　このような分析に触れて想起されるのは、創価教育の創始者である牧口常三郎先生のいわば出世作である『人生地理学』(1903年）における生存競争としての人類社会の発展段階についての論述である。

　牧口は、軍事的競争時代、政治的競争時代を経て当時を経済的競争の時代にあると論じたうえで、「経済的闘争時代に代わって、次に来るべきものは、人道的競争形式ならん」と予見した。ここでいう人道的方式とは「その目的を利己主義にのみ置かずして、自己とともに他の生活をも保護し、増進せしめんとするにあり。反言すれば、他のためにし、他を益しつつ自己も益する方法を選ぶにあり」ということであり、100年以上前に今日のグローバル・ガバナンス戦略を予見されていたのではないかとも思えるのである。

　牧口の言を借りれば、本学もこの人道的競争に誇りをもって参画すべく、SDGs 達成に取り組んでいるところであり、国連アカデミック・インパクトに参加している他、多くの国連機関との協力を進めている。そして、創立50周年へ向けて、2020年には「価値創造×SDGs」をテーマとして一連の諸行事を開

催していく。

　韓国・慶南大学と台湾・中国文化大学との共同プロジェクトである「ピース・フォーラム」も、2019年に慶南大学主催で、済州島にて盛会のうちに開催された。そして、同プロジェクトの継続が3大学間で了承され、2020年には再び本学主催で開催される予定である。今回は、平和と発展のための協働のネットワークをアジアに広げていくための新しい方途を創造しゆくフォーラムとしていきたい。

　2019年には、5月に韓国の済州大学平和研究所と学術交流を取り交わしたのをはじめ、8月にはタイのマヒドン大学平和・人権研究所、2020年に1月には韓国の韓信大学平和・公共性センターとも交流協定を調印することができた。また、すでに大学間包括交流協定を結んでいる広島大学の広島大学平和センターとも平和教育プログラムの開発を中心とした協力をすすめている。

　こうして着実に広がりつつある交流関係をもとに、ピース・フォーラム、「価値創造×SDGs」イベントを成功させ、関係諸機関にその成果を還元できるように取り組んでいきたいと考えている。

池田大作先生「済州大学名誉文学博士号」授与
20周年記念シンポジウム

「平和の橋の構築」

2019年 5 月14日
済州国立大学・韓国

プログラム

挨　拶　　　済州大学　宋錫彦（オン・ソクオン）総長
　　　　　　創価大学　馬場善久学長

１部：「法と平和」　　　　　　　司会：キム・ブチャン教授

【報告】　中山雅司（創大法学部教授）
　　　　　「21世紀の平和と国際法 ─ 人間の安全保障のための世界秩序構築を
　　　　　目指して ─ 」
　　　　　コ・ポンジン（済州大法科大学院教授）
　　　　　「法と平和」
【討論】　尹龍澤（創大法科大学院教授）
　　　　　コ・ホソン（済州大法科大学院教授）

２部：「世界市民と平和教育」　　司会：イ・チャンイク教授

【報告】　中山賢司（創大法学部准教授）
　　　　　「日韓協力関係の新展開と世界市民教育 ─「漂着ごみ」をめぐるクロ

スボーダー・コーポレーションを事例として ── 」

チョ・ソンユン（済州大平和研究所所長）

「戦争の記憶と平和教育」

【討論】 玉井秀樹（創大平和問題研究所所長）

イ・ソヨン（済州大社会教育科教授）

論　　説

21世紀の平和と国際法
── 人間の安全保障のための世界秩序構築を目指して ──

<div align="center">創価大学法学部 教授　中　山　雅　司</div>

１．はじめに
── 創立者池田大作先生の平和への信念と創価大学の理念 ──

　本日は、平和の島、済州島で開催されたこのような記念の場で発表の機会を与えていただき、光栄に存じます。大変にありがとうございます。私は創価大学法学部の中山雅司と申します。私の専門は、国際法、国連研究、および平和学で、とくに平和の実現に法が果たす役割について関心をもってきました。そこで、本日は、「21世紀の平和と国際法 ── 人間の安全保障のための世界秩序構築を目指して ── 」とのテーマでお話をさせていただきます。

　本学の創立者池田大作先生は、創価大学の創立にあたり、「人類の平和を守るフォートレスたれ」との建学の理念を示して下さいました。創立者がなぜ平和運動に生涯を捧げてこられたのか。創立者はこのことについて、ヨーロッパ科学芸術アカデミー会長で心臓外科の権威でもあるフェリックス・ウンガー博士との対談のなかで明確に述べられています[1]。三点あります。一つはご自身の戦争体験です。第２次世界大戦で池田先生は長兄を喪い、空襲で家も失いました。その長兄の遺骨を抱きかかえ、身体を震わせて悲しむお母様の姿を見て、二度とこんな悲劇を繰り返してはならないと若き池田先生は決意されました。二つめは、師の精神の継承です。第２次大戦のさなか、生命尊厳の哲学である日蓮大聖人の仏法の精神のままに立ち上がったのが、創価学会の牧口常三

郎初代会長であり、池田先生の師匠である戸田城聖第二代会長です。軍国主義
と戦った両会長は逮捕され、牧口会長は獄死しました。生きて出獄した戸田会
長は、師匠・牧口会長の精神を継いで平和への闘争を開始されました。その師
匠・戸田会長が叫んだ「この地上から悲惨の二字をなくしたい」との精神の継
承のために行動することが人生のすべてであると池田先生は言われています。
三つめは、仏法者としての社会的使命です。すなわち、苦悩する民衆を前にし
て、座して思索にふけるのではなく、「抜苦与楽」のために立ちあがっていく
「同苦」と「行動」にこそ、大乗仏教の魂があると池田先生は述べられていま
す。

　ところで、池田先生が執筆された小説『人間革命』の冒頭は、「戦争ほど、
残酷なものはない。戦争ほど悲惨なものはない」との一節で始まっていま
す[2]。そして、『新・人間革命』は、「平和ほど、尊きものはない。平和ほど、
幸福なものはない。平和こそ、人類の進むべき、根本の第一歩であらねばなら
ない。」との言葉で始まっています[3]。つまり、「戦争」と「平和」をテーマに
創価学会の歴史と師弟の精神を綴られたのが『人間革命』であり、『新・人間
革命』であります。すなわち、池田先生の思想と行動はまさに平和な世界をど
う築くかという一点にあるといってもよいと確信します。三代会長の悲願とし
て「人類の平和を守るフォートレスたれ」との建学の理念を掲げて創立された
創価大学の使命もその一点にあると思います。この平和な世界への願いは、私
たち日韓の国民の願いだけでなく、世界の人々の願望であることは言うまでも
ありません。

２．世界の現状と国際秩序における「法の支配」

　20世紀は、２度の世界大戦、そして東西冷戦に象徴されるように、まさに
「戦争と暴力の世紀」でした。しかし、21世紀は「平和と人権の世紀」にしな
ければならないとの願いとは裏腹に、現実の世界には、解決困難な課題が山積
しています。国家間の対立や紛争のみならず、グローバリゼーションの進展
は、貧富の格差の拡大や地球環境問題、難民・移民問題、異文化間の衝突、排

外主義の台頭など、人類の生存を脅かすような地球的課題をもたらしています。しかし、このような紛争や対立は今に始まったことではありません。問題は、様々な課題を最終的に強制や軍事力によって解決しようとしてきたところにあります。領土と国民を守ることは国家の安全保障において重要な要素ではありますが、そのために軍備を増強し、結果として戦争を繰り返してきたともいえます。古代ローマの格言に「平和のためには戦争の準備をせよ」という言葉がありますが、平和のために戦争をするというまさに逆説の歴史が人類の歴史であったともいえます。この「戦争の文化」を「平和の文化」にいかに転じていくかが、私たちに課せられた重要な課題であります。言い換えるならば、いかに平和を暴力によらない平和的手段によって築いていくかということです。なぜなら、人間の犠牲の上に成り立つ平和は真の平和とはいえないからです。その意味で私は、国際社会の平和秩序の構築と繁栄のために国際法の果たす役割は大きいと考えます。

　そこで、国際法が国際社会のなかで占める位置と役割について、国際秩序というより広い視点からみてみたいと思います。国際秩序は一般に大きく３つの分野がそれぞれ機能しながら、交錯するなかで国際社会が方向づけられるシステムとしてみることができます。それは、第一に「安全保障・外交の秩序」であり、第二に「経済・金融の秩序」であり、第三に「価値や原則に基づく秩序」という３つの秩序です。これらを第２次大戦後の国際秩序にあてはめて考えれば、「安全保障・外交の秩序」としては、米英仏中露の戦勝５ヵ国が中心となる国連安全保障理事会や NPT 体制、また NATO や日米安保条約など米国を中心とした軍事同盟、様々な地域機構があげられます。「経済・金融の秩序」としては、世界銀行や IMF、WTO などの国際機関やユーロ圏や TPP などの地域経済圏、自由貿易協定があげられます。これらの分野では、それぞれ軍事力および経済力が中心的なパワーとして機能しているといえます。これに対して、価値や原則に基づく秩序に該当するものが、主権の平等や内政不干渉、法の支配、人権や自由の尊重、武力行使の禁止などで、法や倫理を重視するソフトパワーが働く秩序といえます。これら３つの秩序は、「力の体系」、「利益の体系」、「価値の体系」からなる三層構造としてとらえることができ、

複雑に絡み合いながら国際秩序を形成しているといえます。昨年（2018年）、亡くなられた日本を代表する国際法学者の大沼保昭氏は、遺著の『国際法』において、「国際社会は、弱肉強食、駆け引きと暴力が跋扈する不条理の世界である」と表現し、そのなかで法の働く余地があるのか、あるとしたらどのように機能するのかと問いかけていますが[4]、力の支配や力による現状の変更がとくに目につく昨今の国際関係のなかで、法の支配を広げていくことが一層求められていると考えます。

３．国際法の発展と「平和」

　かつて日本を代表する国際法学者であった田畑茂二郎先生は、国際法の目指すところは、法による平和の実現であると述べています[5]。国際法の父と称されるフーゴ・グロティウスがヨーロッパにおけるキリスト教徒間の悲惨な30年戦争を目の当たりにして『戦争と平和の法』を著したのは1625年のことですが、そのタイトルが示すように国際法は「戦争と平和の法」ともいえます。その戦争を経て、1648年に開かれたウェストファリア講和会議を出発点として、主権国家が併存する現在の国際社会の原型ができあがります。その主権国家間の関係を規律する規範として誕生した国際法は、その後、国際社会の地理的範囲をヨーロッパから北中南米、そしてアジア、アフリカへと広げるとともに、科学技術の発展にあわせて規律の対象領域を海洋や宇宙などに広げながら発展を遂げてきました。しかし、19世紀までの近代国際法の時代は、「平和」は国家間の秩序の安定としてとらえられ、国際法はそのための国家相互の権限の調整をおもな役割としていました。その結果、国際社会としては、各国内の人権や正義には目をつぶってきたともいえます。

　そのようななか、20世紀初頭に第１次世界大戦が起き、国際法は戦争の規制に大きく舵を切るとともに、第２次大戦時のナチス・ドイツによるユダヤ人のホロコーストを契機として、これまで国内問題とされてきた人権の国際的保障に乗り出すようになりました。そこにおける「平和」とは、紛争や戦争のない状態にとどまらず、人権や人道、非植民地化、地球環境の保護などの正義の実

現をも意味するようになりました。また、経済的、社会的分野での国際協力の行為規範としても国際法は重要な役割を果たすようになっていきました。そして、今や国際法は、紛争の解決や安全保障のような国家や国民全体の大問題だけでなく、グローバル化の進展にともなって、国民の日常生活にも深く入り込むようになりました。食材の購入やネット通信などをとっても、貿易や国際通信を規律する国際法なしには成り立ちません。さらに、2017年末時点で過去最高の6850万人に上った難民問題を考えるうえでの法的枠組みとしての難民条約や地球温暖化の防止に対するパリ協定など、人権や経済、環境、さらにサイバー攻撃やAI兵器への対応に至るまで、人々の共存と協力、地球的課題への取り組みに国際法は不可欠の存在となっています。

　このような国際法の果たす機能について、ハーバード大学教授のジョセフ・ナイは、① predictability（予測可能性）と② legitimacy（正統性）の2つの機能をあげています[6]。predictability とは、国際法が存在するおかげで対立や摩擦が武力紛争に発展することを防ぐ機能のことであり、legitimacy は、国際法を遵守することが国家の正統性を高めることにつながるという機能のことです。その意味で、国際法はソフトパワーのひとつともいえます。

4．人権の主流化、人間の安全保障と国際法の課題

　ところで、本年（2019年）は冷戦終結から30年の節目を迎えます。この30年、国際社会は大きく変化しました。冷戦の終結は、国家間の軍事的、イデオロギー対立の終焉を意味し、その結果、内戦、テロ、貧困、人権、難民、環境問題等々、さまざまな脅威の顕在化と多様化をもたらしました。同時に冷戦の終結は、機能麻痺に陥っていた国連安保理の活性化をもたらしました。しかし、その変化は国際法にも新たな対応を迫るようになりました。国連が構想した集団安全保障体制は、本来、侵略や国家間紛争、すなわち国家間の平和を前提としたものであるとともに、国連憲章に体現された現代国際法秩序は、国家の主権平等と国内管轄事項への不干渉原則を基本としていることから、冷戦後の紛争の大半を占める国内紛争や内戦の過程で発生した重大な非人道的行為

に対して、国際社会はどのように対処すべきであるかが問われるようになりました。このようななか、1999年、旧ユーゴのコソボへのNATOによる介入をきっかけにいわゆる「人道的介入（Humanitarian Intervention）」をめぐる議論が巻き起こったことはよく知られるところです。さらに、介入という言葉につきまとう介入側の論理を緩和し、国家主権との衝突を避け、それを補完する概念として登場したのがいわゆる「保護する責任（Responsbility to Protect）」です。これは、破綻国家など人権保護の第一次的責任者である国家がその責任を全うできない場合には、国際社会がその責任を果たすべく行動を起こさねばならないとする考え方で、2000年9月、カナダ政府による「介入と国家主権に関する国際委員会（ICISS）」報告書で提唱されました[7]。

　こうした動きの底流には、近年の人権の主流化の流れがあるといえます。冷戦の終結は、経済や情報を中心とするグローバリゼーションの進展を加速させるとともに自由、民主主義、人権などの価値の普遍化をもたらしました。このような変化のなかで、国家主権に対する人権・人道の価値が相対的な高まりをみせ、「人権の主流化」という潮流をもたらしました。この潮流は、さらに地域紛争の頻発に伴う大量虐殺や民族浄化などの非人道的行為の発生という事態のなかで、戦争犯罪や人道犯罪の訴追・処罰という動きをもたらしました。旧ユーゴおよびルワンダの国際刑事法廷や国際刑事裁判所（ICC）による訴追・処罰によって国家の免責と不処罰の歴史を乗り越えようとする試みは、ICCが国家主権との関係で補完性の原則には立つものの、法による正義の実現という点において国際法による大きな一歩といえます。さらに、このような脅威の多様化と「人権の主流化」の動きは、安全保障観にも変化をもたらしました。すなわち、国家の領土および人々を外敵から軍事力によって守ることがイコール国民の安全につながるという伝統的な国家の安全保障の考え方に異議を唱え、人間の視点からパラダイムの再構築を促す「人間の安全保障」の概念の登場です[8]。しかし、人間の安全保障の登場は、これまで国際法が用いてきた人権という概念があるなかで人間の安全保障を唱える必要性は何なのか、人権と人間の安全保障の関係をどのように考えればよいのかという問いを国際法に対して投げかけました。その理由としては、「公対公」、「公対私」の関係で保障

される国際法上の権利に対し、冷戦後は内戦等、「私対私」の関係における諸問題が頻発するようになったこと、違法行為に対する事後救済を原則とする国際法上の救済の限界、人権保障を担うべき国家自身による人権侵害や国家の破綻という状況の現出などが考えられますが、様々な変化のなかで、国際法のあり方が問われているともいえます[9]。

　さらに、2015年には、2030年に向けて、貧困に終止符を打ち、地球を保護し、すべての人が平和と豊かさを享受できるようにすることを目指す「持続可能な開発目標」（Sustainable Development Goals : SDGs）が国連において採択されました[10]。このSDGsが掲げる「誰一人取り残さない（No one will be left behind)」社会の実現という理念は、まさに人権と人間の安全保障が実現された社会のことでもあります。この理念は、軍事や政治や経済的競争を超えて人道を新たな指標として、文化、精神性、人格というソフトパワーによって国際社会のあらゆるアクターが切磋琢磨していくことを提唱した創価教育の父、牧口常三郎先生の「人道的競争」の思想と相通じるものでもあります。そして、このSDGsもまた、拘束的な国家間合意としての国際法に新たな視座と問いかけをもたらすものといえます。すなわち、第一に、SDGsは国家の任意に基づく条約などのハードな規範による強制や罰則を通じた実施ではなく、ボトムアップによる目標の設定と自発的実施というソフト・ローによる達成を目指すものであること、第二に、その目標の達成には国家だけでなく、国連、自治体、NGOや市民社会、企業、大学など、あらゆるステークホルダーがパートナーシップにより目標を達成しようとする点などです。

　しかし、国際法も人権や環境、軍縮など各分野ごとに形成されたレジームにおける様々な実施措置を通じて条約の履行をはかってきたわけで、その有用性を何ら否定するものではありません。むしろ、政策概念としての人間の安全保障をより実効性のあるものとしていくうえで、国際法規範の果たす役割は大きいといえます。なぜならば、国家には規範を形成し実現する能力、権力、正当性があることから、具体的、包括的な安全保障のシステムを構築していくことが期待されるからです。しかし、創立者がデンバー大学教授で著名な国際法学者であるナンダ博士との対談で述べられた次の言葉は重要であると考えま

す。すなわち、「今後は"民衆の意思をさらに反映した、民衆の幸福のための国際法"の確立が急務といえましょう。そのためには、国際社会の合意形成に当たって、「国益」より「人類益」を、「国家主権」より「人類主権」を機軸とするシステムへと移行させていく—その根本的な発想転換を実現すべきです。」と[11]。この言葉は、国際法が国益の調整にとどまらず、人類益を反映した「世界法」へと発展すべきとの期待と方向性を示しているように思います。すなわち、国際法が国際社会における「法の支配」を通じて、人間の尊厳に立脚した平和秩序を構築することができるかどうかが問われているということでもあります。

5．おわりに ── 「平和の文化」と地球市民教育 ──

　その点で、池田先生が、今後の平和秩序の構築について、グローバル・ガバナンスの観点から述べられた次の言葉は示唆を与えます。「国家を超えた問題に対応する統治の在り方が、どうあるべきか。(中略) グローバル・ガバナンスを、公正で責任あるものにするためには、大まかに、いくつかのポイントがあります。一つは、グローバル・ガバナンスの要である国連の改革と強化です。次には、『法による支配』を一歩一歩、制度化して行くことです。その試金石として、私は国際刑事裁判所を軌道に乗せることが重要だと思っています。そして、何といっても、ガバナンスを支える民衆の連帯です。」[12]と。これらグローバル・ガバナンスにおいて大切となる「法の支配」、国連、そして民衆の３つは、とかく自国中心に陥りがちな国家の専横をどう緩和するかという観点からみれば、それぞれ「国家を縛る」、「国家をつなぐ」、「国家を動かす」要素に該当するともいえます。

　そして、国連と NGO や市民社会など非国家アクターの役割は、国家による法の支配を広げるうえで一層重要なカギを握ると考えます。とくに、近年、顕著な動きは、国際規範の形成に NGO や市民社会が大きく関わるようになってきている点です。このことから、NGO がリードして成立した対人地雷禁止条約やクラスター爆弾禁止条約、ICC 規程などを称して、「人間の安全保障条約」

と呼ぶ学者もいます。そして、2017年に採択された核兵器禁止条約はその最たるものといえるでしょう[13]。その採択にヒバクシャやICAN、そしてICANとともに当初から協力関係を築き、条約採択に貢献したSGIなどに代表されるNGOや市民社会が多大な貢献をなしたことは、保有国による核抑止の論理を超えて、人道的観点から国際法を通じて核のない世界を築こうとする草の根の連帯の潮流として注目することができます。

　そのためにもグローバルな視野をもって偏狭な国家主義・民族主義・差別主義と闘い、『人類の連帯』を非暴力と対話によって築いていける地球市民の輩出が一層求められていると考えます[14]。そのカギは教育であり、教育交流を通じた「平和の文化」の構築ではないでしょうか。創立者池田先生の済州大学名誉博士号受章20周年の本年は、国連で「平和の文化に関する宣言と行動計画」[15]が採択されてから20周年の節目の年にもあたります。日韓関係を含め、困難な課題を抱える時代であるからこそ、相互の信頼関係と共通言語としての国際法を基礎としながら、両大学と日韓の揺るぎない友情、そして世界の安定と平和をともに築いてまいりたいと思います。その決意を最後に申し述べ、報告とさせていただきます。ご清聴、ありがとうございました[16]。

注
1）池田大作／フェリックス・ウンガー『人間主義の旗を ── 寛容・慈悲・対話 ── 』（東洋哲学研究所、2007年）16-18頁。
2）池田大作『人間革命』第1巻（聖教新聞社、1965年）3頁。
3）池田大作『新・人間革命』第1巻（聖教新聞社、1998年）11頁。
4）大沼保昭『国際法』（ちくま書房、2018年）15-16頁。
5）田畑茂二郎「差別戦争観と無差別戦争観 ── 法による平和をめざして ── 」『講座平和学Ⅱ平和への思想』（早稲田大学出版会、1984年）137頁。
6）Joseph S. Nye Jr. and David A. Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation : An Introduction to Theory and History (9th ed.)*, (Pearson Education Limited 2013) p.209.
7）International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001).
8）UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994*, Oxford University Press, 1994.
9）山形英郎「国際法への挑戦：「人間の安全保障」」佐藤誠／安藤次男『人間の安全

保障』（東信堂、2004年）38-42頁。

10）A/RES/70/1, 25 September 2015, *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*.

11）池田大作／ベッド・P・ナンダ『インドの精神 ── 仏教とヒンズー教 ── 』（東洋哲学研究所、2005年）321頁。

12）池田大作／R・D・ホフライトネル『見つめあう西と東 ── 人間革命と地球革命 ── 』（第三文明社、2005年）、156頁。

13）A/CONF.229/2017/8（http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8）.

14）池田大作／R・D・ホフライトネル『前掲書』（注12）123頁。また、コロンビア大学講演では、「地球市民」の要件として、一、生命の相関性を深く認識しゆく「智慧の人」、二、人種や民族や文化の"差異"を恐れたり、拒否するのではなく、尊重し、理解し、成長の糧としゆく「勇気の人」、三、身近に限らず、遠いところで苦しんでいる人々にも同苦し、連帯しゆく「慈悲の人」の３つを示されている（コロンビア大学講演「地球市民教育への一考察」1996年６月13日）。

15）A/RES/53/243, 6 October 1999, *Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace*.

16）本稿は、2019年5月14日に韓国済州大学で行われた、創価大学創立者池田大作先生の名誉文学博士号学位授与20周年を記念する済州大学と創価大学の共同学術シンポジウムでの発表をまとめたものである。

日韓海峡圏における越境地域協力と
地球市民教育
——海岸漂着ごみをめぐる環境教育協力の事例考察——

創価大学法学部 准教授　中　山　賢　司

はじめに

　本稿は、日韓海峡圏における越境地域協力（Cross-Border Cooperation=CBC）について、地球市民教育（Global Citizenship Education=GCED）の視角から事例考察を行うものである。具体的には、海岸漂着ごみをめぐる「環境教育協力」に焦点を当て、日韓海峡圏における環境教育型 CBC の実態把握と課題の抽出を行う。これにより、東アジア CBC 研究に新たな分析視角を提示するとともに、国際社会単位の組み替えの可能性に迫ることが目的である。

　冷戦終焉後、世界各地で興隆してきた CBC は[1]、東アジアでも緩やかな深化と拡大を見せている[2]。ただし、欧州で先行する CBC が主に陸で国境を挟んで接する地域間協力であるのに対し[3]、東アジアで見られる CBC の多くは海に敷かれた国境線を挟む地域間協力である。1994年に発効した「海洋法に関する国際連合条約」（1982年採択）によって、これまで主権が直接及ばないとされてきた海域にも、沿岸国の主権的権利、管轄権といった排他的権限が及ぶことになった。これにより、東アジアの海の境界にも相互排他的な国境線が敷かれ、権益と勢力圏をめぐる沿岸国間の対立が1990年代から顕在化してきた。東アジアの海域を挟む CBC は、ややもすればこうした沿岸国による「再境界化（re-bordering）」のための道具のようにも映る。

　しかし他方で、CBC は国家内部のより小さな単位（地方政府、地場企業、民族など）が主体となることから、国家を行為体の基本単位とする既存の国際社会体系に修正を迫るものとしても期待されている。換言すれば、従来の国際秩序の基本にあった領域性を組み替える「脱境界化（de-bordering）」のダイナミズムであり、それが「越境下位地域（transborder subregion）」[4] を生成するという期待である（図 1）。実際、東アジアでは、日韓海峡圏、環黄海圏、環日本海圏、環東シナ海圏などの出現ないしは構想が喧伝されてきた[5]。

　図 1　CBC と領域性の再編

　　注：実線で示した領域がナショナル（主権国家）、ローカル（地方）はその中に
　　　　収まるものとして制度的存在論の次元から図示した。リージョン（地域）と
　　　　トランスボーダー・サブリージョン（越境下位地域）は生成途上であり、東
　　　　アジアにおいて現時点では明確に確定し得ないため破線で示した。
　　出所：筆者作成。

　このように東アジアの海域を挟む CBC は、「再境界化」と「脱境界化」という政治・経済・社会的な力学が複雑に交差する社会現象と言える。果たして、東アジアで深化・拡大する海の CBC は、沿岸国による「再境界化」のための道具に過ぎないのか、それとも既存の国際社会単位を組み替える「脱境界化」のダイナミズムとなり得るのか。

　この点、既存の東アジア CBC に関する研究は、局地経済圏研究やボーダー・スタディーズなどが主流で、地域側の主体性や既存の国際秩序を問い直そうとする視点は弱い。前者は経済面に焦点を当てた生産圏・物流圏などの形成を重視し[6]、後者はボーダーそのものをめぐる歴史的議論あるいはツーリズ

ムを通じた地域活性化に議論が集中している[7]。これに対し、社会集団のアイデンティティの多元化に注目するアプローチは、国際社会単位の組み替え現象に関心を寄せる[8]。地域の個人や社会集団（非国家行為体）のアイデンティティの帰属先が所属国だけでなく、CBC やその活動空間にも向けられ、それらの相互作用（間主観）が新しい国際社会単位を創造することへの期待である[9]。しかしながら、東アジア CBC にみる社会集団のアイデンティティに関する解明は、いまだ考察途上にあり、方法論をはじめとして研究上の課題は少なくない。

　そこで本稿では、社会集団のアイデンティティの多元化に接近する一つの方法として、GCED を手掛かりに考察を加えてみたい。GCED は人々に多元的なアイデンティティを刻印する方法論として、最近とみに注目を集め始めているからである[10]。以下では、日韓海峡圏 CBC をケースに、GCED の一形態としての「環境教育協力」の事例考察を行う。これにより、日韓海峡圏におけるCBC の特性を一般化して描き出してみたい。

１．分析枠組みの検討

（１）平和学と GCED

　周知の通り、1950年代に核戦略批判から出発した平和学は、1960年代後半、平和ならざる状態[11]、構造的暴力[12] などの新たな概念提起を受け、1970年代を通じて、貧困・格差、人権、環境といった問題群をその対象に包摂していった[13]。その後、冷戦の終焉、９・11テロなどを経て、平和学の射程は、security という術語を共有する形で安全保障研究との対話が進み、人間の安全保障（human security）へと深化する一方で、UNESCO（国際連合教育科学文化機関）による「平和の文化（Culture for Peace）」の提言などもあって、平和教育分野で拡大を見せてきた[14]。

　特に平和教育分野では、UNESCO を中心に、各種の国際プロジェクトが展開してきた[15]。中でも、2002年のヨハネスブルグ・サミットで「持続可能な開発のための教育（Education for Sustainable Development=ESD）」の

重要性が確認されたことを受け、2005年からは「国連 ESD の10年（United Nations Decade of ESD=UNDESD）」が開始された[16]。現在はその後継プログラムとして、「ESD に関するグローバル・アクション・プログラム（GAP）」が世界各地で展開している[17]。この ESD と並走する形で、最近とみに注目を集め始めているのが、GCED である。その出発点は2012年9月に潘基文国連事務総長（当時）が提起した「グローバル教育第一イニシアティブ（Global Education First Initiative=GEFI）」にある[18]。つまり、GEFI の三つの優先分野の一つに、「地球市民性（Global Citizenship）の育成」が掲げられたのであった[19]。これを受け、UNESCO は取組みを強化し、2013年8月に「GCED プログラム」を開始した。そして2015年9月、国連サミットで採択された「持続可能な開発目標（Sustainable Development Goals=SDGs）」で、「万人のための質の高い教育」（目標4）を達成するためのターゲットの一つに GCED が明記された[20]。

　このように平和学の一角を担う平和教育分野では、国際理解教育、開発教育、人権教育、ESD などを経て、現在は GCED が中核的テーマとなりつつある。とはいえ、GCED はその抽象性・包括性ゆえに論争的な概念であることは論を俟たない。UNESCO による定義を確認しておけば、GCED とは、より公正、平和、寛容、包摂、安全、持続可能な世界を実現するために、学習者が必要となる知識、技能、価値と態度を育てる枠組みを示すものであるという[21]。そしてその中心的な概念は次の3つから成る。すなわち、①認識面（Cognitive）として、グローバル、リージョナル、ナショナル、ローカルな問題群、異なる国々ないしは人々における相互関係性及び相互依存性についての知識、理解、批判的思考などを獲得すること。②社会情緒面（Socio-emotional）として、人類社会全体への所属感覚、価値と責任の共有、共感、連帯、そして相違と多様性への尊重などを持つこと。③行動面（Behavioural）として、より平和的かつ持続可能な世界を築くために、ローカル、ナショナル、グローバルな次元で有効かつ責任を持った行動をとること、などである[22]。

（２）GCED によるアイデンティティの多元化

　もとより本稿は、GCED に関する具体的な教育プログラムや教育哲学など
を考察することが目的ではない[23]。本稿が着目するのは、前述したように、
GCED が多元的アイデンティティの育成を理念に掲げている点にある。小林
によれば、国連が教育の最優先課題として学習者のアイデンティティのあり方
自体に踏み込んだ提言を行うのは歴史上初めてのことであり、GEFI は教育の
あり方の根本的なパラダイム転換になったという[24]。GCED による「地球市
民アイデンティティ」とは、決して「国民アイデンティティ」や「民族アイデ
ンティティ」を否定するものではなく、むしろそれらを肯定しながら、人々
に多元的なアイデンティティを刻印することを重視している[25]。換言すれば、
「ひとつの帰属集団だけに自己を固着的に投入させるのではなく、複数の異な
る、そして時には相互に矛盾するような帰属集団に自己を同時に深く関与させ
ながら、しかもパーソナリティとしての統合を失わないような自己のあり方」
を指すのが、多元的アイデンティティである[26]。

　しかし、GCED が掲げるその理念の具体化は決して容易ではない。GCED
はその実践面において、以下の点に留意が必要であろう。第 1 に、「地球市民」
という西欧出自の特殊概念が孕む問題である。そもそも近代西欧における市民
像は有産の名望家を指す概念であった。現代においてその意味は希薄になって
いるものの、西欧以外の地域における市民像は実に多様である。主権国家の成
り立ちが西欧と異なる東アジア諸国を見てみても、いわゆる「地球市民性」が
醸成される土壌は脆弱と言わざるを得ない。「地球市民」という未だ成熟して
いない言説がレトリックとなって、ともすると西欧的価値を浸透させるコロニ
アルな実践に結び付きかねない。

　第 2 に、教育という営みに伏在する権力性の側面である。戦時中の日本の教
育勅語を例に出すまでもなく、教育は国家と国民（臣民）を媒介するものとし
て、時に国策連動的な権力作用として機能することは否めない。戦争に関する
「個人の記憶」も、教育を通じて国家の集合的記憶、いわゆる「国民の記憶」
に塗り替えられ、ナショナリズムの源泉ともなって国家間のコンフリクトを引
き起こす。現在の日韓関係悪化の根底にあるものも、こうした「国民の記憶」

をめぐる「視差ビジョン（parallax vision）」[27] に他ならない。平和・共生という目的を掲げつつも、現実にはコンフリクトのための独立変数と化してしまう教育の陥穽がここに見られる。

　そして第3に、世界各地で台頭している自国優先主義やナショナリズムとの緊張関係である[28]。周知のとおり、米国トランプ大統領の自国第一主義、英国の欧州連合（EU）離脱、各地での移民排斥など、現代世界では自国家へのアイデンティファイを強める復古主義的な動きが活発である。この潮流の中で、「地球市民アイデンティティ」という理念が色褪せ、実践の段階において骨抜きになりかねない。

　GCED が孕むこうした問題性を克服し、多元的アイデンティティの育成という本来の理念を堅持するためには何が求められるのか。この点、UNESCO は、GCED が掲げる概念と現地（ローカル）の概念との共通性、連関性を強調している[29]。だが、GCED による理念とその普遍性の解明は難事業であり、ESD との関係性も含め、具体像は判然としていない。思うに、GCED による多元的アイデンティティの育成という理念の背景には、UNESCO が主張してきた「学習の4本柱」のうちの「共に生きることを学ぶ」(Learning to live together, Learning to live with others) という「共生」観があると思われる[30]。だとすれば、この「共生」という理念に伏在する権力性・排他性（「他者否定・自者肯定」の論理）を炙り出した環日本海圏研究の先達・渋谷武の論が想起される。ここに、GCED が孕む問題との共通性とその克服の方途が浮き彫りになる。渋谷はこの「共生」を超克する理念として、「他者肯定」という積極的な主体性を媒介とした「他者肯定・自者肯定」という「協生」観を打ち出した[31]。GCED が孕む問題性を克服する一つとして、渋谷による「協生」観が導きの糸となり得るのではないだろうか。

（3）「協生」の環境教育協力

　渋谷の「協生」観と最も親和的な分野が、本稿が着目する「国境を超えた環境教育協力」に他ならない。なぜならば、環境問題は多くの場合、ローカル、ナショナル、リージョナル、グローバルな問題が相互に深く関連し、複雑な因

果関係の網のなかにある[32]。したがって、環境教育は、加害者を追及する排他的な「犯人捜し」という要素（他者否定・自者肯定）よりも、双方向の因果性を理解し、内省を促す要素（他者肯定・自者肯定）を強くもつ。しかもその因果性の対象は対人間だけなく、対自然をも含む生命の相関性への洞察とつながる。さらに言えば、過去・現在・未来という時間軸を紡ぐものともなる。だからこそ、環境教育型の CBC は、ローカル次元からの「協生」の具体的展開となり、多元的アイデンティティの刻印という GCED 本来の理念と親和的となる[33]。

　中でも、海岸漂着ごみ問題は、自然環境の破壊のみならず、漁業への被害、景観の悪化、さらに人々の生活や健康を脅かす問題であり[34]、近年重要な政策課題に浮上している[35]。海洋ごみによって被害を受ける地方自治体にとっては対策が急務であり、多様な主体の参加[36]、国境超えた連携・協力が不可避である[37]。したがって、海岸漂着ごみをめぐる環境教育協力は、「協生」のための実践としても格好の題材であろう。

　とはいえ、以上の分析視角はこれまで国際関係論分野では手つかずの課題であり、特に東アジアにおける環境教育型 CBC については、その実態把握や意義の解明などはほとんど積み残されてきた。そこで以下では、日韓海峡圏の CBC をケースに、海岸漂着ごみの環境教育協力に焦点を当て、実態把握と特徴の抽出を行いたい。以下、日韓海峡圏の CBC を複数の地方単位からなるマルチラテラルな CBC と、２つの地方単位からなるバイラテラルな CBC とに分けて事例考察を行う。

２．日韓海峡圏のマルチラテラルな CBC

（１）日韓海峡沿岸県市道交流知事会議の特徴

　まず、日韓海峡圏のマルチラテラルな CBC としては、「日韓海峡沿岸県市道交流知事会議（以下、日韓海峡知事会議）」がある。日韓海峡知事会議は、地理的・歴史的に深い関係にある九州北部三県（福岡県、佐賀県、長崎県）と韓国南岸一市三道（釜山広域市、全羅南道、慶尚南道、済州特別自治道）と

の間で1992年８月25日に発足した[38]。両地域の発展と緊密な友好関係を促進することを目的に、毎年１回首長が一堂に会し、意見交換や情報交流を行う「政策対話」の場を輪番制で開催してきた（表１）。加えて、水産、環境、青少年、観光といった幅広い分野で「共同交流事業」を実施してきた（表２）。

　日韓海峡知事会議の特徴を挙げれば、以下の４点に整理できる。第１に、日韓関係の悪化という政治状況に左右されることなく、首長同士の対話が継続してきたことである。2012年８月に李明博韓国大統領（当時）が竹島／独島を訪問し、日韓関係が急速に悪化した際も、その２か月後の10月には慶尚南道昌原市で第21回会議が開催された。また2018年秋以降、元徴用工らへの賠償を日本企業に命じた韓国大法院判決を機に日韓関係が悪化する中にあっても、同年11月には釜山広域市で第27回会議、翌2019年12月には長崎県で第28回会議が開催されている。こうしたローカル次元の主体性に基づくトップ交流および実務者交流が、国家間関係のレジリエント（復元力）に果たす役割は小さくはないだろう[39]。

　第２に、公式の地域間協定や常設事務局などを持たない緩やかな対話型フォーラムという点である。東北アジア６ヶ国78広域地方政府が参加する「北東アジア地域自治体連合（The Association of North East Asia Regional Governments=NEAR）」が憲章（地域間協定）を持ち、常設事務局（慶尚北道浦項市）を構えているのとは対照的である[40]。日韓海峡知事会議は、参加自

表１　日韓海峡沿岸県市道交流知事会議の経緯

回	開催年月	開催場所	回	開催年月	開催場所
第１回会議	1992 年８月	済州道済州市	第 15 回会議	2006 年９月	全羅南道霊岩郡
第２回会議	1993 年６月	佐賀県嬉野町	第 16 回会議	2007 年 10 月	佐賀県唐津市
第３回会議	1994 年９月	釜山直轄市	第 17 回会議	2008 年 10 月	済州特別自治道済州市
第４回会議	1995 年８月	長崎県佐世保市	第 18 回会議	2009 年 10 月	山口県山口市
第５回会議	1996 年９月	慶尚南道昌原市	第 19 回会議	2010 年 11 月	釜山広域市
第６回会議	1997 年３月	福岡県北九州市	第 20 回会議	2011 年 12 月	長崎県長崎市
第７回会議	1998 年９月	光州広域市	第 21 回会議	2012 年 10 月	慶尚南道昌原市
第８回会議	1999 年９月	佐賀県唐津市	第 22 回会議	2013 年 11 月	福岡県
第９回会議	2000 年９月	済州道西帰浦市	第 23 回会議	2014 年 11 月	全羅南道
第 10 回会議	2001 年９月	山口県下関市	第 24 回会議	2015 年 10 月	佐賀県
第 11 回会議	2002 年 11 月	釜山広域市	第 25 回会議	2016 年 11 月	済州特別自治道
第 12 回会議	2003 年９月	長崎県佐世保市	第 26 回会議	2017 年 11 月	山口県長門市
第 13 回会議	2004 年 11 月	慶尚南道昌原市	第 27 回会議	2018 年 11 月	釜山広域市
第 14 回会議	2005 年 11 月	福岡県福岡市	第 28 回会議	2019 年 12 月	長崎県長崎市

出所：https://japan-korea-strait 8.org/（2019 年５月２日アクセス）、長崎県ホームページなどを基に筆者作成。

治体数が限定的で、地理的・政治制度的な凝集性が強いが故に、組織化よりも
実質的協力の深化に注力していると思われる。

　第３に、交流・協力事業の中でも環境分野に重点が置かれていることである。第１回会議（1992年）で「環境技術交流事業」がスタートを切り、第14回会議（2005年）で「親環境農業交流事業」、第17回会議（2008年）で「自然環境学習事業」、そして第18回（2009年）で「日韓海峡海岸漂着ごみ一斉清掃事

表２　日韓海峡沿岸県市道交流知事会議における交流事業一覧

交流事業名	合意会議・年	目的	実施期間
水産関係交流事業	第１回会議（1992年）	漁業資源の共同調査、養殖技術の共同研究、漁民の安全操業に係る情報の交換等の交流により、両地域間の相互理解と友好を深める	1993年〜現在
環境技術交流事業	第１回会議（1992年）	酸性雨共同調査研究、河川水質生物検定共同調査、環境技術職員の交流などに取り組む	1993年〜現在
青少年交流事業（旧）	第１回会議（1992年）	青少年の相互理解を深めるため、高校生が毎年交互に日韓を訪問し交流する	1993年〜2006年
広域観光協議会事業	第２回会議（1993年）	両地域への誘客促進と両地域間の相互交流の促進を目的	1994年〜現在
研究機関共同研究事業	第２回会議（1993年）	研究機関が連携して、情報の交換や共同研究に取り組み、日韓海峡圏の繁栄に寄与	1994年〜1998年＊1999年以降は民間交流に移行
経済交流促進事業	第２回会議（1993年）	両地域の経済交流を促進し、相互理解と友好を深めること	1994年〜2010年
住民親善イベント事業	第３回会議（1993年）	スポーツ、文化イベントなどの共同開催により、住民の連帯感を醸成し、交流領域を拡大	1995年〜2007年
地域振興団体交流支援事業	第４回会議（1995年）	民間の女性団体がフォーラムや施設見学などの交流を通して相互理解と友好を深める	1997年〜2000年＊20001年以降は自主交流に移行
地域伝統工芸交流事業	第５回会議（1996年）	各地域の特色ある伝統工芸品の交流を通じて、相互理解と地域の活性化に寄与	1997年〜2005年
日韓交流史理解促進事業	第８回会議（1999年）	歴史認識の共有化・両国民の相互理解をめざし、日韓の友好交流を学術面から推進	2001年〜2005年
親環境農業交流事業	第14回会議（2005年）	親環境農業（環境保全型農業）に関する実務者レベルでの情報交換	2006年〜2009年
人獣共通伝染病情報伝達	第14回会議（2005年）	人と動物に共通する伝染病に関して情報交換体制の構築	2006年
自然環境学習事業	第17回会議（2008年）	ラムサール条約締約国会議に合わせ、子供たちに同会議への参加を含む自然の保護と活用に関する体験プログラムを実施	2008年〜2012年
若者文化交流事業		若者の間に感性や価値観を共有する共通の若者文化が発展しつつあり交流	2007年〜2012年
日韓海峡海岸漂着ごみ一斉清掃事業	第18回会議（2009年）	海岸漂着ごみが地球環境に与える影響に鑑み、海の環境美化に対する意識啓発を図るため	2010年〜現在
青少年交流事業	第20回会議（2011年）	次世代を担う中学生が、発表と対話を通じて互いの地域を理解し、交流を促進すること	2013年〜現在
グローバル人材育成事業	第22回会議（2013年）	互いの違いや多様性を認め尊重し合う気持ちを養うと同時に、高い志・幅広い視野を有する人材の育成	2016年〜現在

　注：網掛けは、環境分野の交流事業を指す。
　出所：https://japan-korea-strait8.org/（2019年5月2日アクセス）を基に筆者作成。

業」へと広がった（表２参照）。

　そして第４に、感染症に関する情報交換システムが整備されている点である。具体的には、2006年の第14回会議において、「人獣共通伝染病情報（高病原性鳥インフルエンザやウエストナイル熱）の伝達に係る実施要領」が制定され、人獣共通感染症が発生した場合に速やかに情報伝達を行うことが決められた。実際、2008年４月、韓国で高病原性鳥インフルエンザ（Ｈ５Ｎ１亜型・強毒タイプ）が発生した際、同要領に則り、韓国側（釜山広域市）から情報伝達がなされた。また翌2009年３月、愛知県豊橋市のうずら飼養農家において高病原性鳥インフルエンザ（Ｈ７Ｎ６亜型・弱毒タイプ）が発生した際には、韓国側（釜山広域市）への情報伝達が行われた[41]。このように感染症に関する越境ガバナンスの土台を構築している点は画期的であり、ローカル次元におけるパートナーシップの先駆的モデルとも言い得るだろう。

（２）海岸漂着ごみをめぐるマルチラテラルな CBC

　以上見てきた日韓海峡知事会議の諸活動の中でも、特に「日韓海峡海岸漂着ごみ一斉清掃事業」は注目に値する。同事業の目的は、海岸漂着ごみが地球環境に与える影響に鑑み、海の環境美化に対する意識啓発を図ることにある[42]。地域住民や漁協関係者のほか、小中学校の生徒、大学の学生・留学生などがボランティアとして参加する体験活動を通じた環境教育型の CBC である。同事業は第18回会議（2009年）で採択され、翌2010年以降、日韓それぞれの「海の日」の間で実施されてきた（５月31日（韓国）～７月18日（日本））。

　同事業が開始された背景には、2009年に日本で海岸漂着物処理法が成立し、漂着物の処理が海岸管理者の責任と明記され、その大部分を国や県が負うことになったことがある。同法第26条で「環境教育の推進」が謳われ、同法に基づく基本方針では「体験活動を通じて環境教育の効果を高めるという視点が大切」とされた[43]。同法の制定過程には地方自治体や環境 NGO などが深く関わり、議員立法として成立したことから[44]、ローカル次元のイニシアティブと見てよいだろう。

　同事業の成果をいくつかの指標から概観しておく（図３）[45]。まず、同事業

の実施箇所数は、2010年以降、概ね増加傾向にある。2018年は８県市道全体で407箇所に上った。自治体別で見てみると、日本側は長崎県が130箇所、山口県が94箇所、福岡県が28箇所、佐賀県が７箇所であるのに対し、韓国側は全羅南道が65箇所、慶尚南道が64箇所、済州特別自治道が14箇所、釜山広域市が５箇所などである。

　次に、海岸漂着ごみの回収量は、2010年に８県市道全体で1,000トンに満たなかったのが、2016年、2017年には8,000トンを超すまでに急増している。ただし、2018年には1,643トンへと急減した。この要因は主として韓国側自治体での回収量が減少したことが影響している（済州特別自治道を除く）。2017年の韓国側自治体の回収量は、慶尚南道が4,379トン、釜山広域市が2,338トン、全羅南道が1,400トンであったのに対し、2018年は慶尚南道が340トン、全羅南道が299トン、釜山広域市が39トンへと大幅に減少した。とはいえ、全国の会場でクリーンアップキャンペーンを展開している一般社団法人 JEAN が2014年秋に実施した事業（176会場）のごみ回収量（約17トン）と比較すれば[46]、著しく大きな成果を残したことになる。

　同事業への参加人数を見ると、2010年に８県市道全体で６万人程度であったものが、2014年以降は10万人を超える数で推移している。回収量が急減した2018年も、参加人数は８県市道全体で10万４,398人に上った。自治体別では、日本側は福岡県が45,476人、山口県が28,589人、長崎県が13,322人、佐賀県が3,806人であるのに対し、韓国側は全羅南道が5,666人、慶尚南道が5,390人、済州道特別自治道が1,150人、釜山広域市が999人にとどまるなど、日本側自治体のほうが多い傾向にある。

　以上のデータから参加者一人当たり回収量を算出すれば（2018年）、日本側は長崎県が22kg、福岡県、佐賀県、山口県がいずれも３kgであるのに対し、韓国側は済州特別自治道が375kg、慶尚南道63kg、全羅南道53kg、釜山広域市39kgに上る。参加者一人当たりの回収量は、韓国側が日本側を凌駕している。

　このように、漂着ごみ回収活動の参加人数、効果性（参加者一人当たり回収量）などの点で、日本側と韓国側とで若干の違いが見られた。とはいえ、日韓海峡圏における環境教育の体験活動がこれだけの規模で継続的に行われてきた

ことは刮目に値する。地方自治体の財政的な事情で市民や学生のボランティア
に頼らざるを得ないという消極的な側面があるとしても、国家間対立を横目に、
ローカル・イニシアティブに立脚した環境教育協力が行われてきたのであった。

図３　日韓海峡海岸漂着ごみ一斉清掃事業の箇所数、回収量、参加人数、一人当
　　　たり回収量の推移

[箇所数（箇所）]

[回収量（t）]

[参加人数（人）]

[参加者一人当たり回収量（t）]

出所：https://japan-korea-strait8.org/（2019年５月２日アクセス）を基に筆
　　　者作成。

３．日韓海峡圏のバイラテラルな CBC

（１）日韓海峡圏の姉妹都市提携

　次に、日韓海峡圏のバイラテラルな CBC として、姉妹都市交流がある。日
韓海峡圏における広域自治体および基礎自治体のすべての姉妹都市提携を整理
したのが、表３である。図４は、これらの提携関係を一本の線としてそれぞれ
地図上にプロットしたものである。ここで日韓海峡圏の範囲は、日本では福岡
県、佐賀県、長崎県、山口県、韓国では釜山広域市、全羅南道、慶尚南道、済

州特別自治道である。

　日韓海峡圏における姉妹提携第１号は、1976年10月11日に締結された山口県下関市と釜山広域市との提携である。その後、80年代に４件、90年代に５件、2000年代に４件、2010年代に５件が結ばれ、計19件に上っている。日韓の〈周縁〉でこれだけ多くの姉妹都市関係が結ばれ、日韓関係を下支えしていることは注目できるだろう。

　これらのうち広域自治体同士の姉妹提携は、上述した日韓海峡知事会議の取り組みとも重なっている（山口県―慶尚南道、佐賀県―全羅南道、長崎県―釜山広域市）。他方で、下関市と釜山広域市、福岡市と釜山広域市の両姉妹都市関係は、主に環黄海圏における都市間ネットワーク「東アジア経済交流推進機構（The Organization for the East Asia Economic Development=OEAED）」（旧「環黄海圏都市会議」）[47]の中で展開していることから、ここでは捨象した。

表３　日韓海峡圏における姉妹都市提携一覧

締結年月日	日本側		韓国側	
	広域自治体	提携自治体	提携自治体	広域自治体
1987 年 6 月 26 日	山口県	山口県	慶尚南道	慶尚南道
1976 年 10 月 11 日	山口県	下関市	釜山広域市	釜山広域市
2009 年 11 月 16 日	山口県	山口市	昌原市	慶尚南道
2003 年 6 月 18 日	山口県	萩　市	霊岩郡徳津面	全羅南道
1989 年 10 月 24 日	福岡県	福岡市	釜山広域市	釜山広域市
2012 年 5 月 3 日	福岡県	八女市	巨済市	慶尚南道
1991 年 12 月 3 日	福岡県	宗像市	西帰浦市城山邑	済州特別自治道
1992 年 4 月 22 日	福岡県	宗像市	金海市	慶尚南道
2011 年 1 月 25 日	佐賀県	佐賀県	全羅南道	全羅南道
1998 年 10 月 9 日	佐賀県	佐賀市	蓮堤区	釜山広域市
1994 年 9 月 14 日	佐賀県	唐津市	西帰浦市	済州特別自治道
1982 年 3 月 5 日	佐賀県	唐津市	麗水市	全羅南道
1997 年 11 月 22 日	佐賀県	鹿島市	高興郡	全羅南道
2009 年 7 月 25 日	佐賀県	玄海町	機張郡	釜山広域市
2014 年 3 月 25 日	長崎県	長崎県	釜山広域市	釜山広域市
2013 年 8 月 2 日	長崎県	佐世保市	西　区	釜山広域市
1986 年 5 月 16 日	長崎県	対馬市	影島区	釜山広域市
2007 年 5 月 18 日	長崎県	雲仙市	求礼郡	全羅南道
2010 年 10 月 20 日	長崎県	波佐見町	康津郡	全羅南道

　　注：網掛けは、広域自治体同士の姉妹提携を指す。
　　出所：http://www.clair.or.jp/index.html（2019 年 5 月 3 日アクセス）より筆者作成。

図４　日韓海峡圏における姉妹都市提携状況

注：点線は、対馬市と釜山広域市影島区との姉妹提携を指す。
出所：筆者作成。白地図は下記 URL より取得した。
　　　http://www.freemap.jp/item/asia/korea.html、http://www.freemap.jp/item/region/kyusyu.html
　　　（2019 年 5 月 3 日アクセス ）。

（２）海岸漂着ごみをめぐるバイラテラルな CBC

　以上の姉妹都市関係の中で、海岸漂着ごみに関する取り組みを行ってきたの
が、長崎県対馬市を中心とするケースである。対馬はそもそも韓国からわずか
49.5キロメートルの国境の島で[48]、対馬海流や冬の季節風に押され北西部の海
岸には大量のごみが漂着する[49]。環境省による調査（2016年度）では、漂着し
たペットボトルの表記言語の割合をみると、韓国由来が40％、中国由来が17％、
日本由来が13％であったという[50]。対馬は、文字通り、「漂流ゴミの防波堤」
とも言える状況で、その回収や処理が大きな課題となってきた[51]。環境省も
2007年に同市の海岸をモデル地域に指定し、漂着ごみ対策を推進してきた。

　こうした中で対馬市は、釜山広域市の大学生と共同で漂着ごみの回収作業に
取り組んできた。具体的には、2003年に釜山広域市の東亜大学の学生ボラン
ティアと対馬市民による海岸清掃事業を行ったのが最初である。同事業のきっ

かけは、韓国から対馬市に来ていた国際交流員が任期終了後、深刻化する対馬の漂着ごみ問題に対して自分ができるは何かと考え、大学の後輩を連れてきたのが始まりという[52]。2006年からは長崎県と対馬市の共同事業として、「日韓学生つしま会議」が３年間に亘って開催され、両国学生らによる海岸清掃事業が行われた。第１回日韓学生つしま会議（2006年）に参加したのは、韓国から181名（釜山外国語大学校132名、東亜大学校49名）と、日本から137名（長崎大学等135名）の学生たちであった[53]。その後、2008年以降は、対馬市と釜山外国語大学校の主催で「日韓市民ビーチクリーンアップ事業」が毎年行われている。以上の取り組みは、厳密に言えば、対馬市が姉妹提携を結ぶ釜山広域市影島区との交流活動ではない。しかし、対馬市が長崎県と連携して釜山広域市の大学と一緒に取り組んできたことから、対馬市と釜山広域市とのバイラテラルな CBC と見てよいだろう。

　このほか、2013年からは、対馬市と一般社団法人対馬 CAPPA（旧「美しい対馬の海ネットワーク」）が主催する「日韓海岸清掃フェスタ in 対馬」も行われている[54]。また、長崎県と釜山広域市が主催する「海ごみ交流事業」もある。長崎県内離島・本土（長崎県、対馬市、壱岐市、五島市、新上五島町）の学生、NPO（一般社団法人 JEAN）、行政関係者などが連携するほか、韓国（釜山広域市、全羅南道）からの参加者との協働で実施されている。2016年度は、韓国からの参加者が18名（大学生９名、高校生３名、NGO 等６名）、日本からの参加者が91名（大学生７名、高校生33名、NGO・NPO 等51名）で計109名に上ったという[55]。

　このように対馬市の取り組みは、長崎県、釜山広域市といった広域自治体の支援を受けつつ、大学や NGO・NPO との協働を図りながら、多様な形で展開してきた。規模の面では「日韓海峡海岸漂着ごみ一斉清掃事業」よりも小さいが、対馬市の市民と釜山広域市の市民（大学生）との交流を中心に、両地域の人々が一緒になって体験活動を行ってきた点に特徴がある。処理費用にかかる財政的支援などの点で国の政策誘導があったとはいえ、ローカル次元によるイニシアティブと見てよいだろう。近年では、ESD 環境教育と関連づけた取り組みとしても深化しているという[56]。

　以上の対馬市と釜山広域市とのCBCを、上述した渋谷による「協生」観から解釈してみれば、次のようになるだろう。対馬市が釜山広域市の学生への教育を提供することで学生たちの生活拡大（経験や知識の獲得など）が図られ（他者肯定）、その帰結として、意識啓発によるごみの発生抑制と対馬に対する愛着の醸成などが進む（自者肯定）。他方で、釜山広域市の学生ボランティアが対馬の海岸漂着ごみの清掃活動に参加することで対馬の人々の生活拡大（環境質の改善など）が図られ（他者肯定）、その帰結として、意識啓発によるごみの発生抑制と釜山に対する愛着などが醸成される（自者肯定）。こうした「他者肯定」から始まる時間的な関係性にこそローカル次元からの「協生」の具体像がある[57]。ここに、多元的アイデンティティの刻印というGCED本来の理念を具体化するシナリオを描くことができるだろう。

おわりに ——「脱境界化」のダイナミズムとしてのCBC

　本稿では、これまで物流、観光など経済面に限定した切り口が多かった日韓海峡圏のCBC研究に対し[58]、平和学の一角として展開するGCEDを手掛かりに、日韓海峡圏における環境教育協力の事例考察を行った。考察結果から見えてきたことは、日韓海峡圏では2000年代半ば以降、海岸漂着ごみをめぐる環境教育型のCBCが、ローカル・イニシアティブによって継続的に行われてきたことである。特にマルチラテラルなCBCでは、実施個所数、回収量、参加人数などいずれもが増加傾向にある。これらの環境教育型CBCは、体験学習を通じて[59]、双方向の因果性への理解と内省のモーメンタムとなって、地域の人々に多元的アイデンティティを刻印していく。それは「他者肯定・自者肯定」という「協生」観の具体像と言えるものでもあり、GCEDが孕む問題性を克服するシナリオの一つとして一般化できるだろう。かくして、日韓海峡圏における環境教育型のCBCは、従来の国際社会単位を組み替える「脱境界化」のダイナミズムの一つとなって越境下位地域を生成していくことが予測される。

　ただし本稿の分析は、日韓海峡圏における環境教育協力の実態を、地方政府

の行動様式という観点から記述・推論したに過ぎず、地域の人々のアイデンティティの深層やその動態を十分に検証するには至っていない。日韓海峡圏における「脱境界化」のダイナミズムを検証するためには、地域住民の意識調査や聞き取り調査を含め、社会集団のアイデンティティの深層により接近していくことが今後の課題である。とはいえ、権益と勢力圏をめぐって対立が本格化している東アジアの海の境界で、「協生」を目的とした環境教育型 CBC が進む実態とその特徴を明らかにした本稿の意義は決して小さくはない。

注

1）Hidetoshi Taga and Seiichi Igarashi, eds., *The New International Relations of Sub-Regionalism: Asia and Europe*, London: Routledge, 2019.
2）詳しくは、中山賢司「東アジアの越境地域協力（CBC）—〈周縁〉の国際行為体化」（佐藤幸男・森川裕二・中山賢司編『〈周縁〉からの平和学—アジアを見る新たな視座』昭和堂、2019年）287–310頁を参照されたい。
3）欧州の CBC については、髙橋和「欧州における下位地域協力の展開 —— 近代国家体系への挑戦」（百瀬宏編『変貌する権力政治と抵抗—国際関係における地域』彩流社、2012年）151–172頁が参考になる。
4）Xiangming Chen, 2005. *As Borders Bend: Transnational Spaces on the Pacific Rim*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, 2005, p. 10.
5）多賀秀敏・五十嵐誠一編『東アジアの重層的サブリージョンと新たな地域アーキテクチャ』（勁草書房、2020年）。
6）渡辺利夫編『局地経済圏の時代 —— ぬりかわるアジア経済地図』（サイマル出版会、1992年）、Edward K. Y. Chen and C. H. Kwan, eds., *Asia's Borderless Economy: the Emergence of Subregional Economic Zones*, St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1997, Won Bae Kim, Yue-Man Yeung, Sang-Chuel Choe, eds, *Collaborative Regional Development in Northeast Asia*, Chinese UnivPr, 2011.
7）岩下明裕「進化するボーダースタディーズ —— 私たちの現場とツーリズム」（『境界研究』第9号、2019年）91–112頁、同『入門　国境学 —— 領土、主権、イデオロギー』（中央公論新社、2016年）など。
8）例えば、Glenn D. Hook, "Japan and Micro-regionalism: Constructing the Japan Sea Rim Zone," in Yoshinobu Yamamoto, eds, *Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism*, Blackwell Publishers, 1999, pp. 126–141 など。
9）中山、前掲論文。同拙稿では、東アジアの CBC を、〈周縁〉の行為体の〈周縁〉の視点から生まれた政策意識によって、非国家行為体同士の間主観が構築され、さらにネットワークとして可視化したものと論じた。
10）小林亮「ユネスコの地球市民教育に関する心理学的分析 —— 多元的アイデンティティの形成課題をめぐって」（『論叢（玉川大学教育学部紀要）』、2016年）1–18頁。

11) Sugata Dasguputa, "Peacelessness and Maldevelopment: A New Theme for Peace Research in Developing Nations," in International Peace Research Association, *Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association 2nd Conference*, Assen, Vam Gorcum, 1968, Vol.II, p. 19.

12) Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.6, No.3, 1969, pp.167–191.

13) 多賀秀敏「平和学の最前線」（山本武彦編『国際関係論のニューフロンティア』成文堂、2015年）52頁。

14) 同上、65–68頁。

15) その嚆矢は UNESCO が1947年に提唱した「国際理解教育（Education for International Understanding=EIU）」にある。EIU は、第二次世界大戦への反省から、相互理解、東西理解、国連理解などを柱に、世界各地で展開されてきた。

16) ESD は日本が提唱した概念である。現代社会の諸課題を自らの問題として捉え、身近なところから取り組む（think globally, act locally）ことにより、それらの課題の解決につながる新たな価値観や行動を生み出すこと、そしてそれによって持続可能な社会を創造していくことを目指す学習や活動のことを言う。「我が国における『国連持続可能な開発のための教育の10年』実施計画」（2006年３月30日決定、2011年６月３日改訂「国連持続可能な開発のための10年」関係省庁連絡会議）。

17) GAP の優先分野としては、政策的支援、機関包括的アプローチ、教育者、ユース、地域コミュニティなどが挙げられている。https://en.unesco.org/themes/education-sustainable-development（2019年５月３日アクセス）。

18) GEFI 以前に提起されていた各種の議論がその下地になっていると思われる。例えば、Oxfam, *A Curriculum for Global Citizenship Oxfam's Development Education Programme*, Oxfam, 1997、池田大作「『地球市民』教育への一考察」（1996年６月14日、米国コロンビア大学ティーチャーズ・カレッジ講演、『聖教新聞』1996年６月16日付所収）など。

19) http://www.unesco.org/new/en/gefi/home/（2019年５月３日アクセス）。

20) SDGs のターゲット4.7において、2030年までに持続可能な開発を促進するために必要な知識やスキルを、全ての学習者が得られるようにすることとされた。具体的には、持続可能な開発、持続可能なライフスタイル、人権、ジェンダー平等、平和・非暴力の文化の促進、地球市民、文化的多様性と文化の持続可能な開発への貢献に対する認知などに関する教育を通じたものとされた。

21) UNESCO, *Global Citizenship Education: Preparing Learners for the Challenges of the 21ˢᵗ Century*, UNESCO, 2014, p. 8.

22) UNESCO, *Global Citizenship Education; Topics and Learning Objectives*, UNESCO, 2015, p. 15.

23) 教育プログラムについては、UNESCO, *Preparing Teachers for Global Citizenship Education: A Template*, UNESCO, 2018, Oxfam, *Education for Global Citizenship:*

A Guide for Schools, Oxfam, 2015, Oxfam, *Global Citizenship in the Classroom: A Guide for Teachers*, Oxfam, 2015 などが参考になる。教育哲学的な視座から「世界市民の教育学」を探究したものとしては、矢野智司『歓待と戦争の教育学 —— 国民教育と世界市民の形成』（東京大学出版部、2019年）を挙げておく。

24）小林亮『ユネスコスクール ── 地球市民的教育の理念と実践』（明石書店、2014年）97頁。

25）同上、95頁。

26）小林、前掲論文、8頁。

27）「視差ビジョン」とは、カミングス（B. Cumings）がアジアにおける冷戦の起源を論じる際に提起した概念で、見る人の位置の変化から結果的に生じる客体の外観の変化を指す。Bruce Cumings, *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations*, Durham, NC: Duke Universtiy Press, 1999. 同概念を用いて日韓の竹島／独島領有権紛争を論じたものとして、Heonik Kwon, "Parallax Visions in the Dokdo/Takeshima Disputes," in Mikyoung Kim and Barry Schwartz, eds., *Northeast Asia's Difficult Past: Essays in Collective Memory*, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palagrave Macmillan, 2010（権憲益「独島・竹島紛争における視差ビジョン」金美景・B・シュウォルツ編／千葉眞監修／稲正樹・福岡和哉・寺田麻佑訳『北東アジアの歴史と記憶』勁草書房、2014年）がある。

28）UNESCO が2018年に発表したペーパーは、このテーマを掲げている。UNESCO, *Global Citizenship Education and the Rise of Nationalist Perspectives: Reflections and Possible Ways forward*, UNESCO, 2018.

29）UNESCO, *Global Citizenship Education: Taking it Local*, UNESCO, 2018.

30）「GCED に関する UNESCO フォーラム」（2013年12月、タイ・バンコク）に参加した佐藤によれば、当該フォーラムにおける GCED の位置づけは、「共に生きることを学ぶ」を具体化する取り組みという点に特徴があったという。佐藤直久「地球市民性（GCE）に関する UNESCO フォーラムにおける成果と考察」（『環境教育』第23巻第3号、2014年）127頁。

31）渋谷武「協生の哲学：他者肯定・自者肯定の政治」（多賀秀敏編『国境を越える実験：環日本海の構想』有信堂、1992年）185-214頁、渋谷武『"きょうせい"変化考覚書』2002年、森川裕二『東アジア地域形成の新たな政治力学 ── リージョナリズムの空間論的分析』（国際書院、2012年）などを参照されたい。

32）日中韓の環境問題における因果関係については、寺西俊一監修・東アジア環境情報発電所編『環境共同体としての日中韓』（集英社、2006年）が詳しい。

33）GCED をいち早く提唱してきた池田は、GCED プログラムの骨格に据えることが望ましい観点の一つに、「グローバルな危機が悪化する前に、それらの兆候が表れやすい足元の地域において、その意味を敏感に察知し、行動を起こしていくための力をエンパワーメントで引き出しながら、連帯して問題解決にあたることを促す教育」を挙げた。池田大作「地球革命へ価値創造の万波を」（第39回 SGI の日記念提言、『聖教新聞』2014年1月26、27日付所収）。本稿が GCED の一つ

として環境教育型 CBC に着目したことと通低している。

34）小島あずさ・眞淳平『海ゴミ ── 拡大する地球環境汚染』（中央公論新社、2007
　　年）、浅野一弘「危険な海岸漂着物 ── 地方自治体の認識 ──」（『経済と経営』第
　　44巻第 1 号、2014年）15–23頁など。

35）2015年 6 月のG 7 サミットでマイクロプラスチックを含む海洋ごみが世界的な問
　　題であることが確認されたことを受け、2018年 6 月のG 7 サミットでは「海洋プ
　　ラスチック憲章」が承認された。ただし、日本と米国は同憲章への承認を見送っ
　　ている。中野かおり「プラスチックごみをめぐる最近の動向 ── 海洋プラスチッ
　　クごみ問題への取組 ──」（『立法と調査』第406号、2018年）48–57頁。

36）清野は、海岸漂着ごみ問題解決のための発生抑制には、市民一人ひとりの行動や
　　選択が必要であるとして、「市民科学」の重要性を指摘している。清野聡子「九
　　州西部沿岸における地域特性に応じた海岸漂着ごみへの対応と多様な主体の参
　　加」（『水資源・環境研究』第31巻第 1 号、2018年）34–41頁。

37）漂着ごみが国境を超えた問題であることを東アジア圏域で検証したものとして、
　　藤枝繁・小島あずさ「東アジア圏域における海岸漂着ごみの流出起源の推定」
　　（『沿岸域学会誌』第18巻第 4 号、2006年）15–22頁がある。

38）1999年に日本から山口県が加わり、日韓海峡知事会議は現在の 8 県8市道の陣容と
　　なった。https://japan-korea-strait8.org/（2019年 5 月 3 日アクセス）。

39）この論点に関し、竹島／独島領有権紛争をケースに考究したものとして、中山賢
　　司「環日本海圏におけるサブリージョン協力と竹島／独島領有権紛争」（多賀・
　　五十嵐編、前掲書）123–143頁がある。

40）NEAR については、中山賢司『東北アジア・サブリージョンにおける内発的越境
　　ガバナンス』（早稲田大学出版部、2015年）を参照されたい。

41）https://japan-korea-strait8.org/list/jinjyu/（2019年 5 月 3 日アクセス）。

42）https://www.japan-korea-strait8.org/list/seisou/（2019年 5 月 2 日アクセス）。

43）宗像優「海洋ごみ問題をめぐる政治・行政の対応」（宗像優編『環境政治の展開』
　　志學社、2016年）、315–317頁。

44）同上、300–306頁。

45）https://japan-korea-strait8.org/（2019年 5 月 2 日アクセス）。

46）JEAN『2014　JEAN 年間活動＆クリーンアップキャンペーンレポート』2015年
　　 3 月、24–36頁。

47）http://oeaed.org/（2019年 5 月 3 日アクセス）。

48）阿比留正臣「国境の島の国際交流 ── 朝鮮通信使を掘り起こした対馬市の試み」
　　（神田外国語大学第31回 GCI 講演会、2015年 6 月12日）。

49）環境省が2010年度から2014年度に実施した海洋ごみ調査によれば、数量では下関
　　市（約4.7万個）に次いで対馬市が 2 番目（約3.2万個）、重量（累計）では対馬
　　市（約 6 万トン）がトップとなった。

50）環境省海洋環境室「環境省における対策について」2019年 1 月25日。

51）脇本啓喜、三原伊文、三原叶也「対馬市における海洋・海岸汚染の現状と課題及
　　び展望について」（『日本マリンエンジニアリング学会誌』第49巻第 2 号、2014年）

　　８頁。

52）https://jn.lush.com/article/tsushima-ocean-plastics-without-borders-2（2019
　　年５月３日アクセス）。

53）『広報つしま』2006年６月号、4–5頁。

54）清野、前掲論文、38–39頁。

55）長崎県「平成28年度　長崎県海ごみ交流事業の開催状況について」。

56）小島徳重、生駒信康、三原伊文「国境離島・対馬の漂着ゴミと環境学習からの啓
　　発活動等について」（『日本マリンエンジニアリング学会誌』第52巻第５号、2017
　　年）37頁。

57）渋谷による「協生」概念を「時間的秩序関係（時空）」という視点から解釈した
　　森川の議論に依拠した。森川、前掲書、特に105–135頁。

58）例えば、新井直樹「日韓海峡圏におけるクルーズ観光と中国人旅行者の観光動
　　向」（日韓海峡圏研究機関協議会編『海峡圏研究』第11号、2011年）、津守貴之
　　「日韓海峡圏における地域連携の可能性 ── コンテナ物流活動を中心に」（『北東
　　アジア経済研究（岡山大学大学院文化科学研究科）』第２号、2005年）9–23頁、
　　鄭應周「日韓海峡経済圏（１）（２）── 東北アジアにおける国際地域形成」（『経
　　済論叢（京都大学）』第162巻第３号、1998年、第163巻第２号、1999年）85–106頁、
　　32–54頁など。

59）アイデンティティの多元性と他文化への寛容性を高めるには、「多元的文化曝露
　　体験（multiple cultural exposure）」、すなわち質的に異なった文化的文脈に
　　自らを曝す体験学習が有効という議論があるという。小林、前掲論文、８頁。原
　　出所は、Ying-yi Hong, Michael W. Morris, Chi-yue Chiu, and Veronica
　　Benet-Martinez, "Multicultural Minds: A Dynamic Constructivist
　　Approach to Culture and Cognition," *American Psychologist*, Vol. 55,　No. 7,
　　2000, pp. 709–720.

Peace Forum 2019

Conflict, Cooperation, and Peace in East Asia

May 14th-17th, 2019

SGI Jeju Korea-Japan Friendship Training Institute

PROGRAM

May 14   Welcoming Dinner All Participants

May 15   Symposium

Opening Session
  Opening Remarks
  Jae Kyu Park, President, Kyungnam University
  Welcoming Remarks
  Yoshihisa Baba, President, Soka University
  Chien-min Chao, Dean, College of Social Sciences,Chinese Culture
         University
  Congratulatory Remarks
  Bong-Hyun Kim, President, Jeju Peace Institute

Keynote Speech
  Ho-Young Ahn, President, University of North Korean Studies

Session I: Conflict and Cooperation between Korea and Japan

Moderator: Ho-Young Ahn, President, University of North Korean
  Studies
Presentation

Hartmut Lenz, Soka University

Cooperation and Conflict: The role of formal and informal cooperation in East Asian conflict prevention

Jonathan Malcolm Luckhurst, Soka University

Contextual Influences on China-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation in Global Economic Governance

Jung Kim, University of North Korean Studies

From Democratic Escalation to Democratic Restraint: Audience Costs in International Disputes between South Korea and Japan

Discussant

Hideki Tamai, Soka University

Chien-kuo Pang, Graduate Institute of National Development and Mainland China Studies, Chinese Culture University

Yongbok Kim, Kyungnam University

Session II: Conflict and Cooperation between Taiwan and China

Moderator: Kwan-Sei Lee, Director, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University

Presentation

Chien-min Chao, College of Social Sciences, Chinese Culture University

Grand Risk: Cross-Strait Relations under President Tsai Ing-wen

Chien-kuo Pang, Graduate Institute of National Development and Mainland China Studies, Chinese Culture University

The Belt and Road and Taiwan's Opportunities and Challenges

Sangman Lee, Kyungnam University

China-Taiwan Relations During US-China Conflict Era: Convergence or Diffusion

Discussant

   Jonathan Malcolm Luckhurst, Soka University

   Hsuan-Hsiang Lin, Department of Political Science, Chinese Culture
            University

   Yong-Il Moon, Kyungnam University

Session III: Conflict and Cooperation between North and South Koreas

Moderator: Moo-Jin Yang, Vice President, University of North Korean
   Studies

Presentation

   Eul-Chul Lim, Director of Center for International Cooperation for
            North Korean Development, KyungnamUniversity

   New South-North Relations: Opportunity and Challenge

   Hideki Tamai, Soka University

   Possibilities of Cooperative Conflict Resolution: A Study on Conflict
   between North and South Korea

   Hsuan-Hsiang Lin, Department of Political Science, Chinese Culture
            University

   China and East Asian Security: Imagining a New Order by Capitalizing
   Chinese Cultural Ideals

Discussant

   Hartmut Lenz, Soka University

   Chien-min Chao, College of Social Sciences, Chinese Culture University

   Gil-Hyun Yang, Jeju National University

Closing Session and Dinner All Participants

May 16   Peace Tour in Jeju Island

論　　説

Contextual Influences on China-Japan-ROK

Trilateral Cooperation in Global Economic Governance

Jonathan Luckhurst

Associate Professor

Soka University

Abstract

This paper analyzes the contextual influences on trilateral cooperation between the governments of China, Japan, and Republic of Korea in global economic governance. The Trilateral Summit was initiated over a decade ago, with the intention of augmenting their cooperation.The recent revival of the summit process could be a platform for enhancing mutual cooperation in global, as well as regional, economic governance. The following examines how social, ideational, authority, and contextual factors influence trilateral relations.This constitutes a constructivist analytical approach, emphasizing effects of international practices, relations, and authority shifts, especially since the 2008 global financial crisis,while positing the significance of *contextual* rationality. The analysis focuses on the consequences of

cooperation and policy convergence on sustainable development norms and practices, plus on aspects of multilateral trade and financial regulation. This indicates the significance of international socialization and contextual rationality for trilateral cooperation.

The third Trilateral Summit between leaders of China, Japan, and Republic of Korea (ROK) was held in Jeju, Korea, in May 2010. The prospects for trilateral cooperation in global economic governance, therefore, seems a fitting topic for this peace forum in Jeju. The following emphasizes how the shifting international context influences cooperation, particularly theeffects of international agency, relations, practices, and authority.

Closer trilateral cooperation in global economic governance could be achievable, though there are challenges and obstacles to overcome. The first section of the paper indicates the analytical approach, which combines insights from social constructivism with a focus onpractices, relations, shifting authority, and *contextual* rationality. The second examines the recent history of trilateral summits and cooperation. The third analyzes regional economic and development cooperation between the three states. The fourth gauges the significance of convergence between Chinese, Japanese, and Korean perspectives on sustainable economic development. The fifth section assesses trilateral approaches to global economic governance, and the potential for greater cooperation, including at the Group of Twenty (G20).

The 2018 Trilateral Summit leaders' declaration noted several shared priorities, in diverse aspects of global and regional economic governance. Trilateral cooperation in global economic governance

could enhance mutual policy goals, but also diplomatic relations. The present study analyzes how the international ideational context, practices, and relations influence prospects for the three states to achieve global, in addition to regional, economic governance cooperation.

Analytical approach

International Relations (IR) scholarship often focuses on states as rational actors in an anarchic international system. This paper contests the assumption that the rationality of individuals, states, or other 'units' should be considered unproblematical, even when accounting for imperfect information. The following posits the notion of *contextual rationality* for understanding the social embeddedness of agency, especially indicating how shifting global governance and diplomatic practices influence international relations.

The increasing focus on 'practices' in IR research, building on studies from social theorists such as Etienne Wenger (1998), provides useful insights into often ignored 'background' issues. Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (2011, 5) have defined practices as "patterned actions that are embedded in particular organized contexts and, as such, are articulated into specific types of action and are socially developed through learning and training." Shared practices are crucial to international relations; as Ted Hopf (1998, 179) notes, "Social practices,to theextentthatthey authorize, discipline,and police, have the power to reproduce entirecommunities, including the international community, as well as the many communities of identity found therein."

Global and regional economic cooperation between officials and

policymakers from China, Japan, and ROK is influenced by norms, practices, and relational processes. These contribute to perceived mutual interests and potential 'win–win' cooperation, especially through forms of socialization, indicating how actors are influenced to adopt certain international norms and practices. The constitutive effects of social embeddedness on individual rationality do not negate the potential for instrumental agency. In this sense, 'over-socialization' is not the alternative to 'under-socialization' (see Granovetter 1985). A contextual analysis of international practices avoids this binary choice between agency and structure, in common with recent East Asian scholarship on "relationality" and social processes, hence contextualized social relations (Qin 2016).

Contextual rationality is linked to the notion of bounded rationality;but rather than emphasize individual 'satisficing' in decision-making (see Gigerenzer 2010; Simon 1959; 1972), it stresses the social and historical embeddedness, plus context-dependent practices and relations, that influence international relations.IR scholars (Nelson and Katzenstein 2014) and economic sociologists (Fourcade 2006; Mackenzie and Millo 2003) have researched how social conventions and practices, rather than purely rational calculation, account for important aspects of the behavior of financial-market actors (see Luckhurst 2017, 86-87). This is the same for international actors, including in the *context* of trilateral cooperation.

International actors knowingly or unknowingly make choices that are influenced by socially- and historically-constructed discourses or narratives, sometimes in the form of background knowledge (Adler 2008; 2019), what some would call 'ideology.' However, actorsalsomodify international relations and policy practices in the process of reproducing them, through often-reciprocal forms of

international socialization (see Keck and Sikkink 1999, 99-100; Pu 2012; Terhalle 2011). Amitav Acharya (2014) and Antje Wiener (2004) note, in particular, that international norms might be adapted and 'localized' in the process of implementation.

Contextual aspects of rationality are evident in analyzing the influence of the G20 and other global or regional governance fora (see Luckhurst 2016). Another key aspect here is the analysis of international *authority,* and how it is constituted, and sometimes contested, through international relations. The present study applies this analytical framework to the case of trilateral cooperation in global and regional economic governance.

Trilateral summits and cooperation

The Trilateral Summit framework was established just over a decade ago. The initial Trilateral Summit in December 2008, in Fukuoka, Japan, was intended to enhance relations between China, Japan, and ROK. This relationship was formalized in 2011, when the three states established, through a formal treaty, the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) headquartered in Seoul.

The Trilateral Summit was held annually from 2008-12, but only twice since, in 2015 and 2018 in Tokyo. The fact that another Trilateral Summit is scheduled for 2019, this time in Beijing, indicates the process is currently being revived as a feature of China–Japan–ROK relations.Trilateral ministerial meetings continued, despite the decreased summit frequency, however there have been obstacles to cooperation.The deterioration in diplomatic ties was a key factorin the irregularity of summits since 2012. The TCS remained, however, as a rather unusual international organization, effectively a secretariat

without the other organizational bodies or committees commonly associated with international institutions.It is also notable that the TCS is "unique as the only existing inter-governmental organization in Northeast Asia" (Zhang 2018, 250), though with just a small staff and budget. The Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Meeting is meant to provide certain executive functions, so the absence of these meetings in some yearshas undermined the work of the TCS (Zhang 2018, 258).

This brief introduction to the history of the Trilateral Summit and the TCS indicates the scope for it to become amore significant framework for cooperation between the three states. The most recent Trilateral Summit leaders' declarationalso reiterated their mutual support for other forms of multilateralism, including the core role for the World Trade Organization (WTO) in underpinning international trade,plus the global governance role of the G20. They further endorsed closer regional cooperation, through the ASEAN Plus Three group, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and by other means (TCS 2018). The document alsonoted their cooperation on sustainable development, a key policy area with substantial scope for trilateral cooperation through global and regional governance fora.

The 2018 leaders' declaration notes the "three countries share everlasting history and infinite future" (TCS 2018), indicating mutual recognition of their interdependence. This is not to deny the existence of political differences, for example the current dispute between the Japanese and Korean governments over the latter's ban on seafood from Fukushima since the 2011 nuclear disaster (Hosokawa 2019). Their proximity has shaped strategic suspicions and historical disputes, contextual factors not easily mitigated by individual rational calculation. Afocus on contextual rationality, relationality, and

reciprocal processes of socialization indicates prospects for trilateral cooperation, despite diplomatic and political differences.

Trilateral regional economic and development cooperation

This section assesses key issues for trilateral regional economicand development cooperation. Global and Asian multilateral relations on economic and development governance influence the contextual rationality of regional and global policy actors, including those from China, Japan, and ROK.

Recent global authority shifts, especially since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (GFC), increased the relative global and Asian economic influence of officials and policymakers from China and ROK, andarguably even Japan. The Trump Administration's rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership left the Japanese in the lead diplomatic role, plus the largest economy of what subsequently became the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The broader retrenchment of American relations with East Asia (see Lin 2016; Liow 2017; Smith 2017; Tan and Hussain 2017), further indicated the increased regional economic influenceof the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese. RCEP exemplifies this regional multilateral engagement from the three states, with all three members. It indicates abasic normative convergence on trade multilateralism, despite some differences on the content of trade agreements, with the Chinese preferring to exclude from RCEP some of the regulatory issues included in CPTPP, such as stricter labor and environmental provisions.

Cooperation between the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is interesting, due

to the apparent divergence in strategic priorities of their main state sponsors: the Japanese and Americans at the ADB; and the Chinese at the AIIB. ROK also is akey member of both institutions. It is arguably surprising that formal cooperation was initiated, through the banks' 2016 memorandum of understanding (ADB and AIIB 2016), perhapseven more that mutual technical and strategic cooperation already exists, with jointly-financed projects in Bangladesh, Georgia, India, and Pakistan (ADB 2017). The strategic, political, and cognitive effects of the GFC crucially influenced their cooperation, partly by increasing the relative authority of Chinese policy actors in Asia, especially on economic development issues. The 'cognitive' and political authority of the Koreans on development governance was similarly boosted. In the present study, *strategic authority* refers to the significance ofdurable strategic resources and capacities foractors' perceived authoritativeness. *Political authority* concerns actors' perceived or socially-constructed "political rights and responsibilities" (Ruggie 1982, 380). The notion of *cognitive authority* indicates actors' perceived authoritativeness, due to their professional role and intellectual or ideational status markers (Broome and Seabrooke 2015; see Luckhurst 2017)

Lessons from the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, augmented by those from the GFC, undermined earlier conventional wisdom in development policymaking (see Widmaier et al. 2007). This undermining of recent 'western' governance norms and practices reduced the cognitive authority, especially, of officials from the Group of Seven (G7) states and Bretton Woods institutions (Luckhurst 2017). Many policymakers from leading developing states, such as Brazil, China, and India, became more skeptical of policy advice from western-dominated institutions, for example due to the widely-

perceived failures of the 1990s Washington Consensus and, in particular, the IMF's role in exacerbating several financial crises through its structural-adjustment programs (Broad 2004, 133-134; Cooper 2008, 254; Easterly 2003; Luckhurst 2017, 156-163; Rodrik 2012, 90-95; Sohn 2005, 490-492; Stiglitz 2003, 245-246; 2004).

Japanese economic policymakers had been more skeptical about the Washington Consensus than their G7 counterparts. Partly for this reason, after 2008 they quickly joined other Asian regional policymakers in adapting their policy discourse to fit the growing sustainable development consensus. The latter indicated new policy practices but also provided common grounds, as well asrhetorical tools, through which Chinese and Japanese officials, at the AIIB and ADB respectively, could legitimize inter-bank cooperation as an *Asian* partnership for regional development cooperation (ADB 2016). These multilateral development banks (MDBs) stress their shared approaches to regional development cooperation, including their assessment of the need to increase regional multilateral financial resources (ADB 2017; AIIB 2016, 13). Regular meetings between ADB chief Takehiko Nakao and AIIB head Liqun Jin indicate amutual prioritization of inter-institutional cooperation (Cislo and Hays 2017). There is persistent media speculation about potential competition between the two MDBs, but no clear evidence of it in practice; their joint development investment projects underscore the level of actual cooperation.

The Chinese government's 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI), an ambitious infrastructure investment project, augmented their officials' regional authority. AIIB and BRI are not formally linked, but both contribute to the influence of Chinese policy actors on regional development governance. Another key factor was the BRICS' New

Development Bank (NDB), which provided a template for how an MDB could support 'South–South' cooperation, both for Chinese officials and potential AIIB partners and clients. The American and Japanese roles in Asian economic and development governance have also undergone significant adjustments. The Trump Administration's voluntary relinquishing of American leadership in the Asia-Pacific, or 'Indo-Pacific,' left the Japanese as the main alternative to Chinese regional economic influence, despite having fewer financial resources available for large-scale investment projects. Japanese leadership at the ADB indicates their key regional development role, because the ADB remains the most important regional source of multilateral development financing (O'Keeffe et al. 2017, 13).

Partnership between these Chinese- and Japanese- led MDBs augments their regional economic influence. ADB–AIIB cooperation provides a mediated form of inter-state collaboration, rather than an explicitly bilateral one. This could hold instrumental political advantagesfrom *depoliticization* through inter-institutional ties, potentially reducing political contestation and negative public reactions to cooperation between states often perceived as strategic competitors. Recent discussion of the potential for Japan to become involved in jointly-financing BRI projects with the Chinese, particularly from the Chinese side (*Japan Today [Associated Press]* 2019), indicates a broader reconsideration of the benefits of bilateral cooperation on regional development projects. Trilateral cooperation on development financing, trade, and other economic issuesis equally tied to such contextual rationality shifts, and could be facilitated by the veneer of depoliticization linked to technocratic approaches to international cooperation (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 708-709).

Trilateral cooperation and the sustainable development consensus

The financial crises of the 1990s and early-2000s undermined the strategic, political, and cognitive authority of the Bretton Woods institutions, and their western backers, on global development issues. The professional competence of western policymakers who had endorsed the Washington Consensus prescriptions was widely questioned. The GFC further diminished their cognitive authority, as the 'New Classical' intellectual foundations of policy advice from the Bretton Woods institutions and G7 officials — underpinned bythe market-efficiency hypothesis and liberalization and deregulation policies — were undermined by the crisis spreading from western financial centers, especially New York and London.

  The 1990s Asian financial crisisdamaged the political and strategic authority of western-led institutions and governments. This was indicated by the strategic economic policy shift away from attracting inward foreign investment, in states such as China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, ROK, Singapore, and Thailand, a policy endorsed by the Bretton Woods institutions in the early 1990s; to prioritizing, instead, export-led growthand sovereign capital accumulation. Aside from this rejection of the Washington approach, the regional loss of confidence in the IMF was underlined by its lack of borrowers, hence the risk of insolvency due to declining interest payments by 2007 (Woods 2010, 52-53). This loss of confidence was also evident in Latin America, where Argentinian, Brazilian, Colombian, and Mexican policymakers similarly avoided borrowing from the IMF, due to their skepticism about the institution and its policy advice and lending practices (Arditi 2008, 71; Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012, 4-5; Ocampo 2009, 715-716).

  The existence of alternative development models was significant

for the institutional embeddedness of regional economic strategies. Japanese economic growth from the 1960s-1980s provided insights for other regional policymakers, including their emphasis on the guiding strategic economic role of the state. American influence in Latin America had the opposite effectin the 1980s and 1990s, undermining confidence in the strategic economic management capacities of the state. The Japanese economic development experience influenced the Koreans, Chinese, and Singaporeans (Wade 1996), leading to a growth-oriented, export-led Asian development approach. One important aspect of this was a broadly-shared normative understanding of the state as a strategic facilitator of markets, including a prioritization of what later would be considered 'sustainable' development practices, on matters such as 'human-capital' enhancement through education and training, plus an emphasis on infrastructure development (Stiglitz 1996).

Chinese and Korean policymakers gained credibility in development policy circles, due to their success in sustaining rapid economic growth over recent decades. The Korean G20 Presidency of 2010 accomplished G20 support for its 'Seoul Development Consensus' (G20 2010), whilealso initiating the expansion of the G20's policy agenda beyond its core issues of global economic recovery and financial reform (Luckhurst 2016). The growing sustainable development consensus helped legitimize Chinese and Korean influence in global and regional development governance, especially due to the compatibility of their policy priorities with core tenets of sustainable development. Infrastructure investment has been a key component of each states' development approaches, a linkage that Chinese policymakers indicated by setting up the AIIB and BRI. Partly for this common policy focus, the Koreans joined and

became core members of the AIIB, even hosting its second annual meeting in Jeju, in June 2017 (Lee et al. 2017). Thegrowing role of the AIIB was consolidated through a 'South–South' discourse of mutual cooperation, normatively legitimizing Chinese influence in development cooperation as a kind of mutually-supportive ethos of interdependence.

ADB–AIIB cooperation has been similarly justified on normative grounds of regional cooperation, as an alternative to diminishing western economic and development leadership. The compatibility of the sustainable development approach with Asian policy practices, influenced, as noted, by Japanese economic policies in the mid-twentieth century, reinforced regional support for the sustainable development agenda. This echoed Amitav Acharya's (1997) discussion of the normative localization of Asia-Pacific approaches to multilateralism, further indicating how the contextual rationality of ADB and AIIB policy actors has been influenced by global and regional strategic, political, and cognitive authority shifts. The latter are tied to broad ideational and discursive shifts, around which collaborative ADB–AIIB projects could be articulated and, potentially, depoliticized.

Potential for trilateral cooperation in global economic governance

Trilateral cooperation should not be measured, purely, in financial terms and by individual project outcomes; it is also important to assess global and regional authority effects, partly through socialization. ADB–AIIB cooperation has contributed to decentralizing strategic, political, and cognitive authority in global and regional economic governance since the GFC. It enhances the development

governance role of Chinese policy actors, while also potentially augmenting Japanese policy actors' influence, by positioning them in a multilateral steering role, in this senseemergingfrom the shadow of American global and regional leadership. This could have significant consequences for the ADB and Japanese international influence, despite fears that declining U.S. engagement in Asia could undermine Japanese regional authority.

The ADB and AIIB both indicate their convergence on contemporary norms and practices of global development governance (ADB and AIIB 2016). This enhances Chinese global governance authority, reaffirming John Ikenberry's (2008) optimistic prediction that the Chinese would become increasingly integrated as 'stakeholders' in global economic governance. Chinese influence and authority in global and regional economic governance, including through the AIIB, involves reciprocal socialization (Hanlon 2017, 549; Peng and Tok 2016, 742; see Johnston 2008). The AIIB and the BRICS' NDB, in addition to the BRI, became new outlets for Chinese financing and enhanced their authoritativeness in global and regional development governance. This was partly in response to the slowness of institutional reform elsewhere, particularly at the Bretton Woods institutions; while the G20 was another new context that augmented Chinese influence and integration in global governance.

The fact that the AIIB now has more members than the ADB underlines how successfully Chinese officials reduced skepticism and increased their multilateral economic development role. Despite American opposition under the Obama Administration, the UK government and several other U.S. allies became AIIB members. Chinese authorities have carefully distinguished between the AIIB role as an independent MDB, and its more clearly government-

controlled BRI projects. The ADB's leadership, moreover, was not deterred from formal cooperation with the AIIB.

ADB–AIIB cooperation increased the funds available for Asian infrastructure investment, a crucial aspect of economic development. It also contributed to the integration of Chinese officials at the core of global and regional development governance, in cooperation with Japanese officials. It further integrates Chinese policymakersin ideational and cognitive terms, while reinforcing often Asian-influenced sustainable development norms and practices. This indicates the relative shift in authority in global and regional governance, with the Chinese, Koreans, and other Asian and developing-state policy actors playing a greater role, relative to the North Americans and Europeans. Japanese policymakers' and officials' global influencealso could be augmented through their regional authority.

The G20 is an important multilateral context in which China, Japan, and ROK have played significant roles. Each has hosted the rotating G20 presidency, indicating their substantial authority in global economic governance since the GFC. The three governments share some key global policy priorities, including their official commitment to multilateral trade norms and rules, and upholding the institutional role of the WTO; on sustainable economic development, partly due to the influence of Asian development norms and practices; and on macroprudential financial regulation, with their mutual preference for a more cautious approach to financial-sector governance, relative topolicy practices in the UK and U.S., especially until 2008. Trilateral coordination on key global economic governance issues, particularlyat the G20, with advantages from technocratic depoliticization similar to ADB–AIIB cooperation, could augment

their leverage in multilateral negotiations and amplify their influence on the global governance agenda.

Differences and diplomatic disputes sometimes come to the fore, including the aforementioned dispute over Japanese fish exports to ROK. Relations between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Korean President Moon Jae-in have recently deteriorated, especially over historical controversies from the Japanese colonial period in Korea (Kimura2019). This has led to speculation that, while Abe plans to hold a bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the Osaka G20 Summit, such a meeting might not be held with Moon (*Japan Times [Kyodo]* 2019). The significant improvement in China–Japan relations, by contrast, is indicated by the recent meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Japan's Foreign Minister Taro Kono, at which both touted improvements in bilateral ties. There was ashared assessment that theirbilateral, regional, and global economic cooperation would be mutually beneficial. Concerns and uncertainty about the Trump Administration's international economic policies give added impetus for cooperation (*Japan Today [Associated Press]* 2019). Growing Sino–Japanese economic cooperation is indicated across a range of issues, including on the importance of the WTO andon bilateral infrastructure projects in third countries (Armstrong 2018; Mainichi 2018). China–ROK relations are similarly improving, on Korean Peninsula security issues and bilateral economic ties (*South China Morning Post [Associated Press]* 2018; Xinhuanet2018).

The post-GFC context of global economic governance indicates shifts in international authority, from the North to the South andfrom West to East. This is partly because the GFC constituted what historical institutionalists call a 'critical juncture,' undermining conventional wisdom and further decentralizing international

authority (Luckhurst 2017). This new scenario has been influenced by the revisionism of the Trump Administration, in terms of its rejection of multilateral norms and practices (Luckhurst 2017, 131-143), with significant effects on world politics and international relations. This indicates the importance of reassessing contextual factors, such as socialization, that influence trilateral relations; while identifying areas of policy convergence that might deepen cooperation and increase shared prosperity, with diplomatic benefits such as enhancing regional and global peace and security.

Conclusion

The gradual improvement in trilateral diplomatic relations through global and regional economic cooperation, especially due to shared policy practices and more institutionalized as well as informal interactions, contributes to depoliticizing mutual cooperation. These diplomatic and multilateral practicesenhance trilateral diplomatic, political, and economic outcomes, while increasing their global and regional governance authority.

   The three governments continue to have disagreements, though relations shift over time; currently Japan–ROK relations are at a low point, but China–Japan relations are improving, as are China–ROK ties. Shared policy priorities in global and regional economic governance are important for their contextual rationality, despite historical and recent disputes. Trilateral cooperation on the global governance agenda, at fora such as the G20, increases their leverage, influence, and authority in global economic and development governance. This constitutes a rational basis for cooperation, but the contextuality of their relations also shapes prospects for cooperation.

The current revival of the Trilateral Summit could be utilized by the three governments to augment their diplomatic influence and global authority, particularly to enhance cooperation at the G20 and other global and regional fora and institutions. This should further reduce diplomatic tensions and help cement social, political, and economic ties, which are the foundations for peaceful and harmonious relations.

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論　　説

Informal Cooperation in East Asian Conflict Prevention

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Abstract

Frequently bilateral, multilateral or regional institutions are used to mediate conflict, to overcome collective action problems and create the framework for cooperation and governments. In recent years multi-polar international organisations have become challenged by the highly increased expectations in their problems solving capabilities and their lack of means to deliver them. The complexity of issues seem to generate a demand for closer international cooperation as well as more flexibility in the framework of cooperation. Across regions, the level of institutional complexity and formal structure of international cooperation varies considerably. This is especially in the case of East Asia and the relationship between Japan and Korea important, since uncertainty over the sincerity of cooperation

as well as asymmetric information lead to disruptions in the cooperation of both countries.

In the classic theoretical sense elaborated by John Nash (1950) and Thomas Schelling (1960), a bargaining problem refers to a situation where there are multiple self-enforcing agreements or possible outcomes that the negotiators would prefer to no agreement. Nevertheless in many cases the negotiators disagree on the ranking of the mutually preferable agreements.[1] As an empirical matter, as second characteristic feature of bargaining problems is that they are dynamic. They are resolved, if at all, through time (might cause bargaining delay), in sequences of offers and counteroffers, or with one holding out in hope that the others will make concessions (this includes bargaining strategies like commitment strategies). A important empirical aspect of bargaining problems is that they typically involve uncertainty or asymmetric information about what the others side true preferences and constraints are, which opens up the possibilities for bluffing and strategic interaction as well as for misinterpretation. One issue is arising from asymmetric information and explain how institutional setup and competing frameworks are able to improve the possibility of overcoming deadlock situations. It is important to understand under which conditions cooperation can take place and how we can distinguish different bargaining situations. Furthermore it is important to understand causes for bargaining failure and the important properties of how competing institutional frameworks can lead to improved negotiation outcomes.

Given the understanding of the nature of a bargaining problem,

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1   Chicken and Battle of the Sexes are thus minimal models of such a problem. See Schelling 1960 for a more detailed discussion.

it is apparent that bargaining is an integral part in a large variety of international negotiation and cooperation. Regardless of whether the specific domain is regional integration, economic coordination, environmental regulation or even arms control. There will almost always be many possible ways to write the treaty or agreement that specifies the terms of cooperation, and the states involved in the negotiations will surely have conflicting preferences over some subset of the various possibilities. Further, in practice the resolution of such a bargaining problem will take place, if at all, in a series of offers and counter offers and of course uncertainty about the minimum that the other side would accept is often important in international cooperation.

At the same time most efforts of international cooperation also involves issues of monitoring and enforcement. Once a deal is stuck on the terms of cooperation the next task is typically to implement, monitor and enforce an agreement. Only very few international agreements may be self implementing and self-enforcing without any special arrangements. But in the majority of cases, the parties involved recognise that there may be incentives to renegotiate some aspects of the deal, if the circumstances are changing and they set up governance structures of varying complexity to cope with this.[2] Therefore it is important to understand intergovernmental cooperation as a dynamic process, which is not a one off division of a good, but an ongoing process of interaction. It follows then, that the empirical problem faced by states contemplating international cooperation cannot be grasped by a theoretical framework that

2   Governance structures may also be desired as means for handling unforeseen contingencies, which are often problematic because they render unclear what constitutes re-negotiation.

emphasises a "one off" negotiation situation. In a broad range of empirical situations, reaching international cooperation involves first a negotiation stage and second a monitoring and enforcement stage. In empirical analyses these distinctions are often less obvious and therefore difficult to detect in intergovernmental cooperation. It is one of the aims of the paper to structure the key features of international cooperation from a bargaining perspective. Empirically we can observe that multilateral regional institutions are used frequently to mediate and facilitate cooperation. However the level of complexity and formal structure of these cooperation varies considerably, they can constitute a highly structured setup, like the decision making process in APEC, with hundreds of different policy issues discussed, or it could be a bilateral agreement like "The General Security of Military Information Agreement" (GSOMIA) between South Korea and Japan, which is primarily tied together by agreement of on single issue The aim of this paper is to incorporate the institutional level in the bargaining framework and to explore the impact of the variation of institutions along the *formal-informal continuum* (with varying degrees of formalisation and legalisation on the negotiation process).

Within this framework we pay specific attention to the impact of asymmetric information uncertainty and bargaining strategies. In the following sections we will take a closer look at the bargaining mechanism underlying cooperation.

Differentiation of negotiation situation

By focusing on the bargaining process and the impact of the institutional framework, a further distinction of empirical situations should be made. Empirically, problems of international cooperation

may involve either by bargaining over the division of new or potential benefits, or attempts to renegotiate an excising cooperative arrangement, where on party threatens to revert to non-cooperation if the terms are not adjusted.

In the first class of cases, an external event "opens up" a set of deals that all parties would prefer to the status quo. An example could be the issue of Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), where governments see benefits by having a standardised, free and open trade to increase the comparability of economic systems among the member-states. Nevertheless, there might be some bargaining conflict going on which of the several systems (or parts of systems) are the most beneficial and should be agreed on as the new standard.

However, this is only one example, we could think of many areas, other examples could be that technological and educational changes can produce new benefits obtained by international cooperation: like the development of the internet and advances telecommunication make it possible for government to efficiently share information for crime prevention. Of course also new emerging or newly discovered problems can be the source of such international cooperation, which becomes obvious on issues like environmental problems and a new form of global terrorism.

The second type of problems of re-negotiation involve states, which have already previously negotiated cooperative arrangement and some changes lead one or more of the negotiators to ask for re-negotiations of the terms. Within the framework of NAFTA the recent renegotiations between the USA, Mexico and Canada to form the new USMCA are a noticeable example, threatened trade wars among the USA and the EU provide another possible example. In terms of the strategic structure problems of re-negotiations are similar to

cases of international crisis bargaining, in which one state threatens with conflict in the event of failed efforts of re-negotiation. It should be noted, that once the phase of costly non-cooperation has begun, problems of international re-negotiation are structurally similar to problems of dividing up new benefits. In addition, note that after an initial agreement is reached, bargaining problems may recur as circumstances change or relative power shifts, leading to efforts at re-negotiation, some international organisations build in formal arrangements for periodic re-negotiation of prior agreements, and to an extent they might even be identified with these institutions of re-negotiation. The European Union evolves around constant treaty negotiations, which change the "rules of cooperation" frequently.

Saying that diverse international issue domains can be productively viewed as having a common strategic structure does not imply that bargaining and enforcement issues arise in the same manner in all issue areas if these are considered at a lower level of generality. My point is simply that reflection on the empirical problem faced by states wishing to cooperate suggests that, taken as dichotomous s alternatives, coordination games and Prisoners' Dilemma-type games are misleading theoretical models. Almost regardless of the substantive domain, negotiating governments will face both a bargaining problem and problems of enforcement, and it is important to notice that the two problems interact.

Conclusion

For several decades, states have taken institutional frameworks of intergovernmental negotiations more serious than scholars. Whereas the choice of institutional structure of international cooperation

has been neglected in the theoretical study of intergovernmental negotiations and cooperation, they have played a major role in many instances of interstate collaboration. Therefore it is important to understand the impact of an institutional framework on the intergovernmental negotiation process. The use of bargaining theory can help to explain under which conditions formal institutions lead to suboptimal negotiation outcomes or even to negotiation failure. The notion of asymmetric information and uncertainty over actors preferences, which force governments to use costly signals to reveal their 'true' preferences, should play a central role in this analysis. One way to prevent sub-optimal negotiation outcomes is to use less formal negotiation procedures. However, informal cooperation suffers from other short-comings of lower levels of inclusion and centralisation of cooperation. Therefore we further suggests that a combination of formal and informal cooperation — where the informal cooperation is treated like an outside option — might reduce the risk of bargaining failure in formal intergovernmental cooperation.

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論　　説

Possibilities of Cooperative Conflict Resolution:
A Study on Conflict between North and South Korea[1]

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Abstract

This paper examines the inter-Korean conflict from the perspective of a problem-solving approach, limiting it to the confrontation over the ideal state of ethnic unity, and the reign of Korea. In order to make negotiations for resolution successful, it is necessary for the parties to have the intention to form an agreement, to execute it, and to have continuous execution ability. Both sides of the North and South are required to be responsible governments that can continuously implement agreements. It is only when that trust is built that it is possible to modify each objective and to build cooperative relationships. The possibility of building such a trust relationship is also considered.

1　This paper is prepared for an annual conference of the Taiwan/Japan/ Korea Peace Forum, May 15, 2019, in Jeju, Korea.

1. The Nature of the North-South Korean Conflict: Framework for Understanding

(1) Defining "Conflict"

In conflict resolution research, conflict is understood as arising when multiple individuals or groups see each other as pursuing aims that cannot simultaneously be met. Each individual/group believes that if one of them tries to realize their aims, then the other will have to give up on realizing or change its own aims.[2]

How can we describe the conflict between North and South Korea in light of this definition? In order to understand a conflict, one must identify those who are in conflict, other involved parties, and their relationships, make clear what the conflict is about, as well as understand the process by which the conflict arose and its structure.

As is well known, it will soon be seventy-four years since the Korean Peninsula was split in two. With Japan's defeat in World War II the Korean people should have been liberated and acquired self-determination, but as a result of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, the peninsula was divided into two, and two governments were established that were strongly influenced by these two countries' different founding principles. Here I attempt to understand the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), which declared their founding in 1948 to be the direct parties of the North-South Korean conflict.

Incidentally, although the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953, the Korean War (which began in 1950) is still technically

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2   Uesugi pp.113-115, Ramsbotham pp.34-36

ongoing, so perhaps we should see the Korean War as the "conflict" on the Korean Peninsula. However, the primary signers of the 1953 armistice were the United Nations Command (the US) and the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (the Chinese). While Kim Il-sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, also signed it, it was not signed by a South Korean representative.

The Korean War should not be understood as a conflict between North and South but as an international conflict, and while South Korea was a direct victim of the Korean War, it was not a primary party in peace negotiations.

Then, what is the conflict between North and South Korea? Here, I would like to consider this issue while limiting myself to the polity of a unified Korean Peninsula and people, as well as conflict over the right to rule a unified Korea.

(2) Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution research both makes clear via analysis the structures of conflicts and tries to present methods for solving them by changing parties' "perceptions" that they are in a trade-off relationship in which it is impossible for them to realize both of their demands (aims).

In military conflicts (such as wars between states) in which force is exercised and violent acts are carried out, conflict management efforts, such as conflict regulation and containment, are made. However, these are in many ways stopgap measures, and approaches have also been developed that eliminate the causes of the conflict and aim for a permanent resolution.

One example is trying to shift the opposing relationship between those in conflict into a cooperative one in which they each share

the aim of eliminating points of conflict. A well-known example of this method is the "problem-solving approach." This is premised on an environment in which those in conflict can engage in direct negotiation. Research on negotiation techniques for conflict resolution has also progressed, and therein one finds the method called "collaborative negotiation."

In order to make negotiations successful, parties need mutual understanding and efforts to be understood. For this purpose, there are the techniques of "informing" the other party of one's worldview, negotiating climate, position, and needs, as well as of having an "open mind" and "uniting," which build a foundation for sharing aims and creating solutions.[3]

The secret negotiations that made possible the 1993 Oslo Accords, which surprised the world due to Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) relationship changing greatly from an intense oppositional one (to the extent that they rejected each other's existence) to mutual recognition, are a good example of a problem-solving approach that made full use of collaborative negotiation.[4] Norway, who propelled the secret negotiations, subsequently played an important role in promoting conflict resolution in Aceh and Sri Lanka.

However, subsequently the peace in Palestine untangled, and today the Oslo process is seen as having failed. We could say that this once again showed the difficulty of transforming zero-sum-game conflicts. It appears that conflict and division within the parties in conflict was a major factor that prevented the implementation of the "agreement." Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the Oslo Accords,

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3   Raider pp.31-88
4   See Corbin for the negotiation process leading to the Oslo agreement.

was assassinated two years later by a young right-wing Jewish extremist. In this and other ways, on the one hand, anti-peace forces have expanded, while on the other hand, in Palestine, Islamic fundamentalist groups like the Hamas emerged as major forces opposing the PLO and intensified attacks against Israel.

While collaborative negotiation is effective in having parties agree upon new solutions, in order for agreed-upon solutions to be implemented, there is a need for those who reached the agreement to intend and have the ability to implement them in a sustained fashion.

With all of this in mind, I would like to examine how agreements between North and South Korea have been reached to solve the conflict and the efforts of the two countries to make these agreements a reality.

2. North and South Korea Unification and Policy Transformations[5]

I have stated my position that the Korean War should be understood as an international conflict. The intention of Kim Il-sung, who started the war, was to have North Korea unify the peninsula via military force. This has been pointed out by multiple researchers. However, due to a massive counterattack by the United States, he was unable to fulfill this aim, and as a result the North—South division became fixed.

Subsequently, North Korea would advocate North—South federalism and then come to offer proposals aiming for the unification of the two states. North Korea has called for a North Korea-led unification of the peninsula via the "democratization of

5 Regarding changes in the theory of north-south unification, referred to Asai, IPP, Kimiya 2006, Kurata, Kuroda.

South Korean politics" (a socialist revolution in South Korea and the kicking out of US forces from the country). This is shown by Kim Il-sung's statement, "If American imperialism is driven away, and a people's democratic revolution is victorious in South Korea, and then the people are able to hold political power in their own hands, then via the power of Northern socialist forces and South Korean democratic forces, the great deed of the unification of our ancestral land will be carried out."[6]

On the other hand, Syngman Rhee, holding that the South Korean government, which was recognized by the UN, was the Korean Peninsula's only legal government, did not recognize the North Korean government and advocated the recovery of the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. Even after Syngman Rhee was gone and the Chang Myon and Park Chung-hee administrations came into power, they saw South Korea as a legitimate UN recognized government and made clear that their approach was to eliminate communist forces. North and South Korea were in a classical zero-sum-game-like conflict in which they each advocated exclusively acquiring ruling rights in the peninsula.

However upon entering the 1970s, due to changes in international conditions, such as the intensification of the conflict between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, improvements in US-PRC relations, and the PRC becoming the UN representative of China, North Korea looked to improve its relations with the South, and in 1972 the "July 4 South—North Korea Joint Statement" was released. Here the so-called three principles of unification were proclaimed, which state that "peaceful unification" is a shared aim.

6   Regarding the history of north-south negotiation, referred to Asai, NDL 2019.

However, the statement's call to "faithfully carry out these agreed items" was not put into practice. There are almost no cases in which post-military conflict peace treaties are completely implemented (this includes the aforementioned Oslo Accords). Often a process of agreement violations, renegotiations, and the conclusion of a modified agreement is repeated. This is because those in conflict proceed with negotiations while hiding desires that would lead to argument in order to reach an agreement for the time being.

While it is not insignificant that approximately twenty years after the Korean War the two governments released a joint statement, it was not an agreement for changing North—South relations but a way of shelving such changes and trying to avoid a confrontational situation.

From the latter half of the 1960s onwards, South Korea experienced rapid economic growth and democratization was advanced. Amidst this, there were efforts for North—South unification, referred to as "Nordpolitik" (Northern Policy).

In the July 7th Declaration (the Special Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification, and Prosperity) that President Roh Tae-woo announced in 1988, we find the following: "In order to create the conditions that establish peace on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea is ready to improve its relationships with our allies such as Japan and the United States, and we will pursue improved relations with socialist countries, including the Soviet Union and China." It tried to lead North Korea toward coexistence with the South, which was sought by the South's government, by enclosing it internationally. Also, because North Korea was unable to avail support from the Soviet Union or China, as both countries were stuck in economic doldrums at the end of the Cold War, it called for economic exchange between North and

South Korea trying to make North Korea's economy dependent upon that of the South.

The December 1991 "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea" was born out of these circumstances. Also, at the end of 1991, the "Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" was released as well.

However, due to the 1993—1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, North Korea came to be seen as a political and military threat by the international community, particularly Japan and the United States. This also meant the strengthening of an external factor that restricted negotiations between the North and South, the parties in conflict, namely, US's influence.

The Kim Dae-jung administration, which began in 1998, promoted a "Sunshine Policy" in order to unify North and South Korea via a three-stage process. In June 2000, meetings were held between the two countries' heads of state, and they released a joint statement. Based on the idea that stable unification of the North and the South would become possible as the economic gap between the two countries lessened, South Korean business provided their economic and technological power as well as support for economic rebuilding to North Korea.

However, US President George Bush criticized Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the "axis of evil" in his 2002 State of the Union Address, and in 2003 attacked Iraq due to suspicions that it was producing weapons of mass destruction, toppling the Saddam Hussein administration. It was in this context that the second North Korean nuclear crisis happened.

However, Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy was carried on by Roh

Moo-hyun. In 2004 operations began at the Kaesong Industrial Zone. While North Korea had carried out three nuclear tests, the zone was never closed during this time. In 2007 a heads of states meeting was held in Pyongyang between President Roh Moo-hyun and Defense Chairman Kim Jong-il, and the "Declaration on the Advancement of South−North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity" was released.

This declaration called for both the North and South to cooperate to end the Korean War as well as work to implement the six-party talks' agreement in order to solve the peninsula's nuclear problem. However, while the December 6, 2008 six-party talks aimed to put into writing a framework for verifying North Korea's denuclearization, an agreement was not reached, and no six-party talks have been held since then.

The Lee Myung-bak administration, which began in February 2008, adopted a different approach than the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations. It sought denuclearization and the opening up of North Korea as conditions for economic assistance to the country. However, on July 11th, a South Korean female tourist was shot and killed by a North Korean soldier on Mount Kumgang, and the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region project came to a halt. Also, in May 2009, North Korea carried out two nuclear tests. Then due to the ROKS Cheonan sinking in March 2010, South Korea halted all exchange and trade with North Korea (excluding that in the Keasong Industrial Zone). Due to this, the bombardment of Yeonpyeong by North Korea in November, and other reasons, North−South relations hit a brick wall.

In February 2013, the Park Geun-hye administration began. It advocated as its policy toward North Korea a "trust-building process on the Korean Peninsula" that aimed for the development of North

—South relations based on mutual trust. However, North Korea continued to arm itself with nuclear weapons, carried out three nuclear tests in February 2013 and four in January 2016, and launched a ballistic missile in February 2016. Aiming to cut off funding sources for weapons of mass destruction development, South Korea halted operations at the Kaesong Industrial Zone and North—South relations worsened.

In May 2017, Moon Jae-in became president, and for the first time in nine years, political forces seen as conciliatory toward North Korea held the reins of government. However, North Korea pushed forward with its nuclearization, continuing to launch ballistic missiles and so on. With the rapid worsening of the relations between US and North Korea, the advancement of North—South relations was seen as difficult.

However, North—South dialogue rapidly advanced from the beginning of 2018 with the Pyeongchang Olympic Winter Games soon approaching. On April 27, President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un met in Panmunjon and released the "Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula," which confirmed the following objectives: (1) improving North—South relations, (2) alleviating military tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and (3) constructing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

In June of the same year, a heads of states meeting was held between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un. Their joint statement read, "President Trump is committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and Chairman Kim Jong-un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." Then, in September of the same year, President Moon Jae-in visited Pyongyang, and, along with Kim Jong-un, signed the

"Pyongyang Joint Declaration" that called for (1) an end to a militarily hostile relationship, (2) the advancement of economic cooperation, (3) the solving of the issue of separated families, (4) the promotion of cultural exchange, and (5) the advancement of denuclearization.

3．Are Shared North-South Objectives Possible?

In the decades since the 1972 joint declaration between the two countries, their governments have repeatedly agreed to improve relations while not really implementing such agreements. But what about the 2018 agreements?

On November 12th, 2018 an article appeared in the newspaper *Hankyoreh* entitled "Examining Inter-Korean Relations 200 Days after the Panmunjom Declaration."

Examining progress on the 25 agreements in the Panmunjom Declaration and the Pyongyang Joint Declaration, we find that nine (36%) of them have been completely implemented, while 13 (52%) of them continue to be deliberated, either at a preliminary or subcommittee level. There were also two agreements (8%) that failed (holding an inter-Korean event on June 15 and a performance by a Pyongyang art troupe in Seoul in October), while there is one agreement whose implementation is contingent on other factors (deliberating the questions of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, resuming tourism to Mt. Kumgang and creating a joint economic zone on the West Sea and a joint tourism zone on the East Sea).

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/870329.html

http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/869818.html

As for agreements related to using military tension on the Korean Peninsula, the newspaper states that partially due to the Panmunjom Declaration's supplementary military agreement, their implementation rate was the highest. However, it notes that the implementation of agreed-upon items related to the construction of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is not progressing.

> The problem is that this area requires the cooperation not only of South and North Korea but also of Korea's neighbors and parties to the armistice agreement, including the US and China. The crux of this issue is North Korea's denuclearization, a matter wholly dependent upon the results of the North Korea—US dialogue.

Examining the ideals of Korean unification and a peninsular peace regime, which have been professed by the two governments' joint statements and the like as well as considering their actual actions, we can see that while they assert the same position in writing, their reasons for doing so (what they are actually seeking) are opposed.

The Panmunjom Declaration also calls for bringing "a swift end to the Cold War relic of longstanding division and confrontation" and improving and cultivating "inter-Korean relations in a more active manner." Many times it has been agreed that the unification of the Korean people should be sought after establishing the peaceful coexistence of North and South Korea.

In this sense, perhaps, we could say that the issue of who gets to lead the unification of the Korean Peninsula has decreased in importance. However, the problem is that the two governments' understanding of the necessary conditions for each polity to sustain

and survive peacefully does not match.

North Korea is extremely concerned that its current regime will be overthrown due to a military attack or collapse due to the spread of anti-establishment sentiments. It appears unlikely that it will quickly change its policies of firmly maintaining military defensive power (symbolized by its nuclear armament), controlling the speech and the political participation of its citizens, and so on.

While South Korea seeks an end to the Korean War in order to construct a peace regime as discussed in joint declarations, for this to happen, reconciliation between the US and North Korea is indispensable. However, the greatest obstacle to improving US—North Korean relations is North Korea's nuclear armament.

In other words, North Korea's nuclear armament is a point of dispute, and both countries' aims regarding it cannot both be met. North Korea sees its nuclear armament as the most suitable policy for maintaining the country's independence, but from South Korea's perspective it is a major obstacle to the construction of a peaceful regime on the peninsula, in other words, South Korea's peace. Here we should keep in mind that North Korea's nuclear weapons are not aimed at South Korea.

While North Korea's nuclear armament can be seen as problematic in that it challenges the NPT regime, due to sanctions being led by Japan and the United States (which see its armament as a military threat), North Korea has heightened its vigilance to protect its regime, and has actually become more attached to its nuclear armament.

For South Korea, in this situation, the worsening of US—North Korea relations and the peninsula being divided while a Korean War peace treaty remains at a standstill is a major loss.

According to the problem-solving approach, the aim should be for

North and South Korea to become partners that pursue the creation of an understanding in which their two desires are fulfilled at the same time. North Korea's desire to maintain its regime and South Korea's desire to end the Korean War and establish a peace regime.

In the aforementioned US—North Korea joint statement, the US again sought the complete denuclearization of the peninsula.

One way to get the US to agree to effective regime maintenance and an end to the Korean War could be North and South Korea working together to present a roadmap to denuclearization of the peninsula.

Turning to recent developments, partially due to President Moon Jae-in's diplomatic skills, work has been done to improve US—North Korea relations at the 2018 Panmunjom meeting, the US—North Korea heads of states meeting in Singapore, and the Pyongyang meeting. However, it appears that progress is halting due to the lack of agreement at the 2019 US—North Korea heads of states meeting in Hanoi.

According to media reports and the like, while North Korea prepared a phased denuclearization plan, the US pointed out that there were suspicions that facilities were being preserved, and they ended in disagreement. One also finds the view that Presidents Trumps' own scandals, unrelated to the content of negotiations, had an influence. In order to make conflict resolution negotiations successful, as previously stated, those in conflict must come to an agreement, intend to implement it, and have the ability to do so in a sustained fashion. It is also probably important to determine whether the US administration has retained such anability.

There is also a need for both North and South Korean governments to be responsible and able to continually implement any agreement.

It is with this confidence-building that the respective aims of these two countries that lead to disputes can be modified and a cooperative relationship constructed.

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Thammasat University — Soka University Joint Seminar

Role of research and pedagogy in the promotion of peace, sustainable development and global citizenship

August 22, 2019

Thammasat University, Thaphrachan campus

PROGRAM

Keynote Speech

Gasinee Witoonchart, Rector Thammasat University

The Role of Higher Education in promoting peace, sustainable development and global citizenship

Theme 1: Research and Pedagogy that Promote Sustainable Development

Dr. Prinya Thaewanarumitkul, Vice Rector for Sustainability and Main Campus Administration

Prof. Ryohei Tanaka, Vice President of Soka University

Theme 2: Research and Pedagogy that Promote Peace

Dr. Dumrong Adunyarittigun, Former Dean of Faculty of Liberal Arts (TU)

Prof. Hideki Tamai, Director of Soka University Peace Research Institute

Theme 3: Research and Pedagogy that Global Citizenship

Dr. Chanon Adsanatham, Lecturer of Faculty of Liberal Arts (TU)

Prof. Lary Macdonald, Dean of Faculty of International Liberal Arts(SU)

PRESENTATION

Dr. Daisaku Ikeda's Philosophy on Peace and Peace Studies at Soka University[1]

Hideki Tamai

Director

Soka University Peace Research Institute

1. The Establishment of Soka University Peace Research Institute

"Be a fortress for the peace of humankind." is one of the founding principles of Soka University that was put forward by the founder Dr. Daisaku Ikeda. Although Soka University has been expected to be a base for peace creation from the beginning of its founding, specific initiatives for peace studies started with the establishment of Soka University Peace Research Institute in 1976.

3 years after the establishment of the research institute, the first issue of a research bulletin titled "Soka University Peace Research" was published. Dr. Ikeda made a special contribution to this issue

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1 This paper is prepared for Thammasat University — Soka University Joint Seminar, "Role of research and pedagogy in the promotion of peace, sustainable development and global citizenship", August 22, 2019 at Thammasat University, Thailand.

with an article called the "Peace Guidelines toward 21st Century."[2] This year marks the 40th anniversary of the publication of the article on peace by Dr. Daisaku Ikeda.

In the article Dr. Daisaku Ikeda presented his thoughts of peace through the problems of nuclear weapons. It is thought that his philosophy was derived from the Declaration Calling for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons by Mr. Josei Toda, one of the founders of Soka Education.

Before I proceed, I would like to review international politics at the time when the "Peace Guidelines" was published.

In the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union started to jointly manage accidental nuclear wars, leading to the period so-called DÉTENTE. In 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Agreement was signed to set a limit on the number of nuclear warheads. However, these events still did not mean the arrival of peace. The number of nuclear bombs manufactured by the United States and the Soviet Union increased rapidly, and regional conflicts in Asia and Africa broke out. In the wake of the fourth Middle East War which erupted in 1973, the so-called "oil crisis" caused significant damage to the global economy.

Now, let's look at the development of Peace Studies. The anti-nuclear movement spread globally in the 1950s amid a mounting sense of crisis over a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Russell-Einstein Manifesto was announced in 1955, leading to the Pugwash Conference in 1957, through which scientists called for the prevention of nuclear war. Thus, Mr. Josei Toda announced the Declaration Calling for the Abolition of

2 *Soka University Peace Research*, No.1, 1979 (『創大平和研究』創刊号1979年)

Nuclear Weapons in Yokohama in the same year. Peace Studies was increasingly institutionalized in the 50's and 60's, for example, in 1964, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) was established.

In the 1970s, many peace researchers worked to determine the cause of the worsening situation that was far from peace, such as continuous nuclear arms races despite the period of DÉTENTE, the deepening poverty in the third world, and the increasing regional conflicts. Researchers began critical examinations with the hypothesis that the very structure of the international community was causing problems to create violence, which was hindering peace.

During this period, peace studies in Japan were also further institutionalized. The Peace Studies Association of Japan was established in 1973, so was the Institute for Peace Science Hiroshima University in 1975. The latter was the first peace research institute in a Japanese university. Soka University Peace Research Institute was founded in the following year of 1976. We could say that Soka was one of the pioneers of the peace research institutes in Japan.

Looking at international politics again, the U.S.-Soviet relationship began to show signs of deterioration again in 1977. As a result of the rapid advance of nuclear arms races, the Soviet Union deployed a new type of medium-range nuclear missiles, while the United States set out the policy of nuclear deployment to destroy the military targets of the Soviet Union. The U.S.'s plan was based on its nuclear missile technology with improved accuracy to hitting targets.

Against such background, the U.N. General Assembly held the first Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, and Dr. Daisaku Ikeda submitted a disarmament proposal to the General Assembly. I think this was the first time for Dr. Ikeda to make a full-fledged peace proposal. It was the following year, in 1979, that he published the

article the "Peace Guidelines toward 21st Century."

The year of 1979 saw the conflict involving the socialist nations, namely, Sino-Vietnamese War, the emergence of anti-American Islamic force through the establishment of the Iranian revolutionary government, and the invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. These events crucially worsened U.S.-Soviet relations. The second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) was signed the same year but was never ratified. Thus, the so-called "New Cold War" broke out. Dr. Daisaku Ikeda began making proposals as to how to deal with this situation to the second U.N. Special Session on Disarmament in 1982, as well in the SGI Peace Proposals made annually since 1983. I see that the basic idea underlying these proposals appears in the article the "Peace Guidelines toward 21st Century."

2. The points of the "Peace Guidelines toward 21st Century"

Dr. Daisaku Ikeda stated at the beginning of the "Peace Guidelines" that the trend of anti-war and peace is still not the norm of the world. And according to him, from ancient times, humans have gained a great political and economic benefit by winning a war. Humans have seen wars and revolutions as the source of energy to destroy old systems stuck with contradiction and create a new society. Besides, wars have been positively evaluated as creating new values despite great destruction, based on such a belief that humans gain creativity and virtues by risking life. But he insisted that despite all these beliefs, humans still need to abolish wars, and to pursue peace.

And he continued that it is because the destruction and slaughter caused by wars now have become so huge to the extent that all conventional reasons to justify wars are canceled out. And then,

he pointed out the properties of wars deteriorated because of "the increasing tendency where men are used by weapons rather than men using weapons, and humans are increasingly placing themselves under complete control of weapons and wars." Moreover, he noted that the civilization of wars where humans have no control will only lead to the threat of a nuclear war.

I would like to point out that Dr. Ikeda was already aware 40 years ago that the key to overcoming human challenges was to restore humanity to the international community. Dr. Ikeda has consistently suggested "how to restore humanity" in his peace proposals. The words humanity and humanism that Dr. Ikeda used does not mean to encourage an egoistic human-centered principle. He defines the original humanity as the function full of altruism and creativity.

While Dr. Daisaku Ikeda realistically acknowledged the cruel nature of human beings that was increasing the risk of nuclear wars and making them kill each other without even reflecting, he proposed the path of not giving up on such negative nature of humans and transforming them into a good existence with altruism and creativity. He wrote about a demon with an arrogant ego who does not care about others and uses others as measures to satisfy his desire at the expense of others. However, Dr. Ikeda said humans have a moral nature with strong lifeblood that conquers the life of such a demon. Humans also have the lifeblood for compassion, to feel happy by leading others to happiness. Dr. Ikeda suggests that humans have to pursue such an existence. I think this part manifests Dr. Ikeda's creativity as a Buddhist teacher.

In the "Peace Guidelines", he based this idea of the restoration of humanity to discuss six issues that need to be addressed including Peace and the Constitution of Japan, the North-South divide, and

international organizations and so on.

Japan's constitution is an increasingly important topic in considering the future of Japan's security policy, which had changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The Constitution of Japan endorses non-war and peace. However, how to pave a path to peaceful policies in accordance with the spirit of the constitution based on Japan's currently standpoint is a crucial issue in peace studies, as Japan is strengthening its military capabilities and advancing to the international community in line with the reinforced Japan-U.S. alliance.

Looking at the issue of the North-South divide today, globalization has deepened economic problems, such as speculative financial transactions and a globally widening gap between the rich and the poor. In terms of the issue of the United Nations, its existence as a parliament for human beingis ever more significant to examine global governance despite various limitations and problems.

And today, as it is even more crucial for the international community to take actions to build peace and prevent conflicts, the Japanese government is focusing on this field, and many peace researchers are working on this issue. In 2005, the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission was established, which was a long-held proposal of Dr. Ikeda.

In concluding the "Peace Guidelines", he pointed out the importance of education and religions to overcome challenges and create peace.

"Human beings must not become slaves to what they have created, whether it is systems or nuclear weapons. Humans themselves must play the leading role. The inner transformation

of individuals creates inevitable wave motions and inevitable results, to bring regeneration of sense of values to all aspects such as politics, economy, culture, and education. It is a total regeneration of thinking of the whole human race with the humans playing a leading role. I believe that such regeneration of thinking will become the origin of the response from inner selves that deters the nuclear threat from the outside."

"What is our mission in the flow of history from the past to the present and the future? It is to believe in human goodness, and inspire and enlighten others, while returning to the eternal and fundamental standpoint that nothing is more of a being of dignity than humans and that our lives are the greatest treasure."

As such, my understanding is that the guidelines for peace studies at Soka University outlined in the "Peace Guidelines toward 21st Century" are to inspire and enlighten the innate goodness of humans.

3. Fostering Global Citizens for Building Peace and Sustainable Prosperity

When Soka University was selected to Top Global University Project in 2014, Soka University set its goal of the project "Global Initiative for Humanistic Education—Fostering Global Citizens for Building Peace and Sustainable Prosperity." I think this goal matches the guidelines of the founder that I have introduced so far.

At the heart of this project is the Global Core Center, under which School of International Peace Studies (SIPS) plays a leading role for education, while Soka University Peace Research Institute (SUPRI) takes initiatives on research.

Currently, SUPRI is focusing on the following topics for its research activities:

(1) Human Security and the SDGs

(2) Global Justice and Human Rights

(3) Multilateralism in Asia

(4) Peacebuilding in Africa

Dr. Daisaku Ikeda has frequently mentioned the importance of the idea of Human Security since the time shortly after the UNDP's Human Development Report was published in 1994. And in January 1995 in particular, he urged the international community to dramatically change its thinking towards regaining human sovereignty in a lecture titled "Peace and Human Security" at the East-West Center in Hawaii, which had made an earnest request to Dr. Ikeda to visit. That year was when the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake hit Japan. First of all, Dr. Ikeda was making great efforts to help and encourage those who were devastated by the earthquake until just before leaving for Hawaii. This lecture was delivered when Dr. Ikeda himself was doing his best for Human Security.

Incidentally, Dr. Ikeda pointed out that Mr. Toda's Declaration Calling for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, the origin of his peace philosophy, had already included the idea of human security. He pointed this out in his 2009 peace proposal titled "Building Global Solidarity toward Nuclear Abolition" as follows.[3]

The third pillar is that Mr. Toda argued that the protest against

3 'Building Global Solidarity Toward Nuclear Abolition' (September 8, 2009)[https://www.sgi.org/about-us/president-ikedas-proposals/nuclear-abolition-proposal-2009.html]

nuclear tests should absolutely be promoted, but the issue would not be solved fundamentally unless the efforts are made to eradicate the current philosophy of security, which consists on the sacrifice of many people, citing Mr. Toda's declaration "Even though the movement to ban tests for nuclear and atomic bombs is occurring in the world now, I want to exterminate the hidden cause."

The declaration included Mr. Toda's passionate hope in a condensed form and was based on an approach to finding the foundation of peace by removing the misery faced by each human being. This approach derived from the vision of human security, whose importance is being called out today.

In the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, Dr. Ikeda again discussed human security in detail in the 2012 SGI Peace Proposals and presented a new perspective on the recovery of human beings and society. The following three points were raised as a vision that humans should share "Dignity of Life".[4]

・A world where tragedies happening anywhere are never ignored and its citizens overcome threats in solidarity
・A world based on the empowerment of the people and where its priority is placed in protecting the dignity of all citizens and ensuring their right to live peacefully
・A world where its citizens never forget the lessons of the past and devote all their energies to overcoming the negative legacy of human history, and stop passing such legacy onto future

4　'Peace Proposal 2012 Human Security and Sustainability: Sharing Reverence for the Dignity of Life' [https://www.sgi.org/about-us/president-ikedas-proposals/peace-proposal-2012.html]

generations

In the international community, the SDGs were adopted with the aim of creating a society in which all people could have the freedom from fear, freedom from poverty, and the freedom to live with dignity. I think that this is proof that the world is progressing steadily in the direction that Dr. Daisaku Ikeda has consistently advocated. Dr. Ikeda frequently mentions and recognizes the initiatives for SDGs by using the phrase "no one should be left behind."

Under such background, SUPRI has been working on its current focuses of "promoting human security" and "contributing to the achievement of the SDGs." Recently held international symposiums on peace and Human Security as follows;

In 2016,
"Human Security in Asia: Peacebuilding in Northeast Asia"
"Global Governance for Human Security"
"Toward the Century of Humanism: The Pursuit of Human Security and the Efforts to Abolish Nuclear Weapons"

Besides, we do Joint Research collaborated with Kyungnam University and Chinese Culture University, and we held symposium as Peace Forum.

"Creating a Peaceful Community in Asia" in Okinawa, 2017
"Prospects of Cross-strait Relations and East Asian Developments" in Taipei, 2018
"Conflict, Cooperation and Peace in East Asia" in Jeju, 2019.

In the future, SUPRI would like to deepen cooperation with other universities and research institutes in Asian countries and produce further outcomes of its research.

Incidentally, Soka University proposed the following properties as requirements of a creative human, which it strives to foster.[5]

- ・Compassion, a nature to be considerate of the suffering of others
- ・Wisdom, a nature to deeply recognize the equality and possibilities of lives
- ・Courage, a nature to see any differences as food to awaken each other's humanity

These are based on the vision of "global citizenship," which Dr. Daisaku Ikeda presented in a lecture at Columbia University in 1996. Today, each of the faculties of Soka University is working on nurturing global citizens, including the Faculty of International Liberal Arts.

In particular, School of International Peace Studies (SIPS), which I mentioned earlier, is working to produce peace workers of a new era by teaching more professional peace studies. In graduate school education, we hope to develop research and education coordinated organically. SUPRI strives to do so by giving back its research activities and results more directly to classrooms.

I would like to finish this presentation with the hope that more people will understand Soka's peace studies based on its humanism and peace philosophy, and that the network of peace studies and education will spread further.

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5 See Soka University Web page [https://www.soka.ac.jp/en/gcp/about/policy]

SUPRI Project Annual Report
April 2019 - March 2020

Group 1
"Human Security and SDGs"

Group Members:

Vesselin Popovski, Hideaki Ishii, Hideki Tamai, Masashi Nakayama

The research group on Sustainable Development (Popovski, Tamai, Ishii and Nakayama) in 2019 submitted Category C application for Kakenhi grant "Verification of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) implementation system as a global governance" and initiated a new project "Global Governance 3.0".

Verification of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) implementation system as a global governance

The "2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" initiated a new global governance model, known as "governance by goals-setting". This project explores this new model, examines the status of the "Global Partnership for Sustainable Development" with a focus on Japan and investigates whether the SDG implementation system represents indeed a new form of global governance.

There are various opinions regarding the level of innovation and significance of the "Sustainable Development Goals" and how much

they differ from traditional international regimes, formed to address arms control, economic development, and global environmental protection. Kanie, for example, credits the SDGs with presenting a list of goals and targets of unprecedented size and detail as "a new global governance strategy." (Norichika Kanie, "New Global Governance Strategy for the 21st Century: Governance and SDGs by Setting Goals" [Edited by Norichika Kanie, "What are the Sustainable Development Goals? Agenda of Transformation for 2030," Minerva Shobo, 2017., Frank Biermann, Norichika Kanie, Rakhyun Kim, 'Global Governance by Goal-Setting: the Novel Approach of the UN Sustainable Development Goals', Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 2017)

This project clarifies the specificity of the global governance and whether the SDGs implementation system can be evaluated as a new form of global governance. It looks at the actual state of the "Global Partnership for Sustainable Development" in the implementation policy set out in the 2030 Agenda, how the "Global Partnership" is formed, and whether it is fulfilling the function of governance.

The 2030 Agenda is "an action plan for humans, the planet and prosperity." This can indicate that we are members of a global society, that transcends the international community and goes beyond the conventional sovereign state system.

Several authors have developed the theoretical models of global governance and the concept of multi-level governance (Shinji Onoda "Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Multi-level Governance for Implementation", "Sustainability Research, No. 9, March 2019). They place an emphasis on constructivist ideas, arguing that the SDGs are based on inherent needs, principles, concepts and norms of the global society, and claiming that the "Global Partnership" is

functioning as a process for the propagation of the norms underlying the SDGs. Constructivist research has led to the emergence of new concepts and norms such as "inhumanity", "human security" and "responsibility to protect", which have led to the establishment of international treaties and regimes, such as the anti-personnel landmine treaty and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, where in addition to states, non-state actors played a significant role.

The SDGs follow this process and represent an ambition to involve all actors on the planet both in norm-entrepreneurship, and in practical implementation, establishing a global social order. The 2030 Agenda describes the SDG implementation regime as aimed to bring together "governments, civil society, the private sector, UN agencies and other actors, mobilize all available resources and support the implementation of all goals and targets". In addition to the United Nations Global Compact and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN), governments and organizations have provided a variety of practical examples and stakeholder type guidance.

The project considers whether we can formulate a change from "international community" to "global society". Attempts to verify the formation of "global society" in a constructivist manner are ambitious and worthy of a challenge. Another challenge is how sovereign nations are going to respond to changes towards "global society".

The project focuses on the Japanese government's efforts to address the SDGs as a national policy. To this end, in addition to network organizations such as SDSN Japan and Global Compact Network Japan, and private organizations such as Keidanren and NGOs, the project also analyzes good business practices and describe their business content, scale, etc. In addition to establishing

categorization of governmental efforts and business practices, the project investigates also the motivation of the public and the private sector towards implementing the SDGs.

In addition to compiling and categorizing the data of Japanese governmental efforts and business practices into a comprehensive database, the project will undertake awareness survey on the "Global Partnership" and a cognitive survey on target organizations, as to find out how the SDGs are recognized and evaluated, and what are the motivations for promoting global partnerships, based on information published by the surveyed organizations. In addition, it will consider how the case studies of the survey have an impact on achieving the targets of the SDGs in accordance with specific indicators.

Finally, based on these survey results, the project will verify whether the SDGs are accepted as a code of conduct for various organizations, evaluate how effective the examples have been in achieving the SDGs, and to what extent this contributes to the development of global governance.

Prof. Hideki Tamai, principal investigator, Director of SUPRI, and institution founded with the spirit of establishing a fortress to protect the global peace. He has been working on research activities from the standpoint of humanism, altruism and creativity, against the egoistic anthropocentrism. This orientation is in tune with the human security concept of "protecting the irreplaceable central part of human life and realizing the freedom and potential of all". The principal investigator will bring along various institutions with whom he has been working on research on human security.

Prof. Vesselin Popovski, research coordinator, is an expert on international law, the Paris Agreement and the SDGs and will play an important role in providing an analytical perspective from

international law research, which views the SDGs as a new type of international agreements, based on soft law, which promotes independent participation of stakeholders, different from previous international agreements.

Prof. Masashi Nakayama, research coordinator, also an expert in international law, has a wealth of achievements, especially on global governance and the role of the United Nations for human security, and has worked to refine the concept of global governance.

Professor Hideaki Ishii, research coordinator, will focus on the interconnectedness of targets in the SDGs based on his past work on human security issues and the correlation between economic development and disarmament.

The project investigators have been sharing knowledge with internal and external researchers and practitioners, participating in academic conferences on the concept and practice of the SDGs. Some research results have been obtained on the implementation system of the SDGs (Shulla et al., 'The contribution of Regional Centers of Expertise for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development' [Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 237, November 2019], Berrone et al., 'EASIER: An evaluation model for public-private partnerships contributing to the sustainable development goals' [Sustainability, Vol. 11, Issue 8, April 2019].The Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) continues to publish monitoring based on the SDGs indicators and provides practical manuals.

Global Governance 3.0

Background of the Idea

In 1945 the United Nations was established in what can be called the first major comprehensive international institutionalization, or "Global Governance 1.0" (GG 1.0). The League of Nations was an attempt in the same direction, but it could not become global). The global governance experience during the Cold War was far from successful, due to ideological rivalry and mistrust between the East and West.

In 1985 Gorbachov came to power in the USSR and his "perestroika" and "openness" triggered a new era, signing unprecedented treaties between the USA and USSR reducing nuclear and conventional weapons. At the same time the dictator Marcos was ousted in the Philippines, a wave of democratization spread in Latin America and Eastern Europe, the end of apartheid in South Africa and other significant changes, including technological such as the emergence of Internet and global communications. The liberation of Kuwait from Iraq in 1990 is just one example of what has been called a "New World Order" which allowed the United Nations to make a remarkable progress towards more international co-operation and globalization. We can see 1985-2014 as a period of a build up of "Global Governance 2.0" (GG 2.0). However, the Russian annexation of Crimea and military support for rebels in Eastern Ukraine, the arrival of the Trump Administration and the exit of Britain from the EU presented a major blow on global governance in 2014-2020.

Purpose, Research Questions and Significance

With the rise of BRICS, the reluctance of the USA to continue to

play a major geopolitical role and the uncertainties surrounding the European Union, can we revisit the GG 2.0 and think of a potential Global Governance 3.0? The purpose of the project will be to address this and the following questions: What would be the main features of Global Governance 3.0 (GG 3.0)? Would GG 3.0 be able to close the gaps between the expectations and the delivery of the global governance institutions. Although there have been some remarkable achievements in eradicating diseases and dealing with epidemics and alleviating humanitarian suffering in disasters, there has been also a general dissatisfaction with the lack of efficiency in global governance — both in policies and in institutions - across the world, and particularly within the younger generations. As a result there is also a growing insistence and activism to rejuvenate the UN through the work of several think tanks and NGOs. The UN needs re-empowerment, as it dramatically failed to stop the conflicts in Syria, Yemen and several African countries; the atrocities against Rohingya in Myanmar and minorities elsewhere. Instead of seeing denuclearization, North Korea and, potentially, Iran have developed nuclear weapons, presenting a threat to the peace. In 2015 the UN Member States agreed on the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, but following from that they failed to make sufficient pledges in nationally determined contributions and climate actions, and the planet might move fast to 3 plus degrees, which is already a catastrophic threshold. The world has become over-armed, over-heated and the number of refugees and displaced by human-made and natural disasters is record-breaking. Can GG 3.0 successfully deal with the global challenges?

The significance of the project will be to think originally and innovatively about the challenges facing the Global Governance in

the 21st century, to assess evolving attitudes towards GG 3.0 both in developed countries (Japan, the UK, European states) and developing countries (India, Brazil, South Africa, ASEAN countries) and to propose forward looking findings.

Future Plan

The project will aim to collect latest research from established scholars and views from top experts on global governance, and also will seek contributions from younger scholars, recent PhDs through calls for papers. They will be invited to submit draft papers for edited book and to present them and participate in a workshop in Toda Institute for Peace in Yotsuya where all participants will also provide feedback to the other papers. For the purposes of the project the networks of the Academic Council of the UN System (ACUNS) will be utilized, and this global network can provide an additional global visibility of the project through its numerous communication channels.

The project will hold regular workshops with top scholars, bringing the latest knowledge on how the SDGs and PACC can be implemented with assistance from global funds and facilitation mechanisms. The workshops assess how developed countries approach the SDGs and PACC, and how new players in global governance — China, India, Brazil, South Africa, ASEAN — signal preference to less formal and more flexible international agreements, where instead of 'sanctions committees', we observe the emergence of 'facilitation committees', and where transparency and accountability replace monitoring and verification.

The project runs for three years 2020-2023 and will include fieldwork with experts from developing countries to assemble their views on

the NDCs and allow for a rigorous brainstorming.

The project outcomes are articles in peer-reviewed academic journals, op-eds in significant newspapers, dialogue with stakeholders. The project will have its website, presenting the progress and the investigators present papers at significant conferences to disseminate the project's findings and will write annual reports on the progress and tasks remaining.

Other research activities by members of the SUPRI cluster on Sustainable Development

On 3 May 2019 Popovski participated in the Conference on United Nations Reform with a paper "United Nations Charter Constitutional Revision", at the O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana, India. On 6-7 June 2019 Popovski took part in the Global Policy Dialogue convened by the Stimson Centre in Washington DC, preparing the report on Renewal and Innovation of Global Governance for the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations in 2020. He was the leading speaker of the discussion on the 'peace and security' panel with a paper "UN Peace and Security Architecture: Stagnation or Redundancy?", and also offered commentaries at the paper on 'law and justice'. Based on this work, Popovski presented at the Soka University Faculty Development Seminar on 17 July 2019. The research and writing activities of the Stimson Centre's working group continued and on 14-15 December 2019 Popovski took part in the prestigious Doha Forum, annual gathering of top think-tanks and presented a paper on "New Cold War and Peace(Non)building". Also at the Doha Forum Popovski presented the working group's new proposal on upgrading the UN Peacebuilding Commission into Peacebuilding Council. As part of his engagement with the Japanese

Peacebuilding Forum Popovski made a keynote speech "Lack of United Nations Reform", at a meeting with Japanese MPs in the Diet, Nagatacho, Tokyo, on 24 September 2019, moderated by the Ambassador Shinyo, former Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN. On 2 November 2019 at a Seminar "Peacebuilding and Global Governance in Turbulent World" , in the JICA Institute, Ichigaya, Popovski presented the paper "Upgrading Peacebuilding Commission into Peacebuilding Council".

Popovski also continued his research on climate change, sustainability and SDGs. He was among the speakers of the JCPAC Japanese Conservative Union Conference, Tokyo, 31 August - 1 September 2019 with a paper on "Tokyo 2020 Sustainable Olympics". On 9 September 2019 Popovski presented "History of Climate Change Science and Denial", a Keynote Address at the United Nations University, Tokyo.On 22-23 October 2019 in Seoul, Korea, during the Global Green Week, organized by the Global Green Growth Institute, Popovski presented the papers "Climate Change Solutions Acceleration" and "America First, or America Last?: US Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement". Popovski engagement with the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos continued in 21-24 January with the moderation of the panel "The Role of Global Universities in Promoting Sustainable Futures", where the rectors of several top world-class universities made presentations.

Other activities by Popovski include the presentation on "Anti-Corruption and Money Laundering in BRICS", at the FGV University, Sao Paulo Brazil, 6-8 November 2019 and the paper "Legal Disruption and Smart Contracts" at the Academic Conference of the Law School of Sydney University on 9-11 February 2020.

During the reporting period Popovski presented his latest book

"Palgrave Handbook on Global Approaches to Peace" (Routledge 2019) at several academic forums.

PRESENTATION

SUPRI Project Annual Report
April 2019 - March 2020

Group 2
"Global Justice and Human Rights"

Group Members:
Tracey Nicholls, Rob Sinclair, Johanna Zulueta

1. Background to academic year 2019:

The Global Justice and Human Rights research team was constituted at the first meeting of academic year 2018, April 25, 2018. We were charged with developing a research plan that could form the basis of a *Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research* (KAKENHI) application for research funding from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

In our first team meeting (May 16, 2018), we met to discuss our respective research interests, with a view towards establishing the overlap out of which we might develop a collaborative research project. We continued to meet and coordinate over academic year 2018 to develop the KAKENHI application we submitted October 2018 (title: "Understanding Sexual Violence: Epistemic Injustice, Law, and Social Awareness"). We were notified just before the beginning of academic year 2019 that our project proposal for academic year 2018

was not funded.

2. Activities of academic year 2019:

The Global Justice and Human Rights research team continued to meet throughout the year to reframe the project in advance of resubmission in October 2019 of a modified project that was retitled "Understanding Sexual Violence as Epistemic Injustice, Structural Violence, and an obstacle to Sustainable Development." We are currently awaiting notification of the 2019 funding decisions.

In addition to this major project, we organized and co-hosted, with the Center for Gender Studies at International Christian University, a conference called "Woman and Peace-Making in the Asia Pacific" (June 2019, at International Christian University). The conference was funded through the generosity of SUPRI and our ICU co-host Dr. Kana Takamatsu's KAKENHI grant, and was well-attended by SIPS and FILA students. In the spirit of Soka University's commitment to humanistic education, the role of commentator on keynote speeches and panel discussions was reserved for and offered (based on matching research interests) to SIPS masters students, as training for their future academic participation. In the spirit of dialogue, the substantial and necessary expenditure was for a fully bilingual conference guide (schedule, abstracts, and speaker biographies) and for interpretation onsite.

This linguistically accessible and interdisciplinary conference promoted discussion among feminist scholars in Japan on the links between gender inequality and conflict—both large-scale geopolitical

conflict and conflict in the domestic sphere or workplace. The notable contribution our panel discussions made to the growing field of feminist peace studies was to frame "me too" movements around the world (New York, Seoul, Okinawa, Hachioji) as peace-building movements. The notable contribution our keynote speeches made to international relations and peace studies was in demonstrating for students how activism (Suzuyo Takazato) and academic study and dialogue (Kozue Akibayashi) work together to build cultures of peace. Students who completed conference questionnaires afterwards praised ideas that had been presented in the conference, and spoke of how much they had learned and how inspired they were to contribute to peace-making in their own lives. As a matter of student empowerment, there is a lot of value in funding conferences that introduce students to the research expertise of the SIPS faculty/SUPRI researchers and do so in ways that help the students to develop themselves as scholars.

[image: conference participants and attendees, *Women and Peace-Making in the Asia Pacific*, June 2019]

Source: Swati VOHRA

3. Beyond academic year 2019:

Because of international relocation by one of the team members (Nicholls) and teaching and administrative leadership loads of the other two members, it is clear that the composition of this research team in future academic years will look very different. Any team newly constituted by SUPRI in academic year 2020 will obviously also require the kind of start-up time we were given in 2018 to develop a plan that advances and is advanced by the specializations and knowledge bases of each of the team members.

In the event that the plan we developed and submitted in the October 2019 round of KAKENHI applications is funded, and in the event that the funding is transferrable from Nicholls (identified as PI in the 2019 round) to one of the other co-investigators, we would like to discuss how our research project can be executed under the framework of an international, multi-university collaboration.

Our goals for academic year 2019 had included writing and submitting for publication two separate co-written articles, both in SCOPUS-indexed journals. (*Gender and Society* and *Philosophy Compass*).

- The first collaboration is the article Drs. Nicholls and Zulueta are co-writing on how to understand "me too" as a globalized phenomenon, making their argument through multiple theoretical lenses—mobility studies, peace studies, and gender studies. It is still in the writing stage, but this is a project that each of us remains committed to.
- The second collaboration involved all three of us co-writing a theoretical analysis of the injustices of sexual violence. This

article, planned to be published in SCOPUS-indexed *Philosophy Compass*, was to form the initial framework through which we announced and explained our project; we anticipate now that this may no longer be feasible (if the project is not funded) and may no longer be the best use of limited faculty research time.

<u>PRESENTATION</u>

SUPRI Project Annual Report
April 2019 - March 2020

Group 3
"Multilateralism in Asia"

Jonathan Luckhurst

Networked G20 Governance

This project analyzes how the Group of Twenty's (G20) networked form of global governance increased the influence of actors other than officials from leading wealthy states, especially developing- and non- state actors. This contributed to decentralizing global governance authority, especially since the 2008-09 financial crisis. The research indicates how the G20 subsequently became the principal hub of global economic governance, influencing and engaging with diverse stakeholders on its broad policy agenda, plus how this augmented multilateral cooperation through transversal approaches to issues such as sustainable development. The Investigator utilizes substantial experience of G20 processes for this project, including from his attendance at the G20 Osaka Summit and participation in events linked to its official engagement groups, especially the Civil 20, Think 20, and Women 20 forums. The project builds on recent literature on transnational actor networks and the G20, plus emerging constructivist literature on the normative significance of 'practices'

in international relations.

The G20 has become a global governance hub since its first leaders' summit, in Washington, D.C. in November 2008. The forum subsequently constituted important new networked governance practices, especially for *inclusivity*, the latter sometimes intentionally and at others unintentionally increasing the inclusion of more heterogeneous state, non-state, and intergovernmental actors in policy deliberations and in other global governance fora. This contributed to decentralizing authority across its extensive policy agenda, including decentralizing global 'cognitive' authority (Broome and Seabrooke 2015), which undermined common expert and stakeholder beliefs on key global policy norms and practices.

Recent literature on the G20 has not sufficiently examined its contribution to decentralizing global governance authority, especially through networked governance practices with key normative effects. Global governance literature since the 1990s points to the importance of global governance networks. James Rosenau (1992) noted "in a world where authority is undergoing continuous relocation — both outward toward supranational entities and inward toward subnational groups — it becomes increasingly imperative to probe how governance can occur in the absence of government." The present research proposal responds to Rosenau's observation, indicating how the G20's networked practices influenced global economic governance, by constituting an agency-hub for heterogeneous and transnational governance networks engaged with it. Some G20 literature examines the significance of global governance networks for this forum (Luckhurst 2016a; 2019a; Slaughter 2015; Stone 2015). Further analysis is needed to provide a deeper understanding of the broader normative significance of networked G20 governance,

especially for decentralizing global governance authority and constituting inclusivity practices.

The aforementioned lacuna is unfortunate, because of the G20's crucial importance as a post-2008 hub of global economic governance (Luckhurst 2019b). Lack of research on networked G20 governance and its normative consequences is partly due to the state-centricity of much conventional, especially 'liberal' and 'realist,' international relations and even global governance literature. Shifts in twenty-first century global governance authority and increasing influence from heterogeneous, transnational actor-networks are crucial processes. This heterogeneity contributed to the heightened normative contestation of pre-2008 background knowledge on 'market efficiency' and global policy issues, such as macro- versus micro-prudential financial regulation, fiscal-policy strategies for economic growth, multilateral trade practices, and sustainable development. This normative policy contestation coincided with a growing consensus on the legitimacy of the G20's new inclusivity practices. This had significant consequences, leading to the expansion of the G20 agenda and stakeholders' increased emphasis on inclusive and transversal approaches to global economic governance.

Purpose of the project

The purpose of this project, to examine normative consequences of the G20's new inclusivity practices for networked global governance, would bring key insights. The most significant would be to demonstrate the constitutive and instrumental effects of these inclusivity practices on global economic governance processes, norms, and practices. This analysis would fill a substantial gap in the

G20 literature, though building on the Investigator's existing research on global economic governance and the G20 (Luckhurst 2012; 2016a; 2016b; 2017; 2019a; 2019b; 2019c). The analysis would indicate the validity of the core hypothesis, which is that networked G20 governance constitutes new inclusivity practices with key normative effects on global economic governance, including new legitimizing discourses that reinforce these normative effects (De Ville and Orbie 2014; Luckhurst forthcoming).

This influence of global governance networks undermines arguments from more state-centric approaches, such as realism and liberalism, that non-state actors have little influence on global economic governance. The proposed project would contribute significantly to literature on global governance networks and the G20, especially with insights on the normative effects of international practices (Adler 2019; Cooper and Pouliot 2015). The research would focus on the consequences of global governance networks' influence, analyzing contemporary processes and practices, foregrounded along with social-relational dynamics, rather than focusing either on macro-structures or individual agency. This would augment current conceptual frameworks for analyzing global economic governance, contributing important new empirical evidence on the effects of networked G20 governance.

Background to the project

This project proposal builds on several years of the Investigator's research and publications on the G20 and global economic governance, as indicated in the preceding section. This includes two books, several peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters,

which the Investigator has used to develop an innovative approach to analyzing the significance of the G20 for post-2008 global economic governance.

This research trajectory brought useful opportunities to become integrated in a community of G20 and global governance scholars, as well as communicating with global governance practitioners from international organizations and G20 member-state officials. The Investigator's research for his monograph *G20 Since the Global Crisis*, published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2016, was crucial for building these relations with fellow scholars and G20-engaged officials. Research for the 2016 monograph included conducting several semi-structured élite interviews, with G20 government negotiators ('sherpas') and representatives from the official G20 engagement groups. This research subsequently opened additional opportunities for the Investigator to communicate with many G20-engaged officials and stakeholders.

The Investigator's other publications, including published commentary pieces, brought further opportunities for engaging with G20 governance networks. This included participating in events of the official engagement forums, especially the Civil 20, Think 20, and Women 20. The Investigator's ability to research G20 governance networks has been augmented by these experiences, and by his role in the Think 20's 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda Task Force. He has also accepted invitations to join select groups of scholars, experts, diplomats, officials, and politicians in participating in G20-focused workshops, at think-tanks and research institutes such as Chatham House in London, the German Development Institute in Bonn, the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University in Brisbane, and the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and

Public Administration in Moscow. This growing integration in G20 governance networks provides the Investigator with useful opportunities for participant-observation field work at such meetings. These connections also were instrumental in the Investigator receiving official accreditation to attend the G20 Osaka Summit in June 2019, another very useful opportunity for empirical field work, gaining behind-the-scenes insights into policy, political, and diplomatic issues at the G20 summit.

This research proposal is a direct consequence of these experiences, while integrating the Investigator's theoretical focus on normative effects of international practices and the influence of global governance networks in G20 policy deliberations. The Investigator has developed this theoretical approach in several publications, including the aforementioned monograph G20 Since the Global Crisis, the monograph *The Shifting Global Economic Architecture: Decentralizing Authority in Contemporary Global Governance* (2017), the book chapter 'A Constructivist Approach to the G20,' and other recent articles and chapters (see Luckhurst 2019a; 2019b; 2019c; forthcoming a).

The empirical field-work for this project would be viable, due to the Investigator's prior field work and involvement with G20 expert and governance networks, as well as his increasing theoretical focus on key aspects of the proposal. The project would further advance this line of investigation, by innovatively combining key theoretical insights from the three literatures noted earlier, namely on global governance, international practices, and global governance networks, in analyzing the empirical evidence. The latter would be collated through participant-observation field work, documentary analysis, and semi-structured interviews. This would demonstrate the

normative consequences of networked G20 governance for global economic governance.

Core argument on networked G20 governance

   The G20's networked global governance could become one of its most enduring influences on the twenty-first century. The forum's inclusion of more developing-state representatives and non-state actors in global governance networks and processes, contributing to recent international authority shifts, is key to assessing contestation about its legitimacy and efficiency.

G20 'hub' for policy diffusion and decentralizing authority

   The G20 continues to be influential, despite growing skepticism about its policymaking and leadership capacities. It has become, at best, an imperfect multilateral steering committee, some would argue more of a focal point; however, it remains a crucial hub for policy diffusion and decentralizing authority in global economic governance. New G20 inclusivity practices augmented the global-governance status of leading developing states and increased the influence of civil society stakeholders (Luckhurst 2019a), which should not be forgotten amid growing skepticism about the forum. Examples of these normative and practical shifts included the integration of G20 developing-state members in global financial governance bodies, such as the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board since 2009; and the creation of its currently-eight official engagement forums for non-state actors. These G20 effects were beneficial, even though there are legitimate criticisms of

its lack of progress on economic growth and phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies, and on the need to accelerate G20 efforts to achieve the United Nations' 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.

The Japanese G20 presidency arguably was a partial success. There was sufficient consensus to produce the Osaka Summit leaders' declaration. This contrasted favorably with the Group of Seven's (G7) failure to publish a comprehensive document, with just a brief communiqué released from its Biarritz Summit, perhaps indicative that the G20 currently is in better shape than the G7. There were agreements on a range of policy issues in Osaka, covering the usual G20 agenda topics, including infrastructure, sustainable development, financial regulation, and tax and transparency; as well as issues brought to the agenda by the Japanese G20 presidency, such as the challenges of aging populations and marine plastic waste. There was also a continuance of the political dissensus on trade and climate issues that marked the 2018 Buenos Aires G20 Summit, especially between the Trump Administration and several other G20 members. This was evident from disagreements between the Trump and Macron delegations in Osaka, which undermined prospects for a leaders' communiqué at the subsequent G7 summit.

The G20's broad agenda is indicative of how the range of issues has expanded, especially since the Korean G20 presidency added economic development to the agenda in 2010, with its 'Seoul Development Consensus.' This was influenced by epistemic and normative shifts constituted through a global development governance network, similar to the global financial governance network that influenced the G20's endorsement of macroprudential financial regulation during the global financial crisis. Despite the common perception that G20 cooperation declined after the crisis,

the forum subsequently expanded its areas of cooperation, especially through transversal approaches to sustainable development and other important policy issues.

How global governance networks influence the G20

Global governance networks have influenced the G20's post-crisis policy contestation and broader international practices. One example is the gender-equality global governance network, which influenced the Australian G20 presidency's decision to incorporate the goal of reducing the gender labor-participation gap, by 25 percent by the year 2025, in its Brisbane Summit leaders' declaration. The Australian G20 presidency was influenced by civil society gender-equality advocates, as well as officials from multilateral organizations, whose combined efforts contributed to achieving the inclusion of this target. The recent Osaka G20 Summit declaration similarly indicated the influence of the gender-equality global governance network, by incorporating core commitments advocated by five of the official engagement groups, namely the Civil 20, Labour 20, Think 20, Women 20, and Youth 20, on the labor-participation gap and on eliminating violence and harassment against women.

G20 engagement forums augmented the heterogeneity of global governance networks, contributing to their growing diversity and cooperation through linked professional 'ecologies.' The latter indicates linkages between networks of professionals working in distinct fields or contexts, yet cooperating on particular issues. The potential for these governance networks to influence G20 policymaking is evident from the Think 20's engagement, especially as many of the think-tanks and research institutes involved provide

policy analysis to governments. Hence policy convergence between G20-engaged think-tanks, through their Think 20 collaboration, could significantly influence multilateral cooperation. Scholarly literature already noted this shifting context of international cooperation in the 1990s, when James Rosenau (2005) and others began to emphasize the broader complexity of global governance actors and relations, rather than the more issue-specific and intergovernmentally-focused notion of international regimes. Many governments' increasing emphasis on public diplomacy is indicative of this stress on broader societal engagement, through new diplomatic 'outreach' practices.

Decentralizing authority and G20 agenda expansion

The G20 was crucial for decentralizing authority away from leading wealthy states since the global financial crisis, especially in global economic governance. This has often occurred through contingencies, processes, and practices beyond the control of individual actors, or even states. This is indicated by the debate among experts and officials on whether the G20 agenda should be narrowed, for perceived efficiency purposes; or whether its broad agenda should continue due to perceived legitimacy gains. The agenda has substantially expanded since the Korean G20 presidency initiated this broadening process, partly due to the 'Christmas-tree effect' of each G20 Chair opting to adorn the agenda with new topics. This builds further momentum for agenda expansion, even if some policymakers and experts advocate refocusing on macroeconomic and financial policy issues. The Australian G20 presidency of 2014 was a good example, as it advocated the narrow-agenda approach while incorporating new agenda items, especially the gender labor-

participation gap and a greater focus on infrastructure. It is still possible that future contingencies, particularly another serious financial crisis, might again lead to a narrower, crisis-driven agenda.

One consequence of this agenda expansion is that it implicitly contributes to decentralizing global governance authority and augmenting the heterogeneity of G20 governance networks. This is because the broader contexts of policy engagement engage more actors and actor-networks, while constituting new G20-influenced policymaking processes. Importantly, the broader-agenda approach also incorporates more of the priorities of the G20's developing-state members, further indicating a process of decentralizing global governance authority.

Networked G20 governance

The G20's political and diplomatic constraints have often been exposed by dissensus on macroeconomic policies, also on climate and trade issues since Donald Trump's 2016 election victory. This does not diminish the significance of the G20's influence on global governance, especially by constituting inclusivity practices that augmented the status and role of developing-state representatives and non-state actors, while increasing the forum's perceived legitimacy and, potentially, its efficiency. G20 influence on increasingly heterogeneous global governance networks arguably decreases negative effects from the type of groupthink that led to the global financial crisis. The latter occurred due to the collective failure of pre-crisis, G7-led global governance networks to prevent it, partly because the appropriate lessons from the earlier Asian financial crisis were not learnt.

Networked G20 governance influences political and normative contestation on global economic governance, across the forum's expansive and transversally-linked policy agenda. This significantly contributed to decentralizing global governance authority and processes since 2008. The G20 will likely remain more important for global economic governance than the G7, due to post-2008 political and normative shifts to embedding legitimacy- and inclusivity-practices. These processes of adjustment were reinforced by strategic authority shifts, as leading developing states became more significant for the world economy. The G20's contemporary importance, plus its significance as a future crisis committee-in-waiting, are consequences of its role in decentralizing global authority and networked governance processes.

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SUPRI Project Annual Report
April 2019 - March 2020

Group 4
"Peacebuilding in Africa"

Group Members:

Nikolas Emmanuel, Satoshi Sasaki

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ON AFRICAN PEACE PROCESSES: A Quantitative Approach

Going beyond brief illustrations of the various foreign assistance patterns and their impact on peace, it is desirable to search deeper for generalizations about the economic aid-peace relationship. This paper analyzes several hypotheses statistically and provides a more detailed assessment of this issue. Before going on to the quantitative analysis, however, I would like to discuss the data and the key variables operationalized in this study.

The quantitative approach used here includes seventy-one peace processes from intrastate conflicts across all of Africa between 1989 and 2006. Low intensity civil conflicts are also included in the dataset (i.e., where have been at least twenty-five battle deaths in a given year). This takes account of conflicts in Casamance (Senegal) or Northern Niger, for example, even though they do not meet the one thousand battle-death threshold used in datasets such as the

Correlates of War. To make it in the dataset, there has to have been an active peace process, regardless of its outcome. Accordingly, the study derives case information from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) "Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements" dataset (Hogbladh 2011: 99). The UCDP database began providing information on its cases in 1989, the starting point for the analysis in this study. As indicated earlier, there is also a theoretical reason for this start date, beyond the availability of data. Primarily, after the end of the Cold War, there has been an upsurge in the amount of intrastate conflicts in which peace has been attempted through bargaining, especially in Africa. I have chosen to end the analysis with cases from 2006 in order to allow for the availability of ten years of economic assistance data following each peace accord. This allows me to examine the immediate aid trajectory after the attainment of an agreement and compare this post-conflict assistance pattern with that from the five years before the accord. In all, this study analyzes ten years of data. This study uses aid data from the OECD-DAC. The OECD data is helpful due to its ease of manipulation and completeness of coverage of most major development assistance providers, as well as across the time period in question.

The dataset used here examines five years of Official Development Assistance (i.e., ODA net, excluding any debt relief, using 2010 constant US$) figures from all OECD-DAC donors, starting with the year of the peace agreement and continuing four years beyond it. The percent increase in ODA net from these five years after the peace accord (including the accord year), compared with the ODA net provided in the five years before the accord, represents the critical independent variable used in this study. This allows the study to judge if a peace incentive is present in a given case, and what impact

it had on the dependent variable, or the sustainability of peace after an agreement.

Dependent Variable

It is expected that a peace incentive, a large aid package distributed along the lines of pattern 1 cases, should help former belligerents maintain peace beyond five years (Licklider 1995: 683; Hartzell 1999: 12; Walter 1997, 2002; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003). Accordingly, the dependent variable used in this study codes peace agreements as being successful (1) if peace is maintained for at least five years (i.e., no new outbreak of intrastate conflict) after the accord. The cases in which a peace agreement does not succeed in this manner are coded with a zero (0). This variable is drawn from the Center for Systemic Peace's (CSP) "Major Episodes of Political Violence: 1946-2012." The data is used to determine the end dates of the conflicts examined in this analysis (Center for Systemic Peace 2014). The CSP provides an easily accessible, regularly updated, and comprehensive list of the episodes of major armed conflict for the time period in question in this research. This research compares the date of a given peace agreement and the conflict dates in the CSP list.

Independent Variables

The next step in this study is to explore the data for relationships between the dependent variable (i.e., the success or failure of a peace process to end the conflict for at least five years) and post-conflict aid distributions, while controlling for several key variables found frequently in the relevant literature. The objective is to test

the strength of the argument that economic assistance matters. However, before directly going on to the statistical analysis, I first will discuss the independent variables used in this study and their operationalization. This study puts forward six explanatory factors for consideration: 1) aid change, 2) conflict magnitude, 3) state capacity (GNP/capita and infant mortaility), 4) freedom house (level of democracy), 5) peacekeeping (PKO and PKO under Chapter VII Mandate), and 6) military victory and peace agreements.

Aid Change is the change in donor economic assistance before and after a peace agreement. This research includes the peace agreements in Africa from 1989 to 2006, provided in appendix 1. This variable compares the total ODA net flows from all OECD/DAC donors for economic aid over five years before any particular peace agreement, compared with the five years of total aid flows following a given agreement. It is argued here that a substantial increase in economic assistance after an agreement vis-à-vis the economic aid levels before the agreement (i.e., a peace incentive) should have a positive impact on the longevity of peace. That is to say, a positive aid distribution pattern present in aid pattern 1 should increase the likelihood that peace will last beyond five years.

· Conflict Magnitude

In high magnitude conflicts, the influx of a large economic aid package should increase the success of a peace process and lower the likelihood the conflict will reoccur. High magnitude conflicts may facilitate what I. William Zartman (1989) refers to as "ripeness," or the readiness of the various warring factions to come to the bargaining table. A mutually hurting stalemate that may emerge from a high magnitude conflict can help bring exhausted former warring parties

towards peace, such as in places like Sudan (North-South conflict) after decades of civil war. T. David Mason and J. Michael Quinn (2006) agree with this and argue that long, intense civil conflicts create doubts in the minds of the former warring parties about their ability to win, thus encouraging peace and the desire to settle their differences off the battlefield. To test this hypothesis, I operationalize the CPS' s score for the conflict magnitude of societal-systemic impact data as an important control variable.

This score is a scaled indicator of the "destructive impact, or magnitude, of the violent episode on the directly-affected society or societies on a scale of one (smallest) to ten (greatest). Magnitude scores reflect multiple factors including state capabilities, interactive intensity (means and goals), area and scope of death and destruction, population displacement, and episode duration" (Center for Systemic Peace 2014). This research uses the CSP data because it provides a relatively consistent measure across the cases involved, allowing for a more straightforward statistical analysis.

- State Capacity (GNP/Capita and Infant Mortality)

Low levels of state capacity and poor economic conditions (measured by GNP/capita and infant mortality) are expected in the literature to decrease the likelihood that a given peace process will be successful and end conflict beyond five years (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2004). Studies by Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis (2002) and Barbara Walter (2004) also find that high infant mortality rates and low levels of wealth in the aftermath of war closely relate to the outbreak of further warfare after a peace. In light of this, it makes sense that significant amounts of aid may help facilitate peace and

act as a positive incentive to convince warring parties to bargain over the end of warfare. This study uses data from the World Bank World Development Indicators for these two variables.

- **Level of Democracy (Freedom House Scores)**

There is an expectation that higher levels of democratic governance are likely to reduce the probability that fighting will recur after the achievement of a peace agreement (Hegre et al. 2001). In theory, democratic regimes should provide a more stable framework for bargaining, on which new, more inclusive institutions can be built (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). Accordingly, Ted Gurr (2000) argues that democratic institutions are less exclusionary and can help channel and resolve conflicts before they become violent. Also along these lines, Karl Derouen, Jenna Lea, and Peter Wallensteen (2009: 379) note that democracies are typically more efficient and address grievances better and therefore should diminish the likelihood of civil conflict, let alone its reoccurrence. Freedom house democracy scores are used in this study to determine the importance of these factors and how they interact with peace incentives empirically. For the statistical analyses, the two main freedom house variables, those for "political rights" and "civil liberties," are added together and divided by two, providing a single seven-point democracy indicator. This explanatory variable ranges from one, or "free" and democratic, to seven, indicating "not free" and authoritarian. This study uses freedom house data due to its ease of access, but also because of the fact that the dataset is updated annually, providing better coverage over the time span in question here.

- ・ Peacekeeping Operations (PKO and PKO under Chapter VII Mandate)

It seems logical to argue that the intervention of peacekeeping forces (i.e., the United Nations, major powers, regional bodies, sub-regional actors, etc.) should help maintain peace after the achievement of a peace agreement, mainly because outside third parties can help the warring parties sustain peaceful relations. Peacekeeping operations provide information to the warring parties, separate belligerents, monitor ceasefires, maintain buffer zones, and enhance the general security situation in post-conflict situations (Heldt 2008: 1). This assumption has been a part of the literature for quite some time now (Touval 1982). Barbara Walter (1999) provides the clearest reasons for this. She states that external third parties, such as the United Nations, help raise the likelihood of peace because the interveners help provide credible commitments to support and enforce the terms of an agreement. Peacekeeping forces facilitate the settlement of the conflict by reducing the fear among warring parties that the other side will cheat and use the negotiating process to rearm and potentially take the upper hand. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000: 795) go even farther and conclude that "[p]eacemaking aimed at facilitating a peace treaty is potentially lifesaving" and can "help secure longer term peace." Virginia Fortna (2003: 111) supports this hypothesis, indicating that "peace lasts longer when peacekeepers are present than when belligerents are left to their own devices. In other words, peacekeeping works." The data for this variable is drawn from data sets at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), most notably the "Multilateral Peace Operations Database," along with data available from the Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix (ROP)-Université de Montréal. It is coded as a dichotomous variable (i.e., one is given for when

a United Nations or other multilateral peacekeeping operation is present after a conflict and zero for no peacekeeping operation).

However, it is important to note that multilateral peacekeeping forces frequently deploy in very difficult situations, sometimes during continuing violence. 3 To complement the variable indicating the simple presence, or not, of peacekeeping troops, I also operationalize a variable that asks if the particular peacekeeping mission was deployed under a United Nations Chapter VII Mandate, authorizing the use of force to maintain the peacekeeping mission's objectives. The information for this explanatory factor is from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations website.

・ Military Victories and Peace Agreements

Furthermore, it is necessary to consider an additional factor concerning military victories and the resolution of civil conflicts. A number of very high magnitude conflicts such as those in Angola or Ethiopia ended in military victories on the battlefield, followed by peace agreements. To address this, I use Monica Toft's (2004) dataset considering the cases of peace after military victory to determine this variable.

Empirical Analysis

In total, this study analyzes fifty-three African countries across twenty-two years of data (1989-2010). 4 This makes for a dataset with 1,166 observations. However, a number of the explanatory variables are missing data, slightly reducing the total number of observations. This missing data problem is due to the fact that with some cases, such as Somalia, data does not exist on a number of variables during

the time period in question. Regardless of this inconvenience, such longitudinal data (cross-sectional and in time series form) requires the use of particular statistical techniques that can consider relationships measured across time and space, as with the current study. However, before turning to this, I would like to discuss a particular problem that confronts some of the variables in this particular dataset. It is necessary to point out that on initial examination of the data, it appears that several independent variables correlate highly with one another. It is necessary to target correlations near 0.5 or higher for separate statistical analysis in this study. These relationships include peacekeeping and conflict magnitude, infant mortality and GNP/capita, as well as peacekeeping and peacekeeping under a Chapter VII Mandate.

In total, this study uses six different groupings of the eight variables due to this inter-correlation problem. First, a change in economic aid around the time of a peace agreement is analyzed on its own. Second, I examine the entire group of variables together, regardless of inter-correlations. Third, two groups of variables interfere with the statistical analysis due to high inter-correlation. For logical reasons both infant mortality and GNP/capita are highly related, high incomes frequently lead to low levels of infant mortality (although this is not always the case, such as with Equatorial Guinea, which has high levels of GNP/capita, but also relatively high infant mortality due primarily to massive income inequalities). This requires running models alternating each of the two variables. Finally, it also seems evident that the variable for peacekeeping and peacekeeping under a Chapter VII Mandate correlate highly with each other. Again, this makes it necessary to analyze separate models alternating these two explanatory factors.

In addition to running a number of different combinations of variables, a selection of different statistical techniques is used to analyze the data, including several types of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and logistic regressions. However, because the dataset is made up of longitudinal data, a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) random-effects regression is used to analyze the data (using STATA' s xtreg command, with the re command for random effects). This technique takes cross-sectional data and time into consideration and therefore is determined to be the most appropriate. A straightforward OLS regression or even a logistical regression would not be able to take into consideration the fact that since the variables are grouped by country and year, meaning that the observations within each group are somewhat related to each other, they violate a key assumption of OLS and logistical regression techniques. This GLS type of analysis is frequently used to address these types of situations. The statistical results from these tests are available in Tables 1, 2, and 3 below.

Table 1: GLS Regression Analysis – Aid Change & Full Model

	MODEL 1 (n=1166)			MODEL 2 (n=1086)		
	Coeff.	S.E.	Sign.	Coeff.	S.E.	Sign.
Aid Change	0.0012	0.0001	***	0.0012	0.0001	***
Conflict Magnitude				0.0010	0.0026	***
GNP/captia				3.54E-07	2.06E-06	
Infant Mortality				0.0001	0.0001	
Freedom House (average of the political rights scores and civil liberties scores)				-0.0024	0.0023	
PKO				0.0428	0.0137	**
PKO under Chapter VII Mandate				-0.1154	0.0243	***
Military Victory and Accord				0.0224	0.0095	*
Constant	0.0111	0.033	**	0.0027	0.014	

Note: $* = p < .1$, $** = p < .05$, $*** = p < .01$ R-sq = 0.1531   R-sq = 0.1987

Table 2: GLS Regression Analysis – Removing GNP/Capita & Infant Mortality

	MODEL 3 (n=1150)			MODEL 4 (n=1087)		
	Coeff.	S.E.	Sign.	Coeff.	S.E.	Sign.
Aid Change	0.0012	0.0001	***	0.0012	0.0001	***
Conflict Magnitude	0.0084	0.0024	**	0.0102	0.0026	***
GNP/captia				-6.86E-07	1.77E-06	
Infant Mortality	0.0001	0.0001				
Freedom House	-0.0022	0.0022		-0.0021	0.0023	
PKO	0.044	0.0131	***	0.0434	0.0137	***
PKO under Chapter VII Mandate	-0.1046	0.0229	***	-0.1119	0.0241	***
Military Victory and Accord	0.0256	0.00934	*	0.0234	0.0095	
Constant	0.0046	0.0116		0.0104	0.0116	

Note: * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$ R-sq = 0.1918   R-sq = 0.1980

Table 3: GLS Regression Analysis – Removing PKO & Chap. VII Mandate

	MODEL 5 (n=1092)			MODEL 6 (n=1086)		
	Coeff.	S.E.	Sign.	Coeff.	S.E.	Sign.
Aid Change	0.0012	0.0001	***	0.0012	0.0001	***
Conflict Magnitude	0.0116	0.0025	***	0.008	0.0026	**
GNP/captia	8.18E-08	2.06E-06		-2.97E-07	2.08-06	
Infant Mortality	0.0001	0.0001		0.0000	0.0001	
Freedom House	-0.0021	0.0023		-0.0016	0.0023	
PKO				0.0181	0.0128	
PKO under Chapter VII Mandate	-0.0853	0.0225	***			
Military Victory and Accord	0.0237	0.014		0.0186	0.0096	
Constant	0.002	0.014		0.0062	0.0141	

Note: * = $p < .1$, ** = $p < .05$, *** = $p < .01$ R-sq = 0.1909   R-sq = 0.1820

Discussion of Statistical Findings

Several interesting observations emerge from these statistical

analyses. To begin with, take into consideration Model 1, which only considers the statistical relationship between the change in aid levels before and after a peace agreement with the prospect of civil conflict reoccurring within five years. The aid change variable is positive and highly significant, although the coefficient is rather small. Nonetheless, with an overall R-square value of 0.1531, Model 1 points out that the aid change variable provides most of the explanatory power in the study. The other five models only provide R-square statistics between 0.1820 and 0.1987. This makes it easy to argue that the other seven independent variables add only a marginal amount of explanatory power to the equation. This leads to the first and perhaps most important conclusion of this study. That is to say, donor economic aid appears to play a positive role in supporting peace processes. Policy makers should consider this when trying to stop civil conflicts from reoccurring. Peace incentives matter in helping to facilitate a lasting end to conflict.

Furthermore, when considering the full set of variables in Model 2, it is important to notice that several other variables beyond aid change are significant and have an impact on the likelihood of peace in these African cases. These include conflict magnitude, PKO, and PKO under Chapter VII Mandate. Concerning conflict magnitude, which is positive and highly significant, the statistical tests used in this study support the hypothesis advanced here that as a given conflict increases in severity, the likelihood of it being terminated, and remaining terminated past the five year threshold, is high, especially when supported with aid incentives in the form of a peace incentive.

Finally, the two independent variables related to peacekeeping in the analysis appear to be statistically significant, however, they go

in opposite directions (i.e., PKO is positive and PKO under Chapter VII Mandate is negatively related to the dependent variable). This leads to several interesting observations. First, the presence of peacekeeping troops in a given post-conflict situation in Africa could be interpreted as having a positive and significant impact of the likelihood of the maintenance of peace for at least five years after an agreement. However, an even stronger (yet negative) statistical relationship is present with the deployment of peacekeepers under a Chapter VII Mandate. This points to the conclusion that when peacekeepers are sent with an authorization to use military means to restore peace, there is a lower likelihood that a peace agreement will last beyond five years. In short, this means that when peacekeeping troops intervene in a conflict with ongoing violence, it can be difficult for them to bring a peaceful resolution. This factor, although not central in this study, requires further investigation.

Conclusion

Based on these results, significant donor economic assistance packages, when offered as an incentive appear to be a critical element in achieving lasting peace. This suggests that external aid donors can play a critical role in helping to end conflict. If they are willing to back peace with the incentive of financial resources this appears to increase their likelihood of success, reducing the possibility of civil war reoccurrence. However, while this study provides an initial insight into the subject, future research will need to dig deeper into the causal relationships at play. In this research, I argue that donor economic aid increases the probability of a lasting peace in two ways. First, substantial development assistance packages

can provide a strong incentive to help facilitate peace processes by bringing the former warring parties to the bargaining table and encouraging them to stick to the deal after its achievement. Second, for their constituents, such peace incentives help alleviate economic and societal grievances that lead to conflict initially, undermining the desire to continue the fight. Both of these factors work together to convince the former warring parties and their constituencies about the fruits of peace. If conflicts are to be resolved, donors must realize how truly important their efforts are. Economic assistance matters more for peace than is frequently anticipated.

活動報告

１．以下の通り、創価大学平和問題研究所運営委員会を開催した。

【開催日／会場】2019年11月12日　中央教育棟　第２会議室Ｂ
　　※以下の事項について審議し、了承された。
　　　　　１．研究所運営委員会の構成について
　　　　　２．2019年度の活動について
　　　　　３．所員委嘱更新及び客員研究員について
　　　　　４．2020年度活動計画と予算について

２．以下の通り、研究所員会を開催した。

【開催日／会場】2019年5月29日　AW1027
　　※以下の事項について審議し、了承された。
　　　　　１．科研費等外部資金の取り組みについて
　　　　　２．海外諸機関との交流について
　　　　　３．紀要の改善について

【開催日／会場】2019年9月13日　AW1027
　　※以下の事項について審議し、了承された。
　　　　　１．科研費等外部資金の取り組みについて
　　　　　２．海外諸機関との交流について
　　　　　３．紀要の改善について

【開催日／会場】2019年12月18日　AW1027

※以下の事項について審議し、了承された。

   1．紀要34号の発刊について

   2．各プロジェクトの進捗状況について

   3．2020年開催のピースフォーラムについて

   4．2020年度の活動について

3．2019年5月14日、池田大作先生「済州国立大学名誉文学博士号」授与20周年記念シンポジウム「平和の橋の構築」を済州国立大学にて開催した。詳細については本誌掲載。
同日、済州国立大学平和研究所との学術交流協定に調印した。

4．創価大学、韓国・慶南大学、台湾・中国文化大学の3大学による国際会議「ピース・フォーラム」を、2019年5月14日より5月16日まで韓国・済州島にて開催した。詳細については本誌掲載。

5．2019年7月12日、高須幸雄国連事務総長特別顧問をお招きして、ワークショップ「創価大学×SDGs」を開催した。

6．2019年8月22日、タイ・タマサート大学と創価大学との共同セミナー「平和、持続可能な開発、地球市民のために果たす研究・教育の役割」がタマサート大学で開催され、田中副学長、玉井所長、ラリー・マクドナルド国際教養学部長が参加した。開催内容および玉井所長の報告については本誌掲載。

7．2019年8月23日、玉井所長がマヒドン大学（タイ）を訪問し、同大学平和・人権研究所との学術交流協定に調印した。

8．2020年1月11日、韓信大学「平和・公共性センター」（韓国）の李起豪セン

ター長が来学し、同センターとの学術交流協定に調印した。

9．2020年1月15日・16日に、韓信大学「平和・公共性センター」にて、国際
　会議「アジア平和教育フォーラム」が開催され、玉井所長、ウルヴ・ハン
　セン講師（法学部）が参加し、報告・討論を行った。

10．平和講座、共通科目「平和と人権」、「環境と開発」を以下の通り開催し
　た。また、創価高校との高大接続事業として同校「平和学入門」に教員を
　派遣し、授業を行った。

2019年度春期　平和講座（「平和と人権」）実施状況　金曜・４時限　AB101教室

No.	日付	講　師　／　テーマ
1	4月5日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部・平和問題研究所所長） ガイダンス（授業予定、平和学の概要、到達目標の検討）
2	4月12日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部・平和問題研究所所長） 平和学の課題としての人間の安全保障（1）―現代の武力紛争と平和構築の課題
3	4月19日	石井秀明教授（平和問題研究所） 軍縮・開発・平和（1）
4	4月26日	石井秀明教授（平和問題研究所） 軍縮・開発・平和（2）
5	5月10日	佐々木諭教授（看護学部） 貧困と健康からみる人間の安全保障（1）
6	5月17日	佐々木諭教授（看護学部） 貧困と健康からみる人間の安全保障（2）
7	5月24日	井手華奈子准教授（教育学部） ジェンダー、マイノリティー、人権（1）
8	5月31日	井手華奈子准教授（教育学部） ジェンダー、マイノリティー、人権（2）

9	6月7日	【第108回平和講座】ブライアン・アダムズ博士 （グリフィス大学宗教間対話センター所長） 太平洋地域におけるポピュリズムの台頭：ニュージーランドと オーストラリア
10	6月14日	中山賢司准教授（法学部） 北東アジアにおける平和の創造
11	6月21日	井手華奈子准教授（教育学部） 平和教育（1）
12	6月28日	井手華奈子准教授（教育学部） 平和教育（2）
13	7月5日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部・平和問題研究所所長） 平和学の課題としての人間の安全保障（2）― SDGs の取り組み
14	7月12日	【第109回平和講座】ドミートリー・A・ビリチェフスキー （駐日ロシア公使） 「日露関係とロシアの外交」
15	7月19日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部・平和問題研究所所長） リフレクション

2019年度秋期　平和講座（「環境と開発」）実施状況　金曜・4時限　AB103教室

No.	日付	講　師　／　テーマ
1	9月13日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部・平和問題研究所所長） ガイダンス（授業予定、到達目標の検討）
2	9月20日	【第110回平和講座】ンブリ・チャールズ・ボリコ所長 （FAO 駐日連絡事務所） 「FAO と持続可能な開発目標（SDGs）」
3	9月27日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部・平和問題研究所所長） 平和学の課題としての人間の安全保障 ── SDGs の取り組み（1）
4	10月11日	有里典三教授（通信教育部） 地球環境問題の基本構造とは何か
5	10月18日	有里典三教授（通信教育部） 新しい環境倫理の確立にむけて：地球憲章の理念と特徴

6	10月25日	有里典三教授（通信教育部） 誰が環境問題を解決するのか：「市民力」と国際環境 NGO
7	11月1日	【第111回平和講座】ヒュー・マイアル名誉教授（ケント大学） 「平和学はいかに平和を育んできたか」
8	11月8日	【第112回平和講座】サンティアゴ・パルド（駐日コロンビア大使） 「持続可能性のための協定を通じたコロンビア発展の展望」
9	11月15日	近貞美津子准教授（経済学部） 食糧問題を考える
10	11月22日	【第113回平和講座】川野徳幸教授（広島大学平和センター長） 「『平和』とは何か：平和学の視点から考える」
11	11月29日	【第114回平和講座】近藤哲生代表（UNDP 駐日代表部） 「持続可能な未来に向かって ── SDGs 達成に取り組む UNDP の活動 ── 」
12	12月6日	掛川三千代准教授（経済学部） 持続可能な開発と国際協力（1）
13	12月13日	掛川三千代准教授（経済学部） 持続可能な開発と国際協力（2）
14	12月20日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部・平和問題研究所所長） 平和学の課題としての人間の安全保障 ── SDGs の取り組み（2）
15	1月10日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部・平和問題研究所所長） リフレクション

2019年度　創価高校「平和学入門」派遣教員一覧

No	日付	担当者	テーマ等
1	4月19日	玉井秀樹教授 （文学部）	「平和学入門 ── 紛争解決の研究」
2	5月10日	高木功教授 （経済学部）	「SDGs の意義と私たちの生き方」
3	5月17日	杉本一郎教授 （国際教養学部）	「『アジアの世紀』を生きる」

4	6月21日	小出稔教授 (国際教養学部)	「グローバル化と文化的ナショナリズムの相克」
5	10月11日	佐々木諭教授 (看護学部)	「人間の安全保障と生命の格差」
6	10月18日	近貞美津子准教授 (経済学部)	「食糧問題を考える」
7	11月8日	久米川宣一講師 (理工学部)	「植物を活用した身近な環境改善法と世界的な環境問題との接点」
8	11月15日	玉井秀樹教授 (文学部)	「平和学入門 ── 紛争解決の研究」 ② 核兵器禁止条約をめぐる対立
9	2月7日	朝賀広伸教授 (法学部)	「よりよい地球環境をめざして」

研究所員の活動と業績（2018–2019）
Activities and performance of each staff（2018–2019）

Vesselin Ivanov Popovski

1. Books

The Palgrave Handbook of Global Approaches to Peace（Palgrave 2019），co-edited with Aigul Kulnazarova

The Implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change（Routledge 2019）single-edited

2. Research papers, essays, etc.

"Raphael Lemkin: Inventing and Codifying Genocide" in *Jus Gentium Journal* Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2018（pp. 181-215）

"Renovating the Principal Organs of the United Nations" in W. Durch, J. Larik and R. Ponzio（eds）*Just Security in an Ungoverned World*（Oxford University Press 2018）

"The Future of Law and Ethics" in G. Kleber（ed）*Future Courses of*

Human Societies: Critical Reflections from the Natural and Social Sciences" (Routledge 2018)

"Implementation of International Environmental Agreements" in V. Popovski (ed) *The Implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change* (Routledge 2019)

"Hard and Soft Law: Comparing 1997 Kyoto Protocol and 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change" in V. Popovski (ed) *The Implementation of Paris Agreement on Climate Change* (Routledge 2019)

"The UN Security Council and Responsibility to Protect as Global Approaches to Prevent Mass Atrocities", in *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Approaches to Peace* (Palgrave 2019) co-edited with Aigul Kulnazarova

"The Global Approaches and the Future of Peace Research", in *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Approaches to Peace* (Palgrave 2019) co-edited with Aigul Kulnazarova

"UN Security Council and Peacebuilding Council" Policy Brief, Stimson Centre, March 2020

3. Presentations at academic conferences/ symposiums

"Soft Law Agreements", Academic Council of the UN System (ACUNS) Annual Meeting, Rome, 19-21 July 2018

"Achieving SDGs and Agenda 2030", JCPAC Japanese Conservative Union Conference, Tokyo, 8-9 September 2018

"Sustainable Development Goal 13", JICA- sponsored academic conference, Global Studies Program, Doshisha University, Kyoto, 6-7 December 2018

"Latest Trends in Conflict and Peace Research", Tsukuba University Academic Conference, 8-9 December 2018

"Post-Truth and Security Challenges in Asia", International Christian University Seminar, 14 December 2018

"The Role of Higher Education in SDGs", Panel Discussion at Caspian Week, Davos World Economic Forum, 22-24 January 2019

"United Nations Charter Constitutional Revision", Conference on United Nations Reform, Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana, India

"SDGs and Muography", Sustainability Science Research Conference, Tokyo University, 13-14 May 2019

"UN Peace and Security Architecture: Stagnation or Redundancy?", Stimson Centre Global Policy Dialogue, Washington DC, 6-7 June 2019

"United Nations Reform", Soka University Faculty Development Seminar, 17 July 2019

"Sustainable Olympics", JCPAC Japanese Conservative Union Conference, Tokyo, 31 August - 1 September 2019

"History of Climate Change Science and Denial", Keynote Address at United Nations University, Tokyo, 9 September 2019

"Lack of United Nations Reform", Meeting with Japanese MPs in the Diet, Nagatacho, Tokyo 24 September 2019

"Climate Change Solutions Acceleration" and "America First, or America Last?: US Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement" at the Global Green Week, GGGI, Seoul 22-23 October 2019

"Upgrading Peacebuilding Commission into Peacebuilding Council", Seminar "Peacebuilding and Global Governance in Turbulent World", JICA Institute, Ichigaya, 2 November 2019

"Anti-Corruption and Money Laundering in BRICS", FGV University, Sao Paulo Brazil, 6-8 November 2018

"Ignoring Rule of Law and Human Rights by Trump Administration", Hosei University Public Lecture, 26 November 2019

"New Cold War and Peace (Non) building", Doha Forum (Annual Global Think-Tanks Meeting), Qatar, 14-15 December

"Block-chain Solutions to Climate Change", Panel Discussion at Caspian Week, Davos World Economic Forum, 21-23 January 2020

"Legal Disruption and Smart Contracts", Academic Conference, Law School, Sydney University, 9-11 February 2020

Numerous op-eds in newspapers, e-media, blogs (Conversation Global, Raddington Report), interviews for TV and Radio channels, etc.

Robert Sinclair

1. Books

Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Under contract with Lexington Books for their series in American Philosophy.

Science and Sensibilia by W. V. Quine, The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures, Edited by Robert Sinclair, History of Analytic Philosophy Series, 2019, 210 + xiv pp. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave-Macmillan. Includes my "Introduction: Quine's Immanuel Kant Lectures" (1-15) and essays by Gary Ebbs, Paul A. Gregory, Frederique Janssen-Lauret, Gary Kemp, and Sander Verhaegh.

2. Articles and Book Chapters

"Quine's Structural Holism and the Constitutive A Priori," (Forthcoming in *Quine: Structure and Ontology*, Edited by Frederique Janssen-Lauret, Oxford University Press)

"Science, Sense, and Sensibilia: Quine and Austin on Perception," *Al-Mukhatabat* 27 (2018).

"North American Idealism and the Search for a Practical

Philosophy," *Journal of Inter-American Philosophy* 9 (2018). Available at (http://ijp.tamu.edu/blog/?page_id=831).

3. Encyclopedia Articles, Shorter Papers, etc.

"Pragmatism," Forthcoming in *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Theory*, Edited by James Mattingly, 2021, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

"Reification," In Bad Arguments: One Hundred of the Most Important Fallacies in *Western Philosophy*, Edited by Robert Arp, Michael Bruce and Steve Barbone, 2018, 378-381, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.

4. Book Reviews

Sander Verhaegh, Working from Within: The Nature and Development of Quine's Naturalism, Oxford University Press, 2018. Forthcoming in *the British Journal for the History of Philosophy*.

Peter Olen and Carl Sachs (Editors), Pragmatism in Transition: Contemporary Perspectives on C.I. Lewis, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, *HOPOS* 9 (2019): 201-205.

5. Conference Presentations

"Dewey's Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy and the Ideology of Technicism" The Third European Pragmatism Conference, University of Helsinki, Finland, 2018.

"Introducing Quine's Kant Lectures" Society for the Study of The History of Analytical Philosophy (SSHAP) Symposium on Quine's Immanuel Kant Lectures Science and Sensibilia, Central APA Meetings, Chicago, 2018.

Hartmut Lenz

1. Research Publications

"Certain to be Uncertain: Effects of public opinion on EU treaty

negotiations"（forthcoming）*International Organization*

"AchievingEffective Intonational Cooperation: How Institutional Formalization Shapes Intergovernmental Negotiations"（2018）*World Affairs*, 181（2），Sage Publication.

"Constitutional Variation in Government Accountability and the Survival of Semi-Presidential Democracies"（with Petra Schleiter），working paper.

"Risks and benefits of public referenda in EU Treaty negotiations"（with Stephanie Novak）

2. Scholarships and Research Grants

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research（C）,Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science（Kakenhi），2019-2022

The University Research Development Promotion Fund for Research Abroad, Soka University 2021-22

Soka University Research Development Promotion Fund A , Soka University 2018-19

International Cooperation Research Grant（Together with Prof. Hsin-Mei Lin），National Chi Nan University, Taiwan 2019-20

NSF Research Travel Grant, London School of Economics Summer 2018.

3. Invited Presentations, Conferences & Keynote speeches

Jeju, Peace Forum: Conflict, Cooperation, and Peace in Asia, 14th-17th May 2019

"Cooperation and Conflict: The role of formal and informal cooperation in East Asian conflict prevention"

Symposium "Multilateralism in the 21st Century", 4th-5thMarch 2019, University of Freiburg Germany. Title of the presentation: "Institutional Variation and Uncertainty in Intergovernmental Negotiation"

London Schoolof Economics 11-12th June 2019: UACES expert forum to assess Brexit

London School of Economics 5th June 2019: Department of Government: PSPE, Research Seminar Series Presentation

WasedaUniversity 5th April 2019: Political Economy Research Seminar

Presentation: "Brexit the ultimate EU treaty negotiations"

Research Presentation: "The role of two-level games in governmental treaty Negotiations", Hong Kong City University, Hong Kong, (November 2018).

4. International Conventions Papers & Presentations

International Studies Association Annual Convention (ISA) 25th-28th 2020 inHonolulu, Hawaii, USA, Title of the Paper "How domestic constrains impact International Treaty Negotiations"

Annual MeetingAmerican Political Science Association (APSA) 1st-4th September2019. Philadelphia, PA, USA. Title of the paper: Contextualizing the rationality of Treaty negotiations

Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) 6th-9th April 2019. Palmer HouseHilton, Chicago, IL, USA. Title of the paper: "The rationality of choice: The impact ofdomestic politics on Intergovernmental Negotiations"

Tracey Jane Nicholls

1. Presentations at academic conferences and symposium etc.

'Building Empathy with "Me Too."' MOMRI Virtual Conference, Min-On Music Research Institute, Yotsuya (Tokyo), Japan, October 2019.

'Music of the Me Too Movement.' MOMRI Virtual Conference, Min-On Music Research Institute, Yotsuya (Tokyo), Japan, August

2019.

'How to understand "me too" as a globalized phenomenon' (with co-presenter Johanna Zulueta). Perceptions of Gender and Conflict panel, Women and Peace-Making in the Asia Pacific, International Christian University, Mitaka (Tokyo), Japan, June 2019.

'Jamming Rape Culture: Why and how we need to stop the patriarchy.' ICU Peace Week, International Christian University, Mitaka (Tokyo), Japan, June 2019. (Also presented as a guest lecture in Gender in Everyday Life undergraduate course, May 2019.)

'Precarious Grief.' Animaladies II Conference, University of Wollongong, Wollongong NSW, Australia. December 2018.

Ethics Workshop, for South Pacific College of Natural Medicine, Auckland, New Zealand. February 2019.

2. Research papers, essays, etc.

'Improvising Rage,' in Liminalities Special Issue: Unforeseen Encounters, volume 14.1, eds. Nicholas Chare and Marcel Swiboda (May 2018).

'Haiti: Symbolism and Scapegoating in the Americas,' *The Elephant.info*, December 2019.

'The Unapologetic Blackness of Me Too,' *The Elephant.info*, October 2019.

'Monitoring Digital Hate: What the Christchurch Massacre Taught Us About the Limits of Free Speech,' *The Elephant.info*, July 2019.

'Making Black Lives Matter: Fanonian Notes About Today's (Shifting) Front Lines,' *The Elephant.info*, May 2019.

3. Book chapter

'Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: reassessed,' in *Foucault's*

theatres, eds. Kélina Gotman and Tony Fisher (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2020), pp. 163–174.

<u>Nikolas G. Emmanuel</u>

1. Book Publication:

Nikolas Emmanuel, *Conditioning Relations: Evaluating a Political Conditionality*, Riga, Latvia: LAP Publishing, ISBN 978-620-09389-7, 2019 (single-authored book)

2. Research Publications (Journal Articles & Book Chapters in Edited Volumes):

Abu Bakarr Bah and Nikolas Emmanuel, "Positive Peace and the Methodology of Costing Peacebuilding Needs: The Case of Burundi", *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, July 2019

Nikolas Emmanuel, "External Incentives and Conflict De-Escalation: Negotiating a Settlement to Sudan's North-South Civil War", in Ole Wæver, P. Poder & I. Bramsen (eds.), *Resolving Violent Conflict: Multi-disciplinary Approaches to Escalation and Protraction*, London, UK: Routledge, 2019

Nikolas Emmanuel and Brendan Schwartz, "Chad's (Il) liberal Interventions and the Making of a Regional Hegemon", in John Idriss Lahai, Karin von Strokirch, Haward Brasted and Helen Ware (eds.), *Governance and Political Adaptation in Fragile States*, London, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2019

Nikolas Emmanuel and Satoshi Sasaki, "Patterns of Economic Aid and Peace Processes in Africa", *Soka University Peace Research*, 32/33, Spring 2019

3. Conference Research Paper Presentations:

Sept. 2019, "Exploring Drug Policies in Selected African and European States along the Western Mediterranean Corridor",

paper presented at a conference put on by the University of Copenhagen (Altafuna, Catalonia, Spain)

Aug. 2019, "Uses and Abuses of Migration Data on Africa", paper presented as part of the conference on Africa's Grand Challenges sponsored by SAIPIR and Cornell University (Livingstone, Zambia)

April 2019, "Authoritarian Uses of 'Zombie' Election Observers: Lessons from Cameroon's Recent Presidential Elections", paper presented as a part the Spring Symposium at Cornell University's Institute for African Development (Ithaca, NY USA)

Oct. 2018, "Providing a Peace Dividend: Incentives and Peacebuilding in Recent African Conflicts", paper presented as a part of the Faculty of International Liberal Arts research lecture at Soka University (Tokyo, Japan)

Sept. 2018, "Using Data to Study Transnational Organized Crime", paper presented at the conference on "Interzones and Criminal Entanglements", put on by the University of Copenhagen (Tangiers, Morocco).

4．External Grants:

2018-present, European Research Council (ERC) Consolidator Grant, Research Collaborator with Professor Henrik Vigh (PI), "Criminal Entanglements: A new ethnographic approach to transnational organized crime". AMOUNT: 2 € million

Jonathan Malcolm Luckhurst

1．Academic Publications

Journal Articles

The new G20 politics of global economic governance. *International Organisations Research Journal*. Accepted for publication, 2020.

Governance networks shaping the G20 through inclusivity practices. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26 (4), 2019.

The G20 hub of decentralizing global governance authority. *International Organisations Research Journal*, 14 (2), 7-30, 2019.

Book Chapters

G20 sustainable development governance: Epistemic, normative, and political influences. Chapter in Lesage, D., & Wouters, J. (eds.). *The G20, Development and the UN Agenda 2030*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2020.

Networks decentralizing authority in global economic governance. Chapter in Rewizorski, M., Jędrzejowska, K., & Wróbel, A. (eds.). *The future of global economic governance: Challenges and prospects in the age of uncertainty*. New York: Springer, 2020.

A constructivist approach to the G20. Chapter in Slaughter, S. (ed.). *The G20 and international relations theory: Perspectives on global summitry*. London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019.

Other Professional Writings

"Networked G20 Governance for the Twenty-First Century," *Asia Insights*, Griffith Asia Institute, 2020.

"The G20 Osaka Legacy, from Global Summitry to the Korean DMZ," *German Development Institute* blog, July 3, 2019.

Available from: https://blogs.die-gdi.de/2019/07/03/the-osaka-legacy-from-g20-summitry-to-dmz/

"Geopolitics or Policy on the G20 Osaka Summit Menu?" *The Geopolitics*, June 26, 2019.

Available from: https://thegeopolitics.com/geopolitics-or-policy-on-the-g20-osaka-summit-menu/

"Prospects and Possibilities for Japan's 2019 G20 Osaka Summit," *German Development Institute* blog, December 19, 2018.

Available from: https://blogs.die-gdi.de/2018/12/19/prospects-and-possibilities-for-japans-2019-g20-osaka-summit/

"Refocusing on the G20 Policy Agenda: Beyond the Summitry Show," *Rising Powers in Global Governance*. December 2, 2018.

Available from: http://risingpowersproject.com/refocusing-on-the-g20-policy-agenda-beyond-the-summitry-show/

2. Involvement in Official Group of Twenty (G20) Events

G20 Osaka Summit: Accredited by Japan's G20 Presidency to attend as official Civil 20 engagement forum representative. International Exhibition Center, Osaka, June 28-29, 2019.

Civil 20 Summit: Attended G20's official Civil 20 Summit during Japan's G20 Presidency, Tokyo, Toranomon Hills Forum, Tokyo, April 21-23, 2019.

Think 20 Summit: Attended G20's official Think 20 Summit during Japan's G20 Presidency, Toranomon Hills Forum, Tokyo, May 26-27, 2019.

Think 20 Summit: Attended G20's official Think 20 Summit during Argentina's G20 Presidency, Buenos Aires, September 17-18., 2019

3. Presentations at Academic Conferences, Workshops, etc.

Invited Symposium Speaker/ Workshop Participant:

"Networked G20 Governance for the Twenty-First Century." Invited to present at the 9th Annual Australia—Japan Dialogue, '1.5 track' diplomatic forum, on The G20: Outcomes, Issues and Prospects, at Griffith Asia Institute, Brisbane, Australia, November 29, 2019.

Invited to participate in Tokyo Workshop on Understanding Prime Ministerial Leadership in Japan and the UK at Seikei University, organized by scholars from University of Sheffield and Seikei University, November 14, 2019.

"The New G20 Politics of Global Economic Governance." Invited to present at Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration workshop Globalization 4.0: Changing World Order and the Future of Global Economic Governance, Moscow, October 10, 2019.

"G20 Summit Performance: 2008-2018." Invited to present at the International Pre-G20 Summit Joint Workshop on The G20-UN Relationship: Working Together for a Secure, Sustainable World at Kwansei Gakuin University in Nishinomiya, organized by the G20 Research Group, University of Toronto and the Integrated Center for UN and Foreign Affairs Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University, June 23, 2019.

"Challenges and Civil Society Contributions for the G20 Osaka Summit." Invited to present at the workshop The G20 Osaka Summit: Prospects and Possibilities at Keio University, Tokyo, June 20, 2019.

"Prospects for China-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation in Global Economic Governance." Presentation at Peace Forum 2019: Conflict, Cooperation, and Peace in East Asia. Co-organized by Kyungnam University, Soka University, and Chinese Culture University at SGI Jeju Korea-Japan Friendship Training Institute, May 15, 2019.

"G20 Engagement Groups." Invited to give keynote at the Chatham House roundtable on Women, Digitalization and the Future of Work: Challenges and Opportunities of Disruptive Technologies, at Japan's Women 20 Forum launch event at the British Embassy in Tokyo, November 20, 2018.

"Governance Networks in Shaping the G20 Agenda." Invited to present and give keynote speech at German Development

Institute (GDI/DIE) conference on The G20 @ 10: Benefits, Limitations and the Future of Global Club Governance in Turbulent Times, Bonn, October 23-24, 2018.

"G20 at Ten: Navigating a Decade of Turbulence in Global Economic Governance." Invited to present at Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration workshop G20 and BRICS: Pursuing Multilateral Solutions to 21st Century Challenges? Moscow, October 10, 2018.

"Gender Mainstreaming: A Strategic Approach for G20." Invited to contribute to a Think 20 Gender Economic Equity Task Force panel at the Buenos Aires Think 20 Summit, September 17-18, 2018.

"No Going Back: Making Gender Equality Happen." Invited to participate as a roundtable speaker at the Chatham House 2018 International Policy Forum, London, July 9, 2018.

Participant at International Academic Conventions

"Networked Global Governance: Taking G20 Engagement Forums Seriously." International Studies Association Annual Convention, Honolulu, March 25-28, 2020.

"Diversifying Voices? Cognitive Authority Shifts at the G20." International Studies Association Annual Convention, Honolulu, March 25-28, 2020.

"Asian Influence on the G20's Sustainable Development Consensus: How Decentralizing Authority is Shaping Global Governance." International Studies Association Annual Convention, Toronto, March 27-30, 2019.

"The Contextual Rationality of ADB—AIIB Cooperation: Shifting Practices of Global and Asian Development Governance." International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, April 4-7, 2018.

Johanna Orgiles Zulueta

1. Books

Transnational Identities on Okinawa's Military Bases: Invisible Armies. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. (single-authored book)

Thinking Beyond the State: Migration, Integration, and Citizenship in Japan and the Philippines. Manila: De La Salle University Publishing House. (International Edition: Sussex Academic Press, September 2018) (Edited Books)

「加齢移民とシティズンシップ ── コミュニティとしてのカトリック教会の事例」（大賀哲他編著『共生社会の再構築Ⅰ シティズンシップをめぐる包摂と分断』第９章（pp. 146-159）、法律文化社　2019年)

2. Submitted Working Papers

"Aging Migrants in a Multicultural Society: Exploring the Case of Filipinos in Malaysia", submitted to the Asia Centre Fellowship Program of the Japan Foundation Tokyo, January 2019.

(with Wendy Yee Mei Tien, Ichiro Sugimoto, Ponmalar Alagappar, Faridah Che Husain, and Noor Ain Mat Noor) "Are Our Youth Happy? Youth Happiness Indicators for Young People in Asia", submitted to POSCO TJ Park Foundation, POSCO Asia Forum Research Grants, Seoul, Korea, June 2018.

3. Other Publications

"The Aging Other: Older Migrants in Today's Japan", *Critical Asian Studies Commentary*, 2019

・https://criticalasianstudies.org/commentary/2019/12/8/201925-johanna-o-zulueta-the-aging-other-older-migrants-in-todays-japan

"The Global Filipino", *The Philippine Star*, 28 July 2019.

4. Conferences

As Chair/Session Organizer

AAS-in-Asia 2019 Conference ── Bangkok, 1-3 July 2019 (chair)

Panel Title: Filipinos in Japan: Status and Prospects

Women and Peacemaking Symposium, Soka University Peace Research Institute and the ICU Centre for Gender Studies, International Christian University, 22 June 2019. (organizer)

4th Philippine Studies Conference in Japan (PSCJ) ― Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, 17-18 November 2018 (chair) Panel Title: Gender in Contemporary Philippines

Subjectivities", 4th Philippine Studies Conference in Japan (PSCJ), Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, 17-18 November 2018. (as discussant) Panel Title: Filipino Migrants in Japan in the 21st Century: Continuities and Transforming

4th Philippine Studies Conference in Japan (PSCJ), Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, 17-18 November 2018. (as discussant) Panel Title: Revisiting Everyday Politics of Filipino Migrants: Gender, State, and Policies

As Presenter/Speaker

"Negotiating Ageing and Intergenerational Relationships: Older Filipino Women Migrants in Malaysia", to be presented at the Asia Research Institute Workshop, Transnational Relations, Ageing, and Care: Asian Connections and Beyond, National University of Singapore, Singapore, 9-10 January 2020. (invited presenter)

"Empowering Migrants through Leadership and Entrepreneurship: A Case Study of the Ateneo LSE Program in Tokyo", presented at the Association for Applied and Clinical Sociology (AACS) Annual Meeting, Embassy Suites Portland Washington Square, Portland, Oregon, 17-19 October 2019. (presenter)

"Aging Female Migrants and (Transnational) Citizenship: The Case of the Catholic Church Community in Japan", presented

at the AAS-in Asia 2019 Conference, Sheraton Hotel and Towers, Bangkok, Thailand, 1-3 July 2019. (presenter)

"MeToo as a Globalized Phenomenon", presented at the Women and Peacemaking Symposium, Soka University Peace Research Institute and the ICU Centre for Gender Studies, International Christian University, 22 June 2019. (presenter)

"Aging Female Migrants and (Transnational) Citizenship: The Case of the Catholic Church Community in Japan", presented at the Migration in Transborder Asia Workshop, Kyushu University, 7 June 2019. (invited presenter)

"Trans-local Crossings and Realities: Okinawa and the U.S. Bases in Japan Studies", presented at the Japan Studies Association of ASEAN (JSA-ASEAN) Conference, Le Meridien Hotel, Jakarta, Indonesia, 6-7 December 2018. (presenter)

"Multiculturalism in a Base Town: The Case of Okinawa City in Japan", presented at the International Sociological Association (ISA) XIX World Congress, Metro Toronto Convention Centre, Toronto, Canada, 15-21 July 2018. (presenter)

"Aging Women Migrants and Trans/National Citizenship in Japan", presented at the International Sociological Association (ISA) XIX World Congress, Metro Toronto Convention Centre, Toronto, Canada, 15-21 July 2018. (presenter)

報告「東南アジアにおける沖縄の『トランスナショナル・サラリーマン』──タイの事例をめぐって──」(日本移民学会第28回年次大会、南山大学、2018年6月24日)

"From a Base Town to a "Multicultural" City: Examining the Case of Okinawa City", presented at the International Conference on Multicultural Democracy, Kyushu University Nishijin Plaza, Fukuoka, 10-12 May 2018. (invited presenter)

5. Invited Public Lectures and Talks

"Transnational Identities on Okinawa's Military Bases", Graduate School for International Development, Nagoya University, 24 January 2020 and College of Liberal Arts, International Christian University, 23 January 2020.

"Aging and Intergenerational Relationships Among Filipino Women Migrants in Malaysia", Lecture Series in Sociology and Anthropology, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, School of Social Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University, 14 August 2019.

"Invisible Armies: Base Work and Transnational Identities in Okinawa's Military Bases", Kanagawa University Centre for Asian Studies, "ShokuminchiKokka to Kindaisei (The Colonial State and Modernity)" Symposium, Kanagawa University Hakone Centre, Hakone, 22-23 March 2019.

"Journeys to 'Home': Migration, Place, and Identity, Among Older Women Returnees", College of Liberal Arts, International Christian University, 23 January 2019.

"Engaging Japan: Reading, Writing, and Interviewing in Japanese", Asian Centre, University of the Philippines, 16 August 2018.

"Thinking Beyond the State", Centre for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University, 22 June 2018.

"Military Basing, Migrations, and Civilian Work in Okinawa", Kyushu University Graduate School of Law, 1 June 2018.

"Family, Gender, and Labour in Japan", Kyushu University-Seoul National University Joint Lectures, Kyushu University Faculty of Law, 21 May 2018.

"Migration and Multicultural Society", Kyushu University-Seoul National University Joint Lectures, Kyushu University Faculty of

Law, 14 May 2018.

<u>佐々木諭</u>

1. Book

『SDGs と日本　誰も取り残さないための人間の安全保障指標』（共著）明石
書店　2019年

2. Presentations at academic conferences and symposium etc.

"Scoping review on the experiences and attitudes of teenage
mothers during pregnancy in developing countries using the
Maternal Role Attainment and Becoming a Mother theory", The
23rd East Asian Forum of Nursing Scholars (EAFONS), January
10-11, 2020, Chiang Mai, Thailand

"Poor Mental Health and Associated Factors among the Former
Angolan Refugees in Meheba Resettlement Area, Zambia", The
23rd EAFONS

"International Aid Workers Personality Traits Reflect Positive
Perceptions of Stress", The 23rd EAFONS

"Influence of Family Support on the Motivation of Community-
Based Health Workers in Zambia", The 23rd EAFONS

<u>中山賢司</u>

1. Books

『〈周縁〉からの平和学：アジアを見る新たな視座』（佐藤幸男、森川裕二と
共編著、「東アジアの越境地域協力（CBC）──〈周縁〉の国際行為体化」、
昭和堂、2019年、287-310頁）

『東アジアの重層的サブリージョンと新たな地域アーキテクチャ』（多賀秀
敏・五十嵐誠一編、「環日本海圏におけるサブリージョン協力と竹島／独
島領有権紛争」、勁草書房、2020年、123-143頁）

2. Journal Article

「日韓海峡圏における越境地域協力と地球市民教育 ── 海岸漂着ごみをめぐ
　る環境教育協力の事例考察 ── 」（創価大学平和問題研究所編『創大平和
　研究』第34号、2020年）

3. Presentations at academic conferences and symposium

報告「日韓協力関係の新展開と世界市民教育 ── 「漂着ごみ」をめぐるクロ
　スボーダー・コーポレーションを事例として ── 」（済州大学・創価大学
　国際学術シンポジウム、済州大学、2019年 5 月14日）

Presentation "Cross Border Cooperation (CBC) in Northeast Asia",
　"One Asia Convention Seoul 2019 "Education & Peace", Lotte
　Hotel Seoul, 6 August 2019,

報告「東北アジアの重層的協力構造」（上海外国語大学主催「日中韓協力と
　東アジアの平和」国際シンポジウム、上海外国語大学国際会議センター、
　2019年 9 月20日）

報告「日中第三国協力における課題と都市インフラ協力」（上海社会科学院
　主催「日中第三国協力評価シンポジウム」、上海社会科学院、2019年11月
　29日）